<p><strong>1. Relevant Statutory Provisions and Doctrines</strong></p>
<p>The given problem directly involves the interplay between <strong>Section 4</strong> and <strong>Section 9</strong> of the <strong>Information Technology Act, 2000</strong>, evaluated alongside the foundational provisions regulating electronic evidence under Indian law (historically Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and currently <strong>Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)</strong>).</p>
<p><strong>Section 4 of the IT Act, 2000</strong> encapsulates the statutory <strong>"Doctrine of Functional Equivalence."</strong> It provides that where any law mandates that information or any other matter must be in writing, typewritten, or printed form, such requirement is deemed satisfied if the information is rendered or made available in an electronic form and remains accessible for subsequent reference. This provision creates a legal fiction that removes the historical barrier between physical ink-on-paper documents and digital strings of data bits.</p>
<p><strong>Section 9 of the IT Act, 2000</strong> serves as a vital safeguard or an exclusionary proviso for electronic governance. It explicitly dictates that the enabling provisions of Sections 6, 7, and 8 do not automatically confer a right upon any individual to insist that a government department, ministry, or private entity must accept, issue, or retain documents in electronic form. It preserves administrative and contractual autonomy, ensuring that digital transitions cannot be forcefully imposed without appropriate institutional infrastructure or mutual consent.</p>
<p><strong>2. Core Legal Issues Involved</strong></p>
<p>The primary legal issues needing determination in this dispute are:</p>
<p>Whether the Defendant can use Section 9 of the IT Act, 2000 to completely block the admissibility of electronic records in a court of law on the ground that they cannot be forced to accept electronic documents.</p>
<p>Whether the printouts of WhatsApp threads and emails can be admitted into evidence without a mandatory statutory certificate if the Plaintiff offers to produce the physical source devices (smartphone and laptop) at a subsequent stage of the trial.</p>
<p>What is the exact stage at which a certificate certifying electronic records must be produced before the court.</p>
<p><strong>3. Landmark Supreme Court Precedent</strong></p>
<p>The precise legal framework governing this problem was definitively settled by a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India in the landmark case of:</p>
<p><strong>Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and Others, (2020) 7 Supreme Court Cases 1</strong></p>
<p><strong><strong>4. Summary of the Case (Facts, Issues, and Held)</strong></strong></p>
<p><strong>Facts:</strong> The case arose from an election petition challenging the election of an MLA in Maharashtra. The petitioner sought to rely on video recordings of the election process captured on CCTV cameras. The printouts and electronic copies on VCDs were produced, but the official authorities persistently refused or failed to issue the requisite statutory certificate despite formal requests.</p>
<p><strong>Issues:</strong> The primary reference before the three-judge Bench was whether the requirement of a certificate for admitting secondary electronic records is mandatory, and whether the contrary views taken in <em>Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014)</em> and <em>Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P. (2018)</em> could be reconciled.</p>
<p><strong>What was Held:</strong> The Supreme Court held that the certification requirement for secondary electronic evidence is a <strong>mandatory condition precedent</strong> that cannot be circumvented. The Court overruled <em>Shafhi Mohammad</em> and upheld <em>Anvar P.V.</em>, affirming that if an electronic record is sought to be proved by using a printout, copy, or storage media (secondary evidence), a certificate is strictly required.</p>
<p>Crucially, the Court carved out a definitive distinction: if the <em>original</em> media device itself (the actual server, the mobile phone, or the primary laptop containing the data chips) is brought physically to the courtroom and proved by its lawful custodian, it qualifies as <strong>primary evidence</strong>. In such a rare instance, no certificate is required because the original source is before the court. The Court also ruled that such a certificate must be filed <strong>at the time of filing the electronic record</strong> in court, or at least before the commencement of the trial, so that the opposite party is not caught by surprise.</p>
<p><strong>5. Application of Legal Principles to the Problem</strong></p>
<p>Applying the law laid down in <em>Arjun Panditrao Khotkar</em> to the present facts, the Defendant’s first objection under Section 9 of the IT Act is legally untenable. Section 9 prevents a citizen from filed a mandamus to force a department to accept electronic files in daily administration; it <em>does not</em> override Section 4's recognition of electronic records when they are brought as evidence to prove a commercial contract in a court of law. Commercial transactions executed via email and WhatsApp are legally valid contracts under Section 4 and Section 10A of the IT Act.</p>
<p>However, the Defendant’s second objection regarding the printouts is robust. The printouts of WhatsApp threads and emails are secondary electronic records. The Plaintiff’s argument that they can bring the smartphone and laptop "during oral arguments" is a procedural failure. Under the law, if the Plaintiff wants to skip the certificate, they must produce the original devices as primary evidence <strong>at the stage of admission/filing of documents</strong>, allowing the court and the defensive counsel to inspect the native application metadata during the evidentiary trial, not at the final stage of oral arguments. If they choose to rely on the printouts at the filing stage, the statutory certificate must accompany them contemporaneously.</p>
<p><strong>6. Final Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>The Defendant's objection against the admissibility of the uncertified printouts is <strong>sustained</strong>. The Plaintiff’s counter-argument is rejected because bringing the original devices at the late stage of oral arguments cannot retroactively cure the inadmissibility of uncertified secondary printouts filed at the beginning. The court must reject the printouts unless the Plaintiff is granted special judicial leave to file the statutory certificate late, or ordered to produce the original devices immediately for formal forensic and judicial inspection.</p>
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