Birad Mal Singhvi vs Anand Purohit

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Head Note
Supreme Court of India 19 Sep 2015
<p><strong>HELD - "in the scholar’s register and the secondary school examination have no probative value, as no person on whose information the dates of birth of the aforesaid candidates were mentioned in the school record was examined.”</strong></p>
Detailed Summary
<p>PETITIONER:</p> <p>BIRAD MAL SINGHVI</p> <p> </p> <p>               Vs.</p> <p> </p> <p>RESPONDENT:</p> <p>ANAND PUROHIT</p> <p> </p> <p>DATE OF JUDGMENT02/08/1988</p> <p> </p> <p>BENCH:</p> <p>SINGH, K.N. (J)</p> <p>BENCH:</p> <p>SINGH, K.N. (J)</p> <p>VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)</p> <p> </p> <p>CITATION:</p> <p> 1988 AIR 1796                    1988 SCR  Supl. (2)          1</p> <p> 1988 SCC  Supl.  604          JT 1988 (3)         389</p> <p> 1988 SCALE  (2)328</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>ACT:</p> <p> Representation  of the People Act,           1951-Section  33(5), 36(2) (b), 80, 83, 87, 93 and 116.</p> <p>Nomination-Scrutiny of-Returning Officer to be satisfied candidate eligible to contest          section-Enquiry-Summary  in nature-No  scope for elaborate enquiry-Candidate to  Satisfy Returning  Officer  about eligibility-Election petition-Not an  appeal  against  order of  Returning  Officer  rejecting nomination-Fresh material can be adduced by candidate before High Court to support eligibility.  Candidate an elector of different constituency-Proof  of name  in   concerned  electoral roll-Onus  on  candidate  to prove-No  duty of  Returning  Officer to  refer   relevant electoral roll and verify eligibility.</p> <p>Nomination paper-Rejection on ground candidate has not completed   25 years of age Election petition-Documents showing date of birth-Evidentiary value in proving age. Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Section 35-Entry relating to date of birth in school register--Relevant an admissible- Entry regarding age in school register--Not much evidentiary value  10 prove age in absence of material on which the age was recorded.</p> <p>HEADNOTE:</p> <p>Election to the State Legislative Assembly of Rajasthan for Jodhpur City Constituency, was held in the year I985. Nomination papers were filed on 8.2.1985 and the date of scrutiny was Y.2. l9S5. In all 45 candidates filed their nominations, after scrutiny and withdrawal, candidates contested the election. After polling and the      counting of votes, the appellant was declared elected having obtained majority of votes.</p> <p>The respondent who was an elector in the Jodhpur city Constituency  filed  an election petition  before  the          High Court  challenging  the appellant's election on the  ground that  the  result of election was   materially affected  on account of  improper rejection of nomination  papers  of  3 candidates,  namely, Smt. Umrao Ben, Hukmi Chand  and  Suraj Prakash     Joshi. It was pleaded that Smt. Ben was an elector in the Sardarpura Assembly Constituency the Returning Officer wrongly  rejected  her nomination  paper   without affording an opportunity to her to produce a copy of the electoral  roll,  that Hukmi Chand and Suraj  Prakash  Joshi both  were  more  than 25 years of age on the  date  of         the nomination,   yet  the             returning  officer  rejected   their nomination papers on the ground that they were not qualified to be a candidate as they were below 25 years of age.</p> <p>The appellant contested the election petition.  It was asserted that Smt. Ben had failed to file a certified copy of  the relevant entry in the electoral roll  of  Sardarpura Constituency  along  with her nomination, that she  further failed to produce a copy of the electoral roll at the time of  scrutiny  and the returning officer  therefore  rightly rejected her nomination paper. In respect of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi, it was pleaded that none of the two candidates were present before the returning officer at the time  of  scrutiny and since the entries  contained  in the electoral  roll indicated that they were below 25  years  of age the returning officer rightly rejected their  nomination papers and that the rejection of the 3  nomination  papers was proper and the result of the election was not materially affected on account of the rejection of the name.</p> <p>The High Court allowed the election petition and set aside the appellant's election. It held that the nomination paper of Smt. Umrao  Ben was validly rejected as  she had failed to comply with section 33(5) of the Representation of Peoples Act inasmuch as she failed to produce the  copy  of the  electoral              roll  or a certified  copy  of the  extract relating  to  entry of her name in the               electoral  roll.  It further held that the nomination papers of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi had been   rejected improperly by    the Returning officer as both the candidates had  attained the qualifying age of 25 years on the date of nomination.</p> <p>Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment the appellant preferred an appeal to this Court under section 116-A of the Representation of People Act, 1951.</p> <p>On the questions whether: (1) the returning office had validly         rejected the nomination papers of Smt.    Umrao Ben, Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi, and (2) the  respondent had proved in accordance with law that Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash             Joshi whose nomination papers were rejected by the Returning  Officer  had attained the age  of  25  years  on January 1, 1984.</p> <p><strong>PG NO 3</strong>     Allowing the appeal, setting aside the order of the High Court and dismissing the election petition, the Court. </p> <p>HELD: l(a).  Section 33 of the Act provides for presentation of nomination paper and it further lays down the requirements of a valid nomination. Section  33(5) requires  a  candidate who is an  elector  of           a  different constituency,  to file a copy of the electoral roll  of      the constituency  as  a certified copy of the  relevant  entries along with his nomination paper. If a candidate is unable to comply with these requirements at the time of filing the nomination paper he is afforded another opportunity to prove his eligibility by producing a copy of the electoral roll of the constituency of the relevant part thereof or a certified copy of the  relevant entries  of  the  roll before the returning officer at the time of scrutiny. [9A-E]</p> <p>    (b)      The Legislature thus provides two opportunities  to such a candidate for proving his eligibility to contest         the election, one at the time of filing the nomination paper and the  other at the stage of scrutiny. If the candidates fail to  avail of either of the two opportunities his  nomination paper is liable to be rejected. [9E-F]</p> <p>    (c)       Non-compliance with section 33(5) is fatal  to      the nomination  and no other mode is prescribed by the  Act      for proving         the  eligibility of the  candidate.  Section  33(5) prescribes  a  particular  mode to prove  eligibility  of  a candidate to contest election and section 36(Z)(h)  provides penal consequences.[10A]</p> <p>    (d) Section 33(5) of the R.P. Act lays down a  mandatory requirement  for  a  valid nomination. The  purpose  is  to satisfy the returning officer that the candidate is eligible to contest the election and if he              fails to satisfy the returning officer in the manner prescribed, the penalty   and the  consequences  which are specified in  section  36(2)(b) must  follow. Section 33(5) is not directory instead it  is mandatory in nature. [l0F]</p> <p>    (e)      An elector of a different constituency is  under  a mandatory  duty              to  prove his               eligibility  in         the  manner prescribed by section 33(5) of the Act and if he fails to do that,  he must suffer the consequences        contemplated  by section          36(2)(b) of the Act. It is not open to a  candidate who  fails to comply with section 33(5) to put the blame  on the  returning officer for the rejection of  his  nomination paper. The returning officer is under no legal obligation to make amends for the omission of a candidate, especially when the omission relates to a mandatory requirement. [10G-11A]</p> <p><strong>PG NO 4</strong></p> <p>    (F)       The  law does not enjoin the returning     officer  to send  for the electoral roll from his office to verify   the eligibility  of               a candidate. The law casts a  duty  on      the candidate to satisfy the returning officer by following            one of  the three modes prescribed in section 33(5) of  the        Act and if he fails to do that the returning officer is bound to reject the nomination paper, he has no option in the matter.</p> <p>[11B ]</p> <p>    (g)      The law does not require the returning    officer  to send for the electoral roll of a different constituency     for the  purpose  of verifying the eligibility of  a  candidate.</p> <p>[11C]</p> <p>    In        the  instant case, there is no        dispute  that      Smt.</p> <p>Umrao  Ben failed to comply with the requirement of  section</p> <p>33(5)  of  the Act as she had neither filed a  copy  of            the <span style="line-height:1.6">electoral  roll      of the constituency or    the  relevant      part </span><span style="line-height:1.6">thereof, or the certified copy of the relevant entries along </span><span style="line-height:1.6">with  her nomination paper. Nor she had produced any of the </span><span style="line-height:1.6">three documents before the returning officer at the time  of </span><span style="line-height:1.6">scrutiny.  In  such  circumstances  the        returning   officer </span><span style="line-height:1.6">rightly rejected Umrao Ben's nomination     paper. [10B]</span></p> <p>    Sri       Babu Ram  v. Shrimati Prasanni & Ors.,    [l959]   SCR</p> <p>1403; SCR 1403; Narbada Prasad v. Chhagan Lal & Ors., [1969]</p> <p>1 SCR 499; Parmar Himat singh Jugatsingh v. Patel Harmanbhai</p> <p>Narsibhai, [1974] SCR 453; Avadh Raj Singh v. Jugal  Kishore</p> <p>Gupta,[l979]  1 SCR: 228 and Ranjit Singh v. Pritam Singh  &</p> <p>Ors., [1966]3 SCR 543, referred to.</p> <p>    2(a) During the scrutiny the Returning Officer is  under <span style="line-height:1.6">a  statutory duty to satisfy himself that the candidate  who </span><span style="line-height:1.6">may  have  filed nomination paper  possesses  the  necessary </span><span style="line-height:1.6">constitutional     qualification for contesting  the  election.</span></p> <p>[l4F]</p> <p>    (b)      Enquiry  during scrutiny is summary  in  nature  as <span style="line-height:1.6">there  is no scope for any elaborate enquiry at that  stage.</span><span style="line-height:1.6">Therefore it is open to a party to place fresh or additional </span><span style="line-height:1.6">material  before the High Court to show that  the  Returning </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Officer's order rejecting the nomination paper was improper. </span><span style="line-height:1.6">It  should  be       borne in mind that  the    proceedings  in  an </span><span style="line-height:1.6">election  petition are not in the nature of  appeal  against </span><span style="line-height:1.6">the  order  of      the returning officer.       It  is        an  original </span><span style="line-height:1.6">proceeding. [15C]</span></p> <p>    (c)       In  the instant case, on the basis of   the  entries <span style="line-height:1.6">contained  in the electoral roll the Returning Officer  held </span><span style="line-height:1.6">that  the  two     candidates did    not  possess  the  requisite </span><span style="line-height:1.6">qualification  of  age        as required by Article       173  of  the </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Constitution   to  contest  the       election.  Accordingly       he </span><span style="line-height:1.6">rejected  both the nomination papers. In the absence of    any </span><span style="line-height:1.6">material before the returning officer, the returning officer </span><span style="line-height:1.6">was  not wrong in taking the entries in the  electoral          roll </span><span style="line-height:1.6">into  consideration and acting on them. But his decision  is </span><span style="line-height:1.6">not final. In an election petition it is open to an election </span><span style="line-height:1.6">petitioner to place cogent evidence before the High Court to </span><span style="line-height:1.6">show that the candidate whose nomination paper was  rejected </span><span style="line-height:1.6">had  in   fact attained the age of 25 years on  the  relevant </span><span style="line-height:1.6">date. If on the basis of the material placed before the High </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Court it is proved that the candidate whose nomination paper </span><span style="line-height:1.6">had  been rejected was qualified to contest the election  it </span><span style="line-height:1.6">is  open to the High Court to set aside the election.  [14G-</span></p> <p><strong><span style="line-height:1.6">PG NO 5</span></strong></p> <p>    3(a) To render a document admissible under section 35 of <span style="line-height:1.6">the  Evidence  Act  three  conditions  must  be  satisfied, </span><span style="line-height:1.6">firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public  or </span><span style="line-height:1.6">other  official book, register or record, secondly, it             must </span><span style="line-height:1.6">be  an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant  fact;  and </span><span style="line-height:1.6">thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of </span><span style="line-height:1.6">his  official duty, or any other person in performance of  a </span><span style="line-height:1.6">duty specially enjoined by law. [21B]</span></p> <p>    (b)      An  entry  relating to date of birth  made  in   the <span style="line-height:1.6">school register is relevant and admissible under section  35 </span><span style="line-height:1.6">of the Act, but the entry regarding the age of 3 person in a </span><span style="line-height:1.6">school   register is of not much evidentiary value  to  prove </span><span style="line-height:1.6">the  age  of the person in the absence of the material  on </span><span style="line-height:1.6">which the age was recorded. [21C]</span></p> <p>    (c)       Parents or near relations having special  knowledge <span style="line-height:1.6">are the best persons to depose about the date of birth of  a </span><span style="line-height:1.6">person. If  entry regarding date of birth in  the  school's </span><span style="line-height:1.6">register  is  made on the information given  by       parents  are </span><span style="line-height:1.6">someone having special knowledge of the fact, the same would </span><span style="line-height:1.6">have probative value. [20A]</span></p> <p>    (d)      The  date  of      birth  mentioned  in  the  scholar's <span style="line-height:1.6">register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made </span><span style="line-height:1.6">the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. [2OB]</span></p> <p>    (e) The entry contained in the admission form or in the <span style="line-height:1.6">scholar  register must be shown to be made on the  basis  of </span><span style="line-height:1.6">information given by the parents or a person having  special </span><span style="line-height:1.6">knowledge  about the date of birth of the person  concerned. </span><span style="line-height:1.6">If  the    entry in the scholar's register regarding  date  of </span><span style="line-height:1.6">birth is made on the basis of information given by  parents, </span><span style="line-height:1.6">the entry would have evidentiary value but if it is given by </span><span style="line-height:1.6">a  stranger or by Someone else who had no special  means  of </span><span style="line-height:1.6">knowledge  of the date of birth, such an entry will have  no </span><span style="line-height:1.6">evidentiary value. [20C]</span></p> <p><strong><span style="line-height:1.6">PG NO 6</span></strong></p> <p>    In the instant case, nomination papers of two candidates <span style="line-height:1.6">Hukmi  Chand  and Suraj Prakash Joshi were rejected  by    the </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Returning  Officer on the ground that they had not  attained </span><span style="line-height:1.6">the  age  of  25 years at the  time   of  filing  nomination </span><span style="line-height:1.6">papers. In the election petition copies of extract of school </span><span style="line-height:1.6">register,  certificate and mark list of Secondary  Education </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Board were produced. The High Court committed serious  error </span><span style="line-height:1.6">in  accepting  the  dates  of  birth  as  mentioned  in             the </span><span style="line-height:1.6">documents.  The High Court's entire approach in  considering </span><span style="line-height:1.6">the question of dates of birth was misconceived. The  burden </span><span style="line-height:1.6">to  prove this fact in issue was on the respondent  who      was </span><span style="line-height:1.6">the  election petitioner. In fact the burden was on  him  to </span><span style="line-height:1.6">prove  his case by producing Hukmi Chand and  Suraj  Prakash </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Joshi or their parents to prove or corroborate the dates  of </span><span style="line-height:1.6">birth       as   mentioned   in  the    school  register  and      the </span><span style="line-height:1.6">certificate. No adverse inference could be drawn against the </span><span style="line-height:1.6">appellant for not examining them. [22C-G; 23C-D]</span><span style="line-height:1.6">  Raja  Janaki Nath Roy & Ors. v. Jyotish Chandra  Acharya </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Chowdhury, AIR 1941 CAL. 41; Jagan Nath v. Moti Ram &  Ors., </span><span style="line-height:1.6">[1951]   Punjab 377; Sakhi Ram & Ors. v.  Presiding  Officer, </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Labour Court, North Bihar, Muzzafarpur & Ors., [1966]  Patna </span><span style="line-height:1.6">459;  Ghunchi Vora Samsuddish Isabhai v. State     of  Gujarat, </span><span style="line-height:1.6">[1970]   Gujarat 178; Radha Kishan Tickoo) & Anr. v.  Bhushan </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Lal Tickoo    Anr., [1970]J &  K 62; Jagdmba Prasad v.          Shri </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Jagannath  Prasad & Ors., 42 ELR 465; k. Paramalali v.       L.M. </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Alangam              &  Anr., 31 ELR 401; krishna Rao Maharu  Patil        v. </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Onkar  Narayan  14 ELR 386; Brij Mohan Singh v.   Priya     Brat </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Narain   Sinha & Ors.,[1965]3 SCR 861.,Ram murti v. State  of </span><span style="line-height:1.6">U.P. Haryana, AIR 1625,referred to.</span></p> <p><strong><span style="line-height:1.6">JUDGMENT:</span></strong></p> <p>    CIVlL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 574 (NCE) <span style="line-height:1.6">of I987.</span></p> <p>    From  the  Judgment and Order dated 18.2.  1987  of      the <span style="line-height:1.6">Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Elec. Petn No. 8 of 1985. </span><span style="line-height:1.6">    Dr.      N.M. Ghatate, S.V. Deshpande and  Abhishek  Singhvi </span><span style="line-height:1.6">for he Appellant.</span></p> <p>    G.L. Sanghi. Jitender Sharma, P. Gaur and M.K. Calla for <span style="line-height:1.6">the Respondent. </span><span style="line-height:1.6">The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:</span></p> <p><strong><span style="line-height:1.6">PG NO 7</span></strong></p> <p>    SINGH,  J.        This  appeal  under  Section  116-A  of       the <span style="line-height:1.6">Representation  of People Act 1951 (hereinafter referred  to </span><span style="line-height:1.6">as  the Act) is directed against the judgment and  order  of </span><span style="line-height:1.6">the  High Court of Rajasthan dated 18.2.1987  setting  aside </span><span style="line-height:1.6">the  election  of  the appellant to  the  State Legislative </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Assembly   of      Rajasthan   from   Jodhpur   City   Assembly</span></p> <p>Constituency.<span style="line-height:1.6">  Election to the State Legislative Assembly of  Rajasthan </span><span style="line-height:1.6">from  the constituency No. 183 Jodhpur City was held in    the </span><span style="line-height:1.6">year 1985; nomxination papers were filed by 8.2.1985 and the </span><span style="line-height:1.6">date  of scrutiny was 9.2.1985. In all 45  candidates  filed </span><span style="line-height:1.6">their       nominations.  After  scrutiny  and   withdrawal        21 </span><span style="line-height:1.6">candidates   contested    the  election,      after  polling       and </span><span style="line-height:1.6">counting of votes the appellant was declared elected  having </span><span style="line-height:1.6">obtained majority of votes. Anand Purohit, respondent who is </span><span style="line-height:1.6">an elector in the Jodhpur City Constituency No. 183 filed an </span><span style="line-height:1.6">election  petition  before the High  Court  challenging         the </span><span style="line-height:1.6">appellant's  election,       on  the ground that  the  result  of </span><span style="line-height:1.6">election  was  materially affected on  account       of  improper </span><span style="line-height:1.6">rejection  of nomination papers of three candidates  namely, </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Smt.  Umrao  Ben, Hukmichand and Suraj Prakash Joshi.    The </span><span style="line-height:1.6">respondent  pleaded  that Smt. Umrao Ben was an elector  in </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Sardarpura  Assembly  Constituency  the  returning   officer </span><span style="line-height:1.6">wrongly rejected  her nomination paper,  without  affording </span><span style="line-height:1.6">opportunity to her to produce a copy of the electoral  roll. </span><span style="line-height:1.6">He further pleaded that Hukmichand, and Suraj Prakash  Joshi </span><span style="line-height:1.6">both  were  more than 25 years of age on the date  of  their </span><span style="line-height:1.6">nomination,   yet  the      returning  officer  rejected   their </span><span style="line-height:1.6">nomination papers on the ground that they were not qualified </span><span style="line-height:1.6">to  be a candidate as they were below 25 years of  age.     The </span><span style="line-height:1.6">appellant contested the election petition.  He asserted that </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Umrao  Ben  had               failed    to file a  certified  copy  of           the </span><span style="line-height:1.6">relevant   entry  in  the  electoral  roll   of   Sardarpura </span><span style="line-height:1.6">constituency  along with her nomination, she further  failed </span><span style="line-height:1.6">to  produce  copy  of  the electoral roll  at  the  time  of </span><span style="line-height:1.6">scrutiny   and      therefore  the     returning  officer   rightly </span><span style="line-height:1.6">rejected  her  nomination paper. As regards  Hukmichand  and </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Suraj Prakash Joshi, the appellant pleaded that none of     the </span><span style="line-height:1.6">two  candidates dates    was  present  before  the  returning </span><span style="line-height:1.6">officer   at  the  time c,f scrutiny and        since     the  entries </span><span style="line-height:1.6">contained  in  the electoral roll indicated that  they             were </span><span style="line-height:1.6">below 25 years of age the returning officer rightly rejected </span><span style="line-height:1.6">their nomination paper. The appellant further asserted      that </span><span style="line-height:1.6">the rejection of the three nomination papers was proper  and </span><span style="line-height:1.6">the  result of the election was not materially         affected  on </span><span style="line-height:1.6">account of the rejection of the aforesaid three  nomination </span><span style="line-height:1.6">papers.  The  High Court held that the nomination  paper  of </span><span style="line-height:1.6">Smt.  Umrao  Ben was validly rejected as she had  failed  to </span><span style="line-height:1.6">comply  with  Section 33(5) of the Act inasmuch as  she      had</span></p> <p>failed     to  produce  a     copy of the  electoral     roll  or  a</p> <p>certified copy of the relevant       extract relating to entry of</p> <p>her  name in the electoral roll in Sardarpura  constituency.</p> <p>The  High  Court  further held       that  nomination  papers  of</p> <p>Hukmichand  and              Suraj     Prakash Joshi     had  been   rejected</p> <p>improperly  by the returning officer as both the  candidates</p> <p>had  attained the qualifying age of 25 years on the date  of</p> <p>nomination.  On these findings the High Court set aside     the</p> <p>appellant's  election  by  its           judgment  and  order   dated</p> <p>18.2.1987. Aggrieved by the said judgment the appellant   has</p> <p>preferred this appeal under Section 116 of the Act.</p> <p>                                                                                               PG NO 8</p> <p>    The    controversy  in the present appeal relates  to        the</p> <p>validity  of the orders of the returning  officer  rejecting</p> <p>the nomination paper of Smt. Umrao Ben, Hukmichand and Suraj</p> <p>Prakash Joshi. We would first examine the validity  of        the</p> <p>order  of the returning officer rejecting Smt.          Umrao  Ben's</p> <p>nomination  paper,  which was questioned by  the  Respondent</p> <p>before   us.  There is no dispute that Umrao Ben was  not  an</p> <p>elector  in the Jodhpur City Assembly Constituency No.     183.</p> <p>She  was an lector in Sardarpura Assembly  Constituency.  In</p> <p>her  nomination paper    she had given  the  details  of       the</p> <p>relevant entry contained in the electoral roll of Sardarpura</p> <p>Assembly  Constituency, but her nomination  paper  was  not</p> <p>accompanied by a certified copy of the relevant entry in the</p> <p>electoral  roll      of  Sardarpura   constituency  nor  she    had</p> <p>produced  a copy of the electoral roll or the relevant          part</p> <p>thereof before  the  returning    officer  at  the  time          of</p> <p>scrutiny.  Therefore  the  returning  officer  rejected           her</p> <p>nomination  paper.  The High Court held that  the  returning</p> <p>officer   had rightly rejected the nomination paper of  Umrao</p> <p>Ben  and there was no question of improper rejection of   her</p> <p>nomination  paper. Sri G.L. Sanghi, learned counsel for      the</p> <p>respondent  challenged the correctness of the  High  Court's</p> <p>findings on this question. He urged that since the Returning</p> <p>Officer  who was holding the scrutiny of  nomination  papers</p> <p>relating  to the Jodhpur Assembly constituency was also    the</p> <p>returning  officer  of Sardarpura  Assembly  constituency,he</p> <p>should have verified the entry of Umrao Ben's name from the</p> <p>electoral  roll      of Sardarpura Assembly Constituency  which</p> <p>must  have been with him. He urged that Umrao Ben's  request</p> <p>to  verify entries relating to her name from  the  electoral</p> <p>roll of Sardarpura Assembly constituency was ignored by  the</p> <p>returning  officer,  and  further her request for  grant  of</p> <p>time  to produce electoral roll was also rejected. He  urged</p> <p>that object of Section 35 of the Act was merely to ascertain</p> <p>as  to     whether               a  candidate  whose  nomination  paper  was</p> <p>scrutinised  was an elector or not and since  the  electoral</p> <p>roll  of Sardarpura Assembly Constituency was  already      with</p> <p>the  returning     officer he could have verified       the  entries</p> <p>from that electoral roll. The returning officer had acted in</p> <p>an  unreasonable  manner  in  refusing to  do  that  and  in</p> <p>rejecting  her nomination paper. We find no merit  in  these</p> <p>submissions.</p> <p>                                                                                               PG NO 9</p> <p>     Section  33  of the Act provides  for  presentation  of</p> <p>nomination  paper and it further lays down the     requirements</p> <p>of a valid nomination. Sub-section (5) of the Section 33  is</p> <p>as under:</p> <p>    "where  the     candidate  is an  elector  of          a  different</p> <p>constituency   a  copy      of  the   electoral  roll   of             that</p> <p>constituency or of the relevant part thereof or a  certified</p> <p>copy  of the relevant entries in such roll shall, unless  it</p> <p>has been filed along with the nomination paper, be  produced</p> <p>before the returning officer at the time of scrutiny."</p> <p>    The    above   provision  requires a candidate    who  is  an</p> <p>elector  of a different constituency, to file a copy of          the</p> <p>electoral roll of constituency        a relevant part of that roll</p> <p>or a certified copy of the relevant  entries along with         his</p> <p>nomination paper. These documents are necessary to show that</p> <p>the candidate is an elector of a different constituency       and</p> <p>he  is eligible to contest the election. If a  candidate  is</p> <p>unable   to  comply with these requirements at  the  time  of</p> <p>filing      the  nomination  paper   he  is       afforded   another</p> <p>opportunity to prove his eligibility by producing a copy  of</p> <p>the electoral roll of the constituency or the relevant           part</p> <p>thereof or a certified copy of the relevant entries of         the</p> <p>roll  before the returning officer at the time of  scrutiny.</p> <p>The  Legislature  provides  two     opportunities     to  such   a</p> <p>candidate  for     proving his  eligibility  to  contest              the</p> <p>election one at the stage of filing the nomination paper and</p> <p>the  other at the stage of scrutiny. If the candidate  fails</p> <p>of  avail  either of the two  opportunities  his  nomination</p> <p>paper  is  liable  to be rejected. Section  36             of  the   Act</p> <p>provides  that on the date of scrutiny of nomination  papers</p> <p>the  returning officer shall examine the  nomination  papers</p> <p>and  shall  decide all objections which may he made  to      any</p> <p>nomination  and he may either on objection or     on  his   own</p> <p>motion, after holding such summary inquiry. if any,  reject</p> <p>any nomination on the grounds specified in clauses (a),     (b)</p> <p>and  (c) of sub-section (2). Section 36(2)(b)  provides           for</p> <p>the  rejection      of the nomination paper on  the  candidate's</p> <p>failure   to comply with any of the provisions of Section  33</p> <p>or  Section 34 of the Act. Section 33(5.) read with  Section</p> <p>36(2)(b)  makes  it apparent that if a candidate who  is  an</p> <p>elector  of  a      different constituency fails  to  prove        his</p> <p>eligibility in the manner prescribed by Section 33(5) of the</p> <p>Act,  his nomination paper is liable to be rejected for          the</p> <p>non compliance of Section 33(5) of the Act. These provisions</p> <p>are plain which admit of no other interpretation.</p> <p>                                                                                              PG NO 10</p> <p>    Non-compliance  with  Section  33(5)  is  fatal  to             the</p> <p>nomination  and no other mode is prescribed by the  Act   for</p> <p>proving the  eligibility of the  candidate.  Section  35(5)</p> <p>prescribes  a  particular  made to prove  eligibility  of  a</p> <p>candidate to contest election and Section 36(2)(b)  provides</p> <p>penal consequences. Therefore Section 35(5) is mandatory  in</p> <p>nature. There is no dispute that Umrao Ben failed to  comply</p> <p>with the requirement of Section 33(5) of the Act as she      had</p> <p>neither    filed     a  copy  of  the  electoral  roll  of               the</p> <p>constituency or the relevant part thereof, or the  certified</p> <p>copy  of  the  relevant entries along  with  her  nomination</p> <p>paper.   Nor  she  had produced any of  the  three  documents</p> <p>before the returning officer at the time of scrutiny. In the</p> <p>circumstances  the returning officer rightly rejected  Umrao</p> <p>Ben's nomination paper.</p> <p>     Shri  G.L.         Sanghi,  learned counsel  then     urged    that</p> <p>Section 33(5) of the Act was directory and it+was open to  a</p> <p>candidate  to prove his eligibility, by any other  mode.  He</p> <p>urged  that Umrao Ben's request to the returning officer  to</p> <p>verify     her  entry  from the electoral       roll  of  Sardarpura</p> <p>Assembly  Constituency which was in his custody (as  he    was</p> <p>the  returning officer of Sardarpura  Assembly       Constituency</p> <p>also)  was  ignored  and he refused to       grant  her  time  to</p> <p>produce               the necessary documents. In the  election  petition</p> <p>there  was  no pleading that Umrao Ben had  made  any  such</p> <p>request or that the returning officer had refused to  grant</p> <p>her  time.  The High Court has on appreciation      of  evidence</p> <p>held that no request for time was made by Smt. Umrao Ben and</p> <p>no request for verifying the entry relating to her from        the</p> <p>electoral roll of Sardarpura assembly Constituency was made.</p> <p>But even assuming  that the returning officer had refused to</p> <p>verify     the relevant entries relating to Umrao Ben from   the</p> <p>electoral  roll of Sardarpura Assembly Constituency, he     had</p> <p>acted in accordance with law. No exception could be taken to</p> <p>his conduct. Section 33(5) of the Act lays down a  mandatory</p> <p>requirement  for a valid nomination. The purpose of  Section</p> <p>33(5) of the Act is to satisfy the  returning officer  that</p> <p>the candidate is eligible to contest the election and if  he</p> <p>fails        to  satisfy  the returning  officer  in            the   manner</p> <p>prescribed  by Section 33(5) of the Act, the  penalty  and</p> <p>the  consequences  which are specified in  Section  36(2)(b)</p> <p>must  follow. Section 33(5) is not directory instead  it  is</p> <p>mandatory  in nature. An elector of a different constituency</p> <p>is  under a  mandatory duty to prove his eligibility in            the</p> <p>manner prescribed  by Section 33(5) of the Act      and  if  he</p> <p>fails        to  do    that,  he  must    suffer     the       consequences</p> <p>contemplated by Section 36(2)(b) of the Act. It is not          open</p> <p>to a candidate who fails to comply with Section 33(5) of the</p> <p>Act  to   put  the blame on the     returning  officer  for       the</p> <p>rejecting  his       nomination paper. The  retuning officer  is</p> <p>under no legal obligation to make amends for the omission of</p> <p>a  candidate,  especially  when the omission  relates  to  a</p> <p>mandatory  requirements. Apart from this legal aspect,     even</p> <p>on facts, the Returning Officer, in his testimony before the</p> <p>High Court, had stated that the electoral roll of Sardarpura</p> <p>Assembly  Constituency was not with him at the time  he   had</p> <p>taken  up the scrutiny of nomination paper of  Jodhpur      City</p> <p>Constituency. The law does not enjoin the returning  officer</p> <p>to send for the electoral roll from his office to verify the</p> <p>eligibility  of        a candidate. The law casts a  duty  on      the</p> <p>candidate to satisfy the returning officer by following        one</p> <p>of  the three modes prescribed in Section 33(5) of  the       Act</p> <p>and if he fails to do that the returning officer is bound to</p> <p>reject the nomination paper, he has no option in the matter.</p> <p>The  law does not require the returning officer to send      for</p> <p>the  electoral      roll  of a different  constituency  for          the</p> <p>purpose of verifying the eligibility of a candidate.</p> <p>                                                                                              PG NO 11</p> <p>    In Sri Babu Ram v. Shrimati Prasanni & Ors., [1959]         SCR</p> <p>1403  this  Court  interpreted        Section  33(5)     and  Section</p> <p>36(2)(b) and observed as under:</p> <p>    "Section  33(5)  requires the candidate  to           supply   the</p> <p>prescribed  copy and Section 36(2)(b) provides that  on      his</p> <p>failure   to comply with the said requirement his  nomination</p> <p>paper  is liable to de rejected. In other words. this  is  a</p> <p>case where the statute requires the candidate to produce the</p> <p>prescribed  evidence and provides a penalty for his  failure</p> <p>to  do so. In such a case it is difficult to appreciate              the</p> <p>relevance  or validity of the argument that the      requirement</p> <p>of Section 33(5) is not mandatory but is directory,  because</p> <p>the  statute  itself has made it clear that the           failure  to</p> <p>comply  with the said requirement leads to the rejection  of</p> <p>the  nomination paper.  Whenever  the  statute  requires  a</p> <p>particular  act to be done in a particular manner  and         also</p> <p>lays  down that failure to comply with the said      requirement</p> <p>leads  to  a specific consequence it would be  difficult  to</p> <p>accept the argument that the failure to comply with the said</p> <p>requirement should lead to any other consequences. "</p> <p>                                                                                              PG NO 12</p> <p>    Repelling  the argument that failure to comply with        the</p> <p>requirement of Section 33(5) was not a defect of substantial</p> <p>nature and the returning officer could be satisfied by other</p> <p>modes that the candidate's name was entered as an elector in</p> <p>another constituency, the Court held that the       satisfaction</p> <p>of  the   returning  officer  was  required  to           be  made  in</p> <p>accordance with the statutory requirement and if a candidate</p> <p>failed to comply with that requirement the returning officer</p> <p>could not be satisfied by any other mode. The Court  further</p> <p>held  that  the failure to comply with         the  requirement  of</p> <p>Section 33(5) was a defect of substantial nature which could</p> <p>not  be  ignored under Section 36(4) of the  Act.  The         view</p> <p>taken  in Sri Babu Ram's case (supra) has been       followed  in</p> <p>Narbada              Prasad  v. Chaggan Lal & Ors., [I969]       1  SCR    499;</p> <p>Parmar Himat singh Jugatsingh v. Patel Harmanbhai Narsibhai,</p> <p>[1974].  3  SCR   453 and Avadh Raj Singh  v.  Jugal  Kishore</p> <p>Gupta, [l979] 4 SCC 328. Learned counsel for the  respondent</p> <p>sought   support from a Constitution Bench decision  of     this</p> <p>Court in Ranjit Singh v. Pritam Singh & Ors.[1966] 3 SCR 543</p> <p>for his submission that failure to comply with section 33(5)</p> <p>Was not a defect of substantial character. We have carefully</p> <p>gone  through  the  decision but we  do    not  find  anything</p> <p>therein  to support the respondent's contention   instead  it</p> <p>supports  the  view  taken  by us. In  Ranjit  Singh's               case</p> <p>(supra)     a  candidate      who  was  not  an  elector  of       the</p> <p>constituency  had filed three nomination Papers. Along     with</p> <p>one  of  his  nomination paper he had filed a  copy  of       the</p> <p>electoral roll of the constituency when his name was entered</p> <p>as an elector, with a view to comply with the requirement of</p> <p>Section  33(5) of the Act. He had not filed  similar  copies</p> <p>along with other two nomination papers. The nomination paper</p> <p>with  which the candidate had filed a copy of the  electoral</p> <p>roll was rejected on the ground of some technical defect But</p> <p>the  other two nominations were rejected on the ground  that</p> <p>copy  of the electoral roll was not filed along        with  them.</p> <p>This Court held that the returning officer was wrong in      not</p> <p>looking at the copy of the electoral roll filed with one  of</p> <p>the nomination papers. The Court further held Section  33(5)</p> <p>did  not  require  that       a copy  must  be  filed  with         each</p> <p>nomination paper or that any copy should be filed at all  as</p> <p>it  was open to a candidate to produce the copy   before  the</p> <p>returning  officer at the time of scrutiny. The         Court    held</p> <p>that  the  purpose  of filing the copy is  ensure  that             the</p> <p>returning  officer was able to check  whether the  candidate</p> <p>concerned  was qualified or not and that purpose   would  be</p> <p>effectively served even if only one copy was filed with       one</p> <p>nomination  paper  and no copies were filed along  with    the</p> <p>other  nomination  papers. While considering  Section  33(5)</p> <p>and36(4) of the Act the Constitution Bench held that Section</p> <p>33(5)required that it was the copy produced by the candidate</p> <p>which  should  show that he was qualified or  not  and        that</p> <p>purpose a copy produced by the candidate should be  complete</p> <p>whether it was of the roll or of the relevant part  thereof.</p> <p>To  such  a case Section 36(4) had no  application.  Section</p> <p>36(4) provided that returning officer should not reject        any</p> <p>nomination  paper on the ground of any defect which was               not</p> <p>of  a substantial character. Non-production of copy  of     the</p> <p>relevant part was a defect of a substantial character for it</p> <p>made  it  impossible to decide whether     the  candidate    was</p> <p>qualified   or       not.  Since  qualification  for           contesting</p> <p>election was a matter of substantial character, the  failure</p> <p>to produce a copy of the electoral roll which was incomplete</p> <p>was a defect of a substantial character it would  invalidate</p> <p>the  nomination paper. In this view we agree with  the       High</p> <p>Court  that  there had been no improper  rejection   of      the</p> <p>Umrao  Ben's     nomination   paper,   as   the          accidental</p> <p>circumstances  that  the  returning  officer  was  also          the</p> <p>returning officer of the other constituency should not        make</p> <p>any difference.</p> <p>                                                                                              PG NO 13</p> <p>    As       regards the rejection of the  nomination  paper  of</p> <p>Hukmi  Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi are concerned the   High</p> <p>Court  has held that none of the two candidates was  present</p> <p>before the returning Officer at the time of scrutiny nor any</p> <p>person on their behalf Was present. In his nomination  paper</p> <p>Ex.  2     Hukmi  Chand had given a  declaration  that  he     had</p> <p>completed  26  years of age while Suraj    Prakash  Joshi    had</p> <p>given declaration in his nomination paper Ex. 3 that he      had</p> <p>completed  25  years  of age. At the  time  of         scrutiny  no</p> <p>objection  was raised against their nomination paper by    any</p> <p>party  and  none  appeared on behalf of   the  aforesaid    two</p> <p>candidate. The Returning Officer found that according to the</p> <p>entries in the electoral roll the age of Hukmi Chand was  23</p> <p>years similarly in the case of Suraj Prakash Joshi the entry</p> <p>in  the electoral roll indicated that on the  relevant              date</p> <p>his age was 22 years. On the basis of the entries  contained</p> <p>in  the electoral roll the Returning Officer held  that            the</p> <p>two  candidates did not possess the requisite  qualification</p> <p>of  age  as required by Article 173 of the  Constitution  to</p> <p>contest the  election.     Accordingly he  rejected  both    the</p> <p>nomination  papers. Before the High Court a controversy  was</p> <p>raised    as to whether the two candidate were present at the</p> <p>time  of  scrutiny but on the evidence on  record  the          High</p> <p>Court  has held that neither of the two candidates  nor      any</p> <p>body  on their behalf was present at the time  of  scrutiny.</p> <p>Placing  reliance  on  the  oral  and  documentary  evidence</p> <p>produced  by  the  respondent the High     Court  has  recorded</p> <p>findings that Hukmichand as well as Suraj prakash Joshi both</p> <p>had  attained  the  age of 25 years  on      the  relevant      date</p> <p>1.1.1984  and  their  nomination papers    had  been  rejected</p> <p>improperly  by    the  Returning    officer,  which      materially</p> <p>affected the result of the election.</p> <p>                                                                                              PG NO 14</p> <p>     Dr Chitale learned counsel for the appellant urged that</p> <p>on  the  admitted  facts  and  circumstances  the  Returning</p> <p>Officer  could    not  be held to    have  acted  improperly  in</p> <p>rejecting  the      nomination papers of Hukmi Chand  and  Suraj</p> <p>Prakash Joshi.    He  urged that since at  the  time  of         the</p> <p>scrutiny  neither of the two candidates nor  their  proposer</p> <p>nor  anybody else appeared before the returning officer,  or</p> <p>placed   any material before him showing that either  of    the</p> <p>two candidates was qualified to contest the election  having</p> <p>attained  the  age  of more than  25  years,  the  returning</p> <p>officer   had no option but to rely on the entries  contained</p> <p>in  the    electoral roll and therefore the rejection  of         the</p> <p>nomination  papers  of Hukmi Chand and Suraj  Prakash  Joshi</p> <p>could  not be said to be improper. Learned  counsel  further</p> <p>urged  that if the returning officer did not act  improperly</p> <p>in   rejecting        the  nomination paper    of   the   aforesaid</p> <p>candidates, appellants's election could not be set aside  on</p> <p>the basis of fresh or additional material placed before       the</p> <p>High  Court. Section 36 provides that on the date fixed      for</p> <p>the  scrutiny  of nomination, the  candidate,  his  election</p> <p>agent,   proposer  or  any other person     duly  authorised  in</p> <p>writing  by the candidate may attend the proceedings at  the</p> <p>time and place fixed for scrutiny.  The returning officer is</p> <p>required to give them all reasonable facility for  examining</p> <p>the  nomination paper of all the candidates.  Section  36(2)</p> <p>requires  the  returning officer to examine  the  nomination</p> <p>papers and to decide all objections which may be made to any</p> <p>nomination.  He may, either on such objection or on his    own</p> <p>motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as he may  think</p> <p>necessary,  reject  any     nomination on any  of    the  grounds</p> <p>specified under clauses (a),(b),and (c). Clause (d) empowers</p> <p>the  returning     officer   to reject  nomination      paper  of  a</p> <p>candidate  if  on  the date fixed for the  scrutiny  of             the</p> <p>nomination the candidate is not qualified or is disqualified</p> <p>for  being  chosen  to       fill  the  seat        under    any  of   the</p> <p>provisions   of       Articles  84,102,173       and   191   of       the</p> <p>Constitution.      Article     173      lays   down   constitutional</p> <p>qualification  for being a Member of the state       Legislature,</p> <p>according to which a person is not qualified to be chosen to</p> <p>full  a seat in the Legislature of a State unless he is              not</p> <p>less than 25 years of age. During the scrutiny the Returning</p> <p>Officer  is under a statutory duty to satisfy  himself            that</p> <p>the candidate who may have filed nomination paper  possesses</p> <p>the  necessary constitutional qualification  for  contesting</p> <p>the election. In the instant case none of the two candidates</p> <p>appeared nor any body on their behalf appeared or placed any</p> <p>material  before  the  returning officer to  show  that         the</p> <p>candidates were not less than 25 years of age on the date of</p> <p>scrutiny  1.1.1984. No doubt in the nomination     papers   both</p> <p>the  candidates  had made a declaration that they  were  not</p> <p>less than 25 years of age but entries pertaining to them  in</p> <p>the  electoral      roll clearly indicated that they  were          less</p> <p>than  25  years    of  age.   The     returning  officer  placing</p> <p>reliance  on  the entries contained in the  public  document</p> <p>i.e.  the electoral roll, rejected the nomination  paper  of</p> <p>the two candidates on the ground that Hukmi Chand and  Suraj</p> <p>Prakash Joshi were not qualified to contest the election. In</p> <p>the  absence of any material before the   returning  officer,</p> <p>the returning officer was not wrong in taking the entries in</p> <p>the  electoral roll into consideration and acting  on  them.</p> <p>But his decision is not final. In an election petition it is</p> <p>open  to  an election  petitioner to place  cogent  evidence</p> <p>before   the  High  Court to show that  the  candidate  whose</p> <p>nomination  paper was rejected had in fact attained the    age</p> <p>of  25     years on the relevant date. It is open to  the          High</p> <p>Court to take a final decision in the matter notwithstanding</p> <p>the order of the returning officer rejecting the  nomination</p> <p>paper.   If  on the basis of the material placed       before  the</p> <p>High Court it is proved that the candidate whose  nomination</p> <p>paper  had  been  rejected  was    qualified  to       contest the</p> <p>election  it  is  open to the High Court to  set  aside             the</p> <p>election.  Enquiry during scrutiny is summary in  nature  as</p> <p>there  is no scope for any elaborate enquiry at that  stage.</p> <p>Therefore  it  is  open      to  n      party      to  place  fresh  or</p> <p>additional  material before the High Court to show that     the</p> <p>Returning Officer's order rejecting the nomination paper was</p> <p>improper. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings in</p> <p>an election petition are not in the nature of appeal against</p> <p>the  order  of      the returning officer.       It  is        an  original</p> <p>proceeding.  In   the  instant  case  it         was  open  to     the</p> <p>respondent election petitioner to place material before    the</p> <p>High  Court to show that the two candidates  were  qualified</p> <p>and their nomination paper was improperly rejected.</p> <p>                                                                                              PG NO 15</p> <p>    The    question  then arises whether     the  respondent has</p> <p>proved  in  accordance with law that Hukmi Chand  and  Suraj</p> <p>Prakash Joshi whose nomination papers were rejected by the</p> <p>Returning  Officer  had    attained the age  of  25  years  on</p> <p>1.1.1984.  In the election petition the       respondent  pleaded</p> <p>that Hukmi Chand's nomination paper was improperly mentioned</p> <p>his  age  as 23 years while his correct date  of  birth            was</p> <p>13.5.1956 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the Head</p> <p>Master of the New Government School Jodhpur. The  respondent</p> <p>had  further  pleaded  that the nomination  paper  of  Suraj</p> <p>Prakash Joshi was rejected on the sole ground that  in       the</p> <p>electoral roll his age was recorded as 23 years on  1.1.1984</p> <p>but  the  entries contained in the electoral roll  were           not</p> <p>final  and  conclusive. The date of birth of  Suraj  Prakash</p> <p>Joshi  was not mentioned in the election petition and  there</p> <p>was  no further  pleading that on the date  of       filing     his</p> <p>nomination  Suraj Prakash Joshi had  actually  attained       the</p> <p>age  of  25 years. However it was pleaded that    since  Suraj</p> <p>Prakash Joshi had given a declaration that he had  completed</p> <p>25 years of age there was no reason to disbelieve  him as no</p> <p>objection  had been raised against the declaration  made  by</p> <p>him and therefore the returning officer acted improperly  in</p> <p>rejecting  his       nomination  nation  paper.  In      his  written</p> <p>statement the appellant denied the allegations     made by the</p> <p>election petitioner and asserted that the Returning  Officer</p> <p>acted  rightly in rejecting the nomination papers  of  Hukmi</p> <p>Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi as they were not qualified  to</p> <p>contest the election as they had not completed 25 years  of</p> <p>age on the date of nomination. The respondent produced oral</p> <p>and  documentary  evidence to support his  contention.     Even</p> <p>before   the  High Court none of the  two   candidates  whose</p> <p>nomination  papers were rejected appeared nor their  parents</p> <p>were  examined by  the respondent  nor   any  person  having</p> <p>special   knowledge  about  the dates of  birth      of  the   two</p> <p>candidates was  examined by the respondent. As regards Hukmi</p> <p>Chand  the  respondent produced Ex. 8 (a  copy     of  scholars</p> <p>register)  Ex.       9 (counter-foil of certificate of  Board  of</p> <p>Secondary Education) Ex. 10 (mark-sheet of Hukmi Chand)              Ex.</p> <p>11  (a     copy  of counter foil of  certificate  of  Board  of</p> <p>Secondary  Education) relating to Suraj Prakash    Joshi,    and</p> <p>Ex. 12 (Tabulation record of marks obtained by Suraj Prakash</p> <p>Joshi).    These documents were sought to be proved  by  Anant</p> <p>Ram  Sharma PW 3 and Kailash Chand Taparia PW 5. Ex. 8 is  a</p> <p>copy  of  the scholars register issued by the  Head  of         the</p> <p>Government  Higher  Secondary School and  entries  contained</p> <p>therein  show that Hukmi Chand had joined Government  Middle</p> <p>School   Palasani on 24.6. 1972 and he had left the  same  on</p> <p>10.6.1976 after having passed Viiith class. In this document</p> <p>13.6. l956 is mentioned as the date of birth of Hukmi  Chand</p> <p>son  of   Sardar Mal. Ex. 9 is a certificate  issued  by            the</p> <p>Board  of  Secondary Education   Rajasthan  certifying       that</p> <p>Hukmi  Chand  Bhandari  son of Sardar  Mal  Bhandari  passed</p> <p>Secondary  School Examination of 1974 from   New  Government</p> <p>Higher Secondary School Jodhpur, it also shows 13.6. 1956 as</p> <p>date of birth of Hukmi Chand. Ex. 10 is a tabulation  record</p> <p>containing the details of the marks obtained by Hukmi  Chand</p> <p>at  the Secondary School Examination 1974. In this  document</p> <p>also  his date of birth is mentioned as 13.6. l95h.  Placing</p> <p>reliance on these three   documents the High Court held   that</p> <p>Hukmi  Chand's date  of birth was  13.6.1956  and  therefore</p> <p>his  age  on 1. 1. 1984 was more than 15  years.   The         High</p> <p>Court  further     held  that  view of the     entry     in  Ex.    11.</p> <p>certificate  issued  by       the Board  of     Secondary  Education</p> <p>Rajasthan  Suraj.  Prakash  was    born  on  11.3.  1959       and</p> <p>therefore  the was qualified to contest     the election as  he</p> <p>was  not less than 25 years of age. On these   findings        the</p> <p>High Court held that the respondent had successfully  proved</p> <p>that the nomination papers of Hukmi Chand and. Suraj Prakash</p> <p>Joshi had been wrongly rejected.</p> <p>                                                                                              PG NO 16</p> <p>     Before  the  High Court appellant raised  a  contention</p> <p>that  there  was no evidence to prove that Ex. 8, 9, 10,  11</p> <p>and  12 related to Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash  Joshi    and</p> <p>therefore the documents could not be pressed into service. A</p> <p>further  contention was raised that the election  petitioner</p> <p>had  failed to place any evidence before the Court  to        show</p> <p>that entries of age in the documents Ex. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12</p> <p>had  been made on the basis of information furnished  either</p> <p>by  the parents or by any one else having special  knowledge</p> <p>about  the  date of birth of Hukmi Chand and  Suraj  Prakash</p> <p>Joshi.     In the absence of such evidence the entries  in      the</p> <p>documents  had no evidentiary or probative  value. The     High</p> <p>Court  rejected   this  submission on  the  ground  that       the</p> <p>appellant  had raised no such plea in his written  statement</p> <p>nor he produced any evidence to prove that the documents did</p> <p>not  pertain to Hukmi Chand or Suraj Prakash Joshi  or        that</p> <p>any  other persons having the same parentage by the name  of</p> <p>Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi existed. The High  Court</p> <p>committed error. The question of appreciation of evidence is</p> <p>not  to be pleaded instead it was the duty of the  Court  to</p> <p>consider  whether the documents produced by  the  respondent</p> <p>proved the facts in issue. As regards the evidentiary  value</p> <p>of  Ex.    8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 the High Court took  note        that</p> <p>there  was  no    evidence  as to   who  gave  the  information</p> <p>regarding  the date of birth of Hukmi Chand at the  time  of</p> <p>his  admission     in Government Middle School   Paslasani  and</p> <p>even  the  initial  application form for  admission  to           the</p> <p>school was not produced and subsequent form for admission to</p> <p>the Government Multi-purpose Higher Secondary School Jodhpur</p> <p>from where he passed the Secondary examination was also            not</p> <p>produced, as it observed "No attempt was made by the parties</p> <p>to  get   the  application form for  admission  and  transfer</p> <p>certificate   produced      from  the  New   Government   Higher</p> <p>Secondary  School Jodhpur and similarly no application      form</p> <p>for  admission was got produced from the  Government  Middle</p> <p>School, Palasni. But still it can be presumed that the           date</p> <p>of birth recorded in the Scholar's Register is based on        the</p> <p>date  of  birth     given in  the       application  form  initially</p> <p>submitted  a Palasni continued in the  transfer       certificate</p> <p>and  the same was mentioned at the time of admission in the</p> <p>Government  Multipurpose Higher Secondary  School,  Jodhpur"</p> <p>(emphasis supplied). After making the aforesaid observations</p> <p>the  High  Court  held       that  these  documents   were  public</p> <p>documents  within the meaning of Section 74 of the  Evidence</p> <p>Act  and  therefore  there  was     a  presumption  about   the</p> <p>correctness of the date of birth mentioned therein. The High</p> <p>Court was conscious of the fact that  in the absence of      the</p> <p>evidence  of  the  person who  may  have  given    information</p> <p>regarding  the date of birth, the entries contained  in          the</p> <p>scholar's register or certificate had no probative value  as</p> <p>would be clear from the following observations: "It is        true</p> <p>that  it would have been better if the person who  gave     the</p> <p>information  regarding    the date of birth  would  have      been</p> <p>examined but failure to examine such a    person would not  in</p> <p>any way affect the genuineness of the entries and also their</p> <p>probative  value unless in comparison to these entries,      any</p> <p>other  weighty    evidence having greater probative  value  is</p> <p>produce               (emphasis  supplied).      The  entry  in       the  scholar</p> <p>register may be contradicted  by the birth entry or entry in</p> <p>the vaccination register or  reliable horoscope or any other</p> <p>reliable or weighty oral or documentary evidence but in    the</p> <p>absence of such contradicting weighty  evidence, the entries</p> <p>in   the   scholar  register  and  other  records   of  the</p> <p>educational  institution  would, in  my       opinion,  certainly</p> <p>enjoy such probative value."</p> <p>                                                                                              PG NO 18</p> <p>    After making aforesaid observations the High Court       held</p> <p>that   in view of the Ex. X, 9, 10, 11 and I1  the  election</p> <p>petitioner had    discharged the burden in proving that  Hukmi</p> <p>Chand  and Suraj Prakash Joshi both had attained the age  of</p> <p>25 years on the relevant date. The  High Court drew  adverse</p> <p>inference  against the appellant on the ground      that  though</p> <p>Hukmi  Chand  and  Suraj Prakash Joshi had  been   cited  as</p> <p>witnesses  by the appellant but they were not examined.   The</p> <p>High  Court  proceeded   on  the  assumption  that  if  these</p> <p>witnesses  had been examined they would not  have  supported</p> <p>the respondent. After drawing adverse inference against  the</p> <p>appellant and placing reliance      on the aforesaid documentary</p> <p>evidence  the  High Court held that Hukmi  Chand  and  Suraj</p> <p>Prakash Joshi both were qualified to contest  the  election</p> <p>as  they had completed 25 years of age on 1. 1.198$ and  the</p> <p>returning  officer had improperly rejected their  nomination</p> <p>papers     which  materially  affected  the  result  of            the</p> <p>election.  The High Court in  our opinion committed  serious</p> <p>error  of law in appreciating the evidentiary value  of         the</p> <p>documentary evidence produced by the respondents as a result</p> <p>of which its findings are not sustainable.</p> <p>                                                                                              PG NO 18</p> <p>    We     would  now  consider the evidence  produced  by  the</p> <p>respondent  on the question of age of Hukmi Chand and  Suraj</p> <p>Prakash Joshi. The respondent examined Anantram Sharma PW  3</p> <p>and  Kailash  Chandra Taparia PW5. Anantram sharma PW 3            has</p> <p>been  the  Principal   of New  Government  Higher  Secondary</p> <p>School,  Jodhpur since 1984. On the basis of  the  scholar's</p> <p>register  he stated before the High Court  that Hukmi  Chand</p> <p>joined    school on 24.6. 1972 in 9th class and his  date         of</p> <p>birth  as mentioned in scholar's register was 13.6.1956.  He</p> <p>made this statement on the basis of the entries contained in</p> <p>the  scholar's register      Ex. 8. He admitted that entries  in</p> <p>the scholar's register are made on the basis of the  entries</p> <p>contained  in the admission form. He could not     produce               the</p> <p>admission form in original or its copy. He stated that Hukmi</p> <p>Chand  was  admitted in 9th class on the basis       of  transfer</p> <p>certificate issued by the Government Middle School,  Palasni</p> <p>from  where  he had  passed 8th  standard.  He     proved the</p> <p>signature of Satya Narain Mathur the then Principal who   had</p> <p>issued    the  copy  of the scholar's register  Ex.  8.  Satya</p> <p>Narain   Mathur was admittedly alive but he was not  examined</p> <p>to  show  as to on what basis he had mentioned the  date  of</p> <p>birth  of  Hukmi Chand in Ex. 8. The  evidence        of  Anantram</p> <p>Sharma merely   proved that Ex. 8 was a copy of   entries  in</p> <p>scholar's  register. His  testimony does not show as  to  on</p> <p>what  basis  the entry relating to date of  birth  of  Hukmi</p> <p>Chand  was made in the scholar's register.  Kailash  Chandra</p> <p>Taparia PW  5 was Deputy Director  (Examination)  Board  of</p> <p>Secondary Education, Rajasthan, he produced the counter foil</p> <p>of Secondary Education Certificate of Hukmi Chand  Bhandari.</p> <p>a copy of which has been filed as Ex. 9. He also proved      the</p> <p>tabulation record of the Secondary School Examination  1974,</p> <p>a  copy  of which has been  filed as Ex. 10. In        both  these</p> <p>documents   Hukmi  Chand's  date of birth  was     recorded  as</p> <p>13.6.1956.  Kailash  Chandra Taparia further proved  Ex.  11</p> <p>which  is  the copy of the tabulation  record  of  Secondary</p> <p>School Examination of 1977 relating to SuraJ Prakash  Joshi.</p> <p>In  that document the date of birth of Suraj  Prakash  Joshi</p> <p>was recorded  11.3.1959               Kailash Chandra Taparia stated that</p> <p>date  of  birth     as mentioned in the  counter  foil  of        the</p> <p>certificates and in the tabulation form Ex. 12 was  recorded</p> <p>on the basis of the date of birth mentioned by the candidate</p> <p>in  the    examination form. But the examination form  or its</p> <p>copy  was  not    produced before               Court.     In  substance    the</p> <p>statement  of the aforesaid two witnesses merely prove   that</p> <p>in the scholar's register as well as in the Secondary School</p> <p>examination  records  the date of birth of a  certain  Hukmi</p> <p>Chand  was  mentioned  as 13.6.1956 and               in  the  tabulation</p> <p>record   of  Secondary  School Examination  a  certain  suraj</p> <p>Prakash Joshi's date of birth was mentioned as 11.3.1959. No</p> <p>evidence  was produced by the respondent to prove  that the</p> <p>aforesaid documents related to Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash</p> <p>Joshi  who had filed nomination nation papers.     Neither the</p> <p>admission  form nor the examination form on  the  basis  of</p> <p>which the aforesaid entries relating to the date of birth of</p> <p>Hukmi  Chand  and  Suraj Prakash  Joshi    were  recorded was</p> <p>produced before the High Court. No doubt, Exs. 8, 9. 10.  11</p> <p>and 12 are relevant and admissible but these documents   have</p> <p>no  evidentiary value for purpose of proof of date of  birth</p> <p>of  Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi  as the vital  piece</p> <p>of  evidence  is  missing, because no  evidence      was  placed</p> <p>before   the Court to show on whose information the  date  of</p> <p>birth of Hukmi Chand and the date of birth of Suraj  Prakash</p> <p>Joshi  were recorded in the aforesaid document.  As  already</p> <p>stated neither of the parents of the two candidates nor     any</p> <p>other  person having special knowledge about their  date  of</p> <p>birth  was examined by the respondent  to prove the date  of</p> <p>birth  as mentioned in the aforesaid documents.   Parents  or</p> <p>near relations having special knowledge are the best  person</p> <p>to  depose  about the date of birth of a  person.  If  entry</p> <p>regarding date of birth in the scholars register is made  on</p> <p>the information given by  parents or some one having special</p> <p>knowledge of the fact, the same would have probative value.</p> <p>The  testimony   of  Anantram  Sharma  and   Kailash  Chandra</p> <p>Taparia merely  prove the documents but  the  contents    of</p> <p>those documents were not proved. The date of birth mentioned</p> <p>in  the scholar's register has no evidentiary  value  unless</p> <p>the person who  made the entry or who gave the date of birth</p> <p>is  examined. The entry   contained in the admission form  or</p> <p>in  the    scholar register must be shown to be  made  on   the</p> <p>basis of information given by the parents or a person having</p> <p>special   knowledge  about the date of birth  of     the  person</p> <p>concerned. If the entry in the scholar's register  regarding</p> <p>date of birth  is made in the basis of information given  by</p> <p>parents,  the entry would  have evidentiary value but if  it</p> <p>is given by a stranger or by someone else who had no special</p> <p>means of knowledge of the date of birth, such  an entry will</p> <p>have no evidentiary value. Merely because the documents Exs.</p> <p>8, 9, 1(). 11 and 12 were proved, it does not mean that      the</p> <p>contents  of documents were also proved. Mere proof  of               the</p> <p>documents  Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount  to</p> <p>proof  of  all the contents or the correctness         of  date  of</p> <p>birth stated in the documents.     Since the truth of the fact,</p> <p>namely, the date of birth of HukmiChand and  Suraj  Prakash</p> <p>Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as  produced</p> <p>by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence  of</p> <p>the  truth  of the facts or contents of the  documents.        The</p> <p>truth  or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the           date</p> <p>of  birth  of  the  two         candidates  as  mentioned  in     the</p> <p>documents  could be proved by admissible  evidence  i.e.  by</p> <p>the evidence of those persons who could vouch  safe for  the</p> <p>truth  of the facts in issue. No evidence of any  such           kind</p> <p>was   produced by the respondent to prove the truth  of    the</p> <p>facts. namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj</p> <p>Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of  birth  as</p> <p>mentioned in the aforesaid documents have no probative value</p> <p>and  the  dates of birth as mentioned therein could  not  be</p> <p>accepted.</p> <p>                                                                                              PG NO 20</p> <p>     The  High        Court  held  that in  view  of          the  entries</p> <p>contained in the  Ex. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 proved by Anantram</p> <p>Sharma PW 3 and Kailash Chandra Taparia PW 5, the  date  of</p> <p>birth of Hukmichand and Suraj  Prakash Joshi was proved  and</p> <p>on  that  assumption it held that the  two   candidates        had</p> <p>attained  more   than 25 years of age on the  date  of  their</p> <p>nomination. In our opinion the High Court committed  serious</p> <p>error.     Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that</p> <p>entry  in  any       public,  official  book,  register,  record</p> <p>stating   a  fact in issue or relevant  fact and          made  by  a</p> <p>public    servant  in  the  discharge  of       his  official         duty</p> <p>specially  enjoined by the law of the country is itself           the</p> <p>relevant  fact.       To  render  a     document  admissible  under</p> <p>Section  35,  three conditions must be      satisfied,  firstly,</p> <p>entry  that is relied on must be one in a public   or  other</p> <p>official  book, register or record, secondly, it must be  an</p> <p>entry      stating   a  fact  in issue  or           relevant  fact;     and</p> <p>thirdly,  it must be made by a        public servant in  discharge</p> <p>of his official duty, or any other person in performance  of</p> <p>a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to          date</p> <p>of  birth  made   in  the school     register  is  relevant        and</p> <p>admissible  under  Section  35       of the    Act  but  the  entry</p> <p>regarding to the age of a  person in a school register is of</p> <p>not  much evidentiary value to prove  the age of the  person</p> <p>in  the    absence  of the material on  which  the  age          was</p> <p>recorded. In Raja Janaki Nath Roy & Ors. v. Jyotish  Chandra</p> <p>Acharya Chowdhury, AIR 1941 CAL. 41 a Division Bench of               the</p> <p>Calcutta  High Court discarded the entry in school  register</p> <p>about  the  age of a party to the suit on  the           ground  that</p> <p>there was no evidence to  show on what material the entry in</p> <p>the  register about the age of the  plaintiff was made.        The</p> <p>principle so laid down has been accepted by  almost all      the</p> <p>High Courts in the country, see Jagan Nath v.  Moti Ram Moti</p> <p>Ram & Ors., [1951] Punjab 377; Sakhi Ram & Ors. v. Presiding</p> <p>Officer,  Labour  Court, North Bihar,  Muzzafarpur  &  Ors.,</p> <p>[1966]   Patna 459; Ghanchi Vora Samsuddish Isabhai v.  State</p> <p>of  Gujarat,[1970]  Gujarat  178 and Radha Kishan  Tickoo  &</p> <p>Anr.  v.  Bhushan Lal Tickoo & Anr.,  [1971] J &  K  62.  In</p> <p>addition  to these decisions the High Courts  of  Allahabed,</p> <p>Bombay,              Madras have considered the question  of  probative</p> <p>value  of an entry regarding the date of birth made  in        the</p> <p>scholar's  register  or in school  certificate              in  election</p> <p>cases.    The Courts have consistently held that the  date  of</p> <p>birth  mentioned  in  the scholar;s  register  or  secondary</p> <p>school certificate has no probative value unless either       the</p> <p>parents are examined or the person on whose information              the</p> <p>entry may have been made, is examined,see Jagdamba prasad v.</p> <p>Sri  Jagannath Prasad & Ors., 42 ELR 465; K.  Paramalali  v.</p> <p>L.M. Alangam & Anr., 31 ELR 401 and Krishna Rao Maharu Patil</p> <p>v. Onkar Narayan Wagh, 14ELR 386.</p> <p>                                                                                              PG NO 21</p> <p>    In        Brij Mohan Singh v. Priyu Brat Narain Sinha &  Ors.,</p> <p>[1965]   3   SCR 861 a question arose  whether  the  returned</p> <p>candidate  had attained the age of 35 years on the  date  of</p> <p>his  nomination. The High Court had  set aside the  election</p> <p>of  the returned candidate on the ground that he  was  below</p> <p>the  age of 25 years on the date of filing  the         nomination.</p> <p>This Court set aside the order of the High Court and  upheld</p> <p>the  election of  the returned candidate on the ground       that</p> <p>the  burden of proving that the returned candidate  had     not</p> <p>attained  the age of 25 years on the date of his  nomination</p> <p>was  on the election petitioner and since he had failed         to</p> <p>prove that, the election of the returned candidate could not</p> <p>be set    aside. This Court held that an entry recorded in the</p> <p>birth  register        maintained by an illiterate  Chowkidar  by</p> <p>somebody else at his request, was not admissible and had  no</p> <p>probative  value  within Section 35 of the  Indian  Evidence</p> <p>Act. In Ram Murti v. State of Haryana, AIR 1970 SC 1029   the</p> <p>date of birth of a girl mentioned in the school       certificate</p> <p>was not accepted. However in Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of</p> <p>U.P.  & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1625 this Court accepted the      date</p> <p>of birth of a girl as mentioned in the school certificate as</p> <p>the  date  of birth mentioned therein was  supported  by  an</p> <p>affidavit filed by the father of the girl.</p> <p>                                                                                              PG NO 22</p> <p>    The    appellant  was declared elected aS  he     had  polled</p> <p>majority of valid votes. His election could not be set aside</p> <p>unless the respondent-election petitioner was able to  prove</p> <p>that Hukmichand and Suraj Prakash Joshi had attained the age</p> <p>of  25 years on the date of nomination by  producing  cogent</p> <p>and reliable evidence before the High Court.  The burden  to</p> <p>prove  that  fact was on the respondent throughout  and     he</p> <p>could  not  and   did not discharge  that  burden  merely  by</p> <p>producing  the documentary evidence Ex. 8, 9, 10, 11 and  12</p> <p>or  on the basis of  oral testimony of Anantram Sharma PW  3</p> <p>and  Kailash  Chandra  Taparia PW 5.  As  discussed  earlier</p> <p>these  documents  do not conclusively  prove  the  dates  of</p> <p>birth  of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi.      The  entries</p> <p>regarding  dates  of  birth  contained         in   the   scholar's</p> <p>register  and  the  secondary  school  examination  have  no</p> <p>probative value, as no person on whose information the dates</p> <p>of  birth of the aforesaid candidates was mentioned  in     the</p> <p>school record was examined. In the absence of the connecting</p> <p>evidence the documents produced by the respondent, to  prove</p> <p>the age of the aforesaid two candidates have no  evidentiary</p> <p>value.    The High Court committed serious documents.  In               our</p> <p>view  the  High Court's entire approach in  considering       the</p> <p>question  of  dates of birth was  wholly  misconceived.       The</p> <p>burden  to  prove the fact in issue, namely,  the  dates  of</p> <p>birth  of  Hukmichand  and Suraj Prakash Joshi       was  on the</p> <p>respondent  who was the election petitioner. The  respondent</p> <p>could  not  succeed  if      no evidence  was  produced  by  the</p> <p>appellant on the question of age of the aforesaid candidates</p> <p>and his election could not be set aside merely on the ground</p> <p>that the respondent had made out a prima facie case that the</p> <p>entry  contained in the electoral roll regarding the age  of</p> <p>two candidates was incorrect. It appears that in his list of</p> <p>witnesses  the    appellant  had included the  name  of  Suraj</p> <p>Prakash Joshi and his father Maghdutt Joshi as witnesses but</p> <p>they  were not examined by him. Similarly,  Hukmi Chand  was</p> <p>also  cited by the appellant but he was also  not   examined</p> <p>instead  Navratan Mal Bhandari, brother of Hukmi Chand was</p> <p>examined as PW 4 and Ghanshyam Chhangani was examined as  PW</p> <p>6  by the appellant, who supported the appellants case      that</p> <p>Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi had not attained the age</p> <p>of  25 years on the date of nomination. Since the  appellant</p> <p>had not examined Hukmi               Chand. Suraj Prakash Joshi or  their</p> <p>parents, the High Court drew adverse inference against     him.</p> <p>The  High Court committed serious error in doing  so.  There</p> <p>was  no question of drawing adverse inference     against  the</p> <p>appellant, as the burden to prove the age of Hukmi Chand and</p> <p>Suraj Prakash joshi was on the election petitioner and since</p> <p>he  had  failed    to prove the same  by     cogent  evidence  no</p> <p>adverse inference  could be drawn against the appellant.  In</p> <p>fact.  burden  was on the respondent to prove  his  case  by</p> <p>producing the Hukmichand and Suraj  Prakash Joshi, or  their</p> <p>parents to  prove  and corroborate the dates  of  birth  as</p> <p>mentioned in the school register and the certificate. If  he</p> <p>failed     to  do    that he could  not  succeed  merely  because</p> <p>appellant  had    not produced them. In the  circumstances  no</p> <p>adverse inference was at all possible to be  drawn  against</p> <p>the  appellant     for  not examining  Hukmi  Chand  and  suraj</p> <p>Prakash Joshi or their parents.</p> <p>    In        view of the above discussion we are of    the  opinion</p> <p>that Umarao Ben's nomination paper was rightly rejected and</p> <p>further the respondent has failed to prove that Hukmi  Chand</p> <p>and   Suraj  Prakash  Joshi  possessed         the  necessary    age</p> <p>qualification       as   required        by  Article   173   of          the</p> <p>Constitution. Therefore the returning officer was  justified</p> <p>in  rejecting their nomination paper. In this view the           High</p> <p>Court  wrongly   set  aside  the     appellant's  election.        We</p> <p>accordingly allow the appeal set aside the order of the High</p> <p>Court  and dismiss the election petition. The  appellant  is</p> <p>entitled to costs which we quantify at Rs.5,000.</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p>

📄 Full Judgment

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