<p>                                                                  REPORTABLE</p> <p>                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA</p> <p>                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION</p> <p>                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.529 OF 2010</p> <p><br /> Dayal Singh & Ors.                                       … Appellants</p> <p>                                   Versus</p> <p>State of Uttaranchal                               … Respondent</p> <p><br />                                J U D G M E N T</p> <p><br /> Swatanter Kumar, J.</p> <p><br /> 1.    Settled  canons  of  criminal  jurisprudence  when  applied  in  their<br /> correct perspective, give rise to the following questions for  consideration<br /> of the Court in the present appeal:</p> <p>a)    Where acts of omission and commission, deliberate  or  otherwise,  are<br />        committed by the investigating agency or other significant  witnesses<br />        instrumental in proving the offence, what approach,  in  appreciation<br />        of evidence, should be adopted?</p> <p>b)    Depending upon the answer to the  above,  what  directions  should  be<br />        issued by the courts of competent jurisdiction?</p> <p>c)    Whenever there is some conflict in the eye-witness version  of  events<br />        and the medical evidence, what effect will it have on the case of the<br />        prosecution and what would be the manner in which  the  Court  should<br />        appreciate such evidence?</p> <p>2.    The facts giving rise to the questions in the present appeal are  that<br /> the fields of Gurumukh Singh and Dayal Singh were adjoining in  the  village<br /> Salwati within the limits  of  Police  Station  Sittarganj,  district  Udham<br /> Singh Nagar.  These fields were separated by a mend  (boundary  mound).   On<br /> 8th December, 1985, Gurumukh Singh, the complainant,  who  was  examined  as<br /> PW2, along with his father Pyara Singh, had gone to their fields.  At  about<br /> 12 noon, Smt. Balwant Kaur, PW4, wife of Pyara Singh came to the  fields  to<br /> give meals to Pyara Singh and their son  Gurumukh  Singh.   At  about  12.45<br /> p.m, the accused persons, namely, Dayal Singh, Budh  Singh  &  Resham  Singh<br /> (both sons of Dayal Singh) and Pahalwan Singh came to  the  fields  wielding<br /> lathis and started hurling abuses.  They  asked  Pyara  Singh  and  Gurumukh<br /> Singh as to why they were placing earth  on  their  mend,  upon  which  they<br /> answered that mend was a joint  property  belonging  to  both  the  parties.<br /> Without any provocation, all the accused  persons  started  attacking  Pyara<br /> Singh with lathis.  Gurumukh Singh, PW2, at  that  time,  was  at  a  little<br /> distance from his father and Smt. Balwant Kaur, PW4, was nearby.  On  seeing<br /> the occurrence, they raised an alarm and went to rescue  Pyara  Singh.   The<br /> accused, however, inflicted lathi injuries on both  PW2  and  PW4.   In  the<br /> meanwhile, Satnam Singh, who was ploughing  his  fields,  which  were  quite<br /> close to the fields of the parties and Uttam Singh (PW5) who was  coming  to<br /> his village from another village, saw the  occurrence.   These  two  persons<br /> even challenged the accused persons upon which the accused persons ran  away<br /> from the place of occurrence.  Pyara Singh, who had  been  attacked  by  all<br /> the accused persons with lathis fell down and succumbed to his  injuries  on<br /> the  spot.   Few  villagers  also  came  to  the  spot.   According  to  the<br /> prosecution, pagri (Ex.1) of one of the accused, Budh Singh, had  fallen  on<br /> the spot which was subsequently taken into custody by the Police.   Gurumukh<br /> Singh, PW2, left the dead body of his deceased father in the custody of  the<br /> villagers and went to the police station where he got  the  report,  Exhibit<br /> Ka-3, scribed by Kashmir Singh in relation to the  occurrence.   The  report<br /> was lodged at about 2.15 p.m. on 8th December, 1985 by PW2  in  presence  of<br /> SI  Kartar  Singh,  PW6.   FIR  (Exhibit  Ka-4A)  was  registered  and   the<br /> investigating machinery was put into motion.   The  two  injured  witnesses,<br /> namely, PW2 and PW4 were examined  by  Dr.  P.C.  Pande,  PW1,  the  medical<br /> officer at the Public Health Centre, Sittarganj on the date  of  occurrence.<br />  At 4.00 p.m., the doctor examined PW2 and noticed  the  following  injuries<br /> on the person of the injured witness vide Injury Report, Ex. Ka-1.</p> <p>           PW-2</p> <p>           “1.   Lacerated wound of 5 cm X 1 cm and 1 cm in depth.  Margins<br />                  were lacerated.  Red fresh blood was  present  over  wound.<br />                  Wound was caused by hard and blunt object.   Wound  was  at<br />                  the junction of left parietal and occipital bone 7 cm  from<br />                  upper part of left ear caused by blunt object.  Advised  X-<br />                  ray.  Skull A.P. and lateral and the injury was kept  under<br />                  observation.</p> <p>           2.    Contusion of 6 cm X 2.5 cm on left side of body 3 cm above<br />                  the left ilic crest.  Simple in nature caused by  hard  and<br />                  blunt object.”</p> <p>      According to the Doctor, the injuries were caused by  hard  and  blunt<br /> object and they were fresh in duration.</p> <p>      On 8.12.1985 at 7.30 p.m. Dr. P.C. Pande (PW1) examined  the  injuries<br /> of Smt. Balwant Kaur PW4 and found the  following  injuries  on  her  person<br /> vide injury report Ex.Ka.2:</p> <p>           PW-4</p> <p>           1.    Contusion 6 cm X 3 cm on left shoulder caused by hard  and<br />                  blunt object.</p> <p>           2.    Contusion of 5 cm X 2 cm on lateral side of middle of left<br />                  upper arm.  Bluish red in colour caused by hard  and  blunt<br />                  object.</p> <p>           3.    Contusion of 4 cm X 2 cm on left parietal bone 6  cm  from<br />                  left ear caused by hard and blunt object.</p> <p>      According to Dr. Pande, these injuries were caused by hard  and  blunt<br /> object and the duration was within 12 hours and the nature of  the  injuries<br /> was simple.  According to Dr. Pande  the  injuries  of  both  these  injured<br /> persons could have been received on 8.12.1985 at 12.45 p.m. by lathi.”</p> <p> </p> <p>3.    As noted above, according to Dr. Pande, the injuries were caused by  a<br /> hard and blunt object and duration was  within  12  hours.   Thereafter,  SI<br /> Kartar Singh, PW6, proceeded to the place of occurrence in village  Salwati.<br />  He found the dead body  of  Pyara  Singh  lying  in  the  fields.   In  the<br /> presence of panchas, including Balwant Singh, PW8,  he  noticed  that  there<br /> were three injuries on the person of the deceased, Pyara Singh and  prepared<br /> Inquest Report vide Ex. Ka-6 recording his opinion that  the  deceased  died<br /> on account of the injuries found on his  body.   After  preparing  the  site<br /> plan, Ext. Ka-10, he also  wrote  a  letter  to  the  Superintendent,  Civil<br /> Hospital, Haldwani for post mortem, being Exhibit Ka-9. The  dead  body  was<br /> taken to the said hospital by Constable Chandrapal  Singh,  PW7.   Dr.  C.N.<br /> Tewari, PW3, medical officer in the Civil Hospital, Haldwani, performed  the<br /> post mortem upon the body of the deceased and did not find  any  ante-mortem<br /> or post-mortem injuries on the dead body.  On internal examination,  he  did<br /> not find any injuries and could not ascertain the cause of death.   Further,<br /> he preserved the viscera and gave  the  post-mortem  report,  Exhibit  Ka-4.<br /> After noticing that there was no injury or abnormality found  upon  external<br /> and internal examination  of  the  dead  body,  the  doctor  in  his  report<br /> recorded as under:</p> <p>           “Viscera  in  sealed  jars  handed  over  to  the   accompanying<br />            Constables.</p> <p>           Jar No.1 sample preservative saline water.</p> <p>           Jar No.2 Pieces of stomach</p> <p>           Jar No.3 Pieces of liver, spleen and kidney.</p> <p>           Death occurred about one day back.</p> <p>           Cause  of  death  could  not  be  ascertained.   Hence,  viscera<br />            preserved.”</p> <p> </p> <p>4.    It appears  from  the  record  that  the  deceased’s  viscera,   which<br /> allegedly was handed over by doctor to the police, was either never sent  to<br /> the  Forensic  Science  Laboratory  (for  short,  the  ‘FSL’)  for  chemical<br /> examination, or if sent, the report  thereof  was  neither  called  for  nor<br /> proved before the Court.  In fact, this has been left to the imagination  of<br /> the Court.</p> <p>5.    The accused persons, at about 5.45 p.m. on  the  same  day,  lodged  a<br /> written report at the same  Police  Station,  which  was  received  by  Head<br /> Constable Inder Singh, who prepared the check report Exhibit  C-1  and  made<br /> appropriate entry.  The case was registered under Section 307 of the  Indian<br /> Penal Code, 1860  (IPC)  against  PW2,  Gurumukh  Singh.   Dayal  Singh  was<br /> arrested in furtherance of the FIR, Exhibit Ka-4A.  He  was  also  sent  for<br /> medical examination and was examined by  Dr.  K.P.S.  Chauhan,  CW2.   After<br /> examining the said  accused  at  about  7.45  p.m.,  the  doctor  found  two<br /> injuries on his person and prepared the report (Exhibit C-4).  According  to<br /> Dr. Chauhan, the injuries on the person  of  the  accused  could  have  been<br /> received by a firearm object and injuries were fresh within six hours.</p> <p>6.    The  investigating  officer  completed  the  investigation  and  filed<br /> charge sheet (Exhibit Ka-11) against the accused persons  on  15th  January,<br /> 1986.  It may be noticed that in furtherance to  Exhibit  C-2,  neither  any<br /> case was registered nor any charge-sheet was presented before the  Court  of<br /> competent jurisdiction.  The accused  also  took  no  steps  to  prove  that<br /> report in Court.  They also did not file any private complaint.</p> <p>7.     Considering  the  ocular  and  other   evidence   produced   by   the<br /> prosecution, the learned Trial Court vide its  judgment  of  conviction  and<br /> order of sentence, both dated 29th June, 1990,  found  the  accused  persons<br /> guilty of offences under Section 302 read with Section 34  IPC  as  well  as<br /> under Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC.  The Trial Court, while  dealing<br /> with the arguments of the accused for application of Section 34, as well  as<br /> the submission that the witnesses had not attributed specific  role  to  the<br /> respective accused persons, held as under:</p> <p>           “The attack was premeditated and  the  accused  had  come  fully<br />            prepared to do the overt act.  The injury was caused on the head<br />            of the deceased which is a vital part of the body  at  which  it<br />            was aimed by employing lathi, it  was  clear  that  the  accused<br />            persons had intended to cause death by giving blow on vital part<br />            of the body of the deceased.  After receiving the injuries,  the<br />            deceased fell down and even thereafter he was  attacked  by  the<br />            accused persons and he died on the spot immediately.   This  all<br />            goes to show that the accused persons who all  were  armed  with<br />            lathis and had attacked in furtherance of their common intention<br />            by surrounding Sri Pyara  Singh.   At  that  juncture  when  the<br />            occurrence took place suddenly and the witnesses  were  at  some<br />            distance it was quite natural for  the  witnesses  not  to  have<br />            noted as to whose lathi blow caused the injuries  on  Sri  Pyara<br />            Singh and also on the injured persons. It was thus quite natural<br />            in such circumstances for the witnesses not to  have  noted  the<br />            minute details of the incident.  The Hon’ble Supreme  Court  has<br />            held in 1971 Cri.L.J. 1135 Har Prasad  vs.   State            of<br />            Madhya Pradesh that in view  of  the  large  number  of  accused<br />            involved  in  the  occurrence  it  is  quite  natural  for   the<br />            prosecution witnesses to get a bit confused.  In fact, no cross-<br />            examination was made on this respect of the case which has  been<br />            discussed by me above.  The fact that the  accused  persons  had<br />            gone to the place of occurrence  fully  armed  with  lathis  and<br />            immediately  on  the  basis  of  ‘mend’  started  attacking  the<br />            deceased Sri Pyara Singh indicates that they had gone there with<br />            premeditation and prior concert.   All  the  four  accused  were<br />            physically present at the time of  the  commission  of  offence.<br />            The criminal act was done by the accused persons  and  they  all<br />            had shared the common intention by  engaging  in  that  criminal<br />            enterprise  for  which  they  had  come  fully  prepared.    The<br />            prosecution has succeeded in showing  the  existence  of  common<br />            purpose or design.  All the accused persons were confederates in<br />            the commission of the offence and they had participated in  that<br />            common intention.  Each of the accused person is liable for  the<br />            fact done in pursuance of that common purpose  of  design.   The<br />            acts done by the accused persons are similar  as  they  all  had<br />            come prepared armed with lathis and lathi blows were  struck  on<br />            the  deceased  Sri  Pyara  Singh  by  the  accused  persons   in<br />            furtherance of their common intention.  Each of them  is  liable<br />            for the blows struck with lathi on the deceased and also on  the<br />            injured persons.  It is proved beyond all reasonable doubt  that<br />            lathi blow was struck on the head of Sri Pyara Singh which was a<br />            vital part and he died on the spot due to injuries.  Whoever may<br />            have struck that lathi blow, each  of  the  accused  person   is<br />            liable for the lathi blows struck  on  the  vital  part  of  the<br />            deceased.  Since the ladhi blow was struck on the  head  of  the<br />            deceased which is a vital part, the offence  amounts  to  murder<br />            (See 1972 SCC (Cri) 438 Gudar Dusadh Vs. State of  Bihar).   The<br />            death of Sri Pyara Singh was caused in the occurrence and it  is<br />            proved to the hilt and beyond all reasonable doubt that he  died<br />            on the spot on account of lathi blows inflicted on him.   It  is<br />            nobody’s case that he died natural death.  The  accused  persons<br />            have committed offence punishable under  Section  302/34  I.P.C.<br />            for committed offence punishable under Section 323/34 I.P.C. for<br />            causing voluntary hurt to Sri Gurumukh Singh  and  Smt.  Balwant<br />            Kaur.”</p> <p> </p> <p>8.    The above judgment of the Trial Court  was  assailed  by  the  accused<br /> persons in appeal before the High Court.  The High Court, vide its  judgment<br /> dated 17th March, 2008, dismissed the appeal and affirmed  the  judgment  of<br /> conviction and order of sentence passed by learned Trial Court  giving  rise<br /> to the present appeal.</p> <p>9.    From the narration of the  above  facts,  brought  on  record  by  the<br /> prosecution and proved in accordance with law, it is clear  that  there  are<br /> three eye-witnesses to  the  occurrence.   Out  of  them,  two  are  injured<br /> witnesses, namely PW2 and PW4.  PW2 is the son of the deceased  and  PW4  is<br /> the wife.  Presence of these two witnesses at the  place  of  occurrence  is<br /> normal and natural.  According  to  PW4,  she  had  gone  to  the  place  of<br /> occurrence to give food to her husband and son around 12 noon, which is  the<br /> normal hour for lunch in the villages.  The son of the deceased had come  to<br /> the field with his father to work.  They were  putting  earth  on  the  mend<br /> which was objected to by the accused persons who had come there with  lathis<br /> and with a  premeditated  mind  of  causing  harm  to  the  deceased.   Upon<br /> enquiry, the deceased informed the accused  persons  that  the  mend  was  a<br /> joint property of the parties.  Without  provocation,  the  accused  persons<br /> thereupon  started  hurling  abuses  upon  Pyara  Singh  and  his  son,  and<br /> assaulted the deceased with lathis.   PW2  and  PW4  intervened  to  protect<br /> their father and husband respectively, but to  no  consequence  and  in  the<br /> process, they  suffered  injuries.   In  the  meanwhile,  when  the  accused<br /> persons were challenged by PW5 and Satnam  Singh,  who  were  close  to  the<br /> place of occurrence, they ran away.   The  presence  of  PW2,  PW4  and  PW5<br /> cannot be doubted.  The statement made by them  in  the  Court  is  natural,<br /> reliable and does not suffer from  any  serious  contradictions.   Once  the<br /> presence of eye-witnesses cannot be doubted  and  it  has  been  established<br /> that their statement is reliable, there is no reason for the  Court  to  not<br /> rely upon the statement of such eye witnesses in accepting the case  of  the<br /> prosecution.   The  accused  persons  had  come  with  pre-meditated   mind,<br /> together with common intention, to assault the  deceased  and  all  of  them<br /> kept on assaulting the deceased till the time he  fell  on  the  ground  and<br /> became breathless.</p> <p>10.   This Court has repeatedly held that an eye-witness version  cannot  be<br /> discarded by the Court merely on the ground that such  eye-witness  happened<br /> to be a relation or friend of  the  deceased.   The  concept  of  interested<br /> witness essentially must carry with it the element of unfairness  and  undue<br /> intention to falsely implicate the accused.  It is only when these  elements<br /> are present, and statement of the witness is unworthy of credence  that  the<br /> Court would examine the possibility  of  discarding  such  statements.   But<br /> where the presence of the eye-witnesses is proved to be  natural  and  their<br /> statements are nothing but truthful disclosure of actual  facts  leading  to<br /> the occurrence and the occurrence itself, it will  not  be  permissible  for<br /> the Court to discard the statements of such  related  or  friendly  witness.<br /> The Court in the case of Dharnidhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2010) 7  SCC<br /> 759] took the following view :</p> <p>           “12. There is no hard-and-fast  rule  that  family  members  can<br />            never be true witnesses to the occurrence  and  that  they  will<br />            always depose falsely before the court. It  will  always  depend<br />            upon the facts and circumstances of a given case.  In  Jayabalan<br />            v. UT of Pondicherry (2010) 1 SCC 199, this Court  had  occasion<br />            to consider whether the evidence of interested witnesses can  be<br />            relied upon. The Court took the view that  a  pedantic  approach<br />            cannot  be  applied  while  dealing  with  the  evidence  of  an<br />            interested witness. Such evidence cannot be  ignored  or  thrown<br />            out solely because it comes from a person closely related to the<br />            victim. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 213, paras 23-24)</p> <p>                 “23. We are of the considered view that in cases where  the<br />                  court is called upon to  deal  with  the  evidence  of  the<br />                  interested witnesses, the  approach  of  the  court,  while<br />                  appreciating the evidence of such  witnesses  must  not  be<br />                  pedantic. The court must be cautious  in  appreciating  and<br />                  accepting the evidence given by  the  interested  witnesses<br />                  but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence.  The<br />                  primary  endeavour  of  the  court  must  be  to  look  for<br />                  consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or<br />                  thrown out solely because it comes  from  the  mouth  of  a<br />                  person who is closely related to the victim.</p> <p>                 24. From a perusal of the record, we find that the evidence<br />                  of PWs 1 to 4 is clear and categorical in reference to  the<br />                  frequent quarrels between the deceased and  the  appellant.<br />                  They  have   clearly   and   consistently   supported   the<br />                  prosecution version with regard to the beating and the ill-<br />                  treatment meted out to the deceased  by  the  appellant  on<br />                  several occasions which compelled the deceased to leave the<br />                  appellant's house and take shelter in  her  parental  house<br />                  with an intention to live there permanently.  PWs  1  to  4<br />                  have unequivocally stated that the deceased  feared  threat<br />                  to her life  from  the  appellant.  The  aforesaid  version<br />                  narrated by the prosecution witnesses viz. PWs 1 to 4  also<br />                  finds  corroboration  from  the   facts   stated   in   the<br />                  complaint.”</p> <p>           13. Similar view was taken by this  Court  in  Ram  Bharosey  v.<br />            State of U.P. AIR 1954 SC 704, where the Court stated the dictum<br />            of law that a close relative of the deceased does not,  per  se,<br />            become an interested witness. An interested witness is  one  who<br />            is interested in securing the conviction  of  a  person  out  of<br />            vengeance or enmity or due to disputes and  deposes  before  the<br />            court only with that intention and not to further the  cause  of<br />            justice. The law relating to  appreciation  of  evidence  of  an<br />            interested witness is well  settled,  according  to  which,  the<br />            version of an interested witness cannot be thrown overboard, but<br />            has to be examined carefully before accepting the same.”</p> <p> </p> <p>11.   <strong>Similar view was taken by this Court in the cases of Mano Dutt &  Anr.<br /> v. State of UP [(2012 (3) SCALE 219] and Satbir Singh &  Ors.  v.  State  of<br /> Uttar Pradesh [(2009) 13 SCC 790].</strong></p> <p><strong>12.   With some vehemence, it has then  been  contended  on  behalf  of  the<br /> appellant that the post mortem report and the  statement  of  PW3,  Dr.  C.N<br /> Tewari, specifically state that no external or internal injuries were  found<br /> on the body  of  the  deceased.   In  other  words,  no  injury  was  either<br /> inflicted by the accused or suffered by  the  deceased.   In  face  of  this<br /> expert medical evidence,  the  statement  of  the  eye-witnesses  cannot  be<br /> believed.  The expert evidence should be given precedence  and  the  accused<br /> persons are entitled to acquittal.  This argument is liable to  be  rejected<br /> at the very outset despite the fact  that  it  sounds  attractive  at  first<br /> blush.  No doubt the post mortem report (Exhibit Ka-4) and the statement  of<br /> PW3 Dr. C.N. Tewari, does show/reflect that he had not noticed any  injuries<br /> upon the person of the deceased externally or  even  after  opening  him  up<br /> internally.  But the fact of the matter is that Pyara Singh  died.   How  he<br /> suffered  death  is  explained  by  three  witnesses,  PW2,  PW4  and   PW5,<br /> respectively. Besides this, the  statement  of  the  investigating  officer,<br /> PW6, also clearly shows that  the  body  of  the  deceased  contained  three<br /> apparent injuries.  He recorded in his investigative  proceedings  that  the<br /> accused had died of these injuries and was found lying dead at the place  of<br /> occurrence.  It is not only the statement of PW-6, but also the  Panchas  in<br /> whose presence the body was recovered, who  have  endorsed  this  fact.  The<br /> course of events as recorded in the investigation points  more  towards  the<br /> correctness of the case of the prosecution than otherwise. Strangely,  Dayal<br /> Singh and other accused persons not only took the stand of  complete  denial<br /> in their statement under Section 313 of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,<br /> 1973 (CrPC) but even went  to  the  extent  of  stating  that  they  had  no<br /> knowledge (pata nahin) when they were asked whether Pyara Singh had died  as<br /> a result of injuries.</strong></p> <p>13.   We have already discussed above that the presence of PW2, PW4 and  PW5<br /> at the place of occurrence was in the normal course of business  and  cannot<br /> be doubted.  Their statements are reliable, cogent and consistent  with  the<br /> story of the prosecution. Merely because PW3 and PW6 have failed to  perform<br /> their duties in accordance with the requirements of law, and there has  been<br /> some defect in the investigation, it will not  be  to  the  benefit  of  the<br /> accused persons to the extent that they would be entitled  to  an  order  of<br /> acquittal on this ground.  Reference in this regard can usefully be made  to<br /> the case of C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu {AIR 2010 SC 3718  :  (2010)<br /> 9 SCC 567}.</p> <p>14.   Now,  we  will  deal  with  the  question  of  defective  or  improper<br /> investigation  resulting  from  the  acts  of  omission  and/or  commission,<br /> deliberate or otherwise, of the  Investigating  Officer  or  other  material<br /> witnesses, who are obliged to perform certain duties in discharge  of  their<br /> functions and then to examine its effects.  In order to examine this  aspect<br /> in conformity with the rule of law and keeping in mind the basic  principles<br /> of criminal jurisprudence, and the  questions  framed  by  us  at  the  very<br /> outset of this judgment, the following points need consideration:</p> <p>        i) Whether there have been acts of omission  and  commission  which<br />            have resulted in improper or defective investigation.</p> <p> </p> <p><br />        ii) Whether such default and/or acts of omission and commission have<br />            adversely affected the case of the prosecution.</p> <p> </p> <p><br />       iii) Whether such default and acts were deliberate, unintentional  or<br />            resulted from unavoidable circumstances of a given case.</p> <p> </p> <p><br />        iv)  If  the  dereliction  of  duty  and  omission  to  perform  was<br />            deliberate, then  is  it  obligatory  upon  the  court  to  pass<br />            appropriate directions including directions in regard to  taking<br />            of penal or other civil action against such officer/witness.</p> <p> </p> <p><br /> 15.   In order to answer these determinative parameters,  the  Courts  would<br /> have to examine the prosecution evidence in its entirety, especially when  a<br /> specific reference  to  the  defective  or  irresponsible  investigation  is<br /> noticed in light of the facts and circumstances of a given case.</p> <p><br /> 16.   The Investigating Officer, as well as the doctor who are dealing  with<br /> the investigation of a criminal case, are obliged to act in accordance  with<br /> the police manual and the known canons of  medical  practice,  respectively.<br /> They are both obliged to be diligent, truthful and fair  in  their  approach<br /> and  investigation.   A  default  or  breach  of  duty,   intentionally   or<br /> otherwise, can sometimes prove fatal to the case  of  the  prosecution.   An<br /> Investigating Officer is  completely  responsible  and  answerable  for  the<br /> manner and methodology adopted in completing his investigation.   Where  the<br /> default and omission is so flagrant that it speaks volumes of  a  deliberate<br /> act or such irresponsible attitude of investigation, no court can afford  to<br /> overlook it, whether it did or did not cause prejudice to the  case  of  the<br /> prosecution.   It  is  possible  that  despite  such  default/omission,  the<br /> prosecution may still prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and  the  court<br /> can so return its finding.  But, at the same time, the default and  omission<br /> would have a reasonable chance of defeating the case of the  prosecution  in<br /> some events and the guilty could go scot-free.  We may illustrate such  kind<br /> of investigation with an example where a huge recovery  of  opium  or  poppy<br /> husk is made from a vehicle and the  Investigating  Officer  does  not  even<br /> investigate or make an attempt to find out  as  to  who  is  the  registered<br /> owner of the vehicle and whether such owner was involved in  the  commission<br /> of the crime or not.  Instead, he merely apprehends a cleaner  and  projects<br /> him as the principal offender  without  even  reference  to  the  registered<br /> owner.  Apparently, it would prima facie be  difficult  to  believe  that  a<br /> cleaner of a truck would have the capacity to  buy  and  be  the  owner,  in<br /> possession of such a huge quantity, i.e., hundreds of bags, of  poppy  husk.<br /> The investigation projects the poor cleaner as  the  principal  offender  in<br /> the case without even reference to the registered owner.</p> <p>17.    Even  the  present  case  is  a  glaring  example  of   irresponsible<br /> investigation.  It, in fact, smacks of  intentional  mischief  to  misdirect<br /> the investigation as well as to withhold material evidence from  the  Court.<br /> It cannot be considered a case of bona fide  or  unintentional  omission  or<br /> commission.  It is not a case of faulty investigation simplicitor but is  an<br /> investigation coloured with motivation or an  attempt  to  ensure  that  the<br /> suspect can go scot free.  This can safely be gathered from the following:</p> <p>a)     The  entire   investigation,   including   the   statement   of   the<br />       investigating officer, does not  show  as  to  what  happened  to  the<br />       viscera which was, as per the statement of PW3,  handed  over  to  the<br />       Constable, PW7, who,  in  turn,  stated  that  the  viscera  had  been<br />       deposited in the Police Station Malkhana.  In the entire statement  of<br />       the Investigating Officer, there  is  no  reference  to  viscera,  its<br />       collection from the hospital, its deposit in the Malkhana and  whether<br />       it was sent to the FSL at all or not.  If sent, what  was  the  result<br />       and, if not, why?</p> <p>b)    Conduct of the Investigating Officer is  more  than  doubtful  in  the<br />       present case.  In his statement, he had stated that he  noticed  three<br />       injuries on the body of the deceased.  He also admitted  that  in  the<br />       post mortem report, no internal or external injuries were shown on the<br />       body of the deceased.  According to him, he  had  asked  PW3  in  that<br />       regard but  the  reply  of  the  doctor  was  received  late  and  the<br />       explanation  rendered  was  satisfactory.   Firstly,  this  reply   or<br />       explanation does not find place on record.  There is  no  document  to<br />       that effect and secondly, even in his oral evidence, he does  not  say<br />       as to what the explanation was.</p> <p>c)    In his statement, PW3, Dr. C.N. Tewari, stated that he  did  not  find<br />       any external or internal  injuries  even  after  performing  the  post<br />       mortem on the body of the deceased.  This remark on  the  post  mortem<br />       report apparently is falsified both by the eye-witnesses  as  well  as<br />       the Investigating Officer.  It will be beyond apprehension as to how a<br />       healthy person could die, if there were no injuries on  his  body  and<br />       when, admittedly, it was not a case of  cardiac  arrest  or  death  by<br />       poison etc., more so, when he was alleged to have been assaulted  with<br />       dandas (lathi) by four  persons  simultaneously.   In  any  case,  the<br />       doctor gave no cause for death of the deceased  and  prepared  a  post<br />       mortem  report  which  ex  facie  was  incorrect  and  tantamount   to<br />       abrogation of duty.  The Trial Court  while  giving  the  judgment  of<br />       conviction, noticed that medico-legal post  mortem  examination  is  a<br />       very important part of the prosecution evidence and, therefore, it  is<br />       necessary that it  be  conducted  by  a  doctor  fully  competent  and<br />       experienced. The Court also commented adversely upon the  professional<br />       capabilities and/or misconduct of Dr. C.N. Tewari, as follows:</p> <p>           “Whatever may have been the reasons but it is quite evident that<br />            Dr. C.N. Tewari failed in his professional duty and he  did  not<br />            perform post mortem examination properly after  considering  the<br />            inquest report and the  police  papers  sent  to  him.   If  his<br />            finding deferred from the finding of the Panchas he should  have<br />            informed his superior officers in that regard  so  that  another<br />            opinion could have been obtained before the disposal of the dead<br />            body.  The evidence leaves no room  for  doubt  that  Sri  Pyara<br />            Singh was attacked with lathis as alleged by the prosecution and<br />            he received three injuries already referred to above which  were<br />            mentioned in the inquest report (Ex.Ka-6)….</p> <p>           The case of the prosecution cannot be thrown on account  of  the<br />            gross negligence and apathy of  the  Medical  Officer  Dr.  C.N.<br />            Tewari who had performed autopsy on the dead body of  Sri  Pyara<br />            Singh.  Since the Medical Officer Dr. C.N. Tewari had  conducted<br />            in a manner not befitting the medical  profession  and  prepared<br />            post mortem report against facts for reasons best known  to  him<br />            and was negligent in his duty in ascertaining  the  injuries  on<br />            the body of the deceased, hence it is just and proper  that  the<br />            Director General, Medical health U.P. be informed in this regard<br />            for taking necessary action and for eradicating  such  practices<br />            in future.”<br />                                                          (Emphasis supplied)</p> <p><br /> 18.   From the record, it is evident that the learned counsel appearing  for<br /> the State was also not aware if any action had been taken against  Dr.  C.N.<br /> Tewari.   On  the  contrary,  Mr.  Ratnakar  Dash,  learned  senior  counsel<br /> appearing for Dr. C.N. Tewari, informed us that no  action  was  called  for<br /> against Dr. C.N. Tewari as he had authored the post mortem report and  given<br /> his evidence truthfully and  without  any  dereliction  of  duty.   He  also<br /> informed us that since Dr. C.N. Tewari is now retired and is not well,  this<br /> Court need not pass any further directions.</p> <p>19.   We are not impressed with this contention  at  all.  We  have  already<br /> noticed that PW3, Dr. C.N. Tewari, certainly did not act with the  requisite<br /> professionalism.  He even  failed  to  truthfully  record  the  post  mortem<br /> report, Exhibit Ka-4.  At the cost of repetition, we  may  notice  that  his<br /> report is contradictory to the  evidence  of  the  three  eye-witnesses  who<br /> stood the  test  of  cross-examination  and  gave  the  eye-version  of  the<br /> occurrence.  It is also in conflict with the statement of  PW6  as  well  as<br /> the inquest report (Exhibit Ka-6) prepared by him where he had noticed  that<br /> there were three injuries on the body of the deceased.   It  is  clear  that<br /> the post mortem report is silent and PW3 did not even notice  the  cause  of<br /> death.  If he was not able to record a finding with regard to the  cause  of<br /> death,  he  was  expected  to  record  some  reason  in   support   thereof,<br /> particularly when it is conceded before us by the learned  counsel  for  the<br /> parties, including the counsel for Dr. C.N. Tewari that it was  not  a  case<br /> of death by administering poison.</p> <p>20.   Similarly, the Investigating Officer has  also  failed  in  performing<br /> his duty in accordance with law.  Firstly, for  not  recording  the  reasons<br /> given by Dr. C.N. Tewari for non-mentioning of injuries on the  post  mortem<br /> report, Exhibit Ka-4, which had appeared  satisfactory  to  him.   Secondly,<br /> for not sending to the FSL the viscera and other samples collected from  the<br /> body of the deceased by Dr. C.N. Tewari, who allegedly handed over the  same<br /> to the police, and their disappearance.   There  is  clear  callousness  and<br /> irresponsibility on their part  and  deliberate  attempt  to  misdirect  the<br /> investigation to favour the accused.</p> <p>21.   This results in shifting of avoidable burden and  exercise  of  higher<br /> degree  of  caution  and  care  on  the  courts.   Dereliction  of  duty  or<br /> carelessness is an abuse of discretion under a definite law  and  misconduct<br /> is a violation of indefinite law. Misconduct  is  a  forbidden  act  whereas<br /> dereliction of duty is the forbidden quality of an act  and  is  necessarily<br /> indefinite.  One is a transgression of some established  and  definite  rule<br /> of action, with least element of discretion, while the  other  is  primarily<br /> an abuse of discretion.  This Court in the case of State of  Punjab  &  Ors.<br /> v. Ram Singh Ex. Constable [(1992) 4 SCC 54] stated that the ambit of  these<br /> expressions had to be construed with reference to  the  subject  matter  and<br /> the context where the term occurs, regard being given to the  scope  of  the<br /> statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve.  The police service  is  a<br /> disciplined service and it requires maintenance of strict  discipline.   The<br /> consequences  of  these  defaults  should  normally   be   attributable   to<br /> negligence.  Police officers and doctors, by their profession, are  required<br /> to maintain duty decorum of high standards.  The standards of  investigation<br /> and the prestige of the profession are dependent upon  the  action  of  such<br /> specialized persons.  The police manual and even the provisions of the  CrPC<br /> require the investigation to be conducted in a particular manner and  method<br /> which, in our opinion, stands clearly violated in  the  present  case.   Dr.<br /> C.N. Tewari, not only breached the requirement of adherence to  professional<br /> standards but also became instrumental in preparing  a  document  which,  ex<br /> facie, was incorrect and stood falsified by the  unimpeachable  evidence  of<br /> eye witnesses placed by the prosecution on record.  Also, in the same  case,<br /> the Court, while referring to the decision in Ram Bihari  Yadav  and  Others<br /> v. State of Bihar & Ors. [(1995) 6 SCC 31] noticed that if primacy is  given<br /> to such designed or negligent investigation, to the omission  or  lapses  by<br /> perfunctory investigation or omissions, the  faith  and  confidence  of  the<br /> people would be shaken not only in the law enforcement agency  but  also  in<br /> the administration of justice.</p> <p>22.   Now, we may advert to the duty of the Court in  such  cases.   In  the<br /> case of Sathi Prasad v. The State of U.P. [(1972) 3  SCC  613],  this  Court<br /> stated that it is well settled that if the  police  records  become  suspect<br /> and investigation perfunctory, it becomes the duty of the Court  to  see  if<br /> the evidence given in Court should be relied upon and such  lapses  ignored.<br /> Noticing the possibility of investigation being designedly  defective,  this<br /> Court in the case of Dhanaj Singh @ Shera & Ors. v. State of Punjab  [(2004)<br /> 3 SCC 654], held, “in the case of a defective investigation  the  Court  has<br /> to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence.  But it would not be right  in<br /> acquitting an accused person solely on account  of  the  defect;  to  do  so<br /> would tantamount to playing into the hands of the investigating  officer  if<br /> the investigation is designedly defective.”</p> <p>23.   Dealing with the cases of omission and commission, the  Court  in  the<br /> case of Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar [AIR  1999  SC  644],  enunciated  the<br /> principle, in conformity with the previous judgments, that if the  lapse  or<br /> omission  is  committed  by  the  investigating   agency,   negligently   or<br /> otherwise, the prosecution evidence is required to be examined de hors  such<br /> omissions to find out whether the said evidence is  reliable  or  not.   The<br /> contaminated conduct of officials should not stand in the way of  evaluating<br /> the evidence by  the  courts,  otherwise  the  designed  mischief  would  be<br /> perpetuated and justice would be denied to the complainant  party.   In  the<br /> case of Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.  [(2006)<br /> 3 SCC 374], the Court noticed the importance of the role of witnesses  in  a<br /> criminal trial.  The importance and primacy of the quality of trial  process<br /> can be observed from the words of Bentham, who  states  that  witnesses  are<br /> the eyes and ears of justice.  The Court  issued  a  caution  that  in  such<br /> situations, there is a greater responsibility of the court on the  one  hand<br /> and on the other the  courts  must  seriously  deal  with  persons  who  are<br /> involved  in  creating  designed  investigation.   The   Court   held   that<br /> legislative  measures  to  emphasize  prohibition  against  tampering   with<br /> witness, victim or informant have become the imminent  and  inevitable  need<br /> of the day.   Conducts  which  illegitimately  affect  the  presentation  of<br /> evidence in proceedings before the Courts have to be seriously  and  sternly<br /> dealt with.  There should not be any  undue  anxiety  to  only  protect  the<br /> interest of the accused.  That would be  unfair,  as  noted  above,  to  the<br /> needs of the society.  On the contrary, efforts should  be  to  ensure  fair<br /> trial where the accused and the prosecution both get a  fair  deal.   Public<br /> interest  in  proper  administration  of  justice  must  be  given  as  much<br /> importance if not more, as the interest  of  the  individual  accused.   The<br /> courts have a vital role to play.  (Emphasis supplied)</p> <p>24.   With the passage of time, the law also developed  and  the  dictum  of<br /> the Court emphasized that in  a  criminal  case,  the  fate  of  proceedings<br /> cannot always be left entirely in the hands  of  the  parties.  Crime  is  a<br /> public wrong, in breach and violation of public  rights  and  duties,  which<br /> affects the community as a whole and is harmful to the society in general.</p> <p>25.   Reiterating the above principle, this Court in the  case  of  National<br /> Human Rights Commission v. State of Gujarat [(2009)  6  SCC  767],  held  as<br /> under:</p> <p>           “The concept of fair trial  entails  familiar  triangulation  of<br />            interests of the accused, the victim and the society and  it  is<br />            the community  that  acts  through  the  State  and  prosecuting<br />            agencies. Interest of society is not to  be  treated  completely<br />            with disdain and as persona non grata. The  courts  have  always<br />            been considered to have an overriding duty  to  maintain  public<br />            confidence in the administration of justice—often referred to as<br />            the duty to vindicate and uphold the ‘majesty of the  law’.  Due<br />            administration of justice has always been viewed as a continuous<br />            process, not confined to determination of the  particular  case,<br />            protecting its ability to function as a  court  of  law  in  the<br />            future as in the case before it. If a criminal court is to be an<br />            effective instrument in dispensing justice, the Presiding  Judge<br />            must cease to be a spectator and a  mere  recording  machine  by<br />            becoming a  participant  in  the  trial  evincing  intelligence,<br />            active interest and elicit all relevant materials necessary  for<br />            reaching the correct conclusion, to  find  out  the  truth,  and<br />            administer justice with fairness and impartiality  both  to  the<br />            parties and to the community it serves. The courts administering<br />            criminal justice  cannot  turn  a  blind  eye  to  vexatious  or<br />            oppressive conduct that has occurred in relation to proceedings,<br />            even if a fair trial is still possible, except at  the  risk  of<br />            undermining  the  fair  name  and  standing  of  the  judges  as<br />            impartial and independent adjudicators.”</p> <p> </p> <p>26.   In the case of State of  Karnataka  v.  K.  Yarappa  Reddy  [2000  SCC<br /> (Crl.) 61], this Court  occasioned  to  consider  the  similar  question  of<br /> defective investigation as to whether any manipulation in the station  house<br /> diary by the Investigating Officer could  be  put  against  the  prosecution<br /> case. This Court, in Paragraph 19, held as follows:</p> <p>                 “19. But can the above  finding  (that  the  station  house<br />                  diary is not genuine) have any inevitable  bearing  on  the<br />                  other evidence in this case?  If  the  other  evidence,  on<br />                  scrutiny, is found  credible  and  acceptable,  should  the<br />                  Court be influenced by the machinations demonstrated by the<br />                  Investigating Officer in  conducting  investigation  or  in<br />                  preparing the  records  so  unscrupulously?  It  can  be  a<br />                  guiding principle that as investigation is not the solitary<br />                  area  for  judicial  scrutiny  in  a  criminal  trial,  the<br />                  conclusion of the Court in the case cannot  be  allowed  to<br />                  depend solely on the probity of investigation. It is  well-<br />                  nigh settled that even if the investigation is  illegal  or<br />                  even  suspicious  the  rest  of  the   evidence   must   be<br />                  scrutinised independently of the impact  of  it.  Otherwise<br />                  the criminal  trial  will  plummet  to  the  level  of  the<br />                  investigating officers ruling the  roost.  The  court  must<br />                  have predominance and pre-eminence in criminal trials  over<br />                  the action taken by the  investigation  officers.  Criminal<br />                  Justice should not  be  made  a  casualty  for  the  wrongs<br />                  committed by the investigating officers  in  the  case.  In<br />                  other words, if the court is convinced that  the  testimony<br />                  of a witness to the occurrence is true the court is free to<br />                  act on it albeit  the  investigating  officer's  suspicious<br />                  role in the case.”</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>27.   In Ram Bali v. State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  [(2004)  10  SCC  598],  the<br /> judgment in Karnel Singh v. State of M.P. [(1995) 5 SCC 518] was  reiterated<br /> and this Court had observed that ‘in case  of  defective  investigation  the<br /> court has to be circumspect while evaluating the evidence. But it would  not<br /> be right in acquitting an accused person solely on account  of  the  defect;<br /> to do so would tantamount to playing into the  hands  of  the  investigation<br /> officer if the investigation is designedly defective’.</p> <p>28.   Where our criminal justice system provides safeguards  of  fair  trial<br /> and innocent till proven guilty to an accused, there  it  also  contemplates<br /> that a criminal trial is meant for doing justice to all,  the  accused,  the<br /> society and a fair chance to prove to the prosecution.  Then alone  can  law<br /> and order be maintained.  The Courts do not merely  discharge  the  function<br /> to ensure that no innocent man is punished, but also that a guilty man  does<br /> not escape.  Both are public duties of the judge.  During the course of  the<br /> trial, the learned Presiding Judge is expected to work objectively and in  a<br /> correct perspective.  Where the prosecution attempts to misdirect the  trial<br /> on the basis of a perfunctory or designedly defective  investigation,  there<br /> the Court is to be deeply cautious and ensure that despite such an  attempt,<br /> the determinative process is  not  sub-served.   For  truly  attaining  this<br /> object of a ‘fair trial’, the Court should leave no  stone  unturned  to  do<br /> justice and protect the interest of the society as well.</p> <p>29.   This brings us to an  ancillary  issue  as  to  how  the  Court  would<br /> appreciate the evidence in such cases.  The possibility of  some  variations<br /> in the exhibits, medical and ocular evidence cannot be ruled  out.   But  it<br /> is not that every minor variation or inconsistency would  tilt  the  balance<br /> of justice in favour the  accused.   Of  course,  where  contradictions  and<br /> variations are of a  serious  nature,  which  apparently  or  impliedly  are<br /> destructive of the substantive case sought to be proved by the  prosecution,<br /> they may provide an advantage to the accused.  The  Courts,  normally,  look<br /> at expert evidence with a greater sense of acceptability, but it is  equally<br /> true that the courts  are  not  absolutely  guided  by  the  report  of  the<br /> experts, especially if such reports are perfunctory, unsustainable  and  are<br /> the result of  a  deliberate  attempt  to  misdirect  the  prosecution.   In<br /> Kamaljit Singh v. State  of  Punjab  [2004  Cri.LJ  28],  the  Court,  while<br /> dealing with discrepancies between ocular and medical  evidence,  held,  “It<br /> is trite law that minor  variations  between  medical  evidence  and  ocular<br /> evidence do not take  away  the  primacy  of  the  latter.   Unless  medical<br /> evidence  in  its  term  goes  so  far  as  to  completely  rule   out   all<br /> possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the  manner  stated  by<br /> the eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out.”</p> <p>30.   Where the eye witness  account  is  found  credible  and  trustworthy,<br /> medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities may  not  be  accepted<br /> as conclusive.  The expert witness is expected to put before the  Court  all<br /> materials inclusive of the data which induced him to come to the  conclusion<br /> and enlighten the court on the technical aspect of  the  case  by  examining<br /> the terms of science, so that the court, although not an  expert,  may  form<br /> its own judgment on those materials after giving due regard to the  expert’s<br /> opinion, because once the expert opinion is accepted, it is not the  opinion<br /> of the medical officer but that of the Court. {Plz. See  Madan  Gopal  Kakad<br /> v. Naval Dubey & Anr. [(1992) 2 SCR 921 : (1992) 3 SCC 204]}.</p> <p>31.   Profitably, reference to the value of an expert in the eye of law  can<br /> be assimilated as follows:</p> <p>           “The essential principle governing expert evidence is  that  the<br />            expert is not only to provide reasons to support his opinion but<br />            the result should be directly demonstrable.  The court is not to<br />            surrender its own judgment to that of the expert or delegate its<br />            authority to a third party, but should assess his evidence  like<br />            any other evidence.  If the report of  an  expert  is  slipshod,<br />            inadequate or cryptic and the  information  of  similarities  or<br />            dissimilarities is not available in his report and his  evidence<br />            in the case, then his opinion is of no use.  It is  required  of<br />            an expert whether a government expert or private, if he expects,<br />            his opinion to be accepted to put before the court the  material<br />            which induces him to come to his conclusion so  that  the  court<br />            though not  an  expert,  may  form  its  own  judgment  on  that<br />            material.  If the expert in his evidence as a witness  does  not<br />            place the whole lot of similarities  or  dissimilarities,  etc.,<br />            which influence his mind to lead him to a particular  conclusion<br />            which he states in the court then he fails in his duty  to  take<br />            the court into confidence.  The court is not to believe the ipse<br />            dixit of an expert.  Indeed the value  of  the  expert  evidence<br />            consists mainly on the ability of the witness by reason  of  his<br />            special training and experience to  point  out  the  court  such<br />            important facts as it otherwise might fail to observe and in  so<br />            doing the court is enabled to exercise its own view or  judgment<br />            respecting the cogency of reasons and the  consequent  value  of<br />            the conclusions formed thereon.  The opinion is required  to  be<br />            presented  in  a  convenient  manner  and  the  reasons  for   a<br />            conclusion based on certain visible  evidence,  properly  placed<br />            before the Court.  In other words the value of  expert  evidence<br />            depends largely on the cogency of reasons on which it is based.”</p> <p>           [See: Forensic Science in Criminal Investigation & Trial (Fourth<br />            Edition) by B.R. Sharma]</p> <p> </p> <p>32.   The purpose of expert testimony is to provide the trier of  fact  with<br /> useful, relevant information. The overwhelming majority rule in  the  United<br /> States, is that an expert need not be a  member  of  a  learned  profession.<br /> Rather, experts in the United States have a wide range  of  credentials  and<br /> testify regarding a tremendous variety of subjects based  on  their  skills,<br /> training, education or experience.  The role of the expert is  to  apply  or<br /> supply  specialized,  valuable  knowledge  that  lay  jurors  would  not  be<br /> expected to possess.  An expert may present  the  information  in  a  manner<br /> that would be unacceptable with an ordinary witness.  The common  law  tried<br /> to strike a balance between the benefits and dangers of expert testimony  by<br /> allowing expert  testimony  to  be  admitted  only  if  the  testimony  were<br /> particularly important to aiding the trier of fact.  Even in United  States,<br /> if the helpfulness of expert testimony is substantially  outweighed  by  the<br /> risk of unfair prejudice, confusion or waste of  time,  then  the  testimony<br /> should be excluded under the relevant Rules,  and  State  equally  balanced.<br /> Expert testimony on any issue of fact and significance  of  its  application<br /> has been doubted by the scholars in the United States.  Even under  the  law<br /> prevalent in that country, the opinion of an expert has  to  be  scientific,<br /> specific and experience based.   Conflict  in  expert  opinions  is  a  well<br /> prevalent practice there.  While referring to such incidence David  H.  Kaye<br /> and other authors in ‘The New  Wigmore  A  Treatise  on  Evidence  –  Expert<br /> Evidence’ (2004 Edition) opined as under :</p> <p>           “The district court  opinion  reveals  that  one  pharmacologist<br />            asserted  “that  Danocrine  more  probably   than   not   caused<br />            plaintiff’s death from pulmonary hypertension,” but it describes<br />            the reasoning behind this  opinion  in  the  vaguest  of  terms,<br />            referring  only  to  “extensive  education   and   training   in<br />            pharmacology” and an  unspecified  “scientific  technique”  that<br />            “relied upon epidemiological, clinical and  animal  studies,  as<br />            well as plaintiff’s medical records and medical  history…”   The<br />            nature of these studies and their relationship to the  patient’s<br />            records is left unstated.  The district court incanted the  same<br />            mantra  to  justify  admitting  the  remaining  testimony.    It<br />            asserted that the other experts “similarly base their  testimony<br />            upon a careful review of medical literature concerning Danocrine<br />            and pulmonary hypertension, and plaintiff’s medical records  and<br />            medical history.”</p> <p>           The court of appeals elaborated on the testimony of two  of  the<br />            experts.  The physician “was confident to a  reasonable  medical<br />            certainty  that  the  Danocrine  caused  Mrs.  Zuchowicz’s  PPH”<br />            because of “the temporal relationship between the  overdose  and<br />            the start of the disease and the differential etiology method of<br />            excluding  other  possible  causes.”   Yet   the   “differential<br />            etiology” here was barely more than a differential diagnosis  of<br />            PPH.  The causes of PPH are generally  unknown  and  it  appears<br />            that the only other putative alternative causes considered  were<br />            drugs other than Danocrine.  It is not at all clear that such  a<br />            “differential etiology” is adequate to support a  conclusion  of<br />            causation  to  any  kind  of   a   “medical   certainty.”    The<br />            pharmacologist, not being a  medical  doctor,  testified  “to  a<br />            reasonable degree of scientific  certainty  .  .  .  [that]  the<br />            overdose of Danocrine, more likely than not, caused PPH. . .  .”<br />            He postulated a mechanism by which this might have occurred: “I)<br />            a decrease in estrogen; 2) hyperinsulinemia, in which abnormally<br />            high levels of insulin circulate in the body; and 3) increase in<br />            free testosterone and progesterone .  .  .  that  .  .  .  taken<br />            together, likely caused a dysfunction of the endothelium leading<br />            to PPH.”</p> <p>           In sum, plaintiff’s experts did not know what  else  might  have<br />            caused the hypertension, and they offered a conjecture as  to  a<br />            causal chain leading from the drug to  the  hypertension.   This<br />            logic would be more than  enough  to  justify  certain  clinical<br />            recommendations—the advice to Mrs. Zuchowicz to discontinue  the<br />            medication, for example.  But is it enough to  allow  an  expert<br />            not merely to testify to  a  reasonable  diagnosis  of  PPH,  or<br />            “unexplained pulmonary hypertension,” as the condition  also  is<br />            known, but also be able to propound a novel explanation that has<br />            yet to be verified, even in an animal model?”</p> <p> </p> <p>33.         The Indian law on  Expert  Evidence  does  not  proceed  on  any<br /> significantly different footing.  The skill and experience of an  expert  is<br /> the ethos of his opinion, which itself should be  reasoned  and  convincing.<br /> Not to say that no other view would be possible, but  if  the  view  of  the<br /> expert has to find due weightage in the mind of the  Court,  it  has  to  be<br /> well authored and convincing.  Dr. C.N. Tewari was expected to  prepare  the<br /> post mortem report with appropriate reasoning and not  leave  everything  to<br /> the imagination of the Court. He created a serious  doubt  as  to  the  very<br /> cause of death of the deceased.  His report apparently shows an  absence  of<br /> skill and experience and was, in fact, a deliberate attempt to disguise  the<br /> investigation.</p> <p>34.   We really need not reiterate various judgments which  have  taken  the<br /> view that the purpose of an expert opinion is primarily to assist the  Court<br /> in arriving at a final conclusion.  Such report  is  not  binding  upon  the<br /> Court.  The Court is expected to analyse the report, read it in  conjunction<br /> with the other evidence on record and then form  its  final  opinion  as  to<br /> whether such report is worthy of reliance or not.  Just to  illustrate  this<br /> point  of  view,  in  a  given  case,  there  may   be   two   diametrically<br /> contradictory opinions of handwriting experts and both the opinions  may  be<br /> well reasoned. In such case, the Court has to critically examine the  basis,<br /> reasoning, approach and experience of the expert to come to a conclusion  as<br /> to which of the two reports can be safely relied upon  by  the  Court.   The<br /> assistance and value of expert opinion is indisputable,  but  there  can  be<br /> reports which are, ex facie, incorrect or deliberately so  distorted  as  to<br /> render the entire prosecution case unbelievable.  But if such  eye-witnesses<br /> and other prosecution  evidence  are  trustworthy,  have  credence  and  are<br /> consistent with the eye version given by the eye-witnesses, the  Court  will<br /> be well within its jurisdiction to discard the expert  opinion.   An  expert<br /> report, duly proved, has its evidentiary value but such appreciation has  to<br /> be within the limitations prescribed and with  careful  examination  by  the<br /> Court.  A  complete  contradiction  or  inconsistency  between  the  medical<br /> evidence and the ocular evidence on the one hand and the  statement  of  the<br /> prosecution witnesses  between  themselves  on  the  other,  may  result  in<br /> seriously denting the case of  the  prosecution  in  its  entirety  but  not<br /> otherwise.</p> <p>35.   Reverting to the case in hand, the Trial  Court  has  rightly  ignored<br /> the deliberate lapses of the investigating  officer  as  well  as  the  post<br /> mortem report prepared by Dr. C.N. Tewari.  The consistent statement of  the<br /> eye-witnesses  which  were  fully  supported  and  corroborated   by   other<br /> witnesses, and  the  investigation  of  the  crime,  including  recovery  of<br /> lathis, inquest report, recovery of the pagri of one  of  the  accused  from<br /> the  place  of  occurrence,  immediate  lodging  of  FIR  and  the  deceased<br /> succumbing to his injuries within a very short time, establish the  case  of<br /> the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.  These lapses on the  part  of  PW3<br /> and PW6 are a deliberate attempt  on  their  part  to  prepare  reports  and<br /> documents in a designedly defective manner which would have  prejudiced  the<br /> case of the prosecution and resulted in the acquittal of  the  accused,  but<br /> for the correct approach of the trial court to do justice  and  ensure  that<br /> the guilty did not go scot-free.  The evidence of the eye-witness which  was<br /> reliable and worthy of credence has justifiably  been  relied  upon  by  the<br /> court.</p> <p>36.   Despite clear observations of the Trial  Court,  no  action  has  been<br /> taken by the Director General, Medical Health, Uttar  Pradesh.   We  do  not<br /> see any justification for these lapses on the part of the higher  authority.<br />  Thus, it is a fit case where this Court should issue notice to  show  cause<br /> why action in accordance with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts  Act,<br /> 1971 be not initiated against him and he  be  not  directed  to  conduct  an<br /> enquiry personally and pass appropriate orders  involving  Dr.  C.N.  Tewari<br /> and if found guilty, to impose punishment upon him  including  deduction  of<br /> pension.  Admittedly, this direction was passed when Dr. C.N. Tewari was  in<br /> service.   His  retirement,  therefore,  will  be  inconsequential  to   the<br /> imposing of punishment  and  the  limitation  of  period  indicated  in  the<br /> service regulations would not apply in face of the order of this Court.</p> <p>37.   Similarly, the Director  General  of  Police  UP/Uttarakhand  also  be<br /> issued notice to take appropriate action  in  accordance  with  the  service<br /> rules against PW6, SI Kartar Singh, irrespective of the fact whether  he  is<br /> in service or has since retired.  If retired, then authorities  should  take<br /> action  for  withdrawal  or  partial  deduction  in  the  pension,  and   in<br /> accordance with law.</p> <p>38.   Lastly, the learned counsel for the appellant  had,  of  course,  with<br /> some vehemence, argued that the offence even if committed by the  appellant,<br /> would not attract the provisions of Section 302 IPC and would squarely  fall<br /> within the ambit of Part II of Section 304 IPC.  In other  words,  he  prays<br /> for alteration of the offence to an offence  punishable  under  Part  II  of<br /> Section 304 IPC.  We are concerned with a  case  where  four  persons  armed<br /> with lathis had gone to the fields  of  the  deceased.   They  first  hurled<br /> abuses at him and without any provocation started assaulting  him  with  the<br /> dang (lathi) that they were carrying.  Despite efforts to stop them  by  the<br /> the wife and son of the deceased, PW4 and PW2, they did not stop  assaulting<br /> him and assaulted both  these  witnesses  also.   Thereupon,  they  kept  on<br /> assaulting the deceased until he  fell  down  dead  on  the  ground.   Three<br /> injuries were noticed by the Police on the body of the deceased including  a<br /> protuberant injury on the head, which the Court is only left to presume  has<br /> resulted in his death.  In the absence of an  authentic  and  correct  post-<br /> mortem report (Exhibit Ka-4),  the  truthfulness  of  the  prosecution  eye-<br /> witnesses cannot be doubted.  In addition thereto, the stand  taken  by  the<br /> accused that they had suffered  injuries  was  a  false  defence.   Firstly,<br /> according to the doctor, CW2, it was  injuries  of  a  firearm,  while  even<br /> according to the defence, the deceased or his son were not carrying any  gun<br /> at the time of occurrence.  Secondly, they did not choose  to  pursue  their<br /> report with the police at the time of investigation or even when  the  trial<br /> was on before the Trial Court.  The accused persons had gone together  armed<br /> with lathis with a common intention to kill the deceased  and  they  brought<br /> their intention into  effect  by  simultaneously  assaulting  the  deceased.<br /> They had no provocation.  Thus, the intention to kill is  apparent.   It  is<br /> not a case which would squarely fall under  Part  II  of  Section  304  IPC.<br /> Thus,  the  cumulative  effect  of  appreciation  of  evidence,  as   afore-<br /> discussed, is that we find no merit in the present appeal.</p> <p>39.   Having analyzed and discussed in some elaboration various  aspects  of<br /> this case, we pass the following orders:</p> <p>A)    The appeal is dismissed both on merits and on quantum of sentence.</p> <p>B)    The Director Generals, Health Services of  UP/Uttarakhand  are  hereby<br />       issued notice under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971<br />       as to why appropriate action be not initiated  against  them  for  not<br />       complying with the directions contained in the judgment of  the  Trial<br />       Court dated 29th June, 1990.</p> <p>C)    The above-said officials are  hereby  directed  to  take  disciplinary<br />       action against Dr. C.N. Tewari, PW3, whether he is in service  or  has<br />       since retired, for deliberate dereliction of duty, preparing a  report<br />       which ex facie was incorrect and was  in  conflict  with  the  inquest<br />       report (Exhibits Ka-6 and Ka-7) and statement  of  PW6.   The  bar  on<br />       limitation, if any, under the Rules will not come  into  play  because<br />       they were directed by the order dated 29th June, 1990 of the Court  to<br />       do  so.   The  action  even  for  stoppage/reduction  in  pension  can<br />       appropriately be taken  by  the  said  authorities  against  Dr.  C.N.<br />       Tewari.</p> <p>D)    Director Generals of Police  UP/Uttarakhand  are  hereby  directed  to<br />       initiate, and expeditiously complete, disciplinary proceedings against<br />       PW6, SI Kartar Singh, whether he is in service or has  since  retired,<br />       for the acts of omission and  commission,  deliberate  dereliction  of<br />       duty in not mentioning reasons for non-disclosure of cause of death as<br />       explained by the doctor, not sending the viscera to the  FSL  and  for<br />       conducting the investigation of  this  case  in  a  most  callous  and<br />       irresponsible manner.  The question of limitation, if any,  under  the<br />       Rules, would not apply as it is by direction of the  Court  that  such<br />       enquiry shall be conducted.</p> <p>E)    We hold, declare and direct that it shall be appropriate  exercise  of<br />       jurisdiction as well as ensuring just and fair investigation and trial<br />       that courts return a specific finding in such cases, upon recording of<br />       reasons as to deliberate dereliction  of  duty,  designedly  defective<br />       investigation, intentional acts of omission and commission prejudicial<br />       to the case of the prosecution, in breach  of  professional  standards<br />       and investigative requirements  of  law,  during  the  course  of  the<br />       investigation by the investigating agency, expert witnesses  and  even<br />       the witnesses cited by the prosecution.  Further, the Courts would  be<br />       fully justified in directing  the  disciplinary  authorities  to  take<br />       appropriate disciplinary or  other  action  in  accordance  with  law,<br />       whether such officer, expert or employee witness, is in service or has<br />       since retired.</p> <p>40.   The appeal is accordingly dismissed.</p> <p><br />                                         ………...….…………......................J.<br />                                                            (Swatanter Kumar)</p> <p> </p> <p><br />                                         ………...….…………......................J.<br />                                           (Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla)</p> <p>New Delhi,<br /> August 3, 2012</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>                                                                  REPORTABLE</p> <p>                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA</p> <p>                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION</p> <p>                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.529 OF 2010</p> <p>Dayal Singh & Ors.                                       … Appellants</p> <p>                                   Versus</p> <p>State of Uttaranchal                                        … Respondent</p> <p>                                O R D E R</p> <p><br />       Today, by a separate judgment, we have directed that action  be  taken<br /> against PW 3 Dr. C.N. Tewari  and  PW  6  SI  Kartar  Singh.   The  Director<br /> General of Police and Director General, Health of  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh<br /> and/or Uttarakhand whoever is the  appropriate  authority,  to  take  action<br /> within three months from today and report the matter to  this  Court.   List<br /> for limited purpose on 15th October, 2012.</p> <p><br />                                         ………...….…………......................J.<br />                                                                   (Swatanter<br />                                                                       Kumar)</p> <p><br />                                         ………...….…………......................J.<br />                                           (Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla)</p> <p>New Delhi,<br /> August 3, 2012</p> <p> </p>