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RAMESH AND OTHERS V. STATE OF HARYANA , CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2526 OF 2014

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Head Note

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 22 Nov 2016

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CONVICTION DESPITE WITNESS TURNED HOSTILE-&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;it is held by Apex court &amp;quot;In my fieldwork experiences, witnesses become &amp;ldquo;hostile&amp;rdquo; not only when &amp;nbsp;they are directly implicated in a case filed by the police, but &amp;nbsp;also &amp;nbsp;when &amp;nbsp;they are on the side of the plaintiff&amp;#39;s &amp;nbsp;party. During &amp;nbsp;the &amp;nbsp;often &amp;nbsp;rather &amp;nbsp;long period that elapses between the police investigation and the &amp;nbsp;trial &amp;nbsp;itself,&amp;nbsp;often observed, the party who has lodged the complaint &amp;nbsp;(and &amp;nbsp;who &amp;nbsp;becomes the main witness) can irreparably compromise the case with the &amp;nbsp;other &amp;nbsp;party by means of compensation, threat or blackmail.&amp;quot;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The State has a definite role to play in protecting the &amp;nbsp;witnesses, &amp;nbsp;to start with at least in sensitive cases involving those &amp;nbsp;in &amp;nbsp;power, who &amp;nbsp;has political patronage and could wield muscle and money power, to &amp;nbsp;avert &amp;nbsp;trial getting tainted and derailed and truth becoming a casualty. As &amp;nbsp;a &amp;nbsp;protector of its citizens it has to ensure that during a trial in &amp;nbsp;Court &amp;nbsp;the &amp;nbsp;witness could safely depose truth &amp;nbsp;without &amp;nbsp;any &amp;nbsp;fear &amp;nbsp;of &amp;nbsp;being &amp;nbsp;haunted &amp;nbsp;by &amp;nbsp;those against whom he had deposed. Every State &amp;nbsp;has &amp;nbsp;a &amp;nbsp;constitutional &amp;nbsp;obligation and duty to protect the life and &amp;nbsp;liberty &amp;nbsp;of &amp;nbsp;its &amp;nbsp;citizens.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

Detailed Summary

&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; REPORTABLE &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2526 OF 2014 |RAMESH AND OTHERS &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;|.....APPELLANT(S) &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;| |VERSUS &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; | &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; | |STATE OF HARYANA &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; |.....RESPONDENT(S) &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; | &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;J U D G M E N T A.K. SIKRI, J. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;The appellants herein &nbsp;were &nbsp;tried &nbsp;and &nbsp;acquitted &nbsp;by &nbsp;the Sessions Court for offences under Sections 302, 34, &nbsp;498A &nbsp;of &nbsp;Indian &nbsp;Penal Code (for short, &#39;IPC&#39;) for which FIR bearing No. 254 dated 28th &nbsp;September, 1999 was registered against &nbsp;them &nbsp;in &nbsp;Police &nbsp;Station &nbsp;Sadar, &nbsp;Bahadurgarh, District Jhajjar, &nbsp;Haryana. &nbsp; However, &nbsp; the &nbsp;High &nbsp;Court, &nbsp;in &nbsp;appeal, &nbsp;has overturned the &nbsp;verdict &nbsp;of &nbsp;acquittal, &nbsp;thereby &nbsp;convicting &nbsp;all &nbsp;the &nbsp;four accused persons (appellants herein). &nbsp;The judgment &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;High &nbsp;Court &nbsp;is dated 30th May, 2014, whereby the appellants are sentenced as under: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &ldquo;Section 302/34 IPC:- To undergo rigorous imprisonment for &nbsp;life and to pay a fine of &nbsp;Rs.10,000/-. &nbsp; In &nbsp;default &nbsp;of &nbsp;payment &nbsp;of &nbsp;fine, &nbsp;to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Section 498-A/34 IPC:- To undergo rigorous imprisonment for &nbsp;two years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-. &nbsp;In default of payment &nbsp;of &nbsp;fine, &nbsp;to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months.&rdquo; 2. &nbsp; &nbsp;We may state at the outset that &nbsp;the &nbsp;conviction &nbsp;is &nbsp;primarily &nbsp;based upon the statement of Smt. Roshni, wife of Appellant no. 1, just before &nbsp;her death. &nbsp;This statement has been taken by the &nbsp;courts &nbsp;below &nbsp;as &nbsp;her &nbsp;&#39;dying declaration&#39; and acted upon with &nbsp;the &nbsp;aid &nbsp;of &nbsp;Section &nbsp;34 &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;Indian Evidence Act, 1872. &nbsp;It is this dying &nbsp;declaration &nbsp;which &nbsp;is &nbsp;the &nbsp;bone &nbsp;of contention. &nbsp;According to the appellants herein there was no reason to &nbsp;rely upon the same not only because of certain infirmities therein but &nbsp;also &nbsp;for the reason of absence of any corroboration. &nbsp; Therefore, &nbsp;before &nbsp;proceeding further, we would like to reproduce the &nbsp;statement &nbsp;of &nbsp;Roshni &nbsp;(hereinafter referred to as the &#39;deceased&#39;). &nbsp;It reads as under: &ldquo;.....Stated that it was the time of 3 A.M. today. &nbsp;I &nbsp;was &nbsp;sleeping &nbsp;in &nbsp;my house at that time. &nbsp;Then my husband Ramesh came &nbsp;and &nbsp;Suresh &nbsp;his &nbsp;brother, i.e., my devar was also with &nbsp;him. &nbsp; Before &nbsp;this, &nbsp;Ramesh &nbsp;my &nbsp;husband &nbsp;and Suresh gave beatings to me. &nbsp;Thereafter, my devar Suresh &nbsp;lighted &nbsp;stick &nbsp;of matchbox. &nbsp;Wife of Suresh and my &nbsp;mother &nbsp;in &nbsp;law &nbsp;namely &nbsp;Saroj &nbsp;and &nbsp; Prem caught hold. &nbsp;Those both brothers ablazed me. &nbsp;Thereafter, &nbsp;the &nbsp;person &nbsp;who had caught hold me and who had set me on &nbsp;fire &nbsp;fled &nbsp;away &nbsp;from &nbsp;the &nbsp;spot. Thereafter, outsider persons came there and put off my fire. &nbsp;I &nbsp;had &nbsp;become upset. Then I was shifted to Medical College &nbsp;by &nbsp;my &nbsp;devar &nbsp;Suresh &nbsp;and &nbsp;my mother in law. My marriage was solemnized 20 years before. &nbsp;I &nbsp;have &nbsp;two &nbsp;sons &nbsp;Manjit &nbsp;and Ravinder aged about 16 and 15 years. One year ago after giving &nbsp;beatings &nbsp;to me I was thrown in a well by Ramesh and Suresh. &nbsp;I was taken &nbsp;out &nbsp;from &nbsp;the well by the villagers. &nbsp;On some occasion they say to bring &nbsp;buffalo &nbsp;and &nbsp;on some occasion they demand money &nbsp;and &nbsp;scooter. &nbsp; All &nbsp;the &nbsp;persons &nbsp;i.e. &nbsp;my mother in law, devrani, devar and husband used to beat me. &nbsp;Nothing &nbsp;else &nbsp;i intend to depose, i am illiterate. &nbsp;I have &nbsp;heard &nbsp;my &nbsp;aforesaid &nbsp;statement, which is correct and &nbsp;accurate. &nbsp; Admitting &nbsp;it &nbsp;to &nbsp;be &nbsp;correct &nbsp;i &nbsp;put &nbsp;my signature on it.&rdquo; As pointed about above, FIR was registered against &nbsp;the &nbsp;appellants &nbsp;on &nbsp;the basis of the aforesaid statement which reflects the case of &nbsp;prosecution &nbsp;as well. &nbsp;Still, in order to have the complete &nbsp;narration &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;prosecution story, we would like to recapitulate the same hereunder. Marriage between Ramesh (Appellant No. 1) and the &nbsp;deceased &nbsp;was &nbsp;solemnized 20 years before the aforesaid incident. &nbsp;They had &nbsp;two &nbsp;sons &nbsp;out &nbsp;of &nbsp;their wedlock, namely, Manjit and Ravinder, 16 &nbsp;and &nbsp;15 &nbsp;years &nbsp;old &nbsp;respectively. The deceased was being harassed by her husband &nbsp;and &nbsp;in-laws &nbsp;on &nbsp;continuous demand of dowry &nbsp;which &nbsp;could &nbsp;not &nbsp;be &nbsp;fulfilled &nbsp;by &nbsp;the &nbsp;parents &nbsp;of &nbsp;the deceased. One year before the incident, she was even thrown &nbsp;in &nbsp;a &nbsp;well &nbsp;by her husband and younger brother Suresh but was &nbsp;rescued &nbsp;by &nbsp;the &nbsp;villagers. She was subjected &nbsp;to &nbsp;continuous &nbsp;physical &nbsp;torture &nbsp;and &nbsp;beatings &nbsp;by &nbsp;her husband, younger brother Suresh, &nbsp;Saroj &nbsp;(wife &nbsp;of &nbsp;Suresh) &nbsp;and &nbsp;Prem &nbsp;(her mother in-law). &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; On the fateful day, i.e., 20th September, 1999 when the &nbsp;deceased &nbsp;was sleeping in the matrimonial house, her husband &nbsp;Ramesh, &nbsp;Suresh, &nbsp;Saroj &nbsp;and Prem came there. &nbsp;Saroj and Prem caught &nbsp;hold &nbsp;of &nbsp;her &nbsp;from &nbsp;her &nbsp;arms &nbsp;and Ramesh sprinkled kerosene on her. &nbsp;Suresh lighted a matchstick and &nbsp;set &nbsp;her ablaze. &nbsp;After setting her ablaze all of &nbsp;them &nbsp;fled &nbsp;away &nbsp;from &nbsp;the &nbsp;spot. Some persons from her neighbourhood came and &nbsp;extinguished &nbsp;the &nbsp;fire. &nbsp; She was taken to Post-Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences (PGIMS), Rohtak &nbsp;by Ramesh, Suresh and Prem. &nbsp; On &nbsp;examination &nbsp;by &nbsp;the &nbsp;doctors &nbsp;in &nbsp;the &nbsp;Post- Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences, it was found that she was &nbsp;suffering from 100% burns. An information &nbsp;was &nbsp;sent &nbsp;by &nbsp;Dr. &nbsp;R.P. &nbsp;Verma &nbsp;to &nbsp;Police intimating admission of the deceased in the hospital. &nbsp;On &nbsp;receipt &nbsp;of &nbsp;this information, &nbsp;Sub-Inspector &nbsp;Rohtash &nbsp;visited &nbsp;the &nbsp;hospital &nbsp;and &nbsp;collected medico-legal report of the victim. &nbsp;He moved the &nbsp;application &nbsp;(Ex. &nbsp;PJ) &nbsp;to the same medical officer seeking his opinion with regard to the &nbsp;fitness &nbsp;of the patient, that is, to say &nbsp;whether she was in fit state of mind &nbsp;to &nbsp;give a statement. &nbsp; The &nbsp;doctor &nbsp;declared &nbsp;her &nbsp;fit &nbsp;to &nbsp;make &nbsp;a &nbsp;statement &nbsp;vide endorsement Ex. PJ/1. &nbsp;On &nbsp;this, &nbsp;the &nbsp;Sub-Inspector &nbsp;approached &nbsp;the &nbsp;Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak and moved the application (Ex. PH) for &nbsp;deputing an &nbsp;officer &nbsp;to &nbsp;record &nbsp;her &nbsp;statement. &nbsp; Shri &nbsp;Bhupender &nbsp;Nath, &nbsp; Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rohtak was &nbsp;assigned &nbsp;this &nbsp;task &nbsp; vide &nbsp;order &nbsp;Ex. PH/1. &nbsp;The said Judicial Magistrate visited the hospital &nbsp;and &nbsp;recorded &nbsp;the statement, which has already been reproduced above. &nbsp;On &nbsp;the &nbsp;basis &nbsp;of &nbsp;the aforesaid statement, initially the FIR was &nbsp;registered &nbsp;under &nbsp;Section &nbsp;307, 498A read with Section 34, IPC. &nbsp; However, &nbsp; Roshni &nbsp;succumbed &nbsp;to &nbsp;injuries within few hours (around 10.30 p.m.) on the same day, i.e., 20th &nbsp;September, 1999. &nbsp;After her death, the FIR was modified &nbsp;by &nbsp;substituting &nbsp;Section &nbsp;302 IPC in place of Section 307 IPC. &nbsp;Postmortem of the &nbsp;body &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;deceased was conducted. &nbsp;The dead body was also subjected to autopsy by &nbsp;a &nbsp;Board &nbsp;of Doctors. &nbsp; Investigating &nbsp;Officer &nbsp;also &nbsp;conducted &nbsp;the &nbsp; spot &nbsp; inspection, prepared rough site plan of the &nbsp;place &nbsp;of &nbsp;occurrence &nbsp;(Ex.PL), &nbsp;took &nbsp;into possession writing Ex.PD/1, arrested the accused persons, subjected them &nbsp;to custodial interrogation and in pursuance to their disclosure statement, &nbsp;got recovered various articles which were taken into possession. &nbsp;On &nbsp;completion of investigation and &nbsp;other &nbsp;formalities, &nbsp;a &nbsp;report &nbsp;under &nbsp;Section &nbsp;173(2) Cr.P.C. was presented before the Court of Jurisdictional Magistrate. Since an offence under Section 302 IPC is exclusively triable by &nbsp;the &nbsp;Court of Sessions, case was committed under Section 209 Cr.P.C. by the &nbsp;Magistrate after having complied &nbsp;with &nbsp;the &nbsp;provisions &nbsp;contained &nbsp;under &nbsp;Section &nbsp;207 Cr.P.C. &nbsp;It was ultimately entrusted to the &nbsp;Court &nbsp;of &nbsp;Additional &nbsp;Sessions Judge, Rohtak, for trial. The Court of Sessions framed the charges against &nbsp;all &nbsp;the &nbsp;accused &nbsp;persons under Section &nbsp;302, &nbsp;498A, &nbsp;IPC &nbsp;with &nbsp;the &nbsp;aid &nbsp;of &nbsp;section &nbsp;34 &nbsp;IPC. &nbsp; The appellants pleaded not guilty and opted to contest. &nbsp;With this, trial &nbsp;began and prosecution examined as many &nbsp;as &nbsp;14 &nbsp;witnesses. &nbsp; Deposition &nbsp;of &nbsp;these witnesses, as taken note of by the Trial Court as well as &nbsp;the &nbsp;High &nbsp;Court, is described in capitulated form hereinafter. PW-1, Dr. R.P. Verma deposed with regard to admission &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;deceased &nbsp;in PGIMS, Rohtak at 6:40 AM on &nbsp;20th &nbsp;September, &nbsp;1999 &nbsp;with &nbsp;100% &nbsp;burns. &nbsp; He conducted medico-legal examination and proved copy of MLR (Ex.PA). &nbsp;He &nbsp;also sent ruqa (Ex.PB) to Police Post, PGIMS, Rohtak, intimating her admission. PW-2, Constable Jai Chand prepared scaled site plan (Ex.PC) of the place &nbsp;of occurrence with correct marginal notes on demarcation by Karan Singh. PW-3, Sardar Singh (father of the deceased), &nbsp;deposed &nbsp;with &nbsp;regard &nbsp;to &nbsp;the compromise arrived at with the accused Ramesh and others about a year &nbsp;prior to the occurrence in question. He furnished copy of compromise &nbsp;as &nbsp;well &nbsp;as that &nbsp;of &nbsp;proceedings &nbsp; initiated &nbsp; under &nbsp; Section &nbsp; 107/151 &nbsp; Cr.P.C. &nbsp; to Investigating Officer which were taken into possession by &nbsp;him &nbsp;vide &nbsp;Ex.PD. He did &nbsp;not &nbsp;support &nbsp;prosecution &nbsp;version &nbsp;in &nbsp;respect &nbsp;of &nbsp;occurrence &nbsp;and ultimately he was declared hostile for toeing the line of the defence. PW-4, Balraj &nbsp;(brother &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;deceased), &nbsp;identified &nbsp;dead &nbsp;body &nbsp;of &nbsp;the deceased in the hospital. &nbsp;PW-5, Partap, who is one of the relations of &nbsp;the deceased, was a witness to the recovery &nbsp;memo &nbsp;(Ex.PD/1). &nbsp; PW-6, &nbsp;Constable Jagdish Chander got conducted autopsy of the dead body of the deceased. &nbsp;PW- 7, Constable Kuldeep Singh was entrusted with the duty of handing &nbsp;over &nbsp;the special report to the jurisdictional Magistrate as &nbsp;well &nbsp;as &nbsp;senior &nbsp;police officer. PW-8, Sub-Inspector Rohtash Singh, conducted initial investigation &nbsp;of &nbsp;this case. &nbsp;PW-9, Head Constable Balwan Singh, was a member of &nbsp;police &nbsp;party &nbsp;at the time when accused Ramesh was subjected to interrogation by &nbsp;the &nbsp;Station House Officer Karan Singh and he suffered disclosure &nbsp;statement &nbsp;(Ex.PM) &nbsp;to the effect that &nbsp;he &nbsp;had &nbsp;kept &nbsp;concealed &nbsp;an &nbsp;empty &nbsp;plastic &nbsp;container &nbsp;of kerosene and &nbsp;that &nbsp;he &nbsp;could &nbsp;get &nbsp;the &nbsp;same &nbsp;recovered. &nbsp;Subsequently, &nbsp;in pursuance to his disclosure statement, he got &nbsp;recovered &nbsp;plastic &nbsp;container (Ex.P1) from the premises of his residential &nbsp;house &nbsp;which &nbsp;was &nbsp;taken &nbsp;into possession vide Ex.PN. PW-10, Inspector &nbsp;Mohar &nbsp;Singh &nbsp;proved &nbsp;proceedings &nbsp;carried &nbsp;by &nbsp;him &nbsp;under Section 107/151 Cr.P.C. against Ram Phal, son of &nbsp;Chandgi, &nbsp;and &nbsp;Ramesh &nbsp;and Suresh, sons of Ram Phal, in pursuance of DDR No. &nbsp;5 &nbsp;dated &nbsp;May &nbsp;22, &nbsp;1998, Police &nbsp;Station, &nbsp;Sadar, &nbsp;Bahadurgarh. &nbsp; He &nbsp;proved &nbsp;copy &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;calender (Ex.PD/2). &nbsp;On receipt of ruqa, he got registered FIR Ex.P1/A &nbsp;on &nbsp;September 20, 1999. PW-11, Shri Bhupender Nath, Judicial &nbsp;Magistrate &nbsp;Ist &nbsp;Class, &nbsp;who &nbsp;recorded dying declaration of the deceased, proved the &nbsp;same &nbsp;as &nbsp;Ex. &nbsp;PH/3, &nbsp;on &nbsp;the basis of which formal FIR was put in black &amp; &nbsp;white &nbsp;and &nbsp;investigation &nbsp;was put in motion. PW-12, Dr. Neelam Thapar, Medical Officer, General Hospital, &nbsp;Rohtak, &nbsp;being a member of the Medical Board, conducted autopsy on the dead &nbsp;body &nbsp;of &nbsp;Smt. Roshni and deposed as under: &ldquo;....Length of the body was 160 C.M. A mod &nbsp;build &nbsp;and &nbsp;mod &nbsp;nourished &nbsp;dead body of female, wearing no clothes having white metal ring in body side &nbsp;2nd toes. &nbsp;No mark of ligature on the neck and dissection &nbsp;etc. &nbsp;present. &nbsp; R.M. present in all four limbs. &nbsp;The injuries are follows:- &ldquo;1. &nbsp; Superficial to be deep &nbsp;infected &nbsp;burns &nbsp;present &nbsp;all &nbsp;over &nbsp;the &nbsp;body except both feet. 2. &nbsp; &nbsp;There is red line of demarcation between burn and non-burn areas. 3. &nbsp; &nbsp;Singing of hair &nbsp;present &nbsp;over &nbsp;scalp, &nbsp;external &nbsp;genetalia &nbsp;and &nbsp;both axilla. 4. &nbsp; &nbsp;Scalp, skull and vertebrae &nbsp;described, &nbsp;membranes &nbsp;brain &nbsp;healthy &nbsp;and congested walls, &nbsp;ribs and cartridges described. Pleura &nbsp;healthy, &nbsp;larynx &nbsp;and &nbsp;trachea &nbsp;healthy, &nbsp;both &nbsp;lungs &nbsp;healthy &nbsp; and congested. Right side heart contains blood, left side of heart empty. &nbsp; Abdominal &nbsp;wall described. &nbsp;Peritoneum healthy. &nbsp; Mouth, &nbsp;pharynx &nbsp;and &nbsp;oesophagus &nbsp;healthy, stomach and its contents healthy and congested. &nbsp;Stomach contains &nbsp;50css &nbsp;of mucoid juices. &nbsp;Small intestines and their contents &nbsp;healthy &nbsp;and &nbsp;congested and large intestine contain faecal matter. Liver, &nbsp;spleen, &nbsp;kidneys &nbsp;healthy and congested. &nbsp;Bladder empty. &nbsp;Organs of generation external &nbsp;and &nbsp;internal external genetalia-hair burn &nbsp;and &nbsp;uterus &nbsp;does &nbsp;not &nbsp;have &nbsp;any &nbsp;product &nbsp;of conception. In our opinion the cause of death of deceased was burn and its &nbsp;complication where were ante mortem in nature &nbsp;and &nbsp;sufficient &nbsp;to &nbsp;cause &nbsp;the &nbsp;death &nbsp;in natural course of nature.....&rdquo; On the conclusion of the prosecution evidence, &nbsp;incriminating &nbsp;circumstances appearing on record were put to the &nbsp;accused &nbsp;persons &nbsp;for &nbsp;eliciting &nbsp;their explanation thereto, as per the procedure mandated under Section 313 of &nbsp;the Cr.P.C. &nbsp;They denied having any role and pleaded &nbsp;that &nbsp;it &nbsp;was &nbsp;a &nbsp;case &nbsp;of accidental fire in which the deceased was trapped. &nbsp;Since identical &nbsp;defence plea was taken by all the accused persons, our purpose would &nbsp;be &nbsp;served &nbsp;in reproducing the statement of Ramesh (Appellant No.1) &nbsp;which runs as under : &ldquo;I am innocent. &nbsp;I was living separate from the rest &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;family &nbsp;after dispute was settled in May, 1998 as declared by the &nbsp;deceased &nbsp;Smt. &nbsp;Roshni. On the night between 19/20/9.1999, I was at my in laws &nbsp;house &nbsp;at &nbsp;Nizampur, Delhi along with &nbsp;my &nbsp;truck &nbsp;and &nbsp;early &nbsp;in &nbsp;the &nbsp;morning &nbsp;at &nbsp;4.00 &nbsp;A.M. &nbsp;a telephonic message was received that Smt. Roshni has received burn &nbsp;injuries due to falling of kerosene lamp and is being referred &nbsp;to &nbsp;PGI, &nbsp;Rohtak &nbsp;and got her admitted in the hospital. &nbsp;I or any of my family members have &nbsp;never harassed Smt. Roshni for dowry or &nbsp;otherwise. &nbsp; After &nbsp;compromise, &nbsp;she &nbsp;was living happily with me. &nbsp;It seems that since she has &nbsp;tutored &nbsp;her &nbsp;to &nbsp;make she alleged statement before JMIC.&rdquo; The trial court, after appraising the evidence on record, in &nbsp;the &nbsp;light &nbsp;of oral arguments which &nbsp;were &nbsp;advanced &nbsp;by &nbsp;both &nbsp;the &nbsp;sides, &nbsp;held &nbsp;that &nbsp;the prosecution could not prove the guilt of the &nbsp;appellants &nbsp;beyond &nbsp;reasonable doubt. &nbsp;As per the trial court, the dying declaration of &nbsp;the &nbsp;victim &nbsp;could not be acted upon for the purpose of conviction in &nbsp;view &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;following attendant circumstances: (a) &nbsp; The &nbsp;Judicial &nbsp;Magistrate &nbsp;(PW-11) &nbsp;had &nbsp;stated &nbsp;during &nbsp; his &nbsp; cross- examination that he could not say if the deceased &nbsp;was &nbsp;semi-conscious &nbsp;when he recorded her statement and he &nbsp;had &nbsp;proceeded &nbsp;to &nbsp;record &nbsp;her &nbsp;statement because the Doctor had given his opinion that she was in fit state &nbsp;of &nbsp;mind to give the statement. (b) &nbsp;Balraj (PW-4), who is the brother of the &nbsp;deceased &nbsp;had &nbsp;stated &nbsp;during the cross-examination that deceased &nbsp;husband &nbsp;Ramesh &nbsp;(appellant &nbsp;No.1) &nbsp;had come to his house and stayed with him on &nbsp;the &nbsp;night &nbsp;intervening &nbsp;19th-20th September, 1999. &nbsp;He further deposed that on 20th September, &nbsp;1999 &nbsp;at &nbsp;4:00 a.m., they had received information about the deceased catching fire and &nbsp;on hearing this news, he along with &nbsp;Ramesh &nbsp;had &nbsp;gone &nbsp;to &nbsp;Rohtak, &nbsp;where &nbsp;the deceased was already lying admitted in the hospital. &nbsp;PW-4 had also &nbsp;deposed to the effect that he had a talk with the deceased who &nbsp;disclosed &nbsp;him &nbsp;that she had received burn injuries as an earthern lamp had fallen on her. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; The trial court believed the aforesaid statement of PW-4 who &nbsp;is none else than the brother of &nbsp;the &nbsp;deceased &nbsp;and &nbsp;concluded &nbsp;that &nbsp;had &nbsp;the appellants committed murder of his &nbsp;sister, &nbsp;he &nbsp;would &nbsp;not &nbsp;have &nbsp;any &nbsp;soft corner for these accused persons. &nbsp;The trial court &nbsp;also &nbsp;observed &nbsp;that &nbsp;as per the statement of PW-4, since appellant No. 1 Ramesh was with him at &nbsp;the time of the incident, he had been falsely implicated in the case. (c) &nbsp;The trial court also took &nbsp;into &nbsp;consideration &nbsp;the &nbsp;conduct &nbsp;of &nbsp;other appellants, namely, Suresh (brother of Ramesh), &nbsp;his &nbsp;wife &nbsp;Saroj &nbsp;and &nbsp;Prem (mother of Ramesh) who had taken the deceased to the &nbsp;hospital &nbsp;i.e. &nbsp;PGIMS, Rohtak for treatment. &nbsp;Commenting upon this, the trial court &nbsp;observed &nbsp;that had they poured kerosene on the deceased and set her on fire with &nbsp;intention to cause her death, they would not &nbsp;have &nbsp;taken &nbsp;her &nbsp;to &nbsp;the &nbsp;hospital &nbsp;for treatment and they would not have got evidence created &nbsp;against &nbsp;themselves. (d) &nbsp;As per the trial court, the dying declaration of the deceased was &nbsp;also intrinsically weak and was not trustworthy. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; This conclusion was arrived at by analysing the episode &nbsp;in &nbsp;the following manner: &ldquo;...Roshni was sleeping in the house when she caught &nbsp;fire &nbsp;at &nbsp;3:00 &nbsp;AM &nbsp;on 20.09.1999. &nbsp;Four persons were not required to commit her murder by &nbsp;getting her on fire. &nbsp;When she was sleeping one person could &nbsp;easily &nbsp;pour &nbsp;kerosene and set her on fire. &nbsp;Allegations made by Roshni in &nbsp;her &nbsp;statement &nbsp;Ex.PH/3 that Saroj and Prem caught hold of her and Ramesh &nbsp;poured &nbsp;kerosene &nbsp;on &nbsp;her and Suresh lighted fire, appears to be concocted and unnatural.&rdquo; On the aforesaid circumstances, the Court of Sessions held that it &nbsp;was &nbsp;not safe to place reliance upon the dying declaration and the &nbsp;possibility &nbsp;that the deceased committed suicide by dousing herself with kerosene and &nbsp;setting herself on fire and thereafter falsely &nbsp;implicating &nbsp;the &nbsp;appellants, &nbsp;could not be ruled out in order to take revenge against them for &nbsp;their &nbsp;perceived past misbehaviour. The High &nbsp;Court, &nbsp;in &nbsp;the &nbsp;impugned &nbsp;judgment, &nbsp;has &nbsp;found &nbsp;fault &nbsp;with &nbsp;the aforesaid analysis, approach and the manner in which the &nbsp;dying &nbsp;declaration has been dealt with by the trial court. &nbsp;According to the &nbsp;High &nbsp;Court, &nbsp;the veracity of the dying declaration could not be examined &nbsp;with &nbsp;reference &nbsp;to the other evidence. &nbsp;It has held that the approach of the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;court &nbsp;was blemished. &nbsp;According to the High Court, the trial &nbsp;court &nbsp;was &nbsp;required &nbsp;to appreciate as to whether the statement of the deceased was given &nbsp;in &nbsp;a &nbsp;fit state &nbsp;of &nbsp;mind; &nbsp;and &nbsp;whether &nbsp;it &nbsp;was &nbsp;voluntarily &nbsp;given &nbsp;without &nbsp; being influenced by any extraneous circumstances and without any tutory. &nbsp;If &nbsp;that was so and the dying declaration of the deceased passed the &nbsp;muster &nbsp;of &nbsp;the aforesaid test and was to be believed, the conviction could be based &nbsp;solely on such a dying &nbsp;declaration. &nbsp; The &nbsp;High &nbsp;Court &nbsp;then &nbsp;examined &nbsp;the &nbsp;dying declaration in the aforesaid perspective &nbsp;and &nbsp;found &nbsp;that &nbsp;the &nbsp;Doctor &nbsp;had declared her fit to make a statement on the &nbsp;basis &nbsp;of &nbsp;which &nbsp;the &nbsp;Judicial Magistrate &nbsp;recorded &nbsp;the &nbsp;statement &nbsp;and &nbsp;even &nbsp;after &nbsp;recording &nbsp; of &nbsp; the statement, the Doctor again gave endorsement that the deceased remained &nbsp;fit during the period &nbsp;her &nbsp;statement &nbsp;was &nbsp;recorded. &nbsp; In &nbsp;such &nbsp;circumstances, statement of the Judicial Magistrate (PW-11) in the Court that he could &nbsp;not say &nbsp;whether &nbsp;the &nbsp;deceased &nbsp;was &nbsp;semi-conscious &nbsp;when &nbsp;her &nbsp;statement &nbsp; was recorded, was of no consequence as he had acted on the basis of the &nbsp;medical opinion. &nbsp;The High Court has &nbsp;also &nbsp;observed &nbsp;that &nbsp;PW-11 &nbsp;never &nbsp;stated &nbsp;in categorical terms that the deceased was semi-conscious &nbsp;when &nbsp;her &nbsp;statement was recorded and, therefore, the said reply of &nbsp;PW-11 &nbsp;in &nbsp;cross-examination was read out of context. &nbsp;The High Court further observed that &nbsp;it &nbsp;was &nbsp;not appropriate on the part of the trial court to discard the dying &nbsp;declaration in view of the deposition of her brother Balraj (PW-4). &nbsp; As &nbsp;per &nbsp;the &nbsp;High Court, not only PW-4 but his father (PW-3) had not supported &nbsp;the &nbsp;statement for the reasons best known to them and it appeared that they &nbsp;had &nbsp;been &nbsp;won over by the appellants. &nbsp;The High Court also noted that merely &nbsp;because &nbsp;the deceased had suffered &nbsp;100% &nbsp;burns &nbsp;was &nbsp;no &nbsp;ground &nbsp;to &nbsp;discard &nbsp;the &nbsp;dying declaration when there was a specific certificate given by the Doctor &nbsp;about her mental fitness and that she was capable of giving the statement. Learned counsel for the appellants challenged the correctness of the &nbsp;manner in which the High &nbsp;Court &nbsp;has &nbsp;pondered &nbsp;over &nbsp;the &nbsp;issue. &nbsp; &nbsp;In &nbsp;the &nbsp;first instance, he submitted that it was a case of acquittal by &nbsp;the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;court after due appreciation of evidence on record and even when &nbsp;two &nbsp;views &nbsp;were possible, the High Court should not have tinkered with &nbsp;the &nbsp;acquittal. &nbsp; He also insisted that &nbsp;the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;court &nbsp;had &nbsp;given &nbsp;cogent &nbsp;reasons &nbsp;for &nbsp;not believing the dying declaration and one of the &nbsp;most &nbsp;material &nbsp;circumstance was that on the fateful night when the &nbsp;incident &nbsp;occurred, &nbsp;appellant &nbsp;No.1 (husband of the deceased) was with PW-4 and &nbsp;it &nbsp;clearly &nbsp;demonstrated &nbsp;that appellant No.1 was falsely roped in. Therefore, it could not &nbsp;be &nbsp;said &nbsp;that the deceased had &nbsp;given &nbsp;an &nbsp;honest &nbsp;and &nbsp;truthful &nbsp;statement. &nbsp; He &nbsp;further submitted that having suffered 100% burns, under no circumstances could &nbsp;she be in a position to &nbsp;give &nbsp;the &nbsp;statement &nbsp;and, &nbsp;therefore, &nbsp;certificate &nbsp;of Doctor should not have been believed. Learned counsel for the &nbsp;respondent, &nbsp;on &nbsp;the &nbsp;other &nbsp;hand, &nbsp;submitted &nbsp;that incident took place in the matrimonial house and the deceased had given &nbsp;the statement &nbsp;after &nbsp;reaching &nbsp;the &nbsp;hospital. &nbsp; The &nbsp;authorities &nbsp; were &nbsp; fully satisfied that she was in a position &nbsp;to &nbsp;give &nbsp;the &nbsp;statement. &nbsp; Therefore, there was no reason to discard the statement as &nbsp;was &nbsp;wrongly &nbsp;done &nbsp;by &nbsp;the trial court. &nbsp;He, thus, supported the reasons given by the High Court. We have duly &nbsp;appreciated &nbsp;the &nbsp;submissions &nbsp;advanced &nbsp;by &nbsp;counsel &nbsp;for &nbsp;the parties on both sides. &nbsp;No doubt, &nbsp;the &nbsp;High &nbsp;Court &nbsp;was &nbsp;dealing &nbsp;with &nbsp;the appeal against the judgment of the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;court &nbsp;which &nbsp;had &nbsp;acquitted &nbsp;the appellants &nbsp;herein. &nbsp; The &nbsp;scope &nbsp;of &nbsp;interference &nbsp;in &nbsp;an &nbsp;appeal &nbsp; against acquittal &nbsp;is &nbsp;undoubtedly &nbsp;narrower &nbsp;than &nbsp;the &nbsp;scope &nbsp;of &nbsp;appeal &nbsp; against conviction. &nbsp;Section 378 of the Code of &nbsp;Criminal &nbsp;Procedure, &nbsp;1973 &nbsp;confers upon the State a right to prefer an appeal to the &nbsp;High &nbsp;Court &nbsp;against &nbsp;the order of acquittal. &nbsp;At the same &nbsp;time, &nbsp;sub-section &nbsp;(3) &nbsp;thereof &nbsp;mandates that such an appeal is not to be entertained except with the &nbsp;leave &nbsp;of &nbsp;the High Court. &nbsp;Thus, before an appeal is entertained on merits, leave &nbsp;of &nbsp;the High Court &nbsp;is &nbsp;to &nbsp;be &nbsp;obtained &nbsp;which &nbsp;means &nbsp;that &nbsp;normally &nbsp;judgment &nbsp;of acquittal of the trial court is attached a definite value which &nbsp;is &nbsp;not &nbsp;to be ignored by the High Court. &nbsp;In other words, presumption of &nbsp;innocence &nbsp;in favour of an accused gets further fortified or reinforced &nbsp;by &nbsp;an &nbsp;order &nbsp;of acquittal. &nbsp;At the same time, while &nbsp;exercising &nbsp;its &nbsp;appellate &nbsp;power, &nbsp;the High Court is empowered to reappreciate, review and reconsider the &nbsp;evidence before it. &nbsp;However, this exercise is to be undertaken in order to &nbsp;come &nbsp;to an independent conclusion and unless there are &nbsp;substantial &nbsp;and &nbsp;compelling reasons or very strong reasons to differ &nbsp;from &nbsp;the &nbsp;findings &nbsp;of &nbsp;acquittal recorded by the trial court, the High Court, as an &nbsp;appellate &nbsp;court &nbsp;in &nbsp;an appeal against the acquittal, is not supposed to substitute its findings &nbsp;in case the findings recorded by the trial court are &nbsp;equally &nbsp;plausible. &nbsp; The scope of interference by the appellate court in an &nbsp;order &nbsp;of &nbsp;acquittal &nbsp;is beautifully summed up in the case of Sanwat Singh v. State &nbsp;of &nbsp;Rajasthan[1] in the following words: &ldquo;The foregoing discussion yields the following &nbsp;results: &nbsp;(1) &nbsp;an &nbsp;appellate court has full power &nbsp;to &nbsp;review &nbsp;the &nbsp;evidence &nbsp;upon &nbsp;which &nbsp;the &nbsp;order &nbsp;of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down &nbsp;in &nbsp;Sheo &nbsp;Swarup&#39;s &nbsp;case afford a correct guide for the appellate &nbsp;court&#39;s &nbsp;approach &nbsp;to &nbsp;a &nbsp;case &nbsp;in disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used &nbsp;in &nbsp;the judgments of this Court, such as, (i) &quot;substantial and compelling &nbsp;reasons&quot;, (ii) &quot;good and sufficiently cogent reasons&quot;, and (iii) &quot;strong reasons&quot; &nbsp;are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of &nbsp;an &nbsp;appellate &nbsp;court &nbsp;in &nbsp;an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to &nbsp;come &nbsp;to &nbsp;its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter &nbsp;on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the &nbsp;reasons &nbsp;given &nbsp;by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its &nbsp;arriving &nbsp;at &nbsp;a conclusion on those facts, but should also &nbsp;express &nbsp;those &nbsp;reasons &nbsp;in &nbsp;its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified.&rdquo; This legal position is reiterated in &nbsp;Govindaraju &nbsp;@ &nbsp;Govinda &nbsp;v. &nbsp;State &nbsp;by Sriramapuram &nbsp;Police &nbsp;Station &nbsp;and &nbsp;another[2] &nbsp;and &nbsp;the &nbsp;following &nbsp;passage therefrom needs to be extracted: &ldquo;12. The legislature in its wisdom, unlike an appeal by an &nbsp;accused &nbsp;in &nbsp;the case of conviction, introduced the concept of leave to appeal &nbsp;in &nbsp;terms &nbsp;of Section 378 CrPC. This is &nbsp;an &nbsp;indication &nbsp;that &nbsp;appeal &nbsp;from &nbsp;acquittal &nbsp;is placed on a somewhat different footing than a normal appeal. But once &nbsp;leave is granted, then there is hardly any difference between a normal appeal &nbsp;and an appeal against acquittal. The concept of leave to &nbsp;appeal &nbsp;under &nbsp;Section 378 CrPC has been introduced as an additional stage &nbsp;between &nbsp;the &nbsp;order &nbsp;of acquittal and consideration of &nbsp;the &nbsp;judgment &nbsp;by &nbsp;the &nbsp;appellate &nbsp;court &nbsp;on merits as in the case of a regular appeal. Sub-section (3) &nbsp;of &nbsp;Section &nbsp;378 clearly provides that no appeal to the High Court under sub-section &nbsp;(1) &nbsp;or (2) shall be entertained except with the &nbsp;leave &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;High &nbsp;Court. &nbsp;This legislative intent &nbsp;of &nbsp;attaching &nbsp;a &nbsp;definite &nbsp;value &nbsp;to &nbsp;the &nbsp;judgment &nbsp;of acquittal cannot be ignored by the courts. 13. &nbsp;Under the scheme of CrPC, acquittal confers rights on an &nbsp;accused &nbsp;that of a free citizen. A benefit that has accrued to an accused by the &nbsp;judgment of acquittal can be taken away and he can be convicted on appeal, only &nbsp;when the judgment &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;court &nbsp;is &nbsp;perverse &nbsp;on &nbsp;facts &nbsp;or &nbsp;law. &nbsp;Upon examination of the evidence before it, the appellate court should &nbsp;be &nbsp;fully convinced &nbsp;that &nbsp;the &nbsp;findings &nbsp;returned &nbsp;by &nbsp;the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;court &nbsp;are &nbsp;really erroneous and contrary to the settled principles of criminal law.&rdquo; The Court also took note of earlier &nbsp;precedents &nbsp;and &nbsp;summarised &nbsp;the &nbsp;legal position laid down in those cases, in the following words: &ldquo;17. If we analyse the above principle somewhat &nbsp;concisely, &nbsp;it &nbsp;is &nbsp;obvious that the golden thread which runs &nbsp;through &nbsp;the &nbsp;web &nbsp;of &nbsp;administration &nbsp;of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the &nbsp;evidence adduced in a case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused &nbsp;and &nbsp;the &nbsp;other to his innocence, the view which is favourable &nbsp;to &nbsp;the &nbsp;accused &nbsp;should &nbsp;be adopted. 18. There are no jurisdictional limitations on the power &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;appellate court but it is to be exercised &nbsp;with &nbsp;some &nbsp;circumspection. &nbsp;The &nbsp;paramount consideration of the court should be to &nbsp;avoid &nbsp;miscarriage &nbsp;of &nbsp;justice. &nbsp;A miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal of &nbsp;guilty &nbsp;is &nbsp;no less than that from the conviction of an innocent. If there &nbsp;is &nbsp;miscarriage of justice from the acquittal, the higher court would examine the matter &nbsp;as a court of fact and appeal &nbsp;while &nbsp;correcting &nbsp;the &nbsp;errors &nbsp;of &nbsp;law &nbsp;and &nbsp;in appreciation of evidence as well. Then the appellate court may even &nbsp;proceed to record the judgment of guilt to meet &nbsp;the &nbsp;ends &nbsp;of &nbsp;justice, &nbsp;if &nbsp;it &nbsp;is really called for. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; xx &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;xx &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; xx 22. A very vital distinction which the court &nbsp;has &nbsp;to &nbsp;keep &nbsp;in &nbsp;mind &nbsp;while dealing &nbsp;with &nbsp;such &nbsp;appeals &nbsp;against &nbsp;the &nbsp;order &nbsp;of &nbsp;acquittal &nbsp; is &nbsp; that interference by the court is justifiable only when a &nbsp;clear &nbsp;distinction &nbsp;is kept &nbsp;between &nbsp;perversity &nbsp;in &nbsp;appreciation &nbsp;of &nbsp;evidence &nbsp;and &nbsp;merely &nbsp; the possibility of another view. It may not be quite appropriate &nbsp;for &nbsp;the &nbsp;High Court to merely record that the judgment of the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;court &nbsp;was &nbsp;perverse without specifically dealing with the facets of perversity relating &nbsp;to &nbsp;the issues &nbsp;of &nbsp;law &nbsp;and/or &nbsp;appreciation &nbsp;of &nbsp;evidence, &nbsp; as &nbsp; otherwise &nbsp; such observations of the High Court may not be sustainable in law.&rdquo; The appellate court, therefore, is &nbsp;within &nbsp;its &nbsp;power &nbsp;to &nbsp;reappreciate &nbsp;or review the evidence on which the acquittal is based. &nbsp;On reconsideration &nbsp;of the evidence on &nbsp;record, &nbsp;if &nbsp;the &nbsp;appellate &nbsp;court &nbsp;finds &nbsp;the &nbsp;verdict &nbsp;of acquittal to be perverse or against the settled position of law, it is &nbsp;duly empowered to set aside the same. &nbsp;On the other hand, if the trial court &nbsp;had appreciated the evidence in right &nbsp;perspective &nbsp;and &nbsp;recorded &nbsp;the &nbsp;findings which are plausible and the view of the trial court &nbsp;does &nbsp;not &nbsp;suffer &nbsp;from perversity, &nbsp;simply &nbsp;because &nbsp;the &nbsp;appellate &nbsp;court &nbsp;comes &nbsp;to &nbsp;a &nbsp;different conclusion on the appreciation of &nbsp;the &nbsp;evidence &nbsp;on &nbsp;record, &nbsp;it &nbsp;will &nbsp;not substitute its findings to that of findings recorded by the trial court. In the instant case, we find that the &nbsp;High &nbsp;Court &nbsp;has &nbsp;interfered &nbsp;on &nbsp;the ground that the very &nbsp;approach &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;court &nbsp;in &nbsp;appreciating &nbsp;the evidence on record was legally unsustainable. &nbsp;If such observations &nbsp;of &nbsp;the High Court are correct, it was fully &nbsp;justified &nbsp;in &nbsp;interjecting &nbsp;with &nbsp;the verdict of the trial court. We have already noticed above the reasons recorded by the trial court &nbsp;while discarding the dying declaration. &nbsp;Admittedly, no weightage is given by &nbsp;the trial court to the opinion of the Doctor certifying that &nbsp;the &nbsp;deceased &nbsp;was in a fit state of mind. Likewise, no reasons were given by the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;court as to why the &nbsp;testimony &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;Judicial &nbsp;Magistrate, &nbsp;who &nbsp;recorded &nbsp;the statement, be disbelieved. Law on the admissibility of the dying declarations is well settled. &nbsp;In &nbsp;Jai Karan v. State of N.C.T., &nbsp;Delhi[3], &nbsp;this &nbsp;Court &nbsp;explained &nbsp;that &nbsp;a &nbsp;dying declaration is admissible in evidence on the principle of necessity and &nbsp;can form the basis of conviction if it is found to be reliable. &nbsp;In &nbsp;order &nbsp;that a dying declaration may form the sole basis for conviction without the &nbsp;need for independent corroboration it must be shown that &nbsp;the &nbsp;person &nbsp;making &nbsp;it had the opportunity of identifying the person implicated and &nbsp;is &nbsp;thoroughly reliable and free from blemish. &nbsp;If, in the facts and circumstances &nbsp;of &nbsp;the case, it is found that the maker of the statement was &nbsp;in &nbsp;a &nbsp;fit &nbsp;state &nbsp;of mind and had voluntarily &nbsp;made &nbsp;the &nbsp;statement &nbsp;on &nbsp;the &nbsp;basis &nbsp;of &nbsp;personal knowledge without being &nbsp;influenced &nbsp;by &nbsp;others &nbsp;and &nbsp;the &nbsp;court &nbsp;on &nbsp;strict scrutiny finds it to be reliable, there &nbsp;is &nbsp;no &nbsp;rule &nbsp;of &nbsp;law &nbsp;or &nbsp;even &nbsp;of prudence that such a reliable piece of evidence cannot be acted upon &nbsp;unless it is &nbsp;corroborated. &nbsp; A &nbsp;dying &nbsp;declaration &nbsp;is &nbsp;an &nbsp;independent &nbsp;piece &nbsp;of evidence like any other piece of evidence, neither &nbsp;extra &nbsp;strong &nbsp;or &nbsp;weak, and can be acted upon without corroboration if it is found to &nbsp;be &nbsp;otherwise true and reliable. &nbsp;There is no hard and fast rule of universal &nbsp;application as to whether percentage &nbsp;of &nbsp;burns &nbsp;suffered &nbsp;is &nbsp;determinative &nbsp;factor &nbsp;to affect credibility of dying declaration and improbability of its &nbsp;recording. &nbsp;Much depends upon the nature of the burn, part of the body affected by &nbsp;the burn, impact of the burn on the faculties to think and convey &nbsp;the &nbsp;idea &nbsp;or facts coming to mind and other relevant factors. &nbsp;Percentage of burns &nbsp;alone would &nbsp;not &nbsp;determine &nbsp;the &nbsp;probability &nbsp;or &nbsp;otherwise &nbsp; of &nbsp; making &nbsp; dying declaration. &nbsp;Physical &nbsp;state &nbsp;or &nbsp;injuries &nbsp;on &nbsp;the &nbsp;declarant &nbsp;do &nbsp;not &nbsp;by themselves become determinative of mental fitness of the declarant &nbsp;to &nbsp;make the statement (See Rambai v. State of Chhatisgarh[4]). It is immaterial to whom the declaration is made. &nbsp;The &nbsp;declaration &nbsp;may &nbsp;be made to a Magistrate, to a Police Officer, a public &nbsp;servant &nbsp;or &nbsp;a &nbsp;private person. &nbsp;It may be made before the doctor; indeed, &nbsp;he &nbsp;would &nbsp;be &nbsp;the &nbsp;best person to opine about the fitness of the dying man to &nbsp;make &nbsp;the &nbsp;statement, and to record the statement, where he found that life was &nbsp;fast &nbsp;ebbing &nbsp;out of the dying &nbsp;man &nbsp;and &nbsp;there &nbsp;was &nbsp;no &nbsp;time &nbsp;to &nbsp;call &nbsp;the &nbsp;Police &nbsp;or &nbsp;the Magistrate. &nbsp;In such a situation the Doctor would be justified, rather &nbsp;duty bound, to record the dying declaration of the dying man. &nbsp;At the same &nbsp;time, it also needs to be emphasised that in the instant case, &nbsp;dying &nbsp;declaration is recorded by a competent Magistrate who was &nbsp;having &nbsp;no &nbsp;animus &nbsp;with &nbsp;the accused persons. &nbsp;As held in Kushal Rao v. State of Bombay[5], this kind &nbsp;of dying declaration would stand on &nbsp;a &nbsp;much &nbsp;higher &nbsp;footing. &nbsp; After &nbsp;all, &nbsp;a competent Magistrate has no axe to grind against the &nbsp;person &nbsp;named &nbsp;in &nbsp;the dying declaration of the victim and in the absence of circumstances &nbsp;showing anything to the contrary, he should not be disbelieved &nbsp;by &nbsp;the &nbsp;Court &nbsp;(See Vikas &amp; Ors. v. State of Maharashtra[6]). No &nbsp;doubt, &nbsp;the &nbsp;victim &nbsp;has &nbsp;been &nbsp;brought &nbsp; with &nbsp; 100% &nbsp; burn &nbsp; injuries. Notwithstanding, the doctor found that she was in a conscious state of &nbsp;mind and was competent to give her statement. &nbsp;Thus, &nbsp;the &nbsp;Magistrate &nbsp;had &nbsp;taken due precautions and, in fact, Medical &nbsp;Officer &nbsp;remained &nbsp;present &nbsp;when &nbsp;the dying declaration was being recorded. &nbsp; Therefore, &nbsp;this &nbsp;dying &nbsp;declaration cannot be discarded merely going by the extent of burns with which &nbsp;she &nbsp;was suffering, particularly, when the &nbsp;defence &nbsp;has &nbsp;not &nbsp;been &nbsp;able &nbsp;to &nbsp;elicit anything from the cross-examination of the doctor that her mental &nbsp;faculties had totally impaired rendering her incapable of giving a statement. Keeping in view the &nbsp;aforesaid &nbsp;considerations, &nbsp;we &nbsp;feel &nbsp;that &nbsp;High &nbsp;Court rightly observed that the manner in which the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;court &nbsp;proceeded &nbsp;with the matter was legally &nbsp;unsustainable. &nbsp; It &nbsp;was &nbsp;necessary &nbsp;for &nbsp;the &nbsp;trial court, in the first instance, to see as &nbsp;to &nbsp;whether &nbsp;due &nbsp;precautions &nbsp;were taken before recording the statement of the &nbsp;deceased, &nbsp;which &nbsp;became &nbsp;dying declaration as she died within few hours thereafter. &nbsp;In this context, &nbsp;what is relevant is that the moment the deceased was admitted in &nbsp;PGIMS, &nbsp;Rohtak, without any loss of time and immediately thereafter the Doctor at &nbsp;the &nbsp;said hospital sent the information to the police post about her admission in &nbsp;the hospital with burns. &nbsp;On receipt of that information, Sub-Inspector &nbsp;visited the hospital and collected Medical Report of the deceased. &nbsp; He &nbsp;immediately moved an application &nbsp;before &nbsp;the &nbsp;concerned &nbsp;Medical &nbsp;Officer &nbsp;seeking &nbsp;his opinion with regard to the fitness of &nbsp;the &nbsp;patient. &nbsp; On &nbsp;that &nbsp;application itself (Ex. PG), the Doctor made an endorsement (Ex. PG/1) that she was &nbsp;fit to make statement. &nbsp;Sub-Inspector &nbsp;did &nbsp;not &nbsp;record &nbsp;the &nbsp;statement &nbsp;of &nbsp;the deceased himself. &nbsp;Rather, he took due precaution by approaching &nbsp;the &nbsp;Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak with an application (Ex. PH) requesting &nbsp;him &nbsp;to depute an officer &nbsp;to &nbsp;record &nbsp;the &nbsp;statement &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;deceased. &nbsp; On &nbsp;this application, &nbsp;orders &nbsp;were &nbsp;passed &nbsp;(Ex. &nbsp;PH/1) &nbsp;directing &nbsp;Bhupinder &nbsp;Nath, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rohtak to go to the &nbsp;hospital &nbsp;and &nbsp;record the statement. &nbsp;Armed with this order, the Magistrate reached &nbsp;the &nbsp;hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased. &nbsp;This recording was done in &nbsp;the presence of the Doctor who again certified that she had given the &nbsp;statement in a fit state of mind. Aforesaid narration stating the manner in which statement &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;deceased was recorded clearly brings out that all possible precautions were taken &nbsp;by the concerned authorities before and while &nbsp;recording &nbsp;her &nbsp;statement. &nbsp; The trial court in its judgment has not even discussed &nbsp;the &nbsp;aforesaid &nbsp;aspects. The recording of statement by &nbsp;the &nbsp;Judicial &nbsp;Magistrate &nbsp;is &nbsp;sought &nbsp;to &nbsp;be discredited on the specious ground that &nbsp;in &nbsp;his &nbsp;cross-examination &nbsp;he &nbsp;has stated that he could not say whether the deceased was &nbsp;semi-conscious. &nbsp; The High Court has rightly recorded that this statement of PW-11 is read out &nbsp;of context. &nbsp;The aforesaid answer by PW-11 was in reply to the question put &nbsp;to him as to whether the deceased was semi-conscious &nbsp;when &nbsp;her &nbsp;statement &nbsp;was recorded by him. &nbsp;It is in reply to this question he stated that &nbsp;he &nbsp;cannot say if she was semi-conscious when her &nbsp;statement &nbsp;was &nbsp;recorded. &nbsp; He &nbsp;also clarified that since the Doctor had &nbsp;given &nbsp;his &nbsp;opinion, &nbsp;he &nbsp;proceeded &nbsp;to record her statement. &nbsp;It may be noticed that PW-11 nowhere stated that &nbsp;the deceased was semi-conscious when her statement was recorded. &nbsp;The &nbsp;statement of PW-11 was to be taken into consideration as a &nbsp;whole. &nbsp; It &nbsp;has &nbsp;come &nbsp;on record, and we repeat, that after &nbsp;the &nbsp;completion &nbsp;of &nbsp;her &nbsp;statement, &nbsp;the Doctor made an endorsement (Ex. &nbsp;PH/4) &nbsp;to &nbsp;the &nbsp;effect &nbsp;that &nbsp;the &nbsp;deceased remained &nbsp;fit &nbsp;during &nbsp;the &nbsp;recording &nbsp;of &nbsp;her &nbsp;statement &nbsp;and &nbsp;it &nbsp;is &nbsp;only thereafter the learned Magistrate (PW-11) appended his signature (Ex. &nbsp;PH/5) categorically stating that the statement recorded by him &nbsp;was &nbsp;true &nbsp;version of what the deceased had spoken and he had stated in unambiguous terms &nbsp;that she was fit to make statement &nbsp;and &nbsp;remained &nbsp;fit &nbsp;till &nbsp;her &nbsp;statement &nbsp;was recorded. In view of the specific certification by the Doctor &nbsp;about &nbsp;the &nbsp;fitness &nbsp;of the deceased that she remained fit while recording the statement, &nbsp;the &nbsp;mere effect that she had suffered 100% burns would not, ipso facto, lead &nbsp;to &nbsp;the conclusion that the deceased was unconscious &nbsp;or &nbsp;that &nbsp;she &nbsp;was &nbsp;not &nbsp;in &nbsp;a proper state of mind to make a statement. &nbsp;At this stage, it would &nbsp;also &nbsp;be relevant to point out that no challenge was &nbsp;made &nbsp;by &nbsp;the &nbsp;defence &nbsp;to &nbsp;the aforesaid statement of the deceased on the &nbsp;ground &nbsp;that &nbsp;it &nbsp;was &nbsp;not &nbsp;made voluntarily or it was made &nbsp;by &nbsp;any &nbsp;extraneous &nbsp;circumstances &nbsp;or &nbsp;was &nbsp;the result of tutoring. &nbsp;In fact, even as per the appellants, &nbsp;it &nbsp;is &nbsp;they &nbsp;who had taken the deceased to the hospital and no other person known to her &nbsp;had come in her contact before the statement was recorded. &nbsp;On the contrary, PW- 3 and PW-4 (father and &nbsp;brother &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;deceased &nbsp;respectively) &nbsp;have &nbsp;not supported the prosecution version, which aspect shall be &nbsp;dealt &nbsp;with &nbsp;later at the appropriate stage and, therefore, the question of tutoring &nbsp;does &nbsp;not arise at all. On examination and analysis &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;dying &nbsp;declaration &nbsp;in &nbsp;the &nbsp;aforesaid perspective, we do not find any reason to discard it having &nbsp;regard &nbsp;to &nbsp;the legal position &nbsp;on &nbsp;the &nbsp;subject &nbsp;already &nbsp;noticed &nbsp;above &nbsp;by &nbsp;referring &nbsp;to relevant case law. &nbsp;It is trite that &nbsp;dying &nbsp;declaration &nbsp;is &nbsp;a &nbsp;substantive piece of evidence and can be made the basis of conviction once the Court &nbsp;is convinced that dying declaration is made voluntarily and is &nbsp;not &nbsp;influenced by any extraneous circumstances. There is one more reason that was given by the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;court &nbsp;in &nbsp;discarding the dying declaration and if correct, that would afford strong &nbsp;circumstance to justify its conclusion. &nbsp;It is the PW-4 who &nbsp;has &nbsp;come &nbsp;as &nbsp;a &nbsp;shield &nbsp;to protect the appellants. &nbsp;For this reason, we &nbsp;advert &nbsp;to &nbsp;the &nbsp;statement &nbsp;of Balraj (PW-4), brother of &nbsp;the &nbsp;deceased. &nbsp; He &nbsp;stated &nbsp;that &nbsp;on &nbsp;the &nbsp;night intervening 19th &ndash; 20th September, 1999, Ramesh was with &nbsp;him. &nbsp; He &nbsp;further deposed that at 4:00 &nbsp;a.m. &nbsp;on &nbsp;20th &nbsp;September, &nbsp;1999, &nbsp;they &nbsp;received &nbsp;the information about the deceased having sustained burn injuries and &nbsp;he &nbsp;along with Ramesh reached PGIMS, Rohtak where she was already present. &nbsp;It &nbsp;is &nbsp;on the basis of this statement that the trial court observed that since &nbsp;Ramesh was with Balraj (PW-4) in his house, he could not be present &nbsp;at &nbsp;the &nbsp;place of incident when it took place and, therefore, he is falsely implicated &nbsp;and mentioning of his name considerably dents the veracity of dying &nbsp;declaration thereby rendering it questionable. &nbsp;However, we find that in &nbsp;accepting &nbsp;the aforesaid version of PW-4, the trial court committed a serious mistake. &nbsp; As per the hospital records, it is Ramesh who had brought the deceased &nbsp;to &nbsp;the hospital and got her admitted which was even the defence case as well. &nbsp; The trial court completely overlooked this pertinent aspect. &nbsp; This &nbsp;fact &nbsp;alone is sufficient to discredit the statement of PW-4 that Ramesh &nbsp;was &nbsp;with &nbsp;him in his house and both &nbsp;of &nbsp;them &nbsp;had &nbsp;received &nbsp;the &nbsp;information &nbsp;about &nbsp;the incident and when both of them &nbsp;reached &nbsp;PGIMS, &nbsp;Rohtak, &nbsp;the &nbsp;deceased &nbsp;was already there. &nbsp;In these circumstances, we &nbsp;entirely &nbsp;agree &nbsp;with &nbsp;the &nbsp;High Court that PW-4, though brother of the deceased, appears to &nbsp;have &nbsp;been &nbsp;won over by the appellants. We find that it is becoming a common phenomenon, almost a &nbsp;regular &nbsp;feature, that in criminal cases &nbsp;witnesses &nbsp;turn &nbsp;hostile. &nbsp;There &nbsp;could &nbsp;be &nbsp;various reasons for this behaviour or attitude of the &nbsp;witnesses. &nbsp; It &nbsp;is &nbsp;possible that when the statements of such witnesses were recorded under &nbsp;Section &nbsp;161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the police during &nbsp;investigation, the &nbsp;Investigating &nbsp;Officer &nbsp;forced &nbsp;them &nbsp;to &nbsp;make &nbsp;such &nbsp;statements &nbsp; and, therefore, &nbsp;they &nbsp;resiled &nbsp;therefrom &nbsp;while &nbsp;deposing &nbsp;in &nbsp;the &nbsp; Court &nbsp; and justifiably so. &nbsp;However, this is no &nbsp;longer &nbsp;the &nbsp;reason &nbsp;in &nbsp;most &nbsp;of &nbsp;the cases. &nbsp;This trend of witnesses turning hostile &nbsp;is &nbsp;due &nbsp;to &nbsp;various &nbsp;other factors. &nbsp;It may be fear &nbsp;of &nbsp;deposing &nbsp;against &nbsp;the &nbsp;accused/delinquent &nbsp;or political pressure or &nbsp;pressure &nbsp;of &nbsp;other &nbsp;family &nbsp;members &nbsp;or &nbsp;other &nbsp;such sociological factors. &nbsp;It is also &nbsp;possible &nbsp;that &nbsp;witnesses &nbsp;are &nbsp;corrupted with monetary considerations. In some of the judgments in past few years, this Court &nbsp;has &nbsp;commented &nbsp;upon such peculiar behaviour of witnesses turning hostile and we &nbsp;would &nbsp;like &nbsp;to quote from few such judgments. &nbsp; In Krishna &nbsp;Mochi &nbsp;v. &nbsp;State &nbsp;of &nbsp;Bihar[7], this Court observed as under: &ldquo;31. It is matter of common experience that in recent times there &nbsp;has &nbsp;been sharp decline of ethical values in public life even in &nbsp;developed &nbsp;countries much less developing one, like ours, where the ratio of decline &nbsp;is &nbsp;higher. Even in ordinary cases, witnesses &nbsp;are &nbsp;not &nbsp;inclined &nbsp;to &nbsp;depose &nbsp;or &nbsp;their evidence is not found to be credible by courts for manifold reasons. One &nbsp;of the reasons may be that they do &nbsp;not &nbsp;have &nbsp;courage &nbsp;to &nbsp;depose &nbsp;against &nbsp;an accused because of threats to their life, more so &nbsp;when &nbsp;the &nbsp;offenders &nbsp;are habitual criminals or high-ups in the Government or close to &nbsp;powers, &nbsp;which may be political, economic or other powers including muscle power.&rdquo; Likewise, &nbsp;in &nbsp;Zahira &nbsp;Habibullah &nbsp;v. &nbsp;State &nbsp;of &nbsp;Gujarat[8], &nbsp; this &nbsp; Court highlighted the problem with following observations: &ldquo;40. &nbsp;Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of &nbsp;justice. &nbsp;Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of trial process. If &nbsp;the &nbsp;witness himself is incapacitated from acting as eyes and ears of justice, the &nbsp;trial gets putrefied and paralysed and it no longer can constitute a &nbsp;fair &nbsp;trial. The incapacitation may be due to several factors like the witness being &nbsp;not in a position for reasons beyond control, to speak the truth &nbsp;in &nbsp;the &nbsp;court or due to negligence or &nbsp;ignorance &nbsp;or &nbsp;some &nbsp;corrupt &nbsp;collusion. &nbsp;Time &nbsp;has become ripe to act on account of numerous experiences faced by the court &nbsp;on account of frequent turning of witnesses as hostile, either due to &nbsp;threats, coercion, lures and monetary considerations at &nbsp;the &nbsp;instance &nbsp;of &nbsp;those &nbsp;in power, their henchmen and hirelings, &nbsp;political &nbsp;clouts &nbsp;and &nbsp;patronage &nbsp;and innumerable other corrupt &nbsp;practices &nbsp;ingeniously &nbsp;adopted &nbsp;to &nbsp;smother &nbsp;and stifle truth and realities coming out to surface. Broader public and &nbsp;social interest require that the victims &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;crime &nbsp;who &nbsp;are &nbsp;not &nbsp;ordinarily parties to prosecution and the interests &nbsp;of &nbsp;State &nbsp;representing &nbsp;by &nbsp;their presenting agencies do not suffer&hellip; there comes the need for &nbsp;protecting &nbsp;the witnesses. Time has come when serious &nbsp;and &nbsp;undiluted &nbsp;thoughts &nbsp;are &nbsp;to &nbsp;be bestowed for protecting witnesses so that ultimate &nbsp;truth &nbsp;presented &nbsp;before the Court and justice &nbsp;triumphs &nbsp;and &nbsp;that &nbsp;the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;is &nbsp;not &nbsp;reduced &nbsp;to mockery. 41. &nbsp;The State has a definite role to play in protecting the &nbsp;witnesses, &nbsp;to start with at least in sensitive cases involving those &nbsp;in &nbsp;power, &nbsp;who &nbsp;has political patronage and could wield muscle and money power, to &nbsp;avert &nbsp;trial getting tainted and derailed and truth becoming a casualty. As &nbsp;a &nbsp;protector of its citizens it has to ensure that during a trial in &nbsp;Court &nbsp;the &nbsp;witness could safely depose truth &nbsp;without &nbsp;any &nbsp;fear &nbsp;of &nbsp;being &nbsp;haunted &nbsp;by &nbsp;those against whom he had deposed. Every State &nbsp;has &nbsp;a &nbsp;constitutional &nbsp;obligation and duty to protect the life and &nbsp;liberty &nbsp;of &nbsp;its &nbsp;citizens. &nbsp;That &nbsp;is &nbsp;the fundamental requirement for observance of the rule of law. There &nbsp;cannot &nbsp;be any deviation from this requirement because of any extraneous factors &nbsp;like, caste, creed, &nbsp;religion, &nbsp;political &nbsp;belief &nbsp;or &nbsp;ideology. &nbsp;Every &nbsp;State &nbsp;is supposed &nbsp;to &nbsp;know &nbsp;these &nbsp;fundamental &nbsp;requirements &nbsp;and &nbsp;this &nbsp; needs &nbsp; no retaliation. We can only say this with &nbsp;regard &nbsp;to &nbsp;the &nbsp;criticism &nbsp;levelled against &nbsp;the &nbsp;State &nbsp;of &nbsp;Gujarat. &nbsp;Some &nbsp;legislative &nbsp;enactments &nbsp;like &nbsp; the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, &nbsp;1987 &nbsp;(in &nbsp;short &nbsp;the &ldquo;TADA Act&rdquo;) have taken note of the reluctance shown by witnesses &nbsp;to &nbsp;depose against people with muscle power, money power or political power &nbsp;which &nbsp;has become the order of the day. If ultimately truth is to be &nbsp;arrived &nbsp;at, &nbsp;the eyes and ears of justice have to be &nbsp;protected &nbsp;so &nbsp;that &nbsp;the &nbsp;interests &nbsp;of justice do not get incapacitated in the &nbsp;sense &nbsp;of &nbsp;making &nbsp;the &nbsp;proceedings before Courts mere mock trials as are usually seen in movies.&rdquo; Likewise, in Sakshi v. Union of India[9], the menace &nbsp;of &nbsp;witnesses &nbsp;turning hostile was again described in the following words: &ldquo;32. The mere sight of the accused may induce an element of extreme fear &nbsp;in the mind of the victim or the witnesses or &nbsp;can &nbsp;put &nbsp;them &nbsp;in &nbsp;a &nbsp;state &nbsp;of shock. In such a situation he or she may not be able to &nbsp;give &nbsp;full &nbsp;details of the incident which may result in miscarriage &nbsp;of &nbsp;justice. &nbsp;Therefore, &nbsp;a screen or some such arrangement can be made where the &nbsp;victim &nbsp;or &nbsp;witnesses do not have to undergo the trauma of seeing the body &nbsp;or &nbsp;the &nbsp;face &nbsp;of &nbsp;the accused. &nbsp;Often &nbsp;the &nbsp;questions &nbsp;put &nbsp;in &nbsp;cross-examination &nbsp;are &nbsp; purposely designed to embarrass or confuse the victims of rape and &nbsp;child &nbsp;abuse. &nbsp;The object is that out of the feeling of shame or embarrassment, the victim &nbsp;may not speak out or give details of certain acts committed by the &nbsp;accused. &nbsp;It will, therefore, be better if the questions to be &nbsp;put &nbsp;by &nbsp;the &nbsp;accused &nbsp;in cross-examination are given in writing &nbsp;to &nbsp;the &nbsp;Presiding &nbsp;Officer &nbsp;of &nbsp;the Court, who may put the same to the victim or witnesses in a &nbsp;language &nbsp;which is not embarrassing. &nbsp;There &nbsp;can &nbsp;hardly &nbsp;be &nbsp;any &nbsp;objection &nbsp;to &nbsp;the &nbsp;other suggestion given by the petitioner that whenever a child or victim &nbsp;of &nbsp;rape is required to give testimony, sufficient breaks &nbsp;should &nbsp;be &nbsp;given &nbsp;as &nbsp;and when required. The provisions of sub-section &nbsp;(2) &nbsp;of &nbsp;section &nbsp;327 &nbsp;Cr.P.C. should also apply in inquiry or trial of offences under Section 354 and &nbsp;377 IPC.&rdquo; In State v. Sanjeev Nanda[10], the Court &nbsp;felt &nbsp;constrained &nbsp;in &nbsp;reiterating the growing disturbing trend: &ldquo;99. Witness turning hostile is a &nbsp;major &nbsp;disturbing &nbsp;factor &nbsp;faced &nbsp;by &nbsp;the criminal courts in &nbsp;India. &nbsp;Reasons &nbsp;are &nbsp;many &nbsp;for &nbsp;the &nbsp;witnesses &nbsp;turning hostile, but of late, we see, especially in high profile cases, there &nbsp;is &nbsp;a regularity &nbsp;in &nbsp;the &nbsp;witnesses &nbsp;turning &nbsp;hostile, &nbsp;either &nbsp;due &nbsp;to &nbsp;monetary consideration or &nbsp;by &nbsp;other &nbsp;tempting &nbsp;offers &nbsp;which &nbsp;undermine &nbsp;the &nbsp;entire criminal justice system and people carry the impression that the mighty &nbsp;and powerful can always get away from &nbsp;the &nbsp;clutches &nbsp;of &nbsp;law &nbsp;thereby, &nbsp;eroding people&rsquo;s faith in the system. 100. &nbsp;This court in State of U.P. v. Ramesh Mishra and &nbsp;Anr. &nbsp;[AIR &nbsp;1996 &nbsp;SC 2766] held that it is equally settled &nbsp;law &nbsp;that &nbsp;the &nbsp;evidence &nbsp;of &nbsp;hostile witness &nbsp;could &nbsp;not &nbsp;be &nbsp;totally &nbsp;rejected, &nbsp;if &nbsp;spoken &nbsp;in &nbsp;favour &nbsp;of &nbsp;the prosecution or the accused, but it can be subjected to closest scrutiny &nbsp;and that portion of the evidence which &nbsp;is &nbsp;consistent &nbsp;with &nbsp;the &nbsp;case &nbsp;of &nbsp;the prosecution or defence may be accepted. In K. Anbazhagan &nbsp;v. &nbsp;Superintendent of Police and Anr., &nbsp;(AIR 2004 SC 524), this Court &nbsp;held &nbsp;that &nbsp;if &nbsp;a &nbsp;court finds that in the process the credit of the witness has not been &nbsp;completely shaken, he may after reading and considering the evidence of the witness &nbsp;as a whole with due caution, accept, in &nbsp;the &nbsp;light &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;evidence &nbsp;on &nbsp;the record that part of his testimony which it finds to be creditworthy and &nbsp;act upon it. This is exactly what was done in &nbsp;the &nbsp;instant &nbsp;case &nbsp;by &nbsp;both &nbsp;the trial court and the High Court and they found the accused guilty. 101. We cannot, however, close our &nbsp;eyes &nbsp;to &nbsp;the &nbsp;disturbing &nbsp;fact &nbsp;in &nbsp;the instant case where even the injured witness, who was present &nbsp;on &nbsp;the &nbsp;spot, turned hostile. This Court in Sidhartha Vashisht &nbsp;@ &nbsp;Manu &nbsp;Sharma &nbsp;v. &nbsp;State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1 and in Zahira Habibullah Shaikh v. &nbsp;State &nbsp;of Gujarat, AIR 2006 SC 1367, &nbsp;had &nbsp;highlighted &nbsp;the &nbsp;glaring &nbsp;defects &nbsp;in &nbsp;the system like non-recording of the statements correctly by the police and &nbsp;the retraction &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;statements &nbsp;by &nbsp; the &nbsp; prosecution &nbsp; witness &nbsp; due &nbsp; to intimidation, &nbsp;inducement &nbsp;and &nbsp;other &nbsp;methods &nbsp;of &nbsp; manipulation. &nbsp; Courts, however, cannot shut their &nbsp;eyes &nbsp;to &nbsp;the &nbsp;reality. &nbsp;If &nbsp;a &nbsp;witness &nbsp;becomes hostile to subvert the judicial process, the Courts shall &nbsp;not &nbsp;stand &nbsp;as &nbsp;a mute spectator and every effort should be made &nbsp;to &nbsp;bring &nbsp;home &nbsp;the &nbsp;truth. Criminal judicial system cannot be overturned by &nbsp;those &nbsp;gullible &nbsp;witnesses who act under pressure, inducement or intimidation. Further, Section 193 &nbsp;of the &nbsp;IPC &nbsp;imposes &nbsp;punishment &nbsp;for &nbsp;giving &nbsp;false &nbsp;evidence &nbsp;but &nbsp;is &nbsp;seldom invoked.&rdquo; On the analysis of various cases, following reasons can be &nbsp;discerned &nbsp;which make witnesses retracting their statements &nbsp;before &nbsp;the &nbsp;Court &nbsp;and &nbsp;turning hostile: &ldquo;(i) &nbsp;Threat/intimidation. (ii) &nbsp;Inducement by various means. (iii) Use of muscle and money power by the accused. (iv) &nbsp;Use of Stock Witnesses. (v) &nbsp;Protracted Trials. (vi) Hassles faced by the witnesses during investigation and trial. (vii) Non-existence of any &nbsp;clear-cut &nbsp;legislation &nbsp;to &nbsp;check &nbsp;hostility &nbsp;of witness.&rdquo; Threat and intimidation has been one of the major causes for &nbsp;the &nbsp;hostility of witnesses. &nbsp;Bentham said: &ldquo;witnesses are the eyes and ears &nbsp;of &nbsp;justice&rdquo;. When the witnesses are not able to depose correctly in the court of law, &nbsp;it results in low rate of conviction and many &nbsp;times &nbsp;even &nbsp;hardened &nbsp;criminals escape the conviction. &nbsp;It shakes public confidence in the criminal &nbsp;justice delivery system. &nbsp;It is for this reason there has been a lot &nbsp;of &nbsp;discussion on witness protection and from various &nbsp;quarters &nbsp;demand &nbsp;is &nbsp;made &nbsp;for &nbsp;the State to play &nbsp;a &nbsp;definite &nbsp;role &nbsp;in &nbsp;coming &nbsp;out &nbsp;with &nbsp;witness &nbsp;protection programme, at least in sensitive cases involving those in &nbsp;power, &nbsp;who &nbsp;have political patronage and could wield muscle and money power, to &nbsp;avert &nbsp;trial getting tainted and derailed and truth becoming a &nbsp;casualty. &nbsp; A &nbsp;stern &nbsp;and emphatic message to this effect was given in &nbsp;Zahira &nbsp;Habibullah&#39;s &nbsp;case &nbsp;as well. Justifying the measures to be taken for witness &nbsp;protection &nbsp;to &nbsp;enable &nbsp;the witnesses to depose truthfully and without fear, Justice Malimath &nbsp;Committee Report on Reforms of Criminal Justice System, 2003 has remarked as under: &ldquo;11.3 Another major problem is about safety of witnesses &nbsp;and &nbsp;their &nbsp;family members who face danger at different stages. They are often &nbsp;threatened &nbsp;and the seriousness of the threat depends upon the type &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;case &nbsp;and &nbsp;the background of the accused and his family. Many times crucial &nbsp;witnesses &nbsp;are threatened or injured prior &nbsp;to &nbsp;their &nbsp;testifying &nbsp;in &nbsp;the &nbsp;court. &nbsp;If &nbsp;the witness is still not amenable he may even be murdered. &nbsp;In &nbsp;such &nbsp;situations the witness will not come forward to give evidence unless he is &nbsp;assured &nbsp;of protection &nbsp;or &nbsp;is &nbsp;guaranteed &nbsp;anonymity &nbsp; of &nbsp; some &nbsp; form &nbsp; of &nbsp; physical disguise&hellip;Time has come for a comprehensive law being enacted for &nbsp;protection of the witness and members of his family.&rdquo; Almost to similar effect are the observations of Law Commission of India &nbsp;in its 198th Report[11], as can be seen from the following discussion therein: &ldquo;The reason is not far to seek. In the case &nbsp;of &nbsp;victims &nbsp;of &nbsp;terrorism &nbsp;and sexual offences against women and juveniles, we are dealing with &nbsp;a &nbsp;section of society &nbsp;consisting &nbsp;of &nbsp;very &nbsp;vulnerable &nbsp;people, &nbsp;be &nbsp;they &nbsp;victims &nbsp;or witnesses. &nbsp; The victims and witnesses are under fear of or danger to &nbsp;their lives or lives of their relations or to their property. It is &nbsp;obvious &nbsp;that in the case of serious offences under the Indian Penal code, 1860 and &nbsp;other special enactments, some of which we &nbsp;have &nbsp;referred &nbsp;to &nbsp;above, &nbsp;there &nbsp;are bound to be absolutely similar situations for victims and &nbsp;witnesses. &nbsp;While in the case of certain offences under special statutes such fear &nbsp;or &nbsp;danger to victims and witnesses may be more common and pronounced, in the &nbsp;case &nbsp;of victims and witnesses involved or &nbsp;concerned &nbsp;with &nbsp;some &nbsp;serious &nbsp;offences, fear may be no less important. Obviously, &nbsp;if &nbsp;the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;in &nbsp;the &nbsp;case &nbsp;of special offences is to be fair both &nbsp;to &nbsp;the &nbsp;accused &nbsp;as &nbsp;well &nbsp;as &nbsp;to &nbsp;the victims/witnesses, then there is no reason &nbsp;as &nbsp;to &nbsp;why &nbsp;it &nbsp;should &nbsp;not &nbsp;be equally fair in the &nbsp;case &nbsp;of &nbsp;other &nbsp;general &nbsp;offences &nbsp;of &nbsp;serious &nbsp;nature falling under the Indian Penal Code, 1860. It &nbsp;is &nbsp;the &nbsp;fear &nbsp;or &nbsp;danger &nbsp;or rather the likelihood thereof that is common to &nbsp;both &nbsp;cases. &nbsp;That &nbsp;is &nbsp;why several general statutes in other countries provide for victim &nbsp;and &nbsp;witness protection.&rdquo; Apart from the above, &nbsp;another &nbsp;significant &nbsp;reason &nbsp;for &nbsp;witnesses &nbsp;turning hostile may be what is described as &nbsp;&#39;culture &nbsp;of &nbsp;compromise&#39;. &nbsp; Commenting upon such culture in rape trials, Pratiksha Bakshi[12] has highlighted &nbsp;this problem in the following manner: &ldquo;During the trial, compromise acts &nbsp;as &nbsp;a &nbsp;tool &nbsp;in &nbsp;the &nbsp;hands &nbsp;of &nbsp;defence lawyers and the accused to pressurise complainants &nbsp;and &nbsp;victims &nbsp;to &nbsp;change their testimonies in a courtroom. Let us turn to a &nbsp;recent &nbsp;case &nbsp;from &nbsp;Agra wherein a young Dalit woman was gang-raped and the rapist let off &nbsp;on &nbsp;bail. The accused threatened to rape the victim again if she did &nbsp;not &nbsp;compromise. Nearly a year after she was raped, she committed &nbsp;suicide. &nbsp; While &nbsp;we &nbsp;find that the judgment records that the victim committed &nbsp;suicide &nbsp;following &nbsp;the pressure to compromise, the judgment does not criminalise &nbsp;the &nbsp;pressure &nbsp;to compromise as criminal intimidation &nbsp;of &nbsp;the &nbsp;victim &nbsp;and &nbsp;her &nbsp;family. &nbsp;The normalising function of the &nbsp;socio-legal &nbsp;category &nbsp;of &nbsp;compromise &nbsp;converts terror into a bargain in a context where &nbsp;there &nbsp;is &nbsp;no &nbsp;witness &nbsp;protection programme. This often accounts for why prosecution witnesses routinely &nbsp;turn hostile by the time the case comes on trial, if the &nbsp;victim &nbsp;does &nbsp;not &nbsp;lose the will to live. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; In other words, I have shown how legality is actually &nbsp;perceived as disruptive of sociality; in this instance, a sociality that is marked &nbsp;by caste based patriarchies, such that compromise &nbsp;is &nbsp;actively &nbsp;perceived, &nbsp;to put it in the words of a woman judge of a district &nbsp;court, &nbsp;as &nbsp;a &nbsp;mechanism for &lsquo;restoring social relations in society&rsquo;.&rdquo; In this regard, two articles by Daniela &nbsp;Berti &nbsp;delve &nbsp;into &nbsp;a &nbsp;sociological analysis of hostile witnesses, noting how village compromises (and &nbsp;possibly peer pressure) are a reason for witnesses turning hostile. &nbsp;In &nbsp;one &nbsp;of &nbsp;his articles[13], he writes: &ldquo;For reasons that cannot be explained here, even the people who &nbsp;initiate &nbsp;a legal case may change their minds later on and pursue non-official forms &nbsp;of compromise or adjustment. Ethnographic observations of &nbsp;the &nbsp;cases &nbsp;that &nbsp;do make it to the criminal courtroom thus provide insight &nbsp;into &nbsp;the &nbsp;kinds &nbsp;of tensions &nbsp;that &nbsp;arise &nbsp;between &nbsp;local &nbsp;society &nbsp;and &nbsp; the &nbsp; state &nbsp; judicial administration. These tensions &nbsp;are &nbsp;particularly &nbsp;palpable &nbsp;when &nbsp;witnesses deny before the &nbsp;judge &nbsp;what &nbsp;they &nbsp;allegedly &nbsp;said &nbsp;to &nbsp;the &nbsp;police &nbsp;during preliminary investigations. At this very moment they often &nbsp;become &nbsp;hostile. Here I must point out that the problem of what in common law terminology &nbsp;is called &ldquo;hostile witnesses&rdquo; is, in fact, general in India &nbsp;and &nbsp;has &nbsp;provoked many a reaction from judges and politicians, as well &nbsp;as &nbsp;countless &nbsp;debates in newspaper editorials. Although this problem assumes particular &nbsp;relevance at high-profile, well-publicized trials, where witnesses may be &nbsp;politically pressured or bribed, it is a recurring everyday situation with which &nbsp;judges and prosecutors of any small district town &nbsp;are &nbsp;routinely &nbsp;faced. &nbsp;In &nbsp;many such &nbsp;cases, &nbsp;the &nbsp;hostile &nbsp;behavior &nbsp;results &nbsp;from &nbsp;various &nbsp;dynamics &nbsp;that interfere with the trial&#39;s outcome &nbsp;&ndash; &nbsp;village &nbsp;or &nbsp;family &nbsp;solidarity, &nbsp;the sharing of the &nbsp;same &nbsp;illegal &nbsp;activity &nbsp;for &nbsp;which &nbsp;the &nbsp;accused &nbsp;has &nbsp;been incriminated (as in case &nbsp;of &nbsp;cannabis &nbsp;cultivation), &nbsp;political &nbsp;interests, family pressures, various forms of &nbsp;economic &nbsp;compensation, &nbsp;and &nbsp;so &nbsp;forth. Sometimes the witness becomes &ldquo;hostile&rdquo; simply &nbsp;because &nbsp;police &nbsp;records &nbsp;of his or her earlier testimony are plainly wrong. Judges themselves &nbsp;are &nbsp;well aware that &nbsp;the &nbsp;police &nbsp;do &nbsp;write &nbsp;false &nbsp;statements &nbsp;for &nbsp;the &nbsp;purpose &nbsp;of strengthening their cases. &nbsp;Though &nbsp;well &nbsp;known &nbsp;in &nbsp;judicial &nbsp;milieus, &nbsp;the dynamics just described have not yet been studied as they &nbsp;unfold &nbsp;over &nbsp;the course of a &nbsp;trial. &nbsp;My &nbsp;research &nbsp;suggests, &nbsp;however, &nbsp;that &nbsp;the &nbsp;witness&#39;s withdrawal from his or her previous statement is a &nbsp;crucial &nbsp;moment &nbsp;in &nbsp;the trial, one that clearly encapsulates &nbsp;the &nbsp;tensions &nbsp;arising &nbsp;between &nbsp;those involved in a trial and the court machinery itself.&rdquo; &ldquo;In my fieldwork experiences, witnesses become &ldquo;hostile&rdquo; not only when &nbsp;they are directly implicated in a case filed by the police, but &nbsp;also &nbsp;when &nbsp;they are on the side of the plaintiff&#39;s &nbsp;party. &nbsp;During &nbsp;the &nbsp;often &nbsp;rather &nbsp;long period that elapses between the police investigation and the &nbsp;trial &nbsp;itself, I often observed, the party who has lodged the complaint &nbsp;(and &nbsp;who &nbsp;becomes the main witness) can irreparably compromise the case with the &nbsp;other &nbsp;party by means of compensation, threat or blackmail.&rdquo; Present case &nbsp;appears &nbsp;to &nbsp;have &nbsp;been &nbsp;stung &nbsp;by &nbsp;&#39;culture &nbsp;of &nbsp;compromise&#39;. Fortunately, &nbsp;statement of PW-4 in attempting to shield the &nbsp;accused &nbsp;Ramesh has been proved to be false in view of the records &nbsp;of &nbsp;PGIMS, &nbsp;Rohtak &nbsp;and, therefore, we held that High Court was right in discarding his testimony. We, thus, do not find &nbsp;any &nbsp;merit &nbsp;in &nbsp;this &nbsp;appeal, &nbsp;which &nbsp;is &nbsp;accordingly dismissed. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;.............................................J. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; (A.K. SIKRI) &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;.............................................J. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;(AMITAVA ROY) NEW DELHI; NOVEMBER 22, 2016. ----------------------- [1] &nbsp; 1961 SCR (3) 120 [2] &nbsp; (2012) 4 SCC 722 [3] &nbsp; (1999) 8 SCC 161 [4] &nbsp; (2002) 8 SCC 83) [5] &nbsp; 1958 SCR 552 [6] &nbsp; (2008) 2 SCC 516 [7] &nbsp; (2002) 6 SCC 81 [8] &nbsp; (2006) 3 SCC 374 [9] &nbsp; (2004) 5 SCC 518 [10] &nbsp;(2012) 8 SCC 450 [11] &nbsp;Report on &#39;witness identity protection and witness protection programmes&#39; [12] &nbsp;In Justice is a Secret : Compromise in Rape Trials&rdquo; [13] &nbsp;Daniela Berti : Courts of Law and Legal Practice (pp. 6-7)

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