<p>PETITIONER:<br /> SHARAD BIRDHI CHAND SARDA</p> <p>    Vs.</p> <p>RESPONDENT:<br /> STATE OF MAHARASHTRA</p> <p>DATE OF JUDGMENT17/07/1984</p> <p>BENCH:<br /> FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA<br /> BENCH:<br /> FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA<br /> VARADARAJAN, A. (J)<br /> MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)</p> <p>CITATION:<br />  1984 AIR 1622          1985 SCR  (1)     88<br />  1984 SCC  (4) 116      1984 SCALE  (2)445<br />  CITATOR INFO :<br />  D        1988 SC1101     (22)<br />  F        1990 SC  79     (21)<br />  R        1991 SC 917     (37,42,50)<br />  R        1991 SC1842     (6)</p> <p><br /> ACT:<br />      Constitution of  India, 1950,  Article 136-Interference<br /> by the Supreme Court with the concurrent findings of fact of<br /> the   courts   below,    normally   not     permissible-Special<br /> circumstance  like   errors  of      law,    violation   of    well<br /> established principles    of criminal jurisprudence etc. would<br /> be necessary for interference.<br />      Evidence-Circumstantial evidence,    nature and proof of-<br /> Conditions precedent  for conviction-Evidence  Act Section 3<br /> (Act 1 of 1972).<br />      Evidence-Circumstantial   evidence-Onus    of    proof-<br /> Prosecution must  prove every link of the chain and complete<br /> chain-Infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution cannot be cured<br /> by false  defence or  plea-A person  cannot be    convicted on<br /> pure moral  conviction-False  explanation  can    be  used  as<br /> additional link     to fortify the prosecution case, subject to<br /> satisfaction of certain conditions.<br />      Doctrine of  Proximity, concept  of, nature  and limits<br /> explained-Admissibility of statements and dying declarations<br /> under sections 8, 32 of the Evidence Act.<br />      Murder by    administration of  poison-Circumstances that<br /> should be  looked into    before a  conviction-Penal Code (Act<br /> XLV of 1860) Section 300.<br />      Evidence,    appreciation   of-Evidence   of      interested<br /> witnesses,  especially     that  of  close  relatives  of     the<br /> deceased-Duty of  the Court-Evidence  Act (Act    I  of  1872)<br /> Section 3.<br />      Benefit of     doubt-When  two  views     are  possible,     one<br /> leading to the guilt of the accused and the other leading to<br /> his innocence, the benefit of doubt should go to the accused<br /> entitling  his     acquittal-Evidence  Act  (Act    I  of  1872)<br /> Sections 101-104.<br />      Examination of  the accused  under Section     313 of Crl.<br /> P.C.-Circumstances not put to the accused to explain, cannot<br /> be considered  for conviction-Code  of    Criminal  Procedure,<br /> 1973 (Act II of 1974) Section 313.</p> <p> </p> <p>HEADNOTE:<br />      The appellant,  Rameshwar, Birdhichand  Sarda, Ramvilas<br /> Rambagas Sarda,     were accused  1, 2  and 3  respectively  in<br /> Sessions Case  No. 203 of 1982 on the file of the Additional<br /> Sessions Judge,     Pune. The  appellant and the second accused<br /> are the     sons of  one Birdhichand of Pune whose family has a<br /> cloth business.     In addition,  the appellant,  a graduate in<br /> Chemical Engineering had<br /> 89<br /> started a chemical factory at Bhosari, a suburb of Pune. The<br /> third accused  is uncle     of the     appellant  and     the  second<br /> accused. The  appellant is  the husband     of Manjushree alias<br /> Manju while  the second     accused is  the husband of Anuradha<br /> (P.W. 35). Birdhichand's family has its residential house at<br /> Ravivar Peth  in Pune and owns a flat in a building known as<br /> Takshasheela Apartments     in Mukund  Nagar area    of Pune. All<br /> the three  accused were     charged for  the alleged offence of<br /> murder by  poisoning on     the night  of 11/12.6.1982 of Manju<br /> the  newly  married  wife  of  the  first  accused  and     the<br /> appellant herein  under section 302 I.P.C. read with section<br /> 120B. Accused  No, 3 was also charged under section 201 read<br /> with Section  120B I.P.C.  The    whole  case  vested  on     the<br /> circumstantial evidence     based on certain letters alleged to<br /> have been  written by  the deceased to some of the witnesses<br /> and other statements of the deceased to them and the medical<br /> report. On  an appreciation  of the evidence the trial court<br /> found all  the three  accused guilty  as charged,  convicted<br /> them accordingly  and sentenced the appellant to death under<br /> s.302  I.P.C.    and  all   the    three  accused    to  rigorous<br /> imprisonment for  two years  and a  fine of  Rs. 2,000    each<br /> under s.120B  I.P.C. but  did not  award any  sentence under<br /> s.201 read with s.120B.<br />      The appellant  and the  other two accused file Criminal<br /> Appeal No. 265/83 against their conviction and the sentences<br /> awarded     to  them.  The     State    filed  a  Criminal  Revision<br /> application for     enhancement  of  the  sentence     awarded  to<br /> accused 2  and 3.  The appeal  as well    as Criminal Revision<br /> application was     heard along with confirmation case No. 3 of<br /> 1983 together by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court<br /> which allowed  the appellants  appeal in  part regarding his<br /> conviction and    sentence under    s.120B I.P.C.  but confirmed<br /> his conviction    and sentence  of death awarded under section<br /> 302 I.P.C.,  allowed the  appeal of  accused 2 and 3 in full<br /> and acquitted  them  and  dismissed  the  Criminal  Revision<br /> Application. Hence  the appellant  alone has  come up before<br /> the Supreme Court after obtaining Special Leave.<br />      Allowing the appeal, the Court<br /> ^<br />      HELD: (Per Fazal Ali, J.).<br />      1:1. Normally,  the Supreme  Court does  not  interfere<br /> with the concurrent findings of the fact of the courts below<br /> in the absence of very special circumstances or gross errors<br /> of law    committed by  the High    Court. But,  where the    High<br /> Court ignores  or  overlooks  the  crying  circumstance     and<br /> proved    facts,     or  violates    and  misapplies      the    well<br /> established principles of criminal jurisprudence or decision<br /> rendered by  this Court     on appreciation  of  circumstantial<br /> evidence and refuses to give benefit of doubt to the accused<br /> despite facts  apparent on  the face of the record or on its<br /> own finding  or tries  to gloss over them without giving any<br /> reasonable explanation    or commits errors of law apparent on<br /> the  face  of  the  record  which  results  in    serious     and<br /> substantial miscarriage of justice to the accused, it is the<br /> duty of     this Court  to step  in  and  correct    the  legally<br /> erroneous decision of the High Court. [174E-G]<br />      1:2. Suspicion,  however, great  it may be, cannot take<br /> the place of legal proof. A moral conviction however, strong<br /> or genuine  cannot amount  to a legal conviction supportable<br /> in law. [174H]<br />      1:3. The  well established     rule of criminal justice is<br /> 'fouler the  crime higher  the proof'.    In the instant case,<br /> the life and liberty of a subject was at<br /> 90<br /> stake. As  the accused    was given  a capital sentence a very<br /> careful cautious  and meticulous approach necessarily had to<br /> be made by the Court. [175A]<br />      2:1. The  Indian law  on the question of the nature and<br /> scope of  dying declaration  has made  a distinct  departure<br /> from the English law where only the statement which directly<br /> relate to the cause of death are admissible. The second part<br /> of  cl.(1)   of     s.32,     viz,  "the   circumstances  of     the<br /> transaction which  resulted in    his death, in cases in which<br /> the cause of that person's death comes into question" is not<br /> to be found in the English Law. [107F-G]<br />      2:2. From    a review  of the  various authorities of the<br /> Courts and  the clear  language of  s.32(1) of Evidence Act,<br /> the following propositions emerge: [108F]<br />      (1) Section  32 is     an exception to the rule of hearsay<br /> and makes  admissible the  statement of     a person  who dies.<br /> whether the  death is  a homicide or a suicide, provided the<br /> statement relates  to the  cause of  death,  or     relates  to<br /> circumstances leading  to the death. In this respect, Indian<br /> Evidence Act,  in view    of the    peculiar conditions  of     our<br /> society and  the diverse nature and character of our people,<br /> has thought  it necessary  to widen  the sphere     of s.32  to<br /> avoid injustice. [108G-H]<br />      (2) The  test of  proximity  cannot  be  too  literally<br /> construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula<br /> of  universal    application  so     as  to     be  confined  in  a<br /> straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or very with the<br /> circumstances of  each case.  For instance, where death is a<br /> logical clumination  of a  continuous drama  long in process<br /> and is,     as it    were, a     finale of  the story, the statement<br /> regarding each    step directly  connected with the end of the<br /> drama would be admissible because the entire statement would<br /> have to     be read  as on     organic whole and not torn from the<br /> context. Sometimes  statements relevant     to or furnishing an<br /> immediate motive  may also  be admissible as being a part of<br /> the transaction     of death.  It is  manifest that  all  these<br /> statements come     to  light  only  after     the  death  of     the<br /> deceased who  speaks from  death. For  instance,  where     the<br /> death takes  place within  a very short time of the marriage<br /> or the    distance of  time is  not spread  over more than 3-4<br /> months the statements may be admissible under s.32. [109B-D]<br />      (3) The  second part  of cl.1  of s.32  is yet  another<br /> exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a<br /> person    who   was  not     being    subjected  to  or  given  an<br /> opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be<br /> valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by<br /> the solemnity  and sanctity  of oath  for the  simple reason<br /> that a    person on the verge of death is not likely to make a<br /> false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that<br /> the statement  was secured  either by prompting or tutoring.<br /> [109E-F]<br />      (4) Section  32 does  not speak  of homicide  alone but<br /> includes suicide  also, hence all the circumstance which may<br /> be relevant  to prove  a case  of homicide  would be equally<br /> relevant to prove a case of suicide. [109-G]<br />      (5) Where    the main evidence consists of statements and<br /> letters written by the deceased which are directly connected<br /> with or related to her death and<br /> 91<br /> which reveal  a tell-tale  story, the  said statement  would<br /> clearly fell within the four corners of s.32 and, therefore,<br /> admissible. The     distance of  time alone in such cases would<br /> not make the statement irrelevant. [109H]<br />      Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1952] S.C.R. 1091;<br /> Dharambir Singh v. State of Punjab Criminal Appeal No. 98 of<br /> 1958 decided  on 4.11.58 =AIR 1958 SC 152; Ratan Gond v. The<br /> State of  Bihar [1959]    SCR 1336;  Pakala Narayana  Swami v.<br /> Emperor AIR  1939 PC  47; Shiv    Kumar &     Ors v. The State of<br /> Uttar Pradesh  Crl. Appeal No. 55 of 1966 decided on 29.7.66<br /> =(1966) Crl.  Appeal SC 281; and Protima Dutta & Anr. v. The<br /> State, C.W.N. 713 referred to.<br />      Manohar Lal  & Ors.  v. State  of Punjab [1981] Cr.L.J,<br /> 1373; Onkar  v. State  of Madhya  Pradesh [1974]  Crl.    L.J.<br /> 1200; Allijan  Munshi  v.  The    State  AIR  1960  Bom.    290;<br /> Chinnavalayan  v.   State  of    Madras    [1959]    M.L.J.    246;<br /> Rajindera Kumar     v. The State AIR 1960 Punjab 310; and State<br /> v. Kanchan Singh & Anr. AIR 1954 All. 153. approved.<br />      Gokul Chandra  Chatterjee v.  The State,  AIR 1950 Cal.<br /> 306, overruled.<br />      3:1. It is well settled that the prosecution must stand<br /> or fall     on its     own legs  and it cannot derive any strength<br /> from the  weakness  of    the  defence.  This  is     trite    law.<br /> However, where    various links  in a  chain are in themselves<br /> complete, then a false plea or a false defence may be called<br /> into aid only to lend assurance to the Court. In other words<br /> before using  the additional link it must be proved that all<br /> the links  in the  chain are complete and do not suffer from<br /> any infirmity.    It is  not the    law that  where there is any<br /> infirmity or  lacuna in     the prosecution case the same could<br /> be cured  or supplied  by a false defence or a plea which is<br /> not accepted by a Court. [162C-E]<br />      3:2.  Before   a  false  explanation  can    be  used  as<br /> additional link,  the following essential conditions must be<br /> satisfied: [165E]<br />      1. Various     links in  the chain  of evidence led by the<br /> prosecution have been satisfactorily proved; [165E]<br />      2. The  said circumstance    point to  the guilt  of     the<br /> accused with reasonable definiteness and; [165G]<br />      3. The  circumstances is  in proximity  to the time and<br /> situation.[165H]<br />      If these conditions are fulfilled only then a Court can<br /> use a  false explanation or a false defence as an additional<br /> link to lend as assurance to the Court and not otherwise. On<br /> the facts  and circumstances  of the  present case this does<br /> not appear  to be  such a  case. There is a vital difference<br /> between     an   incomplete  chain      of  circumstances   and  a<br /> circumstance, which,  after the     chain is complete, is added<br /> to it merely to reinforce the conclusion of the court. Where<br /> the prosecution     is enable  to prove  any of  the  essential<br /> principles laid     down in  Hanumant's  case  the     High  Court<br /> cannot supply the weakness or the lacuna by taking aid of or<br /> recourse to a false defence or a false plea. [166A; 166D-E]<br /> 92<br />      3:3. Before  a  case  against  an    accused     vesting  on<br /> circumstantial evidence     can be said to be fully established<br /> the following  conditions must    be fulfilled as laid down in<br /> Hanumat's v. State of M.P. [1953] SCR 1091. [163C]<br />      1. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt<br /> is to be drawn should be fully established; [163D]<br />      2. The  facts so  established should be consistent with<br /> the hypothesis    of guilt  and the  accused, that  is to say,<br /> they should  not be  explainable  on  any  other  hypothesis<br /> except that the accused is guilty; [163G]<br />      3. The  circumstances should  be of a conclusive nature<br /> and tendency;[163G]<br />      4. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except<br /> the one to be proved; and [163H]<br />      5. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not<br /> to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent<br /> with the  innocence of the accused and must show that in all<br /> human probability  the    act  must  have     been  done  by     the<br /> accused. [164B]<br />      These five     golden principles constitute the panchsheel<br /> of the    proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence and<br /> in the absence of a corpus deliciti. [164B]<br />      Hanumant v.  The State  of Madhya    Pradesh     [1952]     SCR<br /> 1091; Tufail  (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1969]<br /> 3 SCC 198; Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1972 SC 656;<br /> and Shivaji  Sahabrao Babode  & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra<br /> [1973] 2 SCC 793 referred to.<br />      3:4. The  cardinal principle  of criminal jurisprudence<br /> is that     a case     can be said to be proved only when there is<br /> certain and  explicit evidence and no pure moral conviction.<br /> [164F]<br />      The King  v. Horry     [1952]     N.Z.L.R.  III    quoted    with<br /> approval.<br />      Hanumant v. State of M.P. [1952] S.C.R. 1091; Dharambir<br /> Singh v. The State of Punjab (Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 1958<br /> decided on 4.11.58); Chandrakant Nyslchand Seth v. The State<br /> of Bombay  (Criminal Appeal  No.  120  of  1957     decided  on<br /> 19.2.58) Tufail     (alias) Simmi    v. State  of U.P.  [1969]  3<br /> S.C.C. 198;  Ramgopal v.  State of  Maharashtra AIR  1972 SC<br /> 656; Naseem  Ahmed v.  Delhi  Administration  [1974]  2     SCR<br /> 694/696 Mohan  Lal Pangasa  v. State  of U.P. A.I.R. 1974 SC<br /> 1144/46; Shankarlal  Gyarasilal Dixit v State of Maharashtra<br /> [1981]    2   SCR     384/390;  and    M.C.  Agarwal  v.  State  of<br /> Maharashtra [1963] 2 SCR 405/419 referred to.<br />      Denonandan Mishra    v The  State of     Bihar [1955]  2 SCR<br /> 570/582 distinguished.<br />      Some of  the statements  which have a causal connection<br /> with the  death of Manju or the circumstances leading to her<br /> death are undoubtedly admissible<br /> 93<br /> under section  32 of  the Evidence  Act but other statements<br /> which do  not bear any proximity with the death or if at all<br /> very remotely  and indirectly connected with the death would<br /> not be admissible. [121H]<br />      3.5. In  view of  the close  relationship and affection<br /> any person  in the  position of     the witness would naturally<br /> have a    tendency to  exaggerate or  add facts  which may not<br /> have been  stated to  them at  all. This is human phychology<br /> and no    one can     help it.  Not that this is done consciously<br /> but even  unconsciously     the  love  and     affection  for     the<br /> deceased would    create a  phychological hatred    against     the<br /> supposed murderer,  the court has to examine the evidence of<br /> interested witnesses  with very great care and caution. Even<br /> if the    witnesses were    speaking a  part  of  the  truth  or<br /> perhaps the  whole of it they would be guided by a spirit of<br /> revenge or  nemesis against  the accused  person and in this<br /> process certain     facts which  may not or could not have been<br /> stated may  be imagined to have been stated unconsciously by<br /> the witnesses in order to see that the offender is punished.<br /> [122C-D]<br />      3.6. A  close and    careful scrutiny  of the evidence of<br /> the witness  (PWs 2,  3, 4 and 5) who are close relatives or<br /> deceased and  conspicuously reveals  a story  which is quite<br /> different from the one spelt out from the letters (Exhs. 30,<br /> 32 and    33). In     fact, the  letters have a different tale to<br /> tell particularly  in respect  of certain matters. They are:<br /> [138D]<br />      (i) There    is absolutely  no reference to suicidal pact<br /> or the    circumstances leading  to the same; (ii) There is no<br /> reference even    to Ujvala  and her illcit relations with the<br /> appellant; (iii)  There is  no mention    of the fact that the<br /> deceased was  not at  all willing to go to Pune and that she<br /> was sent  by force;  (iv) The complaints made in the letters<br /> are confined to ill-treatment, loneliness, neglect and anger<br /> of the husband but no apprehension has been expressed in any<br /> of the letters that the deceased expected imminent danger to<br /> her life  from her  husband; (v) In fact, in the letters she<br /> had asked  her sister  and friend  not to  disclose her     and<br /> plight to  her parents    but while narrating the facts to her<br /> parents, she  herself violated    the said  emotional  promise<br /> which appears to be too good to be true and an after thought<br /> added to  strengthen the prosecution case; and (vi) If there<br /> is anything  inherent in  the letters  it is that because of<br /> her miserable  existence  and  gross  ill-treatment  by     her<br /> husband, Manju    might have  herself decided to end her life,<br /> rather than  bother her     parents. Therefore, these witnesses<br /> are not     totally dependable so as to exclude the possibility<br /> of suicide and to come to an irresistible inference, that it<br /> was the     appellant who    had murdered  the deceased. Though a<br /> good part  of the  evidence is    undoubtedly admissible,     its<br /> probative value     is precious  little in     view of the several<br /> improbabilities, [138E-H; 139A-B]<br />      4.1. It  is well-settled that where on the evidence two<br /> possibilities are available or open one which goes in favour<br /> of the    prosecution and the other which benefits an accused,<br /> the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt.<br /> [166H]<br /> 94<br />      In the  instant case,  the evidence  clearly shows that<br /> two views  are possible-one  pointing to  the guilt  of     the<br /> accused and  the other    leading to  his innocence. It may be<br /> very likely  that the  appellant may  have administered     the<br /> poison (potassium  cyanide) to    Manju but at the same time a<br /> fair possibility  that she  herself committed suicide cannot<br /> be safely  excluded or    eliminated. Hence,  on    this  ground<br /> alone the  appellant is     entitled to  the benefit  of  doubt<br /> resulting in his acquittal. [168B]<br />      4.2. In  the cases     of murder  by administering poison,<br /> the Court must carefully scan the evidence and determine the<br /> four important    circumstances which  alone can    justify     the<br /> conviction: (1)     There is  a clear  motive for an accused to<br /> administer poison  to the  deceased; (ii)  that the deceased<br /> died of     poison said  to have  been administered; (iii) that<br /> the accused  had the poison in his possession; and (iv) that<br /> he had    an opportunity    to  administer    the  poison  to     the<br /> accused. [167F-H]<br />      4.3. In the instant case, taking an over all picture on<br /> this part  of the  prosecution case the position seems to be<br /> as follows: [150D]<br />      1. If the accused wanted to give poison while Manju was<br /> wide  awake,   she  would  have     put  up  stiffest  possible<br /> resistance as  any other  person in  her position would have<br /> done. Dr.  Banerjee in    his postmortem    report has not found<br /> any  mark   of    violence  or  resistance  even    if  she     was<br /> overpowered by    the appellant  she would  have    shouted     and<br /> cried and  attracted persons  from  the     neighbouring  flats<br /> which would have been a great risk having regard to the fact<br /> that some of the inmates of the house had come only a short-<br /> while before the appellant. [150E-F]<br />      2. Another     possibility which  cannot be  ruled out  is<br /> that potassium    cyanide may  have been    given to  Manju in a<br /> glass of  water if  she happened  to ask for it. But if this<br /> was so,     she being  a chemist  herself would  have  at    once<br /> suspected some    foul play  and once her suspicion would have<br /> arisen it  would be  very difficult  for  the  appellant  to<br /> murder her. [150G]<br />      3. The  third possibility is that as Manju had returned<br /> pretty late  to the  flat and  she went to sleep even before<br /> the arrival  of the  appellant and  then he  must have tried<br /> forcibly  to   administer  the    poison    by  the     process  of<br /> mechanical suffociation,  in which  case alone    the deceased<br /> could not  have been  in a  position to offer any resistance<br /> but this  opinion of  doctor, has  not been  accepted by the<br /> High  Court,   after  a     very  elaborate  consideration     and<br /> discussion  of    the  evidence,    the  circumstances  and     the<br /> medical authorities,  found that  the opinion  of the doctor<br /> that Manju  died by  mechanical     suffocation  had  not    been<br /> proved or  at any  rate it  is not  safe  to  rely  on    such<br /> evidence. [150H; 151A-C]<br />      4. The other possibility that may be thought of is that<br /> Manju died  a natural death. This also is eliminated in view<br /> of the    report of  the Chemical Examiner as confirmed by the<br /> postmortem  that   the    deceased   died     as   a     result      of<br /> administration of potassium cyanide. [152B]<br /> 95<br />      5. The  only other     reasonable possibility that remains<br /> is that     as the deceased was fed up with the maltreatment by<br /> her husband,  in a  combined spirit of revenge and hostility<br /> after entering    the flat  she herself took potassium cyanide<br /> and lay     limp and  lifeless. When  the appellant entered the<br /> room he     must have thought that as she was sleeping she need<br /> not be    disturbed but  when  he     found    that  there  was  no<br /> movement in  the body after an hour his suspicion was roused<br /> and therefore  he called  his brother from the adjacent flat<br /> to send for Dr. Lodha. [152C-D]<br />      In these  circumstances,  it  cannot  be  said  that  a<br /> reasonable possibility    of  the     deceased  having  committed<br /> suicide as alleged by the defence cannot be safely ruled out<br /> or eliminated.    It is  clear that  the circumstances  of the<br /> appellant having  been last  seen with    the deceased and has<br /> administered the opinion has not been proved conclusively so<br /> as to raise an irresistible inference that Manju's death was<br /> a case of blatant homicide. [152E-F]<br />      Further, in  a matter  of this  magnitude it  would  be<br /> quite natural  for the    members of  the appellants family to<br /> send for  their own  family doctor  who was fully conversant<br /> with the  ailment of  every member  of the  family. In these<br /> circumstances there  was nothing  wrong if the appellant and<br /> his brother  went to  a distance of one and a half kilometer<br /> to get.     Dr. Lodha. Secondly, Dr. Shrikant Kelkar was a skin<br /> specialist  whereas   Dr.  (Mrs,)   Anjali  Kelkar   was   a<br /> Paediatrician and  the appellant may have genuinely believed<br /> that as     they belonged    to different branches, they were not<br /> at all    suitable to  deal with such a serious case. The High<br /> Court was,  therefore, wrong  in treating  this circumstance<br /> namely not  calling the     two Doctors  in  the  flat,  as  an<br /> incriminating conduct of the appellant. [157B-D]<br />      The circumstances    which were  not put to the appellant<br /> in his    examination under  S. 313  of the Criminal Procedure<br /> Code must  be completely excluded from considerating because<br /> the appellant did not have any chance to explain them. Apart<br /> from the  aforesaid comments  there is    one vital  defect in<br /> some of     the circumstances  relied upon     by the     High  Court<br /> namely circumstances  Nos. 4,  5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12,13, 16 and<br /> 17. [160B; 159B-C]<br />      Fateh Singh  Bhagat Singh    v. State  of Madhaya Pradesh<br /> AIR  1953   SCR     468  ;     Shamu    Balu  Chagule  v.  State  of<br /> Maharashtra 1976  1 SCC 438 and; Harijan Meha Jesha v. State<br /> of Gujarat AIR 1979 SC 1566 referred to.<br />      6. Viewing the entire evidence, the circumstance of the<br /> case and  the interpretation of the decisions of the Supreme<br /> Court the  legal and  factual position are (i) that the five<br /> golden    principles   enunciated     by  the  Supreme  Court  in<br /> Hanumant v.  The State of M.P. [1952] SCR 1091 have not been<br /> satisfied in  the instant  case. As  a logical corollary, it<br /> follows that  cannot be     held that  the act  of the  accused<br /> cannot be explained on any other hypothesis except the guilt<br /> of the    appellant nor  can it  be said    that  in  all  human<br /> probability, the  accused had committed the murder of Manju.<br /> In other  words,  the  prosecution  has     not  fulfilled     the<br /> essential requirements of a criminal case which rests purely<br /> on circumstantial  evidence; (ii)  From the  recital in     the<br /> letters Ex. P30, Ex-P32 and Ex-P33 it can be safely held<br /> 96<br /> that there  was a  clear possibility  and a  tendency on the<br /> part  of  the  deceased     Manju    to  commit  suicide  due  to<br /> desperation and     frustration. She  seems to  be tried of her<br /> married life,  but she    still hoped against hope that things<br /> might improve.    She solemnly  believed that  her holy  union<br /> with her  husband bring     health and  happiness    to  her     but<br /> unfortunately  it  seems  to  have  ended  in  a  melancholy<br /> marriage which    left her so lonely and frustrated so much of<br /> emotional disorder  resulting from frustration and pessimism<br /> that she  was forced  to end her life. There can be no doubt<br /> that Manju  was not  only a  sensitive and sentimental women<br /> was extremely  impressionate and  the letters  show  that  a<br /> constant conflict between her mind and body was going on and<br /> unfortunately the  circumstances which    came into  existence<br /> hastened her end. People with such a psychotic philosophy or<br /> bent of mind always dream of an ideal and if the said ideals<br /> fails, the  failure drives  them to end their life, for they<br /> feel that  no  charm  is  left    in  their  life;  (iii)     The<br /> prosecution has     miserably failed  to prove  one of the most<br /> essential  ingredients     of  a     case  of  death  caused  by<br /> administration of  poison i.e..     possession with the accused<br /> (either by  direct or  circumstantial evidence)     and on this<br /> ground alone  the  prosecution    must  fails.  (iv)  That  is<br /> appreciating  the  evidence,  the  High     Court    has  clearly<br /> misdirected itself  on many points, and has thus committed a<br /> gross error of law; (iv) That the High Court has relied upon<br /> decisions of  this Court  which are  either in applicable or<br /> which, on closer examination, do not support the view of the<br /> High Court being clearly distinguishable; (vi) That the High<br /> Court has  taken a  completely wrong  view of law in holding<br /> that even  though the  prosecution may    suffer from  serious<br /> infirmities it could be reinforced by additional link in the<br /> nature of  false defence  in order  to supply the lacuna and<br /> has thus  committed a  fundamental error  or law; (vii) That<br /> the High  Court has not only misappreciated the evidence but<br /> has completely overlooked the well established principles of<br /> law and     has merely  tried to  accept the  prosecution    case<br /> based on tenterhooks and slender tits and bits; (viii) It is<br /> wholly unsafe  to rely    on that     part of the evidence of Dr.<br /> Banerjee (PW  33)  which  shows     that  poison  was  forcibly<br /> administered by the process of mechanical suffociation; (ix)<br /> There is no manifest defect in the investigation made by the<br /> police which  appears to  be honest  and  careful.  A  proof<br /> positive  of   this  fact  is  that  even  though  Rameshwar<br /> Birdichand  and      other     members   of  his  family  who     had<br /> practically no    role to     play had  been arraigned as accused<br /> but they  had to  be acquitted by the High Court for lack of<br /> legal evidence;     (x) That  in view of the findings two views<br /> are clearly  possible in  the present  case, the question of<br /> defence being false does not arise. [172E-H; 173A-H; 174A-D]<br /> Per Varadarajan, J.<br /> (Per contra on facts.)<br />      1:1. The  three letters Exh. P 30, Exh. P 32 and Exh. P<br /> 33 and    the oral  evidence of  PWs. 2,    3, 5,  6, and 20 are<br /> inadmissible in evidence under section 32(1) of the Evidence<br /> Act. There  is no acceptable evidence on record to show that<br /> either    the   appellant     or   his  parents  ill-treated     the<br /> desceased Manju     and that  the    appellant  had    any  illicit<br /> intimacy with  PW 37  Ujvala. The  alleged oral statement of<br /> Manju and what she has stated in her letters Exh. 30, 32 and<br /> 33 may    relate to  matters  perhaps  having  a    very  remote<br /> bearing on  the cause  or the  circumstances of     her  death.<br /> Those circumstances do not have any proximate<br /> 97<br /> relation to the actual occurrence resulting in her death due<br /> to potassium  cyanide poison though for instance in the case<br /> of  prolonged    poisoning  they      may    relates      to   dates<br /> considerably distant from the date of the actual fatal dose.<br /> They are  general impressions  of Manju     indicating fear  or<br /> suspicion, whether  of a  particular individual or otherwise<br /> and not directly related to the occasion or her death. It is<br /> not the case of the prosecution either that the present case<br /> is one of porlonged poisoning. [187B; 190D-F]<br />      1: 2.  The fact  that the    High court  has rejected the<br /> case of     the prosecution  based on Dr. Banerjee's report and<br /> evidence that  it was  also a case of mechanical suffocation<br /> is not    one that  could be  taken into    consideration  as  a<br /> mitigating circumstance in judging the conduct of the doctor<br /> who had conducted the autopsy in a case of suspicious death.<br /> The  conduct   of  the     doctor     in   making  certain  later<br /> interpolations in  the case of suspicious death in which the<br /> appellant has  been sentenced  to death     by the     two  courts<br /> below  deserves      serious  condemnations.   The     doctor     has<br /> tempered with  material evidence  in  the  case     of  alleged<br /> murder may be at the instance of somebody else, ignoring the<br /> probable consequences of his act. In these circumstances Dr.<br /> Banerjee PW  33 is  person who    should not be entrusted with<br /> any serious  and responsible work such as conducting autopsy<br /> in public  interest. In     this case  the appellant would have<br /> gone to     gallows on the basis of the evidence of PW 33 as he<br /> would have  the Court to believe it, and the other evidence,<br /> if they had been accepted. [193D-H]<br />      1: 3.  Section 313     Criminal Procedure  Code lays    down<br /> that in     every inquiry    or trial for the purpose of enabling<br /> the accused personally to explain any circumstance appearing<br /> in the    evidence against  him, the  court may  at any  stage<br /> without previously  warning the     accused, put such questions<br /> to him as the court considers necessary and shall, after the<br /> witnesses for  the prosecution have been examined and before<br /> he is  called for his defence, question him generally on the<br /> case. Hence the evidence on the basis on which question Nos.<br /> 25, 30,     32, and  115 have  been put  to the  appellant     are<br /> wholly irrelevant  as these  questions do  not relate to any<br /> circumstance appearing    in the    against the  appellant.     The<br /> learned Additional  Sessions Judge  was     bound    to  exercise<br /> control over the evidence being tendered in his court and to<br /> know the  scope of  the examination  of     the  accused  under<br /> Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code [195A-C]<br />      Per Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (Concurring)<br />      Though the     test of  proximity cannot and should not be<br /> two literally construed and be reduced practically to a cut-<br /> and-dried formula  of  universal  application,    it  must  be<br /> emphasised  that   wherever  it      is  extended     beyond     the<br /> immediate, it should be explained and must be done with very<br /> great caution  and care.  As a general proposition it cannot<br /> be laid     down for  all purposes     that for instance where the<br /> death takes  place within  a short  time of marriage and the<br /> distance of  time is  not spread  over three or four months,<br /> the statement  would be     admissible under  Section 32 of the<br /> evidence Act.  This is    always not  so and  cannot be so. In<br /> very  exceptional   circumstances  such     statements  may  be<br /> admissible and    that too  not for proving the positive fact,<br /> namely raising    some doubt  about the  guilt of     the accused<br /> [197D-F]<br /> 98</p> <p> </p> <p>JUDGMENT:<br />      CRIMINAL APPELLATE     JURISDICTION: Criminal     Appeal     No.<br /> 745 of 1983<br />      From the Judgment and Order dated the 20th, 21st, 22nd,<br /> 23rd September    1983 of     the Bombay  High Court     in Criminal<br /> Appeal No. 265 of 1983 with confirmation case No. 3/83.<br />      Ram Jethmalani,  M.S. Ganesh,  F. N. Ranka and Ms. Rani<br /> Jethmalani for the Appellant.<br />      K.G. Bhagat,  Addl. Solicitor  General, M.N. Shroff and<br /> U.A. Jadhavrao for the Respondent.<br />      The following Judgments were delivered<br />      FAZAL ALI,     J. This is rather an unfortunate case where<br /> a  marriage   arranged    and   brought  about   through     the<br /> intervention of     common friends of the families of the bride<br /> and bridegroom    though made  a good start but ran into rough<br /> weather soon  thereafter. The bride, Manju, entertained high<br /> hopes and  aspirations and  was     not  only  hoping  but     was<br /> anxiously looking  forward to  a  life    full  of  mirth     and<br /> merriment, mutual love and devotion between the two spouses.<br /> She appears  to be an extremely emotional and sensitive girl<br /> at the    very behest  cherished ideal  dreams to     be achieved<br /> after her  marriage, which  was solemnised  on February     11,<br /> 1982 between  her  and    the  appellant,     Sharad     Birdhichand<br /> Sarda. Soon  after the    marriage, Manju     left  for  her     new<br /> marital home  and started  residing with  the  appellant  in<br /> Takshila apartments  at Pune. Unfortunately, however, to her<br /> utter dismay and disappointment she found that the treatment<br /> of her    husband and  his parents  towards her  was cruel and<br /> harsh and  her cherished  dreams seem to have been shattered<br /> to pieces.  Despite this  shocking state  of affairs she did<br /> not give in and kept hoping against hope and being of a very<br /> noble and  magnanimous nature  she  was     always     willing  to<br /> forgive and  forget. As     days passed  by, despite  her    most<br /> laudable attitude  she found that "things were not what they<br /> seem" and  to quote  her own  words "she  was treated in her<br /> husbands house    as a labourer or as an unpaid maid-servant".<br /> She was     made to  do all  sorts of  odd jobs and despite her<br /> protests to her husband nothing seems to have happened. Even<br /> so, Manju  had such a soft and gentle frame of mind as never<br /> to complain  to her  parents-in-law, not even to her husband<br /> except sometimes.  On finding  things  unbearable,  she     did<br /> protest, and ex<br /> 99<br /> pressed her feelings in clearest possible terms, in a fit of<br /> utter desperation  and frustration,  that he  hated her. Not<br /> only this,  when she  narrated her woeful tale to her sister<br /> Anju in     the letters  written to  her (which  would be dealt<br /> with in a later part of the judgment), she took the abundant<br /> care and  caution of  requesting Anju  not to reveal her sad<br /> plight to  her parents    lest they  may get  extremely upset,<br /> worried and distressed.<br />      Ultimately, things     came to  such a pass that Manju was<br /> utterly disgusted  and disheartened  and she  thought that a<br /> point of  no-return had     reached. At  last, on    the  fateful<br /> morning of  June 12,1982, i.e., nearly four months after her<br /> marriage, she was found dead in her bed.<br />      As to  the cause  of death,  there appears to be a very<br /> serious divergence  between the     prosecution version and the<br /> defence case.  The positive case of the prosecution was that<br /> as the    appellant was  not at  all interested in her and had<br /> illicit intimacy  with another    girl, Ujvala, he practically<br /> discarded his wife and when he found things to be unbearable<br /> he murdered  her between  the night of June 11 and 12, 1982,<br /> and  made  a  futile  attempt  to  cremate  the     dead  body.<br /> Ultimately, the     matter was  reported to  the police. On the<br /> other hand, the plea of the defence was that while there was<br /> a strong  possibility of  Manju having    been ill-treated and<br /> uncared for  by her  husband or     her in-laws, being a highly<br /> sensitive and  impressionate woman she committed suicide out<br /> of  sheer   depression    and   frustration  arising  from  an<br /> emotional upsurge.  This is  the dominant  issue which falls<br /> for decision by this Court.<br />      Both the  High Court  and the  trial court rejected the<br /> theory of  suicide and    found that Manju was murdered by her<br /> husband by  administering her  a strong     dose  of  potassium<br /> cyanide and  relied on    the Medical evidence as also that of<br /> the chemical examiner to show that it was a case of pure and<br /> simple homicide     rather than  that of  suicide as alleged by<br /> the defence. The High Court while confirming the judgment of<br /> the trial  court affirmed  the death sentence and hence this<br /> appeal by special leave.<br />      Before discussing    the facts  of the  case, it  may  be<br /> mentioned that    although the  High Court and the trial court<br /> have gone into meticulous and minutest matters pertaining to<br /> the circumstances  leading to  the alleged  murder of Manju,<br /> yet after going through the<br /> 100<br /> judgments we  feel that     the facts  of the case lie within a<br /> very narrow compass.<br />      The story    of this unfortunate girl starts on 11.2.1982<br /> when her marriage was solemnised with the appellant preceded<br /> by a formal betrothal ceremony on 2.8.8. after the marriage,<br /> Manju, for  the first  time, went  to her  parents' house on<br /> 22.2.82 for  a very  short period  and returned     to Pune  on<br /> 26.2.82. It  is the  prosecution case  that on    17.3.82     the<br /> appellant  had     called     Manju     at  Pearl  Hotel  where  he<br /> introduced her    to Ujvala  and told  her that  she must     act<br /> according to the dictates and orders of Ujvala if she wanted<br /> to lead a comfortable life with her husband. In other words,<br /> the suggestion    was that  the appellant made it clear to his<br /> wife that  Ujvala was  the real     mistress of  the house     and<br /> Manju  was  there  only     to  obey  her    orders.     After    this<br /> incident, Manju     went to  her parents'    house on  2.4.82 and<br /> returned to  Pune on 12.4.82. This was her second visit. The<br /> third and  perhaps the    last visit  of Manju to her parents'<br /> house was  on 25.5.82.    from where  she returned  to Pune on<br /> 3.6.82, never  to return again. The reason for her return to<br /> Pune was  that her  father-in-law insisted  that she  should<br /> return to  Pune because     the betrothal    ceremony  of  Shobha<br /> (sister of the appellant) was going to be held on 13.6.82.<br />      The last step in this unfortunate drama was that Manju,<br /> accompanied by    Anuradha (wife    of A-2)     and  her  children,<br /> returned to  the flat  on 11.6.82  near about 11.00 p.m. Her<br /> husband was  not in  the apartment  at that  time but  it is<br /> alleged by  the prosecution  that he returned soon after and<br /> administered potassium    cyanide to  Manju.  Thereafter,     the<br /> appellant went to his brother, Rameshwar who was also living<br /> in the    same flat  and brought    Dr. Lodha  (PW 24)  who     was<br /> living at  a distance  of 11/2 Kms from Takshila Apartments.<br /> At the    suggestion of  Dr. Lodha Dr. Gandhi (PW 25) was also<br /> called both  and of  them found     that Manju was dead and her<br /> death was  an unnatural     one and advised the body to be sent<br /> for postmortem    in order  to determine    the cause  of death.<br /> Ultimately, Mohan  Asava (PW 30) was approached on telephone<br /> and  was   informed  that   Manju  had    died  at  5.30    a.m.<br /> Subsequently, the  usual investigation    and  the  postmortem<br /> followed which    are not     very germane  for  our     purpose  at<br /> present and would be considered at the appropriate stage.<br />      The plea  of the  appellant  was  that  Manju  was     not<br /> administered potassium    cyanide by  him but  she appears  to<br /> have committed<br /> 101<br /> suicide out of sheer frustration. In order to prove his bona<br /> fide the   accused  relied on the circumstances that as soon<br /> as he came to know about the death of his wife he called two<br /> Doctors (PWs  24 & 25) and when they declared that Manju had<br /> died an     unnatural death,  as the  cause of  death  was     not<br /> known, and therefore the body had to be sent for postmortem,<br /> he immediately    took steps  to inform  the police. He flatly<br /> denied the  allegation of the prosecution that there was any<br /> attempt on his part to persuade Mohan Asava (PW 30) to allow<br /> the body of the deceased to be cremated.<br />      We might  state that  the High  Court has    mentioned as<br /> many  as  17  circumstances  in     order    to  prove  that     the<br /> circumstantial evidence     produced  by  the  prosecution     was<br /> complete and  conclusive, Some    of  13    these  circumstances<br /> overlap, some  are irrelevant  and some cannot be taken into<br /> consideration because  they were not put to the appellant in<br /> his statement under s. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<br /> in order  to explain  the effect  of the  Code    of  Criminal<br /> Procedure in  order to    explain the effect of the same as we<br /> shall presently show.<br />      The law  regarding the nature and character of proof of<br /> circumstantial    evidence   has    been   settled    by   several<br /> authorities of    this Court  as also  of the High Courts, The<br /> locus classicus     of the     decision of  this Court  is the one<br /> rendered in  the case  of Hanumant  v. The  State of  Madhya<br /> Pradesh where  Mahajan, J.  clearly  expounded    the  various<br /> concomitants  of  the  proof  of  a  case  based  purely  on<br /> circumstantial evidence, and pointed out thus:<br />       "The    circumstances  should  be  of  a  conclusive<br />      nature and     tendency and  they should  be    such  as  to<br />      exclude every  hypothesis but  the one  proposed to  be<br />      proved..... it  must be such as to show that within all<br />      human probability    the act     must have  been done by the<br />      accused."<br />      This decision  was followed  and endorsed by this Court<br /> in the    case of     Dharambir Singh  v. The State of Punjab. We<br /> shall however  discuss Hanumant's case fully in a later part<br /> of  our      judgment.  Coming   now   to     the   question      of<br /> interpretation of sec. 32(1) of The Evidence Act, this Court<br /> in the    case of     Ratan Gond  v. State  of Bihar S.K. Das, J.<br /> made the following observations:<br /> 102<br />       "The only  relevant clause  of s.  32 which may be<br />      said to  have any    bearing is  cl.(1) which  relates to<br />      statements made  by a  person as  to the  cause of     his<br />      death  or    as  to    any  of     the  circumstances  of     the<br />      transaction which    resulted in  his death.     In the case<br />      before us, the statements made  by Aghani do not relate<br />      to     the   cause  of   her    death    or  to    any  of     the<br />      circumstances relating  to her  death; on the contrary,<br />      the statements relate to the death of her sister."<br />      In the 'Law of Evidence' by Woodroffe & Ameer Ali (Vol.<br />      II) the  authors have  collected all  the cases  at one<br />      place and indicated their conclusions thus:<br />      "To sum  up, the  test of    the relevancy of a statement<br />      under Section  32(1), is  not what the final finding in<br />      the case  is but  whether the final finding in the case<br />      is but  whether the  cause of  the death  of the person<br />      making the     statement comes  into question in the case.<br />      The  expression   'any  of     the  Circumstances  of     the<br />      transaction which    resulted in  his death'; is wider in<br />      scope than     the expression 'the cause of his death'; in<br />      other words,  Clause (1)  of Section  32 refers  to two<br />      kinds of  statements: (1) statement made by a person as<br />      to the  cause of  his death, and (2) the statement made<br />      by a  person as  to any  of the  circumstances  of     the<br />      transaction which resulted in his death.<br />       The words,  'resulted in  his death'    do not    mean<br />      'caused his  death',  Thus     it  is     well  settled    that<br />      declarations are  admissible only    in so  far  as    they<br />      point directly  to the fact constituting the res gestae<br />      of the  homicide; that is to say, to the act of killing<br />      and to the circumstances immediately attendant thereon,<br />      like threats  and difficulties  acts, declarations     and<br />      incidents, which  constitute or  accompany and  explain<br />      the fact or transaction in issue.<br />      They are  admissible for  or against  either party,  as<br />      forming parts of the res gestae."<br /> (P. 952)<br />      It would  appear that  the     solid    foundation  and     the<br /> pivotal pillar on which rests the edifice of the prosecution<br /> may be indicated as follows:-<br /> 103<br />      (1)  Written dying     declaration by     the deceased in her<br />       letters, two of which were addressed to her sister<br />       Anju and one her friend Vahini,<br />      (2)  The oral  statements made  by the  deceased to her<br />       father (PW  2), mother  (PW 20), Sister (PW 6) and<br />       her friend  (PW 3) and also to PWs 4 and 5 showing<br />       her state of mind shortly before her death and the<br />       complaints  which  she  made    regarding  the    ill-<br />       treatment by her husband,<br />      (3)  evidence showing  that the appellant was last seen<br />       with the deceased in the room until the matter was<br />       reported to the police.<br />      (4)  the unnatural     and incriminating  conduct  of     the<br />       appellant,<br />      (5)  the medical evidence taken alongwith the Report of<br />       the chemical    examiner which    demonstrably  proves<br />       that it  was a  case of homicide, completely rules<br />       out the  theory  of  suicide    as  alleged  by     the<br />       appellant.<br />      Mr. Jethmalani,  learned counsel for the appellant, has<br /> vehemently argued  that there  was a very strong possibility<br /> of  the      deceased  having  committed  suicide    due  to     the<br /> circumstances mentioned     in her     own letters.  He  has    also<br /> questioned  the      legal     admissibility     of  the  statements<br /> contained in the written and oral dying declarations. He has<br /> submitted  that      the  so-called   dying  declarations     are<br /> admissible neither under s. 32 nor under s.8 of the Evidence<br /> Act it    was submitted by the appellant that the present case<br /> is not    at all    covered by  cl.(1) of  s. 32 of the Evidence<br /> Acts.<br />      The leading  decision on  this question, which has been<br /> endorsed by this Court, is the case of Pakala Narayana Swami<br /> v. Emperor  where Lord    Atkin has  laid down  the  following<br /> tests:<br />       "It has  been suggested that the statement must be<br />      made after     the transaction  has taken  place, that the<br />      person making  it must  be at any rate near death, that<br />      the "circumstances" can only include the acts done when<br />      and<br /> 104<br />      where the    death was  caused. Their  Lordships  are  of<br />      opinion that the natural meaning of the words used does<br />      not convey     any of these limitations. The statement may<br />      be made before the cause of death has arisen, or before<br />      the deceased has any reason to anticipate being killed.<br />      The  circumstances      must    be   circumstances  of     the<br />      transaction: general  expressions    indicating  fear  or<br />      suspicion    whether      of  a      particular  individual  or<br />      otherwise and  not directly  related to the occasion of<br />      the   death    will   not      be   admissible-----------<br />      Circumstances of  the transaction" is a phrase no doubt<br />      that conveys  some limitations.  It is  not as broad as<br />      the analogous  use in  "circumstantial evidence"  which<br />      includes evidence    of all    relevant facts. It is on the<br />      other hand     narrower than    "res gestae".  Circumstances<br />      must  have      some    proximate  relation  to     the  actual<br />      occurrence. ----------It  will be    observed  that    "the<br />      circumstances are    of the transaction which resulted in<br />      the death of the declarant."<br />      These principles  were followed and fully endorsed by a<br /> decision of  this Court     in Shiv Kumar & Ors v. The State of<br /> Uttar Pradesh where the following observations were made:<br />       "It is clear that if the statement of the deceased<br />      is to  be admissible  under this  section it  must be a<br />      statement    relating   to  the   circumstances  of     the<br />      transaction resulting  in his  death. The statement may<br />      be made before the cause of death has arisen, or before<br />      the  deceased   has  any  reason  to  anticipate  being<br />      killed,---------A necessary  condition of admissibility<br />      under the    section is  that the  circumstance must have<br />      some proximate relation to the actual occurrence-------<br />      ---- The phrase "circumstances of the transaction" is a<br />      phrase that  no doubt  conveys some  limitations. It is<br />      not as  broad as  the analogous  use in "circumstantial<br />      evidence"    which  includes     evidence  of  all  relevant<br />      facts. It    is on  the other  hand    narrower  than    "res<br />      gestae" (See  Pakala Narayana Swami v. The King Emperor<br />      AIR 1939 PC 47).<br />      The aforesaid  principles have  been followed by a long<br /> catena of  authorities of  almost all  the courts which have<br /> been noticed  in this  case. To mention only a few important<br /> once, in Manoher Lal<br /> 105<br /> & ors.    v. The    State of  Punjab, the  Division Bench of the<br /> Punjab & Haryana High Court observed thus:<br />       The  torture     administered  sometimes   manifests<br />      itself in    various forms.    To begin  with, it  might be<br />      mental torture  and then  it may  assume  the  form  of<br />      physical torture.    The physical harm done to the victim<br />      might be  increased from  stage to     stage to  have     the<br />      desired effect. The fatal assault might be made after a<br />      considerable interval of time, but if the circumstances<br />      of     the  torture  appearing  in  the  writings  of     the<br />      deceased come  into existence  after the  initiation of<br />      the torture  the same  would be  held to be relevant as<br />      laid down in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act."<br />      We fully  agree with the above observations made by the<br /> learned Judges.     In Protima  Dutta & Anr. v. The State while<br /> relying on  Hanumant's case  (supra) the Calcutta High Court<br /> has clearly  pointed  out  the    nature    and  limits  of     the<br /> doctrine of  proximity and  has observed  that in some cases<br /> where there is a sustained cruelty, the proximity may extend<br /> even to     a period  of three  years. In    this connection, the<br /> High Court observed thus:<br />       "The 'transaction'  in this case is systematic ill<br />      treatment for  years since     the marriage of Sumana with<br />      incitement     to  end  her  life.  Circumstances  of     the<br />      transaction include  evidence of cruelty which produces<br />      a state  of mind  favourable to  suicide. Although that<br />      would not    by itself  be sufficient  unless  there     was<br />      evidence of  incitement to     end her  life it  would  be<br />      relevant as evidence.<br />       This observation  taken as  a whole  would, in  my<br />      view, imply  that the  time  factor  is  not  always  a<br />      criterion in  determining whether the piece of evidence<br />      is      properly   included    within     "circumstances      of<br />      transaction. "--------"In    that case the allegation was<br />      that there     was  sustained     cruelty  extending  over  a<br />      period of    three years interspersed with exhortation to<br />      the victim     to end     her  life."  His  Lordship  further<br />      observed and  held that the evidence of cruelty was one<br />      continuous chain,    several links  of which were touched<br />      up by the exhortations to die. "Thus evidence<br /> 106<br />      of cruelty,  ill treatment     and exhortation  to end her<br />      life adduced  in the  case     must  be  held     admissible,<br />      together with  the statement  of Nilima  (who committed<br />      suicide)  in   that  regard   which  related   to     the<br />      circumstances terminating in suicide."<br />      Similarly, in  Onkar v.  State of    Madhya Pradesh while<br /> following the  decision     of  the  Privy     Council  in  Pakala<br /> Narayana Swami's case (supra), the Madhya Pradesh High Court<br /> has explained  the nature  of the circumstances contemplated<br /> by s. 32 of the Evidence Act thus:<br />       "The    circumstances    must  have   some  proximate<br />      relation to  the Actual  occurrence and  they can    only<br />      include the  acts done  when and  where the  death     was<br />      caused.-------  Thus   a  statement  merely  suggesting<br />      motive for     a crime  cannot  be  admitted    in  evidence<br />      unless  it      is  so   intimately  connected   with     the<br />      transaction itself     as to    be  a  circumstance  of     the<br />      transaction. In  the instant case evidence has been led<br />      about statements  made by the deceased long before this<br />      incident which may suggest motive for the crime."<br />      In Allijan     Munshi v.  State, the Bombay High Court has<br /> taken a similar view.<br />      In Chinnavalayan v. State of Mad ras two eminent Judges<br /> of the    Madras High Court while dealing with the connotation<br /> of the word 'circumstances' observed thus:<br />       "The special    circumstance permitted to transgress<br />      the time  factor is,  for example,     a case of prolonged<br />      poisoning, while  the special circumstance permitted to<br />      transgress the  distance factor is, for example, a case<br />      of decoying  with intent to murder. This is because the<br />      natural  meaning  of  the    words,    according  to  their<br />      Lordships, do not convey any of the limitations such as<br />      that the  statement must  be made after the transaction<br />      has taken place, that the<br /> 107<br />      person making  it must  be at any rate near death, that<br />      the circumstances    can only  include acts done when and<br />      where the    death was caused. But the circumstances must<br />      be circumstances  of the transaction and they must have<br />      some proximate relation to the actual occurrence."<br />      In Gokul  Chandra Chatterjee  v. The State the Calcutta<br /> High  Court   has  somewhat  diluted  the  real     concept  of<br /> proximity and observed thus:<br />       'In the  present case,  it  cannot  be  said    that<br />      statements in the letters have no relation to the cause<br />      of     death.      What    drove    her  to      kill    herself     was<br />      undoubtedly  her    unhappy     state     of  mind,  but     the<br />      statements in  my view have not that proximate relation<br />      to the  actual occurrence    as to  make them  admissible<br />      under s. 32(1), Evidence Act. They cannot be said to be<br />      circumstances of  the  transaction     which    resulted  in<br />      death."<br />      We, however, do not approve of the observations made by<br /> the High  Court in  view of the clear decision of this Court<br /> and that  of the  privy Council.  With due respect, the High<br /> Court has  not properly interpreted the tenor and the spirit<br /> of the    ratio laid  down  by  the  Privy  Council.  We    are,<br /> therefore, of  the opinion  that this case does not lay down<br /> the correct law on the subject.<br />      Before closing  this chapter  we might  state that     the<br /> Indian law  on the question of the nature and scope of dying<br /> declaration has     made a     distinct departure from the English<br /> law where  only the  statements which directly relate to the<br /> cause of  death are admissible. The second part of cl.(1) of<br /> 32,  viz.   "the  circumstances     of  the  transaction  which<br /> resulted in  his death,     in cases in which the cause of that<br /> person's death    comes into  question" is not be found in the<br /> English law.  This distinction    has been clearly pointed out<br /> in the    case of     Rajindera Kumar  v.  The  State  where     the<br /> following observations were made:<br />       "Clause (1)  of s.  32 of  the Indian Evidence Act<br />      provides  that   statements,  written   or     verbal,  of<br />      relevant facts made by a person who is dead,--------are<br />      themselves rele-<br /> 108<br />      vant facts when the statement is made by a person as to<br />      the  cause      of  his   death,  or    as  to    any  of     the<br />      circumstances of  the transaction which resulted in his<br />      death, in    case, in  which the  cause of  that person's<br />      death comes into question.---------- It is well settled<br />      by now that there is difference between the Indian Rule<br />      and the  English Rule  with regard     to the necessity of<br />      the declaration  having been  made under expectation of<br />      death.<br />       In the  English Law  the declaration    should    have<br />      been made    under the  sense of  impending death whereas<br />      under the    Indian Law  it    is  not     necessary  for     the<br />      admissibility of  a dying declaration that the deceased<br />      at the  time of  making it     should have  been under the<br />      expectation of death.<br />      And in the case of State v. Kanchan Singh & Anr. it was<br /> observed thus:<br />       "The law  in India does not make the admissibility<br />      of a  dying declaration  dependent     upon  the  person's<br />      having a  consciousness of     the approach of death. Even<br />      if the  person did     not apprehend    that he would die, a<br />      statement made  by him  about the    circumstances of his<br />      death would be admissible under s. 32. Evidence Act.<br />      In these  circumstances, therefore,  it  is  futile  to<br /> refer to English cases on the subject.<br />      Thus, from     a review of the authorities mentioned above<br /> and the     clear language     of s.32(1) of the Evidence Act, the<br /> following propositions emerge:-<br />       (1) Section  32 is  an exception  to the  rule  of<br />      hearsay and  makes admissible the statement of a person<br />      who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide,<br />      provided the  statement relates  to the cause of death,<br />      or exhibits  circumstances leading     to death.  In    this<br />      respect, as  indicated above,  the Indian Evidence Act,<br />      in view  of the  peculiar conditions of our society and<br />      the diverse nature and<br /> 109<br />      character of  our people,    has thought  it necessary to<br />      widen the sphere of s.32 to avoid injustice.<br />       (2) The  test of proximity cannot be too literally<br />      construed and  practically reduced     to a  cut-and-dried<br />      formula of     universal application    so as to be confined<br />      in a  straitjacket. Distance  of time  would depend  or<br />      vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance,<br />      where death  is a    logical culmination  of a continuous<br />      drama long     in process  and is, as it were, a finale of<br />      the story,     the statement    regarding each step directly<br />      connected with the end of the drama would be admissible<br />      because the  entire statement  would have to be read as<br />      an     organic  whole     and  not  torn     from  the  context.<br />      Sometimes    statements  relevant  to  or  furnishing  an<br />      immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part<br />      of the  transaction of  death. It    is manifest that all<br />      these statements  come to light only after the death of<br />      the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where<br />      the death    takes place  within a very short time of the<br />      marriage or  the distance    of time     is not     spread over<br />      more than    3-4 months  the statement  may be admissible<br />      under s.32.<br />       (3) The second part of cl.1 of s.32 is yet another<br />      exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence<br />      of a  person who was not being subjected to or given an<br />      opportunity of  being cross-examined  by  the  accused,<br />      would  be     valueless  because   the  place  of  cross-<br />      examination is  taken by  the solemnity and sanctity of<br />      oath for  the simple  reason that a person on the verge<br />      of death is not likely to make a false statement unless<br />      there is strong evidence to show that the statement was<br />      secured either by prompting or tutoring.<br />       (4) It may be important to note that s.32 does not<br />      speak of  homicide alone  but  includes  suicide  also,<br />      hence all    the circumstances  which may  be relevant to<br />      prove a  case of  homicide would be equally relevant to<br />      prove a case of suicide.<br />       (5) Where the main evidence consists of statements<br />      and letters  written by the deceased which are directly<br />      connected with or related to her death and which reveal<br />      a tell-tale  story, the  said statement  would  clearly<br />      fall within  the four  corners of    s.32 and, therefore,<br />      admissible. The distance of<br /> 110<br />      time alone     in such  cases would not make the statement<br />      irrelevant.<br />      This now  brings us  to a    close consideration  of     the<br /> contents of  the letters  (Exhs. 30,  32 and  33) written by<br /> Manju to  her sister  and friend.  We propose to examine the<br /> contents of the letters for four purposes:<br />      1)      in order  to    find  out  the    state  of  mind     and<br />       psychological attitude of Manju,<br />      2)      the nature of Manju's attitude towards her husband<br />       and in-laws,<br />      3)      the amount  of tension and frustration which seems<br />       to be clearly expressed in the letters and<br />      4)      to   determine   Manju's   personal    traits     and<br />       psychological approach to life to determine if she<br />       was  ever   capable  of  or  prone  to  committing<br />       suicide.<br />      We start  with the     letter dated  8.5.82 (Ex. 30) which<br /> was addressed  to her sister Anju and is printed at page 191<br /> of Part     I of the printed Paperbook. The learned counsel for<br /> the appellant  in order     to make  our task easy has supplied<br /> the English  translation as  also the  Roman script  of     the<br /> original letter. On a comparison of the two versions, we are<br /> of the    opinion that  by and  large the     English translation<br /> printed in the Paperbook is a true and faithful rendering of<br /> the contents of the original letter. It is not necessary for<br /> us to  extract the  entire letter  but we propose to extract<br /> only  the  relevant  portions  which  seek  to    explain     and<br /> illustrate the four purposes mentioned above.<br />       "All read  the letter with curiosity, or it may go<br />      to anybody's hand. I do not want to take any risk. So I<br />      have taken     up today  for writing, the second letter to<br />      you."     The    Roman      scripy     runs     thus:-<br />      (P.191)<br />       "Khat to  sabhi utsukta  se padte hain. Kahin kisi<br />      ke hath  pad saktahai. Aisi risk leni nahin aai. Isliye<br />      maine   tumhe   aaj   doosra   khat   likhneko   liya."<br />      (P.17)<br />      An analysis of the above clearly shows that Manju was a<br /> highly secretive  woman and  wanted  to     keep  her  personal<br /> matters or<br /> 111<br /> secrets to  herself except  giving a rough idea or a passing<br /> glimpse of her feelings only to those who were very close to<br /> her as    friends or  near relations.  The extract  shows that<br /> perhaps in  a spell of heavy emotions she had written a very<br /> long letter  to her  sister whom  she regarded    as her    best<br /> friend but  on second  thought she  tore it  off lest it may<br /> fall in     anybody's hands  and she  was not  prepared to take<br /> such a    risk. This  mentality and  noble nature     would be of<br /> great assistance  to us     in assessing the probative value of<br /> the statements made by her to her parents, sister and friend<br /> during her  last visit    to Beed. The second paragraph, which<br /> is extracted  below, reflects  her state  of  mind  and     the<br /> tension and torture which she was undergoing:<br />       "Now in  this letter,     when (Out  of)     the  things<br />      coming to    my mind     which cannot  be written,  I do not<br />      understand what is to be written, The State of mind now<br />      is very  much the    same. Enough. You understand (me). I<br />      am undergoing  a very  difficult test.  I am  unable to<br />      achieve it.  Till I  could control     (myself), well     and<br />      good. When     it becomes  impossible, some other way will<br />      have to  be evolved.  Let    us  see     what  happens.     All<br />      right."<br /> (P.191)<br />      She has hinted that hinted that she was passing through<br /> difficult times but was trying to control herself as much as<br /> she could.  She has further indicated that if things did not<br /> improve then  she may  have to evolve some other method. The<br /> exact words used in the Roman script runs thus:<br />       "Jab    tak   sambhal  sakti   hoon  theek  hai     jab<br />      assambhab ho  jayega  to  phir  rasta  nikalna  padega,<br />      dekhenge kya kya hota hai,"<br />      The words    "some other  way will  have to    be  evolved"<br /> clearly gives a clue to her psychotic state of mind and seem<br /> to suggest  that the  other method  to get  rid of  all     her<br /> troubles was to commit suicide. It is pertinent to note that<br /> in the    first two  paragraphs of  her letter extracted above<br /> there is no indication nor any hint about the conduct of her<br /> husband.<br />      In the third para of her letter she states her feelings<br />      thus: "I  thought much  that  since  the  house  of  my<br />      husband's parents    is at Pune, I would do this and that<br />      or the people<br /> 112<br />      from the  house  of  my  husband's     parents  are  free.<br />      However, I     have gradually     come to  know that  in that<br />      house, the     worth of  a daughter-in-law is no more than<br />      that          of         a           laborer."<br />      (P.191)<br />      The relevant portion in the Roman script reads thus:<br />       "Is ghar  mein bahu  ki keemat  majdoor  se  jyada<br />      nahin hai."<br /> (P. 18)<br />      At the  end or  the third paragraph she repeats her sad<br /> plight thus:<br />       "My  state  here  however  is     like  an  unclaimed<br />      person. Let  it be     gone. I  do not  like to weep (over<br />      it). When we will meet, we will talk all the things."<br />      In the  middle of    the 4th paragraph she comes out with<br /> an emotional  outburst by  indicating that all her hopes had<br /> been shattered and because of being neglected by her husband<br /> her health  was adversely  affected. In the Roman script she<br /> used the following words:<br />       "Sachmuch kya     kya sapne  rahte hain kuarepanmein,<br />      magar toote  huye dekhkar dilpar kya gujarti hai. Vaise<br />      tu maine  kuch bhi     sapne nahin  dekhe the,  bas ek  hi<br />      sapna tha    ki mera     pati mujhse  bahut pyar kare, magar<br />      abhi wo bhi na pakar dilki halat per kaboo nahin pa sak<br />      rahi.  Tabiyat   par  uska      asar     dikh    raha   hai."<br />      (P. 19-20)<br />      In the  latter part  of the  8th paragraph while giving<br /> vent to her feelings she states thus:<br />       "Now Manju is moving, it is necessary to tell that<br />      she is alive. You don't tell anybody about this letter.<br />      I felt like telling all this to Bhausab. What, however,<br />      is the  use of  making him sorry. One should test one's<br />      fate, whatever  may be  the result.  I want to tell you<br />      all. But I cannot tell."<br />      The  words     used  by  her    show  her  affectionate     and<br /> secretive nature and the precaution taken by her not to tell<br /> any thing  to her father, who is addressed as 'Bhausab'. The<br /> Roman script of the relevant portion runs thus:<br /> 113<br />       "Dil tu  karta tha  Bai Bhau    Sahab ko sab bataon,<br />      magar unko     dukh dekar  kya phaida.  Apne    apne  naseeb<br />      dekhenge, natija  kya nikalta  hai. Mujhe    tumbein     sab<br />      kuch batana hai magar bata nahin sakti."<br />                               (P.22)<br />      These extracts  throw a  flood of    light on the nature,<br /> character, mental  attitude,  suffering     and  shock  of     the<br /> deceased. One  thing which  may be  conspicuously noticed is<br /> that she  was prepared    to take     all the blame on her rather<br /> than incriminate  her  husband    or  her     inlaws.  The  other<br /> portions of  the letter     (Ex.30) are  not at all germane for<br /> the purpose  of this  case. Summarising the main contents of<br /> the letter, the following conclusions or inferences follow:<br />      (a)  Manju was a highly emotional and sensitive woman,<br />      (b)  She got  the shock  of her  life when     due to ill-<br />       treatment by    her husband  and in-laws  she  found<br />       that all  her dreams    had been shattered to pieces<br />       after marriage  leaving her  a dejected, depressed<br />       and disappointed woman,<br />      (c)  she had been constantly ill-treated by her in-laws<br />       and her position in the house was nothing but that<br />       of an unpaid maid-servant or a labourer,<br />      (d)  she wanted to keep all her worries and troubles to<br />       herself and  on no  account was  she    prepared  to<br />       disclose them     to  her  parents  or  even  to     her<br />       sister,  lest      they    also   get   depressed     and<br />       distressed.<br />      (e)  no serious  allegation of  cruelty had  been    made<br />       against the  husband personally  by  her  and     she<br />       thought that    she herself  should  suffer  out  of<br />       sheer frustration.<br />      Now we  shall examine  Ex.32 which     is a  letter  dated<br /> 8.6.82 written by Manju to her sister Anju. This was perhaps<br /> her last  letter to  Anju and is very important and relevant<br /> for decision  of the  case. The letter begins with the words<br /> "I am happy here." In the second paragraph she expresses her<br /> feelings as follows:<br />       "Shobhabai's 'Sadi'  programme is  fixed on 13th I<br />      do not know why there is such a dirty atmosphere in the<br />      house ?  It is  felt every     moment that  something will<br />      happen.<br /> 114<br />      Everybody is  in tension.    No work     has been started in<br />      the house. Let it go. I am out of mind. Still I am used<br />      not to pay need to it. Ala what about your law."<br />                              (P.195)<br />      So far  as the  first part     is  concerned,     the  'dirty<br /> atmosphere' about  which she  speaks is totally unrelated to<br /> anything done  by the  husband or  of any cruel treatment by<br /> him; it     merely refers    to the    tension     prevailing  in     the<br /> family as  the 'Sadi' (Kohl) was fixed on 13.6.82. Her anger<br /> is not    so much     towards her  husband or  herself as for the<br /> manner in  which things were being done. She complained that<br /> no work     had been  started and    being the eldest daughter in<br /> law of    the family  she felt  it her  duty to  see that     all<br /> arrangements  were   complete.    It   was  conceded   by     the<br /> Additional Solicitor-General that this portion of the letter<br /> does not  refer to  any ill-treatment  by the husband or his<br /> parents but relates only to the defective and unsatisfactory<br /> arrangements for  such an  important function.    The relevant<br /> portion of  the 3rd paragraph is also more or less innocuous<br /> but in between the lines it contains a tale of woe, a spirit<br /> of desperation    and frustration and a wave of pessimism. the<br /> actual vernacular words are-<br />       "Mera to  aane ka  kya hota  hai dekna hai Buajike<br />      yahan se  khat aur aaya to shahid chance mil sakta hai.<br />      Magar meri     mangal ke  dulhan ke  roop mein  dekhne  ki<br />      bahut ichha hai. Dekhenge."<br />      She was  naturally apprehending  some thing and was not<br /> very hopeful  of going to her father's place. This being her<br /> last letter,  and that    too a  short one,  it gives  a clear<br /> inkling of  the manner    of how her mind was working. She did<br /> not lay     any blame  on her husband or anybody else but still<br /> she was     afraid that  something was going to happen and that<br /> she may not be able to go to her father and see the marriage<br /> of her sister-in-law for which preparations were being made.<br /> In our opinion, these words are extremely prophetic and seem<br /> to indicate  that by  that time     she had  almost made up her<br /> mind to     end her  life instead    of carrying on her miserable<br /> existence. As  brevity is  the soul  of     wit,  she  directly<br /> hinted that  she may  not be  able to meet her father or any<br /> body naturally because when a life comes to an end there can<br /> be no such question. Exh. 32, though a short letter, depicts<br /> her real  feeling and perhaps a tentative decision which she<br /> may have  already taken     but did  not want  to disclose     for<br /> obvious reasons.<br /> 115<br />      Then we  come to Exh.33 which is a letter dated 23.4.82<br /> written by  the deceased  to her  close friend,     Vahini     and<br /> which shows her exact feelings, changing, mood and emotions.<br /> This is     the only letter where she had made clear complaints<br /> against     her  husband  and  the     relevant  portions  may  be<br /> extracted thus:<br />       "Really, Vahini, I remember you very much. Even if<br />      I am  little uneasy,  I feel  that you should have been<br />      near with me.<br />       All persons  here  are  very    good.  Everybody  is<br />      loving. Still I feel lonely. One reason is that, in the<br />      house there  are many  persons and they are elder to me<br />      and such  I do  not dare  to do any work independently.<br />      Every  time  some    fear  is  in  mind  which  leads  to<br />      confusion.<br />       God knows  when I  can come  there ?    The point on<br />      which we  had discussion  is as it was. Vahini. I swear<br />      you if you talk to anyone. I am much in pains. But what<br />      else can  I do  ? No  other go  than that, and the same<br />      mistake is     done again and again by me. It is that I go<br />      ahead and talk for ten times, then I become angry if he<br />      does not  speak. Vahini,  there is     nothing in my hands<br />      except to    weep profusely.     At least  till now this man<br />      has no  time to  mind his    wife, let it be, but Vahini,<br />      what shall I do?" (P.196)<br />       "Who knows what hardships be-fall on me, so long I<br />      am alive.    Why the god has become (unkind) towards me."<br />      (P. 197)<br />       "Since yesterday  I have  made up  my mind  not to<br />      speak a  word even,  till he speaks (to me). Let me see<br />      to what  extent I control my feelings. Vahini, you also<br />      pray to god for me whether a girl like me should be put<br />      to such  a difficult  test. Vahini, I am so much afraid<br />      of him that the romantic enchantment during first 10-15<br />      days after marriage has become like a dream."<br />       "I cannot  dare to  ask him whether his clothes be<br />      taken for    wash. At present my status is only that of a<br />      maid servant without pay as of right.<br /> 116<br />       Why so much indifference towards me only ? Vahini,<br />      I, feel  to weep  in your    arms. Vahini  come  to    Pune<br />      early.<br />       On getting  up every    morning I feel he will speak<br />      today but    every day  I am hoping against hope. Vahini,<br />      what will happen ? Now there is no ray of hope.<br />       Day before  yesterday I became excited and uttered<br />      in rage.  "You hate  me, was I unable to get food in my<br />      parent's house ?<br />       He was  irritated due     to word 'hate'. He said. if<br />      you talk more like this, I will be very bad man.<br />       If this  goes on,  I will  not come to sleep. That<br />      means not    permitted (to  cry) also. How he says to me,<br />      are you tired of me so early ? What shall I say to such<br />      a man. Once I feel that he does not count me. On second<br />      thought, I     feel he  cares me  much. But  due to  moody<br />      nature, it     will take  time to  pacify the same. On the<br />      day on  which self-pride  is lessened,  no other person<br />      will be  more fortunate than me But till that day it is<br />      not certain that I will be alive."<br />                             (P. 197)<br />      In     the  second  paragraph     she  starts  by  giving  an<br /> indication that     she was  feeling uneasy and would have very<br /> much liked  to have  Vahini with her. In the third paragraph<br /> she clearly  states that  all persons in her father-in-laws'<br /> place were  very good  and loving  but due  to a  number  of<br /> persons in  the house  she did    not get     a  chance  to    work<br /> independently. The  last line  "every time  some fear  is in<br /> mind which  leads to confusion" is the starting point of the<br /> first symptom  of her invisible fear which she was unable to<br /> locate. The fourth paragraph is rather important which shows<br /> that whatever  her feelings may have been she sought an oath<br /> from Vahini  not to  talk to  anyone regarding    the  matters<br /> which she  proposed to    write in  the said  letter. She says<br /> that she  was  much  in     pains    and  hints  that  she  weeps<br /> profusely and  the reason  given by her for this is that she<br /> went on     committing mistakes  and talked to her husband many<br /> times but  his silence    was extremely painful which made her<br /> angry. In  the last portion, for the first time, she makes a<br /> direct complaint  against her  husband to the effect that he<br /> had no time to look after her (Manju). In the same paragraph<br /> she describes her hardships and complains<br /> 117<br /> why God     was  unkind  to  her.    She  further  expresses     her<br /> sentiments  that   the    romantic   enchantment     which     she<br /> experienced during  the first  few days     of her marriage had<br /> completely disappeared    and looks  like a  lost dream  or  a<br /> "Paradise lost".  Then she  describes her  plight as being a<br /> maid-servant   without     pay.    She   again   complains      of<br /> indifference towards her. Ultimately, she hopes against hope<br /> that some  day he will speak to her and discuss the problems<br /> but there  is no response. Later, she refers to a particular<br /> incident and goes to the extent of telling him that he hates<br /> her. This  seems to  have irritated the husband who resented<br /> this remark  very much. Again in the same breath towards the<br /> end of    the paragraph,    while she says that her husband does<br /> not care  for her  yet she at once changes her mind and says<br /> that he     cares for  her much  but due to his moody nature it<br /> will take  time to  pacify him.     Her feelings  again take  a<br /> sudden turn when she says that when her husband's self-pride<br /> is lessened  none would be more fortunate than her. The next<br /> line is     rather important  because she    hints that  till the<br /> said heyday comes perhaps she might not be alive.<br />      A careful    perusal of this letter reveals the following<br /> features-<br />      (1)  after     going     to  her   marital  home   she    felt<br />       completely lost  and took even minor things to her<br />       heart and  on the slightest provocation she became<br />       extremely sentimental and sensitive.<br />      (2)  She  exhibited  mixed     feelings  of  optimism     and<br />       pessimism at the same time.<br />      (3)  it can  easily be  inferred that  she did not have<br />       any serious  complaint against her husband but she<br />       became sad  and morose because she was not getting<br />       the proper  attention which  she thought she would<br />       get.<br />      (4)  There is  no    indication  that  she  expected     any<br />       danger from  her husband  nor is there anything to<br />       show that  things had     come to  such a pass that a<br />       catastrophe  may   have  resulted.  There  may  be<br />       certain concealed  and hidden     hints which she was<br />       not prepared to reveal in writing : what they were<br />       is not clear.<br />      (5)  A close reading and analysis of the letter clearly<br />       shows at least two things-<br /> 118<br />       (a)  that she felt extremely depressed,<br />       (b)  that there  was a  clear     tendency  resulting<br />            from her     psychotic nature to end her life or<br />            commit suicide.<br />      This possibility  is spelt out from the various letters<br /> which we  have extracted.  Indeed, if  this was     not so     how<br /> could it  be possible that while not complaining against her<br /> husband she gives a hint not only to Vahini but also to Anju<br /> that she  might not  live. She    mentions of  no such  threat<br /> having been given to her by husband at any time or anywhere.<br />      (6)  The  contents      of  the  letter  lead     us  to     the<br />       irresistible conclusion  that Manju  felt  herself<br />       lonely and desolate and was treated as nothing but<br />       a chattel  or a  necessary  evil  ever  since     she<br />       entered her marital home.<br />      Thus, from     the recitals  in the  letters we can safely<br /> hold that  there was  a clear  possibility and a tendency on<br /> her  part   to    commit     suicide  due    to  desperation     and<br /> frustration. She  seems to be tired of her married life, but<br /> she still  hoped against  hope that things might improve. At<br /> any rate,  the fact  that she  may  have  committed  suicide<br /> cannot be  safely excluded or eliminated. It may be that her<br /> husband may  have  murdered  her  but  when  two  views     are<br /> reasonably possible  the benefit  must go to the accused. In<br /> order to  buttress our    opinion, we  would like to cite some<br /> passages of  an eminent     psychiatrist, Robert  J. Kastenbaum<br /> where in  his book  'Death, Society and Human Experience' he<br /> analyses  the  causes,    the  circumstances,  the  moods     and<br /> emotions which    may drive  a person  to commit    suicide. The<br /> learned author has written that a person who is psychotic in<br /> nature and  suffers from  depression and frustration is more<br /> prone to commit suicide than any other person. In support of<br /> our view, we extract certain passages from his book :<br />       "The fact  is that  some people who commit suicide<br />      can be classified as psychotic or severely disturbed.<br />                              (P.242)<br />       If  we  are  concerned  with    the  probability  of<br />      suicide in     very large  populations,  then     mental     and<br />      emotional disorder is a relevant variable to consider.<br />                              (P.243)<br /> 119<br />       And it  is only  through a gross distortion of the<br />      actual circumstances  that one could claim all suicides<br />      are enacted in a spell of madness.<br />                              (P.243)<br />       "Seen in these terms, suicide is simply one of the<br />      ways in which a relatively weak member of society loses<br />      out in the jungle like struggle.<br />                              (P.243)<br />       The individual does not destroy himself in hope of<br />      thereby achieving    a noble     postmortem reputation    or a<br />      place among the eternally blessed. Instead he wishes to<br />      subtract himself  from a  life whose  quality  seems  a<br />      worse evil than  death.<br />                              (P.245)<br />       The newly  awakened spirit  of hope  and  progress<br />      soon became  shadowed by  a sense of disappointment and<br />      resignation that, it sometimes seemed, only death could<br />      swallow.<br />                              (P.245)<br />       Revenge  fantasies   and  their  association    with<br />      suicide are  well known to people who give ear to those<br />      in emotional distress."<br />                              (P.251)<br />       "People who attempt suicide for reasons other than<br />      revenge may  also act  on the  assumption    that,  in  a<br />      sense, they  will survive    the death  to benefit by its<br />      effect.<br />      xx             xx             xx<br />       The victim  of suicide  may also  be the victim of<br />      self-expectations that  have not  been  fulfilled.     The<br />      sense of  disappointment and  frustration may have much<br />      in common with that experienced by the person who seeks<br />      revenge  though  suicide-However,    for  some  people  a<br />      critical  moment    arrives     when    the  discrepancy  is<br />      experienced as too glaring and painful to be tolerated.<br />      If something  has to  go it  may be the person himself,<br />      not the perhaps excessively high standards by which the<br />      judgment has  been made-Warren Breed and his colleagues<br />      found that a sense of<br /> 120<br />      failure is     prominent among  many people who take their<br />      own lives."<br />                              (P.252)<br />      The above observations are fully applicable to the case<br /> of Manju. She solemnly believed that her holy union with her<br /> husband     would     bring    health    and  happiness    to  her     but<br /> unfortunately  it  seems  to  have  ended  in  a  melancholy<br /> marriage which    in view of the circumstances detailed above,<br /> left her so lonely and created so much of emotional disorder<br /> resulting from frustration and pessimism that she was forced<br /> to end    her life.  There can  be no doubt that Manju was not<br /> only a    sensitive and  sentimental woman  but was  extremely<br /> impressionate and  the letters show that a constant conflict<br /> between her mind and body was going on and unfortunately the<br /> circumstances which  came into    existence hastened  her end.<br /> People with  such a  psychotic philosophy  or bent  of    mind<br /> always dream  of an  ideal and    if the said ideal fails, the<br /> failure drives them to end their life, for they feel that no<br /> charm is left in their life.<br />      Mary K.  Hinchliffe, Douglas Hooper and F. John Roberts<br /> in their book 'The Melancholy Marriage' observe that-<br />       "Studies of  attempted suicides  cases  have    also<br />      revealed the  high incidence  of marital problems which<br />      lie behind the act. In our own study of 100 consecutive<br />      cases (Roberts  and Hooper 1969), we found that most of<br />      them could     be understood    if the patients interactions<br />      with others in their environment were considered."<br />                                (P.5)<br />      Such  persons   possess  a     peculiar  psychology  which<br /> instils extreme     love and  devotion but     when they are faced<br /> with disappointment  or find  their environment so unhealthy<br /> of unhappy,  they seem    to loose all the charms of life. The<br /> authors while describing these sentiments observe thus :<br />       "Hopelessness', 'despair', 'lousy, and 'miserable'<br />      draw attention  to the  relationship of  the  depressed<br />      person to    his environment.  The  articulate  depressed<br />      person will  often also  struggle to put into words the<br />      fact that    not only  does there  appear to     be  no     way<br />      forward and thus no point to<br /> 121<br />      life-but that the world actually looks different."<br />                               (P.7)<br />      Coleridge in  `Ode to  Dejection' in his usual ironical<br /> manner has very beautifully explained the sentiments of such<br /> persons thus :<br />      "I see them all so excellently fair-<br />      I see, not feel, how beautiful they are ;"<br />      At another place the author (Hinchliffe, Hooper & John)<br /> come  to   the    final    conclusion  that  ruptured  personal<br /> relationship play  a major  part in the clinical picture and<br /> in this connection observed thus :<br />       "Initially we     applied these    ideas  to  study  of<br />      cases of  attempted suicide  (Roberts and    Hooper 1969)<br />      and although  we did  not assume  that  they  were     all<br />      necessarily  depressed,   we  looked   for     distal     and<br />      proximal causes  for their     behaviour  and     found    that<br />      ruptured personal    relationships played a major part in<br />      the clinical picture."<br />                              (P.50)<br />      The observations  of the  authors    aptly  and  directly<br /> apply to  the nature,  mood and     the  circumstances  of     the<br /> unfortunate life  of Manju  which came to an end within four<br /> months of marriage.<br />      We have  pointed out  these circumstances    because     the<br /> High Court  has laid  very great stress on the fact that the<br /> evidence  led  by  the    prosecution  wholly  and  completely<br /> excludes the  possibility of suicides and the death of Manju<br /> was nothing but a dastardly murder.<br />      We shall  now deal with the next limb of the oral dying<br /> declaration said  to have  been made  by the deceased to her<br /> parents and  friends. Some  of the  statements which  have a<br /> causal    connection   with  the     death    of   Manju  or     the<br /> circumstances  leading     to  her   death   are     undoubtedly<br /> admissible under  s.32 of the Evidence Act as held by us but<br /> other statements  which do  not bear  any proximity with the<br /> death or  if at     all very  remotely and indirectly connected<br /> with the  death     would    not  be     admissible.  Unfortunately,<br /> however, the  two kinds     of statements    are so    inextricably<br /> mixed up that it would<br /> 122<br /> take a great effort in locating the part which is admissible<br /> and the one which is not.<br />      Before discussing    the evidence  of  the  witnesses  we<br /> might  mention     a  few      preliminary  remarks    against     the<br /> background  of     which    the   oral  statements     are  to  be<br /> considered. All persons to whom the oral statements are said<br /> to have     been made  by Manju  when she    visited Beed for the<br /> last time,  are close relatives and friends of the deceased.<br /> In view     of the     close relationship and affection any person<br /> in the    position of  the  witness  would  naturally  have  a<br /> tendency to  exaggerate or add facts which may not have been<br /> stated to them at all. Not that is done consciously but even<br /> unconsciously the  love and affection for the deceased would<br /> create a  psychological hatred against the supposed murderer<br /> and, therefore,     the court has to examine such evidence with<br /> very great  care and  caution. Even  if the  witnesses    were<br /> speaking a  part of  the truth    or perhaps  the whole of it,<br /> they would  be guided  by a  spirit of    revenge     or  nemesis<br /> against the accused person and in this process certain facts<br /> which may  not or could not have been stated may be imagined<br /> to have     been stated unconsciously by the witnesses in order<br /> to  see     that  the  offender  is  punished.  This  is  human<br /> psychology and no one can help it.<br />      This now takes us to a consideration of the evidence of<br /> the witnesses concerned which read together with the letters<br /> form a    composite chain     of evidence regarding the causes or<br /> the circumstance  relating to  the death  of  the  deceased.<br /> According to  the prosecution,    the last  visit of  Manju to<br /> Beed was  on 25.5.82  where she stayed till 3rd of June 1982<br /> when she was brought back by the father of the appellant. In<br /> other words,  the narration of the troubles and tribulations<br /> of Manju  was made  only  during  her  last  visit  and     not<br /> earlier. These    statements are    alleged to have been made to<br /> Rameshwar Chitlange  (PW 2),  Manju's father,  Rekha (PW 3),<br /> who was     Manju's friend     and referred  to as `Vahini' in the<br /> letter Ex.33,  Anju (PW     6), Manju's  sister to whom letters<br /> (Exhs. 30  and 32)  were written, and PW-20, Bai, the mother<br /> of Manju.  Meena Mahajan (PW 5) was also examined but we are<br /> not in    a position  to rely  on the evidence of this witness<br /> for two     reasons -(1) she does not figure anywhere in any of<br /> the letters  written by     Manju, and  (2) nothing was told to<br /> her by    Manju directly but she was merely informed regarding<br /> the incidents  mentioned by  PW-2.  This  sort    of  indirect<br /> evidence is not worthy of any credence.<br /> 123<br />      We     would     first    deal  with  the     evidence  of  PW-2,<br /> Rameshwar  Chitlange  (Manju's    father).  We  shall  give  a<br /> summary of  the relevant  part of  his evidence     because the<br /> other parts relate to how the marriage was performed and the<br /> spouses had gone for honeymoon which are not germane for our<br /> purpose. The  witness states  that when     Manju came  to Beed<br /> with her  maternal uncle he found her somewhat uneasy and on<br /> making enquiries  whether she  was happy  at  her  husband's<br /> house she  told him  that she  was not    very happy  with her<br /> husband since she noticed that her husband was not very much<br /> pleased with  her and in fact hated her. These facts are the<br /> result of  the usual domestic quarrels between a husband and<br /> a wife,     hence this  statement    cannot    be  said  to  be  so<br /> directly or  proximately related to the death of Manju so as<br /> to be admissible under s.32 of the Evidence Act.<br />      It appears     from his  evidence that  even after hearing<br /> the narration  from his     daughter  he  advised    her  to     get<br /> herself adjusted  to the  situation and to the atmosphere of<br /> her new     marital home.    Apart from  being inadmissible    this<br /> does not  appear to  be of any assistance to the prosecution<br /> in proving the case of murder alleged against the appellant.<br /> The witness  goes on to state that as the grandfather of the<br /> accused had  died he  visited Pune,  accompanied by his wife<br /> and Manju.  Since this    was more  or less a formal visit for<br /> expressing his    condolences to    the bereaved family, he left<br /> Manju at  the house  of the  accused. The  only part  of his<br /> evidence on  which reliance was placed by the prosecution is<br /> that he had noticed Manju very much disturbed and uneasy and<br /> requested Birdichand (father of the accused) to allow him to<br /> take Manju  to the  house  of  Dhanraj,     which    he  did.  On<br /> reaching the house of Dhanraj, the witness states that Manju<br /> completely broke  down and  started weeping  and fell in the<br /> grip of     her mother.  This state of Manju, which the witness<br /> saw with his own eyes, would undoubtedly be primary evidence<br /> of what he saw and felt though not in any way connected with<br /> s. 32  of the Evidence Act. But from this circumstance alone<br /> it cannot  be safely  inferred that  Manju  apprehended     any<br /> serious danger to her life from her husband.<br />      The witness  further states that he informed Birdichand<br /> about the  grievances made  to him  by Manju. The appellant,<br /> Sharad, was  sent for  and he quietly listened to his father<br /> but the     witness felt that whatever Birdichand may have told<br /> to his    son that  does not  appear to  have made any serious<br /> impact on him (appellant) and he left the<br /> 124<br /> room. This  is purely  an opinion evidence and therefore not<br /> admissible. Even  so, the  accused perhaps  did not think it<br /> necessary to  enter into arguments with his father-in-law in<br /> the presence  of his father and that is why he may have kept<br /> quiet. From  this no  inference can  be drawn that he was in<br /> any way inimically disposed towards Manju or was animated by<br /> a desire to take her life.<br />      The witness further stated that he found that Manju was<br /> weeping every  now and    then during  the night    at Dhanraj's<br /> place. Later,  in the morning the witness took Manju back to<br /> her in-laws  house but his grievance was that Sharad did not<br /> care to     meet or  talk to  them.  These     are  however  small<br /> circumstances which  are incidents  of any  married life and<br /> from this  no adverse  inference can  be drawn    against     the<br /> appellant.<br />      Another complaint    made in     the statement was that when<br /> he made     a voluntary  offer to    solve  the  difficulties  of<br /> Sharad, the  appellant curtly  told him that he did not want<br /> to get    his difficulties solved by other persons and at this<br /> attitude of  Sharad the     witness  was  naturally  very    much<br /> disappointed. This  conduct of    the accused  also is  not of<br /> such an importance as to lead to any adverse inference. Some<br /> persons who  have a  keen sense of pride and self-respect do<br /> not like  anyone else not even their father or father-in-law<br /> to interfere  in their personal matters. Perhaps this may be<br /> the reason for the somewhat cool and curt attitude of Sharad<br /> but that  proves nothing.  In fact,  experience     shows    that<br /> where elders  try to intermeddle in the affairs of a husband<br /> and his     wife, this  creates a    serious obstruction  in     the<br /> relations of  the married  couple. Nothing  therefore, turns<br /> upon this statement of PW 2.<br />      Again, the witness repeats that when Manju came down to<br /> see him     off he     noticed her  weeping all the time. To cut a<br /> long story short, the witness came back to Beed and sent his<br /> son Pradeep  to bring  Manju from  Pune to Beed. On reaching<br /> there he  was informed    that Manju  and Sharad had gone on a<br /> holiday trip  to Mysore,  Triupati, etc. After the return of<br /> Pradeep to  Beed, Dhanraj  informed the     witness that Sharad<br /> and Manju  had returned     to Pune  and therefore, he sent his<br /> son, Deepak  to Pune to bring back Manju. When Manju arrived<br /> at  Beed,  the    witness     found    her  totally  disturbed     and<br /> frightened. This  statement would  be admissible  as primary<br /> evidence. What    probative value     should be  attached to this<br /> small matter is a different issue.<br /> 125<br />      Thereafter, the  witness was  told the incidents by his<br /> wife (PW  20) which  had been  narrated to  her by Manju but<br /> that is     of no    value so far as this witness is concerned as<br /> the main  evidence would be that of PW 20. However, in order<br /> to save     the marriage  from a a total break-down the witness<br /> was extremely  worried and  therefore, he  called  one    Hira<br /> Sarda, a  close acquaintance  of the  family of accused, who<br /> told him  (witness) that he was going to Hyderabad and after<br /> 4th-5th June  some solution  would be found out. At the same<br /> time, he  advised the  witness not  to    make  any  haste  in<br /> sending back Manju to Pune.<br />      On the  2nd June  1982, Birdichand     arrived at Beed and<br /> requested the  witness to  send Manju  to Pune    because     the<br /> marriage of  Birdichand's daughter  was fixed  for 30th June<br /> 1982 and the Kohl (betrothal) ceremony was to be held on the<br /> 13th of     June so  that Manju  may be present at the ceremony<br /> and look after the arrangements. The witness says that after<br /> hearing this he apprised Birdichand that Manju was extremely<br /> frightened and    that she  was not  ready to  go back  to her<br /> husband's house     nor was  he (witness)    willing to  send her<br /> back so     soon.    He  suggested  to  Birdichand  that  as     the<br /> marriage of  his nephew was to be celebrated at Beed on 25th<br /> June, Sharad  would come  to attend the marriage and at that<br /> time he     can  take  Manju  with     him.  Birdichand,  however,<br /> persuaded the  witness to  send back  Manju and     assured him<br /> that no     harm of  any kind  would come    to her    and he    also<br /> promised that  Manju would  be sent  back to  Beed, The most<br /> important statement  in the  evidence of this witness may be<br /> extracted thus :<br />       "I was  having this  talk with  Birdichand on     the<br />      first floor  of my     house. Manju  heard this  from     the<br />      staircase, called    me out    in the ground portion of the<br />      house and    told me that she was not in a position to go<br />      to the  house of  the accused. Since she was in a state<br />      of fear  or extreme  fear in her mind and she also told<br />      me that  she was not prepared to go to the house of the<br />      accused.<br />       **               **            **<br />       Therefore, after  the     meals    I  sent     Manju    with<br />      Birdichand. Birdichand, Manju and Kavita then left Beed<br />      by about 12.30 p.m. by bus on 3rd of June, 82. At that<br /> 126<br />      time Manju     was constantly weeping right from inside my<br />      house till     the bus  left. She  was also  in a state of<br />      extreme fear."<br />                            (P. 197)<br />      The witness  has said  many times in his statement that<br /> Manju was  always weeping  and crying  and the    final crisis<br /> came when  on hearing  the talks  between him and Birdichand<br /> she called  him from the staircase and told him that she was<br /> not prepared  to go  to her  husband's house as she was in a<br /> state of  extreme fear. It is difficult to believe this part<br /> of the evidence of the witness for two reasons-<br />      (1)  When the  talks were    going on  between two elders<br />       would Manju  be  sitting  near  the  staircase  to<br />       listen their    talks and  call her  father and give<br />       vent to  her feelings     and her  decision not to go<br />       back to  Pune at any cost. This conduct appears to<br />       be directly  opposed not  only to  the  tenor     and<br />       spirit of  the letters (Exhs. 30, 32 and 33) which<br />       we have  discussed but  also    against     her  mental<br />       attitude and noble nature.<br />      (2)  As indicated    by us  while discussing the letters-<br />       could a woman who was so affectionate and reserved<br />       in nature  and who  would not like the contents of<br />       her letters  to Anju and Vahini to be disclosed to<br />       her parents  lest they feel worried, disturbed and<br />       distressed-suddenly turn  turtle,  forgetting     her<br />       sentiments not  to worry  them and come out in the<br />       open to  declare before  all by weeping and crying<br />       that she  was in  a state of extreme fear, seem to<br />       us to     be inherently    improbable.  Once  a  mature<br />       woman develops  a particular    nature or habit or a<br />       special bent    of mind     she is     not likely to forgo<br />       her entire  nature-in this case, her affection and<br />       love for  her parents and the feeling of not doing<br />       anything which  may cause  distress  or  worry  to<br />       them,     and  start  telling  her  woeful  story  to<br />       everyone whom she met.<br />      Manju must have known fully that her husband's sister's<br /> 127<br /> betrothal ceremony  was to  be held  on 13th June and if her<br /> father-in-law was  making request  after request to take her<br /> to Pune to attend the said ceremony, and had given all sorts<br /> of assurances  that no    harm would  come to  her, would     she<br /> still call  her father    and express her state of fear and go<br /> on repeating  what she had already said. This seems to us to<br /> be an  afterthought or    an embellishment  introduced in     the<br /> evidence of  the witness  so  as  to  add  credence  to     the<br /> prosecution story  and provide    an imaginary  motive for the<br /> murder of the deceased. Indeed, if she was bent on resisting<br /> all attempts  of her  father-in-law to    take her to Pune she<br /> would  not  have  gone    at  all.  On  the  other  hand,     her<br /> subsequent conduct  of ultimately  going to  Pune and making<br /> arrangements for  the Kohl  ceremony belies  the  story     put<br /> forward by  the witness.  It is     extremely difficult  for  a<br /> person to  change a  particular bent  of mind  or a trait of<br /> human nature  unless there  are substantial  and  compelling<br /> circumstances to do so. In the instant case, we find no such<br /> compelling circumstance     even taking  the statement  of     the<br /> witness at its face value.<br />      To take the other side of the picture, the witness says<br /> that when  he reached  Pune on 12.6.82 and visited the place<br /> where Manju  had died,    he found Sharad sleeping or lying on<br /> the cot     and on     seeing him  he immediately  started  crying<br /> vigorously and making a show of the grief and shock they had<br /> received.  The     exact    statement  of  the  witness  may  be<br /> extracted thus :<br />       "I could  notice that     Sharad who  was sleeping or<br />      lying on the cot in the said room on seeing me entering<br />      the room  immediately started  crying vigorously giving<br />      jerks to  his body and making show of the grief and the<br />      shock he  had received.  Ultimately I  asked him  as to<br />      what had  happened to  Manju when he told me that since<br />      11th it  was the day of his marriage with Manju, he and<br />      Manju were     in joyest  mood. According to him they went<br />      to bed  by about  12 midnight  and he  had a sexual act<br />      with Manju     in such  a  manner  which  they  never     had<br />      enjoyed before.  Ultimately according  to him when they<br />      completely felt  tired and     exhausted both of them fell<br />      asleep. According to him by about 5.30 a.m. when he got<br />      up and  after visiting the urinal, when returned to the<br />      room he  found that Manju had not got up as usual since<br />      according to  him, she used to wake up at the same time<br />      he used to wake up and so he<br /> 128<br />      went near    Manju and  called her  out when he found her<br />      dead."<br />      It is  rather  strange  that  while  the  witness    took<br /> whatever his  daughter told  him at  its face  value without<br /> making any  further enquiry,  he immediately  jumped to     the<br /> conclusion that     the grief and tears in the eyes of his son-<br /> in-law were  fake and  that he was merely shedding crocodile<br /> tears. There is nothing on the record nor in the evidence to<br /> show any  circumstance which  may have    led the     witness  to<br /> arrive at this conclusion. On the other hand, if the conduct<br /> of the    appellant, as described by the witness, is seen from<br /> a dispassionate     angle, it was quite spontaneous and natural<br /> because by  the time the witness reached Pune the postmortem<br /> had been  done and the death of Manju had come to light long<br /> before his  arrival. There  was no reason for the witness to<br /> have presumed  at that    time that Sharad must have committed<br /> the murder  of the deceased. There were no materials or data<br /> before him  which could have led him to this inference. This<br /> clearly shows one important fact, viz., that the witness was<br /> extremely  prejudiced    against     Sharad      and  if  one    sees<br /> anything-even the  truth-with a     pale glass everything would<br /> appear to him to be pale.<br />      The second     part of  the statement     made by the witness<br /> regarding having  sexual  intercourse  near  about  midnight<br /> seems to  us to     be inherently improbable. However, educated<br /> or advanced  one may be, it is against our precious cultural<br /> heritage for  a person    to utter such things in a most frank<br /> and rudimentary fashion to his father-in-law. We are clearly<br /> of the    opinion that the story of having a sexual act, etc.,<br /> was a  pure figment  of the  imagination of  the witness and<br /> this, therefore,  goes a  long way  off to  detract from the<br /> truth of the testimony of this witness.<br />      Furthermore, at page 175 the witness admits that during<br /> the life  time of  Manju, Anju    and Rekha told him about the<br /> receipt of the letters from Manju but they never referred to<br /> the nature or the contents of the letters. This is a correct<br /> statement because both Anju and Vahini had been requested by<br /> Manju not to disclose to her parents the state of affairs or<br /> the tortures  which she     was suffering and perhaps they kept<br /> the sanctity  of oath given to them by the deceased. This is<br /> an additional  circumstance to    show that  even     when  Manju<br /> visited Beed  for the  last time she might tell something to<br /> her own sister Anju or to Vahini but she would never dare<br /> 129<br /> to disclose  all the  details and  put all  the cards on the<br /> table before  her  parents-a  step  which  she    deliberately<br /> desisted from  coming into  existence. We can understand the<br /> evidence of  the witness  that Manju was worried, distressed<br /> and depressed.    Sometimes out  of natural love and affection<br /> parents make  a mountain  of a    mole hill  and this  is what<br /> seems to have happened in this case.<br />      Great reliance  was placed     by the Additional Solicitor<br /> General, on  behalf of    the respondent,     on the relevance of<br /> the statements    of PWs    2, 3, 6, and 20. He attempted to use<br /> their  statements  for    twin  purposes-firstly,     as  primary<br /> evidence of  what the  witnesses saw with their own eyes and<br /> felt the  mental agony    and the     distress through  which the<br /> deceased was  passing. Secondly, he relied on the statements<br /> made by     the deceased  (Manju) to  these witnesses about the<br /> treatment meted out to her by her husband during her stay at<br /> Pune and  furnishes a clear motive for the accused to murder<br /> her.<br />      As regards     the first  circumstance, there     can  be  no<br /> doubt  that   the  said     evidence  of  the  witnesses  would<br /> undoubtedly be    admissible as revealing the state of mind of<br /> the deceased.  This would  be primary  evidence in  the case<br /> and,  therefore,   there  cannot  be  any  doubt  about     the<br /> relevancy of  the statement  of the  witnesses in  regard to<br /> this aspect  of the  matter. As     to what  probative value we<br /> should attach  to such    statements would  depend on a proper<br /> application of    the context  and evidence  of  each  of     the<br /> witnesses,<br />      As regards     the second  aspect-which is  in respect  of<br /> what the  deceased  told  the  witnesses-it  would  only  be<br /> admissible under  s. 32     of the     Evidence Act as relating to<br /> the circumstances  that led to the death of the deceased. In<br /> view of the law discussed above and the propositions and the<br /> conclusions we    have reached, there cannot be any doubt that<br /> these statements  would fall  in the  second part of s.32 of<br /> the  Evidence  Act  relating  directly    to  the     transaction<br /> resulting in  the death     of Manju,  and would be admissible.<br /> Before, however,  examining this  aspect of  the question we<br /> might at  the outset  state that  the character, conduct and<br /> the temperament     of Manju,  as disclosed  or evinced  by the<br /> admitted letters  (Exhs. 30,32    and 33),  which     demonstrate<br /> that it     is most  unlikely, if    not impossible, for Manju to<br /> have  related  in  detail  the    facts  which  the  aforesaid<br /> witnesses deposed.  If this  conclusion is  correct, then no<br /> reliance can  be placed on this part of the statement of the<br /> aforesaid witnesses.<br />      We now proceed to discuss the evidence of PWs 3,4, 5, 6<br /> and<br /> 130<br /> 20. As    we have     discussed the    evidence of  PW 2, father of<br /> Manju, it  will be  more  appropriate  to  discuss  now     the<br /> evidence of  PW-20 (Manju's  mother) from  whom most  of the<br /> matters spoken to by PW-2 were derived. Her evidence appears<br /> at page 305 of part I of the Paper Book. It is not necessary<br /> for us    to go  into those  details which  have already    been<br /> deposed to  by PW-2.  The most relevant part of her evidence<br /> is about  the visit  of Manju  to Beed on 2.4.82. She states<br /> that during  this visit     she found  Manju cheerful and happy<br /> and she     did not complain of anything during her stay for 8-<br /> 10 days.  In answer  to a question-whether she enquired from<br /> Manju or had any talk with her during that period-she stated<br /> Manju told  her that her husband was not taking any interest<br /> in her    and used to leave the house early in the morning and<br /> return late at night on the excuse that he was busy with his<br /> factory work.  It may  be stated here that the accused had a<br /> chemical factory  where he  used to  work from    morning till<br /> late at     night.     The  witness  further    deposed     that  Manju<br /> informed her  that there  was no  charm left  for her at the<br /> house of her husband. These facts however run counter to her<br /> first statement     where she stated that Manju was quite happy<br /> and cheerful  as expected  of a newly married girl. Even so,<br /> whatever Manju    had said  does    not  appear  to     be  of     any<br /> consequence because  she (the  witness) herself     admits that<br /> she did     not take it seriously and told Manju that since she<br /> had entered  a new family it might take some time for her to<br /> acclimatise herself  with the  new  surroundings.  She    also<br /> warned Manju  against  attaching  much    importance  to    such<br /> matters.<br />      Thereafter she  goes on  to state    that near  about the<br /> 11th or 12th of April 1982 she (PW 20) alongwith her husband<br /> left for  Pune to  offer condolences  on the  death  of     the<br /> grand-father of     the appellant.     She then  proceeds to state<br /> that during  their second  visit to Pune on the 11th or 12th<br /> of May    1982 she  stayed with  her brother, Dhanraj and that<br /> while she was there Manju hugged at her neck and having lost<br /> her control,  started weeping  profusely. She further states<br /> that Manju  requested her  to take her to Beed as it was not<br /> possible for  her to stay in her marital house where she was<br /> not only bored but was extremely afraid and scared.<br />      On the  next day  she (PW    20) met     the mother  of     the<br /> appellant  and     told  her  plainly  that  she    found  Manju<br /> extremely perturbed,  uneasy and  scared and  that  she     was<br /> experiencing tremendous     pressure and  restrictions from her<br /> husband. But  the mother of the appellant convinced her that<br /> there was nothing to worry about,<br /> 131<br /> and everything    will be     alright. The  witness then narrated<br /> the fact to her husband and requested him to take Manju with<br /> them to     Beed. PW 2 then sought the permission of Birdichand<br /> to take     Manju to.  Beed but he told him that as some guests<br /> were to     visit him,  he (PW  2) can  send somebody after 4-5<br /> days to     take Manju  to Beed.  It may be mentioned here that<br /> the details about the sufferings and the mental condition of<br /> Manju was  not mentioned by this witness even to her husband<br /> (PW 2)    as he    does  not say  anything about  this  matter.<br /> Further, her statement is frightfully vague.<br />      As already     indicated that the letters (Ex. 30, 32, 33)<br /> clearly show  that Manju never wanted to worry or bother her<br /> parents about her disturbed condition, it appears to be most<br /> unlikely  that     on  the   occasion  of     the  death  of     her<br /> grandfather-in-law she    would  choose  that  opportunity  to<br /> narrate her tale of woe to her mother. This appears to us to<br /> be a  clear embellishment  introduced by  the prosecution to<br /> give a    sentimental colour  to the evidence of this witness.<br /> Ultimately, on May 25, 1982 Deepak brought Manju to Beed and<br /> this time  she was  accompanied by  her cousin, Kavita. Here<br /> again, she  states that     on  her  arrival  she    found  Manju<br /> extremely disturbed  and under tension of fear and Manju was<br /> prepared to  make  a  clean  breast  of     all  her  troubles.<br /> However,  as   Kavita  was   there  and     did  not  give     any<br /> opportunity to    Manju to meet her mother alone, she (Kavita)<br /> was sent out on some pretext or the other. Thereafter, Manju<br /> told her  mother  that    she  was  receiving  a    very  shabby<br /> treatment from her husband and while narrating her miserable<br /> plight she  told her about two important incidents which had<br /> greatly upset  her-(1) that  she happened  to come  across a<br /> love letter  written by PW 37, Ujwala Kothari to her husband<br /> which showed  that the    appellant was  carrying     on  illicit<br /> relations with PW 37, (2) that on one occasion the appellant<br /> told Manju that he was tired of his life and did not want to<br /> live any  more    and,  therefore-wanted    to  commit  suicide.<br /> Despite Manju's     enquiries as  to why  he wanted  to  commit<br /> suicide, he  did not  give any reason. She then informed her<br /> mother when  this talk    was going  on, she  (Manju)  herself<br /> volunteered to    commit suicide. Thereafter, Sharad put forth<br /> a proposal  under which     both of them were to commit suicide<br /> and they  decided to  write notes  showing  that  they    were<br /> committing suicide.  On hearing this plan from Sharad, Manju<br /> told him  that she was not inclined to commit suicide as she<br /> had not lost all hope of life and that she had expressed her<br /> desire to  commit suicide  only because     he had said that he<br /> would do so. PW 20 would have<br /> 132<br /> us believe  that while    in one    breath    she  agreed  to     the<br /> suicide pact  yet the  next moment she made a complete volte<br /> face. This is hard to believe having regard to the nature of<br /> the temperament of Manju.<br />      The two  statements said have been made by Manju to her<br /> mother appear  to be  contradictory and     irreconcilable     and<br /> smack  of   concoction.     According  to    Manju,    Sharad    then<br /> prepared two  notes one     addressed to his father and another<br /> to his    father-in-law and asked Manju to do the same but she<br /> refused to  do anything     of the     sort. The  witness admitted<br /> that she  was not  told as to what had happened to the notes<br /> written by the appellant.<br />      All this  story of     a suicidal pact seems to us nothing<br /> but a fairy tale. There is no mention nor even a hint in the<br /> letters (Exhs.    30, 32,     33)  written  by  Manju  about     the<br /> aforesaid suicidal  pact  and  the  story  narrated  by     the<br /> witness before the trial court, nor was the note produced in<br /> the court. This appears to us to be a make-believe story and<br /> was introduced    to castigate  the appellant  for his  shabby<br /> treatment towards Manju.<br />      Another intrinsic    circumstance to     show the untruth of<br /> this statement    is that     although PW 2 was apprised of these<br /> facts yet he never mentioned them to Birdichand particularly<br /> when he was insisting that Manju should be sent back to Pune<br /> for attending the betrothal ceremony of his daughter Shobha.<br /> Indeed, if  this fact,    which is of very great importance so<br /> far as    the lives  of both  the husband     and  the  wife     are<br /> concerned, would have been there, the first thing which PW 2<br /> would have  done is  to     tell  Birdihand  that    matters     had<br /> reached such  a stage as to leave no doubt that her daughter<br /> was in    an instant  fear of  death and it was impossible for<br /> him to    allow his  daughter to    go to  Pune where Sharad was<br /> bent on     forcing her  to commit     suicide or even murder her,<br /> more particularly  because PW 20 admits in her evidence that<br /> as all    the things  she had  learnt from Manju were serious,<br /> she had     informed her husband about the same who agreed with<br /> her.<br />      Apart from     this grave incident, the witness deposed to<br /> another equally     important matter,  viz., that    on the Shila<br /> Septami day,  the appellant rang up his mother to send Manju<br /> alongwith Shobha  to a    hotel (Pearl  Hotel),  as  has    been<br /> deposed to  by other  witnesses) because he wanted to give a<br /> party to his friends. As Shoba was not present in the house,<br /> Manju's mother-in-law sent her alone, in<br /> 133<br /> a rickshaw  to the  hotel. On reaching the hotel she did not<br /> find any  other person    except a  girl who was introduced by<br /> her husband as Ujavla Kothari. The most critical part of the<br /> incident is  that the  appellant is alleged to have informed<br /> Manju that she should take lessons from Ujvala as to how she<br /> should behave  with him     and also  told her that Ujvala knew<br /> everything about  him and  he was  completely in  her hands.<br /> Subsequently the  appellant went  away and  Ujvala told     her<br /> that the  appellant was     a short-tempered man and she should<br /> talk to     him only  if and when he wanted to talk to her. She<br /> (Ujvala) also  told Manju  that the appellant was completely<br /> under  her   command  and  she    was  getting  every  bit  of<br /> information  about   the  incidents  happening    between     the<br /> husband and  the wife. Finally, she was apprised of the fact<br /> by Ujvala  that she and Sharad were in love with each other.<br /> Manju is  said to  have retorted  and protested to Ujvala by<br /> saying that  she was  not prepared  to take any lessons from<br /> her regarding  her behaviour  towards  her  husband  as     she<br /> (Manju) was  his wedded wife while Ujvala was only a friend.<br /> Manju also told her mother that these facts were narrated by<br /> her to    the appellant and accused No. 2. As a result of this<br /> incident, Manju     became a  little  erratic  which  attracted<br /> double cruelty    towards her  by her  husband  and  made     her<br /> extremely scared of her life and in view of this development<br /> she requested  her mother  not to send her back to the house<br /> of the accused.<br />      One point of importance which might be noticed here and<br /> which shows  that whatever be the relations with her husband<br /> and Ujvala,  the picture  presented by    the witness  is     not<br /> totally correct     because if  such a  point of  no return had<br /> already been  reached, there  was absolutely  no question of<br /> Birdichand and    sending for  the appellant  and arranging  a<br /> trip to     Ooty, Mysore  and other  place nor would have Manju<br /> agreed to  go to  these places.     The witness  further stated<br /> that as     soon as Manju came to know that Birdichand had come<br /> to take     her away  she was  shocked  and  continuously    kept<br /> saying that  she  was  extremely  afraid  of  going  to     her<br /> husband's house and that she should not be sent back.<br />      The  behavioral  attitude    of  Manju  depicted  by     the<br /> witness seems  to us  to be  absolutely contradictory to and<br /> not at    all in    consonance with     her temperament,  frame  of<br /> mind, psychological  approach to  things and  innate habits.<br /> That is     why no     reference had    been made  even directly  or<br /> indirectly in any of the letters written by<br /> 134<br /> Manju, and  she had expressly requested both Anju and Vahini<br /> not to    disclose anything  to her  parents lest they may get<br /> worried and.  distressed on  her account.  In  other  words,<br /> Manju was a woman who despite her troubles and tribulations,<br /> sufferings and    travails, anxiety  and anguish    would  never<br /> have thought  of narrating  her woeful    story to her parents<br /> and thereby  give an  unexpected shock to them. This feeling<br /> is mentioned  in the  clearest possible terms in the letters<br /> (Exhs. 30, 32, 33) which we have already discussed. There is<br /> no reference at all in any of the letters regarding suicidal<br /> pact or the illicit relationship of her husband with Ujvala.<br />      Another important    fact which the High Court has missed<br /> is that even according to the statement of this witness, the<br /> appellant had  asked his  mother to  send Shobha  along with<br /> Manju to  the hotel  and at that time he could not have been<br /> aware that  Shobha would not be available. Indeed, if he had<br /> an evil     intention of  insulting or injuring the feelings of<br /> Manju by  keeping Ujvala there he would never have asked his<br /> mother to  send Shobha    also because  then  the     matter     was<br /> likely    to   be     made    public.     This  is  another  inherent<br /> improbability which  makes  the     whole    story  difficult  to<br /> believe.<br />      Despite these  serious developments  both PW  2 and  20<br /> tried to  convince Manju  to accept  the assurances given by<br /> Birdichand that     no harm  would come  to her and if anything<br /> might  happen  they  will  take     proper     care.    We  find  if<br /> impossible to  believe that the parents who had so much love<br /> and affection  for their  daughter would,  after knowing the<br /> circumstances, still  try to take the side of Birdichand and<br /> persuade her daughter to go to Pune. Rameshwar (PW 2) should<br /> have told  Birdichand point-blank  that he  would  not    send<br /> Manju in  view of  the serious    incidents that had happened,<br /> viz.,  the   suicidal  pact,  the  cruel  treatment  of     the<br /> appellant towards  Manju, the  constant fear  of death which<br /> Manju was apprehending, the illicit relationship between the<br /> appellant and  Ujvala, and  the     strong     resistance  of     his<br /> daughter who was not prepared to go Pune at any cost and was<br /> weeping and  wailing  all  the    time.  On  the    other  hand,<br /> knowingly and  deliberately they  seem to  have thrown their<br /> beloved daughter into a well of death. The fact that Manju's<br /> parents tried  to console  her and believed the assurance of<br /> Birdichand knowing  full well  the history of the case shows<br /> that any  statement made  by Manju to her parents was not of<br /> such great  consequence as to harden their attitude. This is<br /> yet another  intrinsic circumstance Manju to which negatives<br /> the story of suicidal pact and the invitation to<br /> 135<br /> come to     the Pearl  Hotel and  the manner  in which  she was<br /> insulted in  the presence  of Ujvala. There is no doubt that<br /> relations between  the appellant  and Manju  were  extremely<br /> strained, may-be  due to his friendship with Ujvala, she may<br /> not have  felt happy  in her marital home as she has clearly<br /> expressed in  her letters  but she did not disclose anything<br /> of such     great consequence  which  would  have    shocked     the<br /> parents and  led them  to resist  her going  to Pune  at any<br /> cost. This  makes the version given by PWs 2 and 20 unworthy<br /> of credence.<br />      We now  proceed to     take up the evidence of PW-6, Anju,<br /> the sister  of Manju.  The statement of this witness is more<br /> or less     a carbon  copy of  the evidence  of PW-20 which has<br /> been discussed    above and, therefore, it is not necessary to<br /> consider her  evidence in  all its  details. So     far as     the<br /> first visit is concerned, she fully supports her mother that<br /> Manju was  very happy  as was  expected of  a newly  married<br /> girl. When  Manju came    to Beed     around 2nd  April 1982     she<br /> stayed there  for 8-10    days  and  during  that     period     the<br /> witness noticed     that  she  was     somewhat  dissatisfied     and<br /> complained that     her husband  used to  return late at night.<br /> She also  complained against  the callous  attitude  of     the<br /> other members  of her  husband's family. She also introduced<br /> the story  of Ujvala Kothari and corroborated what PW 20 had<br /> said which  we have  discussed above. She also refers to the<br /> said suicidal  pact and then to the fact that Birdichand had<br /> come to     take away  Manju to Pune so that she may be able to<br /> attend the betrothal ceremony of Shobha. Then she deposes to<br /> an incident which appears to be wholly improbable. According<br /> to her,     on the     3rd of     June, 1982,  PW 2  invited his     two<br /> friends, Raju  and Rath,  for lunch at which Birdichandi was<br /> also present,  and told     them that Manju was not prepared to<br /> go to  Pune as    she was     afraid to  go there but Birdichand,<br /> alongwith his  two friends,  assured him  that nothing would<br /> happen. We  do not  think that    in the    course of things P-2<br /> would be  so foolish  as to  let the  secret matters  of the<br /> house known to others than the parties concerned. Thereafter<br /> the witness proves the letters (Exhs. 30 and 32).<br />      She stated     one important    statement to the effect that<br /> on some     occasions Manju  had a     talk with her mother in her<br /> presence. Although  Manju had requested Anju not to disclose<br /> anything to  her parents  yet everything  was made  known to<br /> them, During  cross-examination the witness was asked-how as<br /> it that Manju was narrating these talks when the witness had<br /> been asked not to disclose the<br /> 136<br /> same to her parents, which she explained away by saying that<br /> she did not ask Manju why she was disclosing these things to<br /> her mother. No satisfactory answer to this question seems to<br /> have been given by her. At another place, the witness states<br /> thus :<br />       "I did  not tell all these informations I received<br />      from Manju     to any     body. Nor  anybody enquired from me<br />      till my statement was recorded by the Police."<br />      Her evidence, therefore, taken as a whole is subject to<br /> the same infirmity as that of PW 20 and must suffer the same<br /> fate.<br />      PW-3, Rekha  (who was  addressed as  `Vahini' in Maju's<br /> letter (Ex.  33), states  that on  the first  occasion    when<br /> Manju came  home she  was quite     happy but during her second<br /> visit to  Beed in  the month of April, 1982 she did not find<br /> her so    and Manju  complained that  her husband was avoiding<br /> her to    have a talk with her on one excuse or another. Manju<br /> also informed  the witness  that the  appellant had  a girl-<br /> friend by name Ujvala and the witness says that she tried to<br /> console Manju  by  saying  that     since    her  husband  was  a<br /> Chemical  Engineer   he     may  have  lot     of  friends.  While<br /> referring to  Exh. 33  (letter written    to her by Manju) she<br /> stated that  the only complaint made in that letter was that<br /> her husband  was not  talking  to  her    properly.  She    then<br /> deposed to  an incident     which happened     when on  her way to<br /> Bombay when  the witness  stayed at  Pune for some time. She<br /> states that she had a talk with Manju for about half-an-hour<br /> when she  narrated the    story of the suicidal pact. She also<br /> stated that  she was  extremely afraid    of the situation and<br /> almost broke down in tears and wept.<br />      The most  important fact  which may  be  noted  in     her<br /> evidence is  a clear  pointer to  the frame  of mind and the<br /> psychotic nature  of Manju.  At page  212 of  Part I  of the<br /> Paperbook while     narrating the    relationship of     her husband<br /> with Ujvala  she says that the appellant lost his temper and<br /> thereupon she spoke the following words to him :<br />       ,`I am  not going  to spare this, I will not allow<br />      this, his    bad relations even though a blot may come to<br />      our family and I have decided likewise."<br />      These significant    and pregnant words clearly show that<br /> Manju was so much bored and disgusted with her life that she<br /> entertained a  spirit of  revenge and  told the witness that<br /> she was not going to<br /> 137<br /> tolerate this  even though a blot may come to the family and<br /> that she  had decided  likewise. This  statement undoubtedly<br /> contains a  clear hint    that she had almost made up her mind<br /> to end    her life,  come what  may and thereby put to trouble<br /> her husband  and his  family members  as being suspect after<br /> her death.  This appears  to be     a culmination    of a feeling<br /> which she had expressed in one of her letters to Anju in the<br /> following words:<br />       "Till I  could control  (myself), well  and  good.<br />      When it becomes impossible, some other way will have to<br />      be evolved. Let us see what happens. All right."<br /> Similarly, in  her letter (Ex. 33) to this witness she gives<br /> a concealed hint "But till that day it is not certain that I<br /> will be alive."<br />      Thus the feelings of death and despair which she orally<br /> expressed  to  the  witness  at     Pune  seems  to  have    been<br /> fulfilled when    on the    morning of  12th June  1982 she     was<br /> found dead.<br />      The evidence of PW 4, Hiralal Ramlal Sarda, is not that<br /> important. He  merely states  that in  the last     week of May<br /> 1982, PW  2 had called him and told him that Manju was being<br /> ill-treated  by     her  husband  and  therefore  she  was     not<br /> prepared to  go to  her marital home. PW 2 also informed him<br /> about the  suicidal pact  affair. As  the witness  was in  a<br /> hurry to  go to Hyderabad he counselled PW 2 not to take any<br /> final decision    in a hurry and that Manju should not be sent<br /> to Pune with Birdichand until his return when a decision may<br /> be taken. On return from Hyderabed he learnt that Birdichand<br /> had already  taken Manju  to Pune and thereafter he left for<br /> Pune. Indeed,  if the matter was so grave and serious that a<br /> person like PW 4, who was a relation of the appellant rather<br /> than that  of PW  2, had  advised him  not to make haste and<br /> take a    final decision    but wait  until his  return yet PW 2<br /> seems to  have spurned    his advice  and sent  Manju to Pune.<br /> This shows  that the  matter was  not really  of such  great<br /> importance or  urgency as to take the drastic step of making<br /> a blunt     refusal to  Birdihchand about    Manju's not going to<br /> Pune. This  also shows    that the  story of suicidal pact and<br /> other things  had been    introduced in order to give a colour<br /> or orientation to the prosecution story.<br />      Another fact  to which  this  witness  deposes  in     the<br /> narration by  the appellant about his having sexual act with<br /> his wife. We have<br /> 138<br /> already     disbelieved   this  story   as      being      hopelessly<br /> improbable and    against the cultural heritage of our country<br /> or of  our nature  and habits.    This is the only purpose for<br /> which this  witness was     examined and  his evidence does not<br /> advance the matter any further.<br />      PW-5, Meena Mahajan, has also been examined to boost up<br /> the story  narrated by PW 2 and other witnesses. She was not<br /> at all    connected with    the family of PW 2 but is alleged to<br /> be a  friend of     Manju and  she says  that she    found  Manju<br /> completely disheartened     and morose  and she started weeping<br /> and crying  while narrating her said story. The witness goes<br /> on to  state  that  Manju  was    so  much  terrified  of     the<br /> appellant that    she was afraid of her life at his hands. No.<br /> witness has  gone to the extent of saying that there was any<br /> immediate danger to Manju's life nor did Manju say so to PWs<br /> 2, 6  and 20.  This witness  appears to     us to be more loyal<br /> than the king. Even assuming that Manju was a friend of PW 6<br /> but she never wrote to her any letter indicating anything of<br /> the sort.  For these  reasons we are not satisfied that this<br /> witness is worthy of credence.<br />      A close  and careful  scrutiny of    the evidence  of the<br /> aforesaid witnesses  clearly  and  conspicuously  reveals  a<br /> story which  is quite, different from the one spelt out from<br /> the letters (Exhs. 30, 32 and 33). In fact, the letters have<br /> a different  tale to  tell particularly     in respect  of     the<br /> following matters:-<br />      (1)  There is  absolutely no reference to suicidal pact<br />       or the circumstances leading to the same,<br />      (2)  there is  no reference  even    to  Ujvala  and     her<br />       illicit relations with the appellant,<br />      (3)  there is  no mention of the fact that the deceased<br />       was not  at all willing to go to Pune and that she<br />       was sent by force,<br />      (4)  the complaints made in the letters are confined to<br />       ill-treatment, loneliness,  neglect and  anger  of<br />       the husband but no apprehension has been expressed<br />       in any  of the  letters that the deceased expected<br />       imminent danger to her life from her husband.<br />      (5)  In fact,  in the  letters she had asked her sister<br />       and friend  not to  disclose her sad plight to her<br />       parents but<br /> 139<br />       while narrating  the    facts  to  her    parents     she<br />       herself violated  the said emotional promise which<br />       appears to  us to  be too  good to  be true and an<br />       after thought     added to strengthen the prosecution<br />       case.<br />      (6)  If there is anything inherent in the letters it is<br />       that because    of her miserable existence and gross<br />       ill-treatment by  her husband,  Manju     might    have<br />       herself decided to end her life rather than bother<br />       her parents.<br />      We are  therefore unable  to agree     with the High Court<br /> and the     trial court  that the witnesses discussed above are<br /> totally dependable  so as  to  exclude    the  possibility  of<br /> suicide and that the only irresistible inference that can be<br /> drawn from  their evidence  is that it was the appellant who<br /> had murdered the deceased.<br />      Putting all  these pieces together a general picture of<br /> the whole episode that emerges is that there is a reasonable<br /> possibility of    Manju having  made up  her mind     to end     her<br /> life, either  due to frustration or desperation or to take a<br /> revenge on  her husband     for shattering     her dream  and ill-<br /> treating her day-to-day.<br />      Apart from     the spirit  of revenge     which may have been<br /> working in  the mind  of Manju, it seems to us that what may<br /> have happened  is that    the sum     total    and  the  cumulative<br /> effect of  the circumstances  may have    instilled in  her an<br /> aggressive impulse  endangered by frustration of which there<br /> is ample  evidence both     in her     letters and  her subsequent<br /> conduct. In  Encyclopedia of  Crime and     Justice (Vol. 4) by<br /> Sanford H. Kadish the author mentions thus :<br />       "Other  psychologically   oriented  theories     ave<br />      viewed  suicide  as  a  means  of    handling  aggressive<br />      impulses engendered by frustration."<br />      Another inference that follows from the evidence of the<br /> witness discussed  is that  the constant fact of wailing and<br /> weeping is  one of the important symptoms of an intention to<br /> commit suicide    as mentioned  by George     W. Brown and Tirril<br /> Harris in their book "Social Origins of Depression" thus:-<br />       "1. Symptom data<br />       Depressed mood-<br /> 140<br />      1. Crying<br />      2. feeling miserable/looking miserable, unable to smile<br />      or laugh<br />      3. feelings of hopelessness about the future<br />      4. suicidal thoughts<br />      5. suicidal attempts<br />      Fears/anxiety/worry<br />      15. psychosomatic accompaniments<br />      16. tenseness/anxiety<br />      17. specific worry<br />      18. panic attacks<br />      19. phobias<br />      Thinking<br />      20. feelings of self-depreciation/nihilistic delusions<br />      21. delusions or ideas of reference<br />      22. delusions of persecution/jealousy<br />      23. delusions of grandeur<br />      24. delusions of control/influence<br />      25. other delusions e. g. hypochondriacal worry<br />      26. auditory hallucinations<br />      27. visual hallucinations."<br />      Most of  these symptoms  appear to     have been proved as<br /> existing in  Manju both     from her  letters (Exhs. 30, 32 and<br /> 33) and from the evidence discussed.<br />      We might  hasten to observe here that in cases of women<br /> of a  sensitive and  sentimental nature     it has usually been<br /> observed that  if they    are tired  of their  life due to the<br /> action of  their kith and kin, they become so desperate that<br /> they develop  a spirit    of revenge  and try to destroy those<br /> who had     made their  lives worthless  and under     this strong<br /> spell of  revenge sometimes they can go to the extreme limit<br /> of committing suicide with a feeling that the subject who is<br /> the root  cause of  their malady  is also destroyed. This is<br /> what may have happened in this case. Having found her dreams<br /> shattered to  pieces Manju  tried first to do her best for a<br /> compromise  but      the  constant     ill-treatment    and  callous<br /> attitude of her husband may have driven<br /> 141<br /> her to    take revenge  by killing  herself so that she brings<br /> ruination  and     destruction  to   the    family     which     was<br /> responsible for     bringing about     her death. We might extract<br /> what Robert  J. Kastenbaum  in his book 'Death, Society, and<br /> Human Experience' has to say:<br />      "Revenge fantasies     and their  association with suicide<br />      are well  known to     people who  give ear  to  those  in<br />      emotional distress."<br /> After a careful consideration and discussion of the evidence<br /> we reach the following conclusions on point No. 1:<br />      1) that  soon after  the marriage the relations between<br />      Manju and    her husband  became extremely  strained     and<br />      went to  the extent  that no  point of  return had been<br />      almost reached,<br />      2) that  it has  been proved  to some  extent that     the<br />      appellant had  some sort  of intimacy with Ujvala which<br />      embittered the relationship between Manju and him,<br />      3) That the story given out by PW 2 and supported by PW<br />      20 that when they reached Pune after the death of Manju<br />      they found appellant's weeping and wailing out of grief<br />      as this  was merely a pretext for shedding of crocodile<br />      tears, cannot be believed,<br />      4) that  the story     of suicidal pact and the allegation<br />      that  appellant's     illicit   relations   with   Ujvala<br />      developed to  such an  extreme  that  he  was  so    much<br />      infatuated with  Ujvala as     to form  the bedrock of the<br />      motive of    the murder  of Manju,  has not    been clearly<br />      proved,<br />      5) the  statement of  PW 2     that the appellant had told<br />      him that  during the  night on  11th June    1982 he     had<br />      sexual act with the deceased is too good to be true and<br />      is not believable as it is inherently improbable,<br />      6) that  despite the  evidence of PWs 2, 3, 6 and 20 if<br />      has not been proved to our satisfaction that the matter<br />      had assumed such extreme proportions that Manju refused<br />      to go  to Pune  with her  father-in-law (Birdichand) at<br />      any cost  and yet    she was     driven by use of compulsion<br />      and persuasion to accompany him,<br /> 142<br />      7) that  the combined reading and effect of the letters<br />      (Exhs. 30,     32 and 33) and the evidence of PWs 2, 3, 4,<br />      6 and  20 clearly    reveal that  the signs    and symptoms<br />      resulting from  the dirty    atmosphere and    the  hostile<br />      surroundings in  which Manju was placed is a pointer to<br />      the fact that there was a reasonable possibility of her<br />      having committed  suicide and  the prosecution  has not<br />      been able    to exclude  or    eliminate  this     possibility<br />      beyond reasonable doubt.<br />      We must  hasten to add that we do not suggest that this<br /> was not     a case     of murder  at all  but would only go to the<br /> extent of  holding that     at least the possibility of suicide<br /> as alleged by the defence may be there and cannot be said to<br /> be illusory.<br />      8) That a good part of the evidence discussed above, is<br />      undoubtedly admissible  as held by us but its probative<br />      value seems  to be     precious  little  in  view  of     the<br />      several  improbabilities    pointed     out   by  us  while<br />      discussing the evidence.<br />      We might  mention here  that we had to reappreciate the<br /> evidence of  the witnesses and the circumstances taking into<br /> account the  psychological aspect of suicide as found in the<br /> psychotic nature  and character     of Manju  because these are<br /> important facts     which the High Court completely overlocked.<br /> It seems  to us     that the  High Court while appreciating the<br /> evidence  was  greatly    influenced  by    the  fact  that     the<br /> evidence furnished  by the  contents of the letters were not<br /> admissible in  evidence which,    as we have shown, is a wrong<br /> view of law,<br />      We now come to the second limb- perhaps one of the most<br /> important  limbs   of  the   prosecution  case     viz.,     the<br /> circumstance that  the appellant  was  last  seen  with     the<br /> deceased before     her  death.  Apparently,  if  proved,    this<br /> appears to  be a  conclusive evidence  against the appellant<br /> but here  also the High Court has completely ignored certain<br /> essential details  which  cast    considerable  doubt  on     the<br /> evidence led by the prosecution on this point.<br />      The question  of the  appellant having  been last    seen<br /> with the  deceased  may     be  divided  into  three  different<br /> stages:<br />      1) The  arrival of     Anuradha and her children alongwith<br />      Manju at  Takshila apartments,  followed by the arrival<br />      of<br /> 143<br />      the appellant  and his  entry into     his  bedroom  where<br />      Anuradha was talking to Manju,<br />      2) the  calling  of  PW  29  by  A-2  followed  by     the<br />      appellant and  his brother's  going out on a scooter to<br />      get Dr. Lodha and thereafter Dr. Gandhi.<br />      3) Sending for Mohan Asava (PW 30) and the conversation<br />      between the  appellant,  Birdichand  and  others  as  a<br />      result of which the matter was reported to the police.<br />      Although    the   aforesaid      three      stages   of    this<br /> circumstance cannot  technically be  called to mean that the<br /> accused was  last seen with the deceased but the three parts<br /> combined with  the first  circumstance    might  constitute  a<br /> motive for the murder attributed to the appellant.<br />      From a  perusal of     the judgment  of the  High Court on<br /> these points,  it appears  that the  High Court     has made  a<br /> computerise and     mathematical approach    to  the     problem  in<br /> fixing the  exact time of the various events which cannot be<br /> correct as  would appear from the evidence of the witnesses,<br /> including Dr Banerjee (PW 33) .<br />      The evidence  of PW  7, the motor rickshaw driver shows<br /> that on     the night  of the  11th of  June he had brought the<br /> deceased alongwith Anuradha and others and dropped them near<br /> the Takshila  apartments at about 11.00 p.m. The witness was<br /> cross-examined on several points but we shall accept finding<br /> of the    High Court on the fact that on the 11th of June 1982<br /> the witness  had dropped  the persons,    mentioned above,  at<br /> about 11.00 p.m. The rest of the evidence is not germane for<br /> the purpose of this case. It may, however, be mentioned that<br /> one should  always give     some room for a difference of a few<br /> minutes in  the time  that a  layman-like PW 7 would say. We<br /> cannot assume  that when  the witness  stated  that  he     had<br /> dropped Manju and others at 11.00 p.m., it was exactly 11.00<br /> p.m.--it would have been 10-15 minutes this way or that way.<br /> His evidence  is only  material to show the approximate time<br /> when Manju returned to the apartments.<br />      The next  witness on  this point  is PW-28,  K.N. Kadu.<br /> This witness  corroborates PW-7     and stated he had heard the<br /> sound of  a rickshaw near the apartments when the wife of A-<br /> 2, Manju  and 3     children entered the apartments and went to<br /> their rooms. He<br /> 144<br /> further     says  that  after  about  15  minutes    he  saw     the<br /> appellant coming  on a    scooter and while he was parking his<br /> scooter the  witness asked  him why  did he  come so late to<br /> which he  replied that    he was    busy in     some meeting.    This<br /> would show  that the  appellant must  have  arrived  at     the<br /> apartments near     about    11.30  or  11.45  p.m.    It  is    very<br /> difficult to  fix the exact time because the witness himself<br /> says that  he had  given the timings approximately. The High<br /> Court was,  therefore, not  justified in  fixing the time of<br /> arrival of  Manju and  party or     the appellant    with  almost<br /> mathematical precision    for that would be a most unrealistic<br /> approach. The High Court seems to have speculated that Manju<br /> must have  died at  12.00 a.m., that is to say, within 15-20<br /> minutes of  the arrival     of the     appellant. It    is, however,<br /> impossible for    us to  determine the  exact time  as to when<br /> Manju died  because even  Dr. Banerjee    says in his evidence<br /> that the  time of death of the deceased was between 18 to 36<br /> hours which takes us to even beyond past 12 in the night. At<br /> any rate,  this much  is certain  that Manju  must have died<br /> round about  to 2.00  a.m. because when Dr. Lodha arrived at<br /> 2.45 a.m.  he found  her dead  and he  had also     stated that<br /> rigor mortis  had started  setting  in,     It  is.  therefore,<br /> difficult to  fix the  exact time  as if every witness had a<br /> watch which  gave correct  and exact time. Such an inference<br /> is not at all called for.<br />      The third    stage of  this    matter    is  that  while     the<br /> witness was  sleeping he heared the sound of the starting of<br /> a scooter  and got up from his bed and saw appellant and A-2<br /> going away. Therefore, he found 7-8 persons coming and going<br /> on their scooters. The High Court seems to suggest that this<br /> must have happened by about 1.30 p.m. Even so, this does not<br /> prove that  Manju have    died at midnight. As the witness had<br /> been sleeping and was only aroused by the sound of scooters,<br /> it would  be difficult to fix the exact time when he saw the<br /> appellant and A-2 going out on their scooters. His evidence,<br /> therefore, was    rightly relied    upon by     the High  Court  in<br /> proving the facts stated by him.<br />      PW-29, B.K.  Kadu, who was serving as a watchman at the<br /> Takshila apartments says that near about the midnight he was<br /> called by  Rameshwar, A-2  and on hearing the shouts he went<br /> to flat     No. 5.     He further  says that    A-2 directed  him to<br /> unbolt or unchain the door but the door was not found closed<br /> from inside  and hence    A-2 went out and returned after some<br /> time. While the witness was<br /> 145<br /> standing at  the door  A-2 returned and after his return the<br /> witness also  came back     to his     house and  went  to  sleep.<br /> Perhaps the  witness was  referring to the incident when A-1<br /> and A-2     had gone  on scooter  to fetch     Dr.  Lodha.  During<br /> cross-examination the  witness    admitted  that    he  did     not<br /> possess any  watch and    gave the timings only approximately.<br /> We shall  accept his  evidence in  toto but  that  leads  us<br /> nowhere.<br />      This is  all the  evidence so far as the first stage of<br /> the case  is concerned    and, in all probability, it does not<br /> at all    prove that  A-1 had  murdered the  deceased. On     the<br /> other hand,  the circumstances    proved by  the three witness<br /> are not     inconsistent with  the defence plea that soon after<br /> entering the room Manju may have committed suicide.<br />      Part II  of this  circumstance relates to the coming of<br /> Dr. Lodha and then Dr. Gandhi on the scene of occurrence and<br /> we accept  their evidence  in toto.  Dr. Lodha    was a family<br /> doctor of the appellant's family and it was quite natural to<br /> send for  him when the appellant suspected that his wife was<br /> dead. Although    Dr. Lodha (PW 24) was a family doctor of the<br /> appellant's family yet he did not try to support the defence<br /> case and  was frank enough to tell the accused and those who<br /> were present  there that  it was  not possible    for  him  to<br /> ascertain the  cause of     death which could only be done by a<br /> postmortem. In    other words,  he indirectly  suggested    that<br /> Manju's death  was an  unnatural one,  and in order to get a<br /> second opinion    he advised  that Dr. Gandhi (PW 25) may also<br /> be summoned.  Accordingly, Dr.    Gandhi    was  called  and  he<br /> endorsed the  opinion of  Dr. Lodha.  Such a  conduct on the<br /> part of the appellant or the persons belonging to his family<br /> is  wholly   inconsistent  with      the  allegation   of     the<br /> prosecution that the appellant had murdered the deceased.<br />      The High Court seems to have made one important comment<br /> in that     why Dr.  Lodha and Dr. Gandhi were called from some<br /> distance when  Dr. Kelkar,  who was  a skin  specialist     and<br /> another Doctor    who was     a child  expert, were living in the<br /> same building. This comment is neither here nor there. It is<br /> manifest that  Birdichand was  a respectable  person of     the<br /> town and  when he found that his daughter-in-law had died he<br /> would naturally send for his family doctor rather then those<br /> who were not known to him.<br /> 146<br />      It appears     that PW 30 Mohan Asava was also summoned on<br /> telephone and  when he    came at     the scene  of occurrence he<br /> found A-2,  Birdichand sitting    on the floor of the room and<br /> Bridichand hugged  him out of grief, and told him that Manju<br /> had died  of shock and the Doctors were not prepared to give<br /> a death certificate.<br />      In order  to understand the evidence of this witness it<br /> may be    necessary to determine the sequence of events so for<br /> as PW  30 is concerned. The witness has stated that while he<br /> was sleeping he was aroused from his sleep by a knock at the<br /> door by     Ram Vilas  Sharda (brother  of appellant)  at about<br /> 4.00 or 4.15 a.m. Ram Vilas told him that Manju had died and<br /> the doctors were not prepared to give any death certificate.<br /> After having  these talks  the witness, alongwith Ram Vilas,<br /> proceeded to  the apartments  and remained  there till 5.15.<br /> a.m. Then  he returned    to his house, took bath and at about<br /> 6.30 a.m.  he received    a telephone  call from Ram Vilas for<br /> lodging a  report with    the police with the request that the<br /> time of     death should be given as 5.30 a.m. Consequently, he<br /> reached the  police station near about 7.00 or 7.15 a.m. and<br /> lodged a report stating that Manju had died at 5.30 a.m.<br />      This witness appears to be of doubtful antecedents and,<br /> therefore, his    evidence has  to be  taken with     a grain  of<br /> salt. He  admitted in  his statement  at p.  387  that    some<br /> proceedings  about  evasion  of     octroi     duty  were  pending<br /> against him  in the  Court. He    also admitted  that  he     was<br /> convicted and  sentenced to  9 months  R.I  under  the    Food<br /> Adulteration Act in the year 1973.<br />      Apart from     this it appears that most of the statements<br /> which he  made in the Court against Birdichand and the other<br /> accused, were  not made     by him     before     the  police.  These<br /> statements were     put to     him and he denied the same but they<br /> have been  proved by  the Investigation Officer, PW 40 whose<br /> evidence appears  at p.     521  of  Part    II  of    the  printed<br /> paperbook. These belated statements made in the Court may be<br /> summarised thus:<br />      While in  his statement before the court the witness at<br /> p. 386    (para  19)  states  that  the  death  of  Manju     was<br /> suspicious yet    he made     no such statement before the police<br /> on being  confronted by     the statement    of  PW    40.  Another<br /> important point on which his statement does not appear to be<br /> true is that the dominent fact<br /> 147<br /> mentioned to  him by  Birdichahd and  others  was  that     the<br /> doctors were  not prepared to issue death certificate but he<br /> did not     say so     before the police. Similarly, he deposed in<br /> the court about the statement made to him by Birdichand that<br /> he would  lose his prestige and therefore the body should be<br /> cremated before     7.00 a.m,  but he  advised him not to do so<br /> unless he has informed the police otherwise his whole family<br /> would be  in trouble. Almost the entire part of his evidence<br /> in para     5 at p. 381 appears to be an afterthought, as PW 40<br /> stated thus:<br />       "I recorded the statement of PW 30 Mohan Asava. He<br />      did not  state  before  me     that  death  of  Manju     was<br />      suspicious. He did not state before me that Accused No.<br />      3 informed     him that  the Doctors    were not prepared to<br />      issue the death certificate. He did not state before me<br />      that the  demand was made of the death certificate from<br />      the Doctors  or the  Doctors refused  to give the same.<br />      During his     statement this     witness did  not  make     the<br />      statements as  per para  No. 5  excluding the  portions<br />      from A to F of his examination-in-chief."<br />      The portions  referred to    as 'A to F' in para No. 5 of<br /> examination-in-chief of PW 30 may be extracted thus:<br />       "Birdichand then started telling me that Manju had<br />      died on  account of shock and that-----he said that she<br />      died of  heart attack------under  any  circumstance  he<br />      wanted to    cremate Manju before 7.O' clock------when he<br />      said that    he would  spend any  amount  but  wanted  to<br />      cremate her before 7.00 a.m."<br />      This statement  does not  appear to  be  true  for     the<br /> following reasons.<br />      (a)  Birdichand knew  full well that PW 30 was a police<br />       contact constable  and as  he was  not prepared to<br />       persuade the    doctors to give a death certificate,<br />       his  attitude      was  hardly  friendly     as  he     was<br />       insisting that  the matter  should be     reported to<br />       the police.<br />            It is,  therefore, difficult  to believe that<br />       Birdichand would  take such a great risk in laying<br />       all his  cards on the table knowing full well that<br />       the witness was not<br /> 148<br />       so friendly  as he  thought and therefore he might<br />       inform the  police; thereby  he would     be in a way<br />       digging his own grave.<br />      (b)  On a    parity of  reasoning it would have been most<br />       improbable on     the part  of the  appellant,  after<br />       having decided to report the matter to the police,<br />       to ask  PW 30     to report the time of death as 5.30<br />       a.m. knowing    full well  his attitude when he came<br />       to the apartments.<br />      It is  not at  all understandable how the witness could<br /> have mentioned the time of Manju's death as 5.30 a.m. or, at<br /> any rate,  when her  death was known to her husband and when<br /> he himself  having gone     to the     apartments near  about 4.15<br /> a.m. knew full well that Manju had died earlier and that Dr.<br /> Lodha and  Dr. Gandhi  had certified  the same    and  advised<br /> Birdichand to  report the  matter  to  the  police.  In     the<br /> original Ex-120     (in Marathi  language), it appears that the<br /> time of     death given  by  the  witness    is  'Pahate'  which,<br /> according to  Molesworth's Marathi-English  Dictionary at p.<br /> 497, means  'The period     of six     ghatika before     unrise, the<br /> dawn' i.  e., about  2 hours  24 minutes before sunrise (one<br /> ghatika is  equal to 24 minutes). This would take us to near<br /> about 3.00  a.m. Either     there    is  some  confusion  in     the<br /> translation of    the word  'Pahate' or  in  the    words  '5.30<br /> a.m.', as  mentioned  in  the  original     Ex.  120.  However,<br /> nothing much  turns on    this except  that according  to     the<br /> witness Manju  must have  died around  3.00  a.m.  which  is<br /> consistent with     the evidence  of Dr.  Lodha  that  when  he<br /> examined Manju    at about  2.30 a.m.  he found  her dead     and<br /> rigor mortis had already started setting in.<br />      We are  not concerned here with the controversy whether<br /> the report was admissible under s. 154 or s. 174 of the Code<br /> of Criminal  Procedure but  the fact remains that the policd<br /> did receive  the information  that the    death took  place at<br /> 5.30 a.m. The High Court seems to have made a capital out of<br /> this small incident and has not made a realistic approach to<br /> the problem  faced by  Birdichand and  his family.  Being  a<br /> respectable man     of the town, Birdichand did not want to act<br /> in a  hurry lest  his reputation  may suffer  and  naturally<br /> required some time to reflect and consult his friends before<br /> taking any  action. The     allegation that  A-3  told  him  to<br /> report the  time of  death as 5.30 a.m. is not at all proved<br /> but is based on the<br /> 149<br /> statement of  PW 30,  before the  police. Thus, the approach<br /> made by     the High Court to this aspect of the matter appears<br /> to be  artificial and  unrealistic as  it failed  to realise<br /> that the  question of  the time     of death of the deceased as<br /> 5.30 a.m.  could never    have been  given by the appellant or<br /> any other  accused because  they knew full well that the two<br /> doctors had  examined the whole matter and given the time of<br /> death as  being round about 1.30 a.m. Having known all these<br /> facts how  could anyone     ask PW 30 to give the time of death<br /> at the police station as 5.30 a.m.<br />      Thus, it  will be    difficult for  us  to  rely  on     the<br /> evidence of  such a  witness who  had gone  to the extent of<br /> making    wrong    statements  and      trying  to   appease    both<br /> Birdichand and the prosecution, and, therefore, his evidence<br /> does not inspire any confidence.<br />      The last part of the case on this point is the evidence<br /> of PWs    2 and  4, where     the appellant    is said to have told<br /> them that he had sexual intercourse with his wife near about<br /> 5.00 a.m.  on the  12th June  1982. Apart  from the inherent<br /> improbability in  the statement     of the     appellant, there is<br /> one other  circumstance which  almost clinches the issue. It<br /> appears that  Kalghatgi (PW  20), Inspector-in-charge of the<br /> police station    made a    query from  Dr.     Banerjee  which  is<br /> extracted below:<br />       Whether it  can be  said definitely  or not  as to<br />      whether sexual  intercourse might have taken just prior<br />      to death ?"<br />      The above    query was  made in Ex. 129 and the answer of<br /> the Doctor appears in Ex. 187 which is extracted below:<br />       "From clinical  examination there  was no positive<br />      evidence of  having any recent sexual, intercourse just<br />      prior to death."<br />      This positive  finding of    the Doctor  therefore knocks<br /> the bottom  out of the case made out by the prosecution tion<br /> that the  appellant had told PWs 2 and 4 about having sexual<br /> intercourse with  his wife. Unfortunately, however, the High<br /> Court instead  of  giving  the    benefit     of  this  important<br /> circumstance to     the accused  has given     the benefit  to the<br /> prosecution which  is yet another error in the approach made<br /> by the Eight Court while assessing the prosecution evidence.<br /> Having regard  to the  very short margin of time between the<br /> arrival of  the appellant  in his  bed-room and the death of<br /> Manju, it seems<br /> 150<br /> to be  well-nigh impossible  to believe that he would try to<br /> have  sexual   intercourse  with   her.     This  circumstance,<br /> therefore, falsifies  the evidence  of PWs  2 and  4 on this<br /> point and  shows the  extent to which the witnesses could go<br /> to implicate the appellant.<br />      Finally, in  view of  the disturbed nature of the state<br /> of mind     of Birdichand    and the catastrophe faced by him and<br /> his family,  it is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  grief<br /> expressed and  the tears shed by the appellant when PW 2 met<br /> him could  be characterised  as fake.  If it is assumed that<br /> the accused  did not  commit the murder of the deceased then<br /> the weeping  and wailing  and expressing  his grief  to PW 2<br /> would be quite natural and not fake.<br />      There  are      other     minor     details  which      have    been<br /> considered by the High Court but they do not appear to us to<br /> be very material.<br />      Taking  an      overall  picture   on     this  part  of     the<br /> prosecution case the position seems to be as follows:<br />      (1)   if the  accused wanted to give poison while Manju<br />       was wide  awake, she    would have  put up  stiffest<br />       possible resistance  as any  other person  in     her<br />       position would  have done.  Dr.  Banerjee  in     his<br />       postmortem  report  has  not    found  any  mark  of<br />       violence  or     resistance.   Even   if   she     was<br />       overpowered  by   the     appellant  she     would    have<br />       shouted and  cried and  attracted persons from the<br />       neighbouring flats  which would  have been a great<br />       risk having  regard to  the fact  that some of the<br />       inmates of  the house     had come only a short-while<br />       before the appellant.<br />      (2)   Another possibility    which cannot be ruled out is<br />       that potassium  cyanide may  have  been  given  to<br />       Manju in  a glass of water, if she happened to ask<br />       for it.  But if  this was  so, she being a chemist<br />       herself would     have at  once suspected  some    foul<br />       play and  once her  suspicion would have arisen it<br />       would be  very  difficult  for  the  appellant  to<br />       murder her.<br />      (3)   The    third  possibility  is    that  as  Manju     had<br />       returned pretty late to the flat she went to sleep<br />       even before  the arrival of the appellant and then<br />       he must have tried to<br /> 151<br />       forcibly administer  the poison  by the process of<br />       mechanical suffocation,  in which  case alone     the<br />       deceased could  not have  been in  a    position  to<br />       offer any  resistance. But  this  opinion  of     the<br />       Doctor has  not been    accepted by  the High  Court<br />       which, after    a very    elaborate consideration     and<br />       discussion of     the evidence, the circumstances and<br />       the medical authorities, found that the opinion of<br />       the  Doctor    that  Manju   died   by      mechanical<br />       suffocation has  not been  proved or, at any rate,<br />       it is     not safe  to rely on such evidence. In this<br />       connection, we  might refer to the finding of fact<br />       arrived at by the High Court on this point:<br />       "In view  of the  above position  as is  available<br />      from  the     evidence  of  Dr.  Banerjee  and  from     the<br />      observations made    by the    medical authorities  it will<br />      not be  possible to  say that the existence of the dark<br />      red blood in the right ventricle exclusively points out<br />      the  mechanical   suffocation  particularly  when    such<br />      phenomenon     is  available    in  cases  of  poisoning  by<br />      potassium cyanide." (PB p. 147-48)<br />       "In view of this answer it will not be possible to<br />      say  conclusively     that  this  particular     symptom  of<br />      observation  is   exclusively  available    in  case  of<br />      mechanical suffocation.<br />       Thus we  have discussed  all the  seven  items  on<br />      which Dr. Banerjee has relied for the purpose of giving<br />      an opinion     that there  was mechanical  suffocation. In<br />      our  view,      therefore,  those  7    findings  would     not<br />      constitute conclusive  date for  the purpose of holding<br />      that  there   was    mechanical  suffocation.  As  the  7<br />      findings mentioned     above can  be available even in the<br />      case of cyanide poisoning we think that it would not be<br />      safe to  rely upon these circumstances for recording an<br />      affirmative   finding   that   there   was      mechanical<br />      suffocation. As  the 7  findings mentioned above can be<br />      available even  in the  case of  cyanide  poisoning  we<br />      think that     it would  not be  safe to  rely upon  these<br />      circumstances for recording an affirmative finding that<br />      there was mechanical suffocation."<br />                          (P.150-151)<br />      It is  not necessary for us to repeat the circumstances<br /> relied upon  by the  High Court     because the finding of fact<br /> speaks for itself.<br /> 152<br /> This being  the     position,  the     possibility  of  mechanical<br /> suffocation is completely excluded.<br />      (4)   The other  possibility that    may be thought of is<br />       that Manju  died a  natural death.  This  also  is<br />       eliminated in     view of  the report of the Chemical<br />       Examiner as  confirmed by  the postmortem that the<br />       deceased had died as a result of administration of<br />       potassium cyanide.<br />      (5)  The only other reasonable possibility that remains<br />       is that  as the  deceased  was  fed  up  with     the<br />       maltreatment by  her husband, in a combined spirit<br />       of revenge  and hostility  after entering the flat<br />       she herself  took potassium  cyanide and  lay limp<br />       and lifeless.     When the appellant entered the room<br />       he must  have thought that as she was sleeping she<br />       need not be disturbed but when he found that there<br />       was no  movement in the body after an hour so, his<br />       suspicion was     roused and  therefore he called his<br />       brother from adjacent flat to send for Dr. Lodha.<br />      In these  circumstances,  it  cannot  be  said  that  a<br /> reasonable possibility    of  the     deceased  having  committed<br /> suicide, as  alleged by the defence, can be safely ruled out<br /> or eliminated.<br />      From a  review of the circumstances mentioned above, we<br /> are of    the opinion  that the  circumstance of the appellant<br /> having been  last seen with the deceased has not been proved<br /> conclusively so     as to    raise an irresistible inference that<br /> Manju's death was a case of blatant homicide.<br />      This now  brings us to an important chapter of the case<br /> on which  great reliance  appears to have been placed by Mr.<br /> Jethmalani  on     behalf     of  the  appellant.  Unfortunately,<br /> however,  the  aspect  relating     to  interpolations  in     the<br /> postmortem report  has been  completely glossed     over by the<br /> High Court  which has  not attached  any importance  to     the<br /> infirmity appearing  in the  medical evidence  in support of<br /> the said  interpolations. Although  the learned     counsel for<br /> the  appellant     drew  our   attention    to   a     number      of<br /> interpolations in  the postmortem  report as also the report<br /> sent to     the Chemical  Examiner, we  are impressed only with<br /> two infirmities which merit<br /> 153<br /> serious consideration.    To begin  with, it  has been pointed<br /> out that in the original postmortem notes which were sent to<br /> Dr. Banerjee  (PW 33)  for his    opinion, there    is  a  clear<br /> interpolation by  which the words `can be a case of suicidal<br /> death' appear  to have    been scored  out  and  Dr.  Banerjee<br /> explained that    since he  had written  the words `time since<br /> death' twice,  therefore, the  subsequent writing  had    been<br /> scored out  by him.  In     other    words,    the  Doctor  clearly<br /> admitted the  scoring out  of the  subsequent portion and we<br /> have to     examine whether  the explanation  given by  him  is<br /> correct. In  order to decide this issue we have examined for<br /> ourselves the  original postmortem notes (Ex. 128) where the<br /> writing has  been admittedly scored out by Dr. Banerjee. The<br /> relevant column     against which    the scoring has been done is<br /> column. No. 5 which runs thus:<br />       "5. Substance     of accompanying  Report from Police<br />      officer or Magistrate, together with the date of death,<br />      if known.    Supposed  cause     of  death,  or     reason     for<br />      examination."<br />      The last line indicates that the Doctor was to note two<br /> things-(1) the date of death, if known, and (2) the supposed<br /> cause of  death. This  document appears to have been written<br /> by PW 33 on 12.6.82 at 4.30 p.m. The relevant portion of the<br /> words written  by the  Doctor are  `time since    dealt' which<br /> were repeated  as he  states in     his statement.     After these<br /> words some  other words     have been admittedly scored out and<br /> his (PW     33) explanation was that since he had written `time<br /> since death'  twice, the  second line being a repetition was<br /> scored out.  A bare  look at  Ex. 128 does not show that the<br /> explanation  given   by     the  Doctor  is  correct.  We    have<br /> ourselves examined  the     said  words  with  the     help  of  a<br /> magnifying glass  and find  that the  scored words could not<br /> have been  `time since    death'. The only word common between<br /> the line  scored out and the line left intact is `death'. To<br /> us, the     scored out  words seem     to be    `can be     a  case  of<br /> suicidal death'.  Dr Banerjee  however stuck to his original<br /> stand which  is not  supported by  his own  writing  in     the<br /> document itself.  It seems'  to us  that at  the first flush<br /> when he     wrote the  postmortem notes it appeared to him that<br /> no abnormality was detected and that it appears to be a case<br /> of suicide rather than that of homicide. This, therefore, if<br /> the strongest  possible circumstance  to  make    the  defence<br /> highly probable,  if not certain. Furthermore, the Doctors's<br /> explanation that  the scored  words were "time since death",<br /> according to the said explanation, the scored words ore only<br /> three whereas<br /> 154<br /> the portion  scored out     contains as  many as  seven  words.<br /> Hence the  explanation of  the Doctor  is not borne out from<br /> the document.<br />      It is  true that  the Doctor reserved his opinion until<br /> the chemical  examiner's report but that does not answer the<br /> question because  in column  No.5  of  postmortem  note     Dr.<br /> Banerjee has  clearly written  "can be    a case    of  suicidal<br /> death" which  indicates a  that in the absence of the report<br /> of the    chemical examiner,  he was  of the  opinion that  it<br /> could have  been a  case of  suicide. In his evidence, PW 33<br /> stated that  in Exh. 128 in column No. 5 the contents scored<br /> out read  `time since  death' and   since it was repeated in<br /> the next  line, he  scored the    words in  the  second  line.<br /> Despite persistent  cross-examination the  Doctor appears to<br /> have stuck  to his  stand. It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid<br /> that this matter was of vital importance and we expected the<br /> High Court  to have  given serious  attention to this aspect<br /> which goes in favour of the accused.<br />      Another  interpolation   pointed  out  by    the  learned<br /> counsel is regarding position of tongue as mentioned in Exh.<br /> 134. In     the original  while filling  up the said column the<br /> Doctor appears    to have     scored out something; the filled up<br /> entry appears  thus-`mouth is  closed  with  tip  (something<br /> scored out)  seen caught  between the  teeth'.    But  in     the<br /> carbon copy  of the  report which  was sent  to the Chemical<br /> Examiner (Exh.    132) he has added `caught between the teeth'<br /> in ink    but in the original there is something else. This is<br /> fortified by  the fact    that the copy of the report actually<br /> sent  to   the    chemical   examiner  does  not    contain     any<br /> interpolation against  the said     column where  the filled up<br /> entry reads `Inside mouth'.<br />      The combined  effect of  these circumstances  show that<br /> Dr. Banerjee (PW33) tried to introduce some additional facts<br /> regarding the  position of  the tongue.     Perhaps this may be<br /> due to    his final  opinion that     the deceased  died  due  to<br /> mechanical suffocation    which might lead to the tongue being<br /> pressed between     the teeth. This, however, throws a cloud of<br /> doubt on  the correctness or otherwise of the actual reports<br /> written by  him and  the one  that was    sent to the Chemical<br /> Examiner. It  is obvious  that in  the carbon copy which was<br /> retained by  the Doctor,  the entries  must have  been    made<br /> after the  copy was  sent to the Chemical Examiner. However,<br /> this circumstance  is not  of much  consequence because     the<br /> opinion     of   the  Doctor   that  Manju      died    by  forcible<br /> administration of  potassium cyanide  or by  the process  of<br /> mechanical suffocation has not been proved.<br /> 155<br /> This aspect  need not detain us any further because the High<br /> Court has not accepted the case of mechanical suffocation.<br />      So far  as the  other  findings  of  Dr.  Banerjee     are<br /> concerned we fully agree with the same. A number of comments<br /> were made  on behalf  of the  appellant about Dr. Banerjee's<br /> integrity and incorrect reports but subject to what we said,<br /> we do not find any substance in those contentions.<br />      In para  90 of  its judgment the High Court has given a<br /> number of  circumstances which    according to it, go to prove<br /> the  prosecution   case     showing   that     the  appellant     had<br /> administered the poison during the night of 11th June, 1982.<br /> These circumstances may be extracted thus:<br />      (1)   In the  bed-room Manju  died of poisoning between<br />       11.30 p.m.  and  1.  a.m.  in     the  night  between<br />       11/12th June, 1982.<br />      (2)   Accused No.    1 was present in that bed room since<br />       before the  death of    Manju i.e. since about 11.15<br />       p.m.<br />      (3)   Accused No,    1 did not return to the flat at 1.30<br />       a.m or 1.45 a.m. as alleged.<br />      (4)   The conduct    of accused  No. 1 in not calling for<br />       the immediate     help of  Dr. Shrikant Kelkar and/or<br />       Mrs.    Anjali     Kelkar     is  inconsistent  with     his<br />       defence that    he felt     suspicious of the health of<br />       Manju when  he allegedly  returned to     the flat at<br />       1.30 a.m.<br />      (5)   In different     conduct of  accused No.  1 when Dr.<br />       Lodha and  Dr. Gandhi went to the flat in Takshila<br />       apartment, Accused  No. 1 did not show any anxiety<br />       which one  normally finds when the doctor comes to<br />       examine the  patient. Accused     No. 1    should    have<br />       accompanied the  doctors when     they examined Manju<br />       and should  have expressly  or  by  his  behaviour<br />       disclosed his feelings about the well being of his<br />       wife. It  was also  necessary for  him to disclose<br />       the alleged fact that he saw Manju in a suspicious<br />       condition when  he returned  at about 1.30 a.m. Or<br />       so.<br />      (6)   An attempt  of Birdichand to get the cremation of<br />       Manju done  before 7    a. m.  On 12.  6 82  even by<br />       spending any amount for that purpose. This conduct<br />       though<br /> 156<br />       of Birdichand     shows the  conduct of    a person  to<br />       whom Accused    No. 1  had gone     and informed  as to<br />       what had happened.<br />      (7)  Delay and false information to police at the hands<br />       of Mohan Asava. Though the information is given by<br />       Mohan as per the phone instructions of accused No.<br />       3 it    is, presumed  that accused  No. 1  must have<br />       told accused    No. 3 about the incident and on that<br />       basis accused     No.3  gave  instructions  to  Mohan<br />       Asava.<br />      (8)   Accused No.    1 himself  does not  take any action<br />       either personally or through somebody else to give<br />       correct information to police.<br />      (9)   Arrangement of  the dead  body to  make show that<br />       Manju died a peaceful and natural death.<br />      (10) Accused  No. 1  has a     motive to  kill Manju as he<br />       wanted to  get rid  of her  to continue  relations<br />       with Ujvala.<br />      (11) Absence  of an  anklet on  left ankle     of Manju is<br />       inconsistent with the defence that Manju committed<br />       suicide.<br />      (12) The  conduct of  the    accused     in  concealing     the<br />       anklet in  the fold of the Chaddar is a Conduct of<br />       a guilty man.<br />      (13) The  door of the bedroom was not found bolted from<br />       inside. This    would have  been  normally  done  by<br />       Manju if she had committed suicide.<br />      (14) Potassium  cyanide must not have been available to<br />       Manju.<br />      (15) Manju     was 4    to  6  weeks  pregnant.     This  is  a<br />       circumstance which  would  normally  dissuade     her<br />       from committing suicide.<br />      (16) Denial of the part of accused No. 1 of admitted or<br />       proved facts.<br />      (17) Raising  a false  plea of absence from the bedroom<br />       at the relevant time.               (PP. 152-155)<br /> 157<br />      We have  already discussed     most of  the  circumstances<br /> extracted above     and given  our opinion, and have also fully<br /> explained the  effect of circumstances Nos. 1,2,3,4,5 and 6.<br /> We might  again even  at the risk of repetition say that too<br /> much reliance seems to have been placed by the High Court on<br /> circumstance No. 4 as the appellant did not immediately call<br /> for Dr. Shrikant Kelkar (PW 26) and Dr. (Mrs.) Anjali Kelkar<br /> (PW 27).  In a    matter of  this magnitude  it would be quite<br /> natural for  the members  of the  appellant's family to send<br /> for their  own family  doctor who  was fully conversant with<br /> the  ailment  of  every     member     of  the  family.  In  these<br /> circumstances there  was nothing  wrong if the appellant and<br /> his brother went to a distance of 11/2 Km. to get Dr. Lodha.<br /> Secondly, Dr.  Shrikant Kelkar    was skin  specialist whereas<br /> Dr.  (Mrs)   Anjali  Kelkar  was  a  Paediatrician  and     the<br /> appellant may  have genuinely believed that as they belonged<br /> to different  branches, they  were not    all suitable to deal<br /> with such  a serious  case. The     High Court  was, therefore,<br /> wrong in  treating this     circumstance  as  an  incriminating<br /> conduct of the appellant.<br />      Circumstance No.  5 is  purely conjectural     because  as<br /> soon as     Dr. Lodha  came he  examined Manju and advised that<br /> Dr. Gandhi  be called.    We fail     to understand    what was the<br /> indifferent conduct  of the  appellant when  he had sent for<br /> the two Doctors who examined the deceased. The appellant was<br /> in the    same room  or rather  in an  adjacent room  when the<br /> deceased was  being examined.  From this no inference can be<br /> drawn that  the appellant  was indifferent  to the  state in<br /> which Manju was found.<br />      As regards circumstance No. 6 we have already explained<br /> this while  dealing with the evidence of Mohan Asava, PW 30.<br /> As regards  circumstance No.  7, the High Court has presumed<br /> that there being no dependable evidence that the information<br /> given to  the police  by  PW  30  was  false  and  that     the<br /> appellant must have told A-3 about the incident on the basis<br /> of which  he gave  instructions to  PW 30.  This is also far<br /> from the  truth as  has been pointed out by us while dealing<br /> with the evidence of PW 30.<br />      Circumstance No.  8 is  that PW  30 was asked to report<br /> the matter  to the  police. When  the dead body was lying in<br /> the flat  what action  could the appellant have taken except<br /> reporting the  matter to the police through one of his known<br /> persons. So far as<br /> 158<br /> circumstances Nos.  9 and  10 are  concerned,  they  do     not<br /> appear to  us to  be of any consequence because, as shown by<br /> us, from  a reading  of the letters (Exhs. 30,32 and 33) and<br /> the conduct of the appellant, we do not find any evidence of<br /> a clear motive on the part of the appellant to kill Manju.<br />      Circumstances Nos.     11 and 12 are also of no assistance<br /> to the    prosecution because  whether the  anklet was  in the<br /> chaddar or  elsewhere is  wholly insignificant    and does not<br /> affect the  issue in question at all. Circumstance No. 13 is<br /> also speculative because if the bedroom was not found bolted<br /> from inside that would it self not show that Manju could not<br /> have  committed      suicide.  Various  persons  may  react  to<br /> circumstances in  different ways.  When     Manju    entered     her<br /> bedroom her husband had not come and since she went to sleep<br /> she may     not have  bolted the door from inside to enable her<br /> husband to  enter the  room. As regards circumstance No. 14,<br /> the High  Court has  overlooked a very important part of the<br /> evidence of PW 2 who has stated at page 178 of part I of the<br /> printed paperbook thus:<br />       "The plastic    factory at  Beed  is  a     partnership<br />      concern in     which two  sons of  Dhanraj,  my  wife     and<br />      sister-in-law, i.e., brother's wife are partners."<br />      Dr. Modi's     Medical Jurisprudence    and Texicology (19th<br /> Edn.) at  page 747  shows that    `Cyanide is  also  used     for<br /> making basic  chemicals for  plastics'. Apart  from the fact<br /> that the  High Court  in relying  on this  circumstance     has<br /> committed a  clear error  of record,  it  is  an  additional<br /> factor to  show that  cyanide could  have been    available to<br /> Manju when she visited Beed for the last time and had stayed<br /> there for more than a week.<br />      Circumstance No.15-the fact that Manju was 4 to 6 weeks<br /> pregnant would    dissuade Manju    from committing     suicide  is<br /> also purely  speculative. A pregnancy of 4 to 6 weeks is not<br /> very serious  and can easily be washed out. Moreover, when a<br /> person has decided to end one's life these are matters which<br /> do not    count at  all. On  the other hand, this circumstance<br /> may have prompted her to commit suicide for a child was born<br /> to her,     in view of her ill-treatment by her husband and her<br /> in-laws, the  child may     not get proper upbringing. Any way,<br /> we do  not want     to land  ourselves in the field of surmises<br /> and conjectures as the High Court has done.<br /> 159<br />      Circumstance No.  17 is  wholly irrelevant     because the<br /> prosecution cannot  derive any    strength from  a false    plea<br /> unless it  has proved  its  case  with    absolute  certainty.<br /> Circumstance No.17  also is not relevant because there is no<br /> question of  taking a false plea of absence from the bedroom<br /> at the    relevant time  as there is no clear evidence on this<br /> point.<br />      Apart from     the aforesaid    comments there    is one vital<br /> defect in  some of  the circumstances  mentioned  above     and<br /> relied upon  by the  High Court,  viz.,     circumstances    Nos.<br /> 4,5,6,8,9,11,12,13,16, and  17. As  these circumstances were<br /> not put to the appellant in his statement under s.313 of the<br /> Criminal Procedure  Code they  must be    completely  excluded<br /> from consideration  because the     appellant did    not have any<br /> chance to  explain them.  This has been consistently held by<br /> this Court  as far  back as  1953 where in the case of Fateh<br /> Singh Bhagat  Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh(1) this Court<br /> held that  any circumstance  in respect     of which an accused<br /> was not examined under s. 342 of the Criminal procedure code<br /> cannot be  used against     him ever since this decision. there<br /> is a  catena of     authorities of     this Court uniformly taking<br /> the view  that unless  the circumstance appearing against an<br /> accused is  put to him in his examination under s.342 of the<br /> or s.313  of the Criminal Procedure Code, the same cannot be<br /> used against  him.  In    Shamu  Balu  Chaugule  v.  State  of<br /> Maharashtra(2) this Court held thus:<br />       "The fact  that  the    appellant  was    said  to  be<br />      absconding not  having been  put to  him under  section<br />      342, Criminal Procedure Code, could not be used against<br />      him."<br />      To the same effect is another decision of this Court in<br /> Harijan Megha  Jesha v.     State    of  Gujarat  (3)  where     the<br /> following observation were made:<br />       "In  the  first  place,  he  stated  that  on     the<br />      personal search  of the  appellant, a  chadi was  found<br />      which was    blood stained and according to the report of<br />      the   serologist,      it    contained    human    blood.<br />      Unfortunately, however,  as this  circumstance was     not<br />      put to the accused in his statement<br /> 160<br />      under section  342, the prosecution cannot be permitted<br />      to rely  on this  statement in  order  to    convict     the<br />      appellant.':<br />      It is  not necessary  for us to multiply authorities on<br /> this point  as this question now stands concluded by several<br /> decision of  this Court.  In this  view of  the matter,     the<br /> circumstances which  were not  put to  the appellant  in his<br /> examination under  s.313 of the Criminal Procedure Code have<br /> to be completely excluded from consideration.<br />      We might  mention here an important argument advance by<br /> counsel for  the appellant  and countered  by the Additional<br /> Solicitor General.  It was argued before the High Court that<br /> it was    highly improbable  that if the betrothal ceremony of<br /> appellant's sister,  which was    as important as the marriage<br /> itself, was going to be performed on the 13th of June, would<br /> the appellant  clouse a     day before  that for  murdering his<br /> wife and  thereby bring disgrace and destruction not only to<br /> his family  but also to her sister. We have already adverted<br /> to this aspect of the matter but it is rather interesting to<br /> note how  the High  Court has  tried to     rebut this inherent<br /> improbability,    on   the  ground   that      in   a   case      of<br /> administration of  poison the culprit would just wait for an<br /> opportunity to    administer the    same and  once he  gets     the<br /> opportunity he is not expected to think rationally but would<br /> commit the murder at once. With due respect to the Judges of<br /> the High  Court, we  are not able to agree with the somewhat<br /> complex line  of reasoning  which is  not supported  by     the<br /> evidence on  record. There  is clear  evidence, led  by     the<br /> prosecution that except for a week or few days of intervals,<br /> Manju always  used to  live with  her husband  and  she     had<br /> herself complained  that he  used to  come  late  at  night.<br /> Hence, as  both were  living alone  in the same room for the<br /> last four months there could be no dearth of any opportunity<br /> on the    part of     the appellant    to administer  poison if  he<br /> really wanted to do so. We are unable to follow the logic of<br /> the High  Court's reasoning  that once    the appellant got an<br /> opportunity he    must have  clung to it. The evidence further<br /> shows that both Manju and appellant had gone for a honeymoon<br /> outside Pune  and even    at that     time he could have murdered<br /> her and     allowed the  case to  pass  for  a  natural  death.<br /> However, these are matters of conjectures.<br />      The   Additional     Solicitor-General   realising     the<br /> hollowness  of    the  High  Court's  argument  put  it  in  a<br /> different way.    He submitted  that as  the deceased  was 4-6<br /> weeks pregnant the appellant realised<br /> 161<br /> that unless the deceased was murdered at the behest it would<br /> become very  difficult for him to murder her, even if he had<br /> got an    opportunity, if     a child  was born and then he would<br /> have to     maintain the  child also  which would have affected<br /> his illicit  connections with  Ujvala. This appears to be an<br /> attractive argument  but on  close scrutiny it is untenable.<br /> If it  was only     a  question  of  Manju's  being  4-6  weeks<br /> pregnant before     her death, the appellant could just as well<br /> have waited  just for another fortnight till the marriage of<br /> his sister  was over which was fixed for 30th June, 1982 and<br /> then either  have the  pregnancy terminated  or killed    her.<br /> Moreover, it  would appear from the evidence of PW 2 (P.176)<br /> that in     his community    the Kohl  ceremony is  not merely  a<br /> formal betrothal  but a very important ceremony in which all<br /> the near  relations are     called and  invited to     attend     the<br /> function and  a dinner is hosted. We might extract what PW 2<br /> says about this:<br />       "At the  time of  Kohl celebration  of  Manju,  on<br />      2.8.1981 my  relatives i.e.  my sister from outside had<br />      attended this function and many people were invited for<br />      this function.  A dinner was also hosted by me. In that<br />      function the  father of  the bridegroom  is required to<br />      spend for    the dinner  while the  presentations made to<br />      the bride    are required  to be  given or  donned at the<br />      expenses of  the side  of bridegroom  This programme is<br />      not attended by the bridegroom." (P.176)<br />      As Birdichand  and others    were made  co-accused in the<br /> case they  were unable to give evidence on this point but it<br /> is the    admitted case  of both    the parties that the accused<br /> belonged  to   the  same   community  as   PW  2.  In  these<br /> circumstances, it  is difficult     to accept the argument that<br /> the appellant  would commit  the murder     of his wife just on<br /> the eve     of Kohl ceremony, which he could have done the same<br /> long before that ceremony or after the marriage as there was<br /> no hurry  nor any  such impediment  which would deny him any<br /> opportunity of murdering his wife.<br />      We     now  come  to    the  nature  and  character  of     the<br /> circumstantial evidence.  The law  on the  subject  is    well<br /> settled for the last 6-7 decades and there have been so many<br /> decisions on  this point  that the  principles laid  down by<br /> courts have become more or less axiomatic.<br /> 162<br />      The High  Court has  referred to some decisions of this<br /> Court and  tried to  apply the    ratio of  those cases to the<br /> present     case    which,    as   we     shall     show,    are  clearly<br /> distinguishable. The High Court was greatly impressed by the<br /> view taken  by some  courts, including    this Court,  that  a<br /> false defence  or a  false plea taken by an accused would be<br /> an additional  link in    the various  chain of circumstantial<br /> evidence and  seems to    suggest that since the appellant had<br /> taken a     false plea  that would     be conclusive,     taken along<br /> with other  circumstances, to  prove  the  case.  We  might,<br /> however, mention  at the  outset that  this is not what this<br /> Court has said. We shall elaborate this aspect of the matter<br /> a little later<br />      It is  well settled  that the prosecution must stand or<br /> fall on     its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from<br /> the weakness  of the  defence. This  is     trite    law  and  no<br /> decision has  taken a  contrary view.  What some  cases have<br /> held is     only this:  where various  links in  a chain are in<br /> themselves complete than a false plea or a false defence may<br /> be called  into aid  only to lend assurance to the Court. In<br /> other words,  before using  the additional  link it  must be<br /> proved that  all the  links in the chain are complete and do<br /> not suffer  from any infirmity. It is not the law that where<br /> is any infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution case, the same<br /> could be  cured or  supplied by     a false  defence or  a plea<br /> which is not accepted by a Court.<br />      Before discussing    the cases  relied upon    by the    High<br /> Court we  would like  to cite a few decisions on the nature,<br /> character and  essential proof    required in  a criminal case<br /> which rests  on     circumstantial     evidence  alone.  The    most<br /> fundamental and     basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v.<br /> The State of Madhya Pradesh.(1) This case has been uniformly<br /> followed and  applied by  this Court  in a  large number  of<br /> later decisions     uptodate, for instance, the cases of Tufail<br /> (Alias) Simmi  v. State     of Uttar Pradesh(2) and Ramgopal v.<br /> Stat of     Maharashtra(3). It  may be  useful to    extract what<br /> Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant's case (supra):<br />       "It is  well to  remember that  in cases where the<br />      evidence    is   of      a   circumstantial   nature,     the<br />      circumstances from     which the conclusion of guilt is to<br />      be drawn should in the<br /> 163<br />      first instance  be fully  established and all the facts<br />      so established  should  be     consistent  only  with     the<br />      hypothesis of  the guilt  of the  accused.     Again,     the<br />      circumstances should  be of  a  conclusive     nature     and<br />      tendency and  they should    be such     as to exclude every<br />      hypothesis but  the one proposed to be proved. In other<br />      words, there  must     be  a    chain  of  evidence  so     far<br />      complete as  not to  leave any  reasonable ground far a<br />      conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused<br />      and it  must be  such as  to show that within all human<br />      probability  the    act  must  have     been  done  by     the<br />      accused."<br />      A close  analysis of  this decision would show that the<br /> following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against<br /> an accused can be said to be fully established:<br />      (1)  the circumstances  from which     the  conclusion  of<br />       guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.<br />      It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the<br /> circumstances concerned     'must or  should' and    not 'may be'<br /> established. There  is not  only a  grammatical but  a legal<br /> distinction between  'may be  proved' and 'must be or should<br /> be proved'  as was  held by  this Court     in Shivaji Sahabrao<br /> Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra(') where the following<br /> observations were made:<br />       "Certainly, it  is a    primary principle  that     the<br />      accused must  be and  not merely may be guilty before a<br />      court can    convict and the mental distance between 'may<br />      be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures<br />      from sure conclusions."<br />      (2)  The facts so established should be consistent only<br />       with the  hypothesis of  the guilt of the accused,<br />       that is  to say. they should not be explainable on<br />       any other  hypothesis except    that the  accused is<br />       guilty,<br />      (3)  the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature<br />       and tendency.<br />      (4)  they    should    exclude     every    possible  hypothesis<br />       except the one to be proved, and<br /> 164<br />      (5)  there must  be a  chain of evidence so complete as<br />       not  to   leave  any    reasonable  ground  for     the<br />       conclusion consistent     with the  innocence of     the<br />       accused  and     must  show   that  in     all   human<br />       probability the  act must  have been    done by     the<br />       accused.<br />      These  five  golden  principles,  if  we  may  say     so,<br /> constitute the    panchsheel of  the proof  of a case based on<br /> circumstantial evidence.<br />      It may  be interesting to note that as regards the mode<br /> of proof  in a    criminal case  depending  on  circumstantial<br /> evidence, in the absence of a corpus deliciti, the statement<br /> of law    as to proof of the same was laid down by Gresson, J.<br /> (and concurred    by 3  more Judges)  in The King v. Horry,(l)<br /> thus:<br />       "Before he  can be  convicted, the  fact of  death<br />      should be    proved by  such circumstances  as render the<br />      commission of  the crime  morally certain    and leave no<br />      ground  for   reasonable  doubt:    the   circumstantial<br />      evidence should  be so  cogent  and  compelling  as  to<br />      convince a jury that up on no rational hypothesis other<br />      than murder can the facts be accounted for."<br />      Lord Goddard  slightly modified the expression, morally<br /> certain by  'such circumstances     as render the commission of<br /> the crime certain'.<br />      This indicates  the  cardinal  principle'    of  criminal<br /> jurisprudence that a case can be said to be proved only when<br /> there is  certain and explicit evidence and no person can be<br /> convicted on pure moral conviction. Horry's case (supra) was<br /> approved by  this Court in Anant Chintaman Lagu v. The State<br /> of Bombay(2)  Lagu's case  as also the principles enunciated<br /> by this Court in Hanumant's case (supra) have been uniformly<br /> and consistently  followed in  all later  decisions of    this<br /> Court without  any single  exception. To  quote a  few cases<br /> Tufail's case  (supra), Ramgopals  case (supra), Chandrakant<br /> Nyalchand Seth    v. The    State of Bombay (Criminal Appeal No.<br /> 120 of 1957 decided on 19.2.58), Dharmbir Singh v. The State<br /> of Punjab  (Criminal  Appeal  No.  98  of  1958     decided  on<br /> 4.11.1958). There are a number of other cases where although<br /> Hanumant's case has not<br /> 165<br /> been expressly    noticed but  the same  principles have    been<br /> expounded and  reiterated,  as    in  Naseem  Ahmed  v.  Delhi<br /> Administration(l). Mohan  Lal Pangasa  v. State     of U.P.,(2)<br /> Shankarlal Gyarasilal  Dixit v.     State of Maharashtra(3) and<br /> M.C. Agarwal  v. State    of Maharashtra(4)-a five-Judge Bench<br /> decision.<br />      It may  be necessary  here to  notice a  very  forceful<br /> argument  submitted   by  the  Additional  Solicitor-General<br /> relying on  a decision    of this Court in Deonandan Mishra v.<br /> The State  of Bihar(5),     to supplement this argument that if<br /> the defence  case is false it would constitute an additional<br /> link so as to fortify the prosecution case. With due respect<br /> to the learned Additional Solicitor General we are unable to<br /> agree with  the interpretation given by him of the aforesaid<br /> case, the relevant portion of which may be extracted thus:<br />       "But in  a case  like this where the various links<br />      as started     above have been satisfactorily made out and<br />      the  circumstances      point     to  the  appellant  as     the<br />      probable assailant, with reasonable definiteness and in<br />      proximity    to   the  deceased   as     regards   time     and<br />      situation-such  absence   of   explanation      of   false<br />      explanation would    itself be  an additional  link which<br />      completes the chain."<br />      It will  be seen  that this  Court     while    taking    into<br /> account the  absence of     explanation or     a false explanation<br /> did hold  that it  will amount    to be  an additional link to<br /> complete the  chain but     these observations  must be read in<br /> the light  of what  this Court    said earlier, viz., before a<br /> false explanation  can    be  used  as  additional  link,     the<br /> following essential conditions must be satisfied:<br />      (1)  various links     in the chain of evidence led by the<br />       prosecution have been satisfactorily proved.<br />      (2)  the said  circumstance point    to the    guilt of the<br />       accused with reasonable definiteness, and<br />      (3)  the circumstance  is in  proximity to the time and<br />       situation.<br /> 166<br />      If these conditions are fulfilled only then a court can<br /> use a  false explanation or a false defence as an additional<br /> link to lend an assurance to the court and not otherwise. On<br /> the facts  and circumstances  of the present case, this does<br /> not appear  to be such a case. This aspect of the matter was<br /> examined in  Shankarlal's  case     (supra)  where     this  Court<br /> observed thus:<br />       "Besides, falsity of defence cannot take the place<br />      of     proof     of  facts  which  the    prosecution  has  to<br />      establish in order to succeed. A false plea can at best<br />      be considered  as an  additional circumstance, if other<br />      circumstances point  unfailingly to  the guilt  of     the<br />      accused."<br />      This Court,  therefore, has in no way departed from the<br /> five  conditions  laid    down  in  Hanumant's  case  (supra).<br /> Unfortunately, however,     the High  Court also  seems to have<br /> misconstrued this  decision and     used  the  so-called  false<br /> defence put  up by  the appellant  as one  of the additional<br /> circumstances connected     with the  chain. There     is a  vital<br /> difference between  an incomplete chain of circumstances and<br /> a circumstance    which, after the chain is complete, is added<br /> to it merely to reinforce the conclusion of the court. Where<br /> the prosecution     is unable  to prove  any of  the  essential<br /> principles laid     down in  Hanumant's case,  the     High  Court<br /> cannot supply the weakness or the lacuna by taking aid of or<br /> recourse to  a false  defence  or  a  false  plea.  We    are,<br /> therefore, unable  to accept  the argument of the Additional<br /> Solicitor-General<br />      Moreover, in  M.G. Agarwal's  case (supra)     this  Court<br /> while reiterating  the principles  enunciated in  Hanumant's<br /> case observed thus:<br />       "If the  circumstances  proved  in  the  case     are<br />      consistent either    with the innocence of the accused or<br />      with his  guilt, then  the accused     is entitled  to the<br />      benefit of doubt."<br />      In Shankarlal's  (supra) this Court reiterated the same<br /> view thus:<br />       "Legal principles  are not  magic incantations and<br />      their importance  lies more  in their  application to a<br />      given set    of  facts  than     in  their  recital  in     the<br />      judgment".<br />      We then  pass on to another important point which seems<br /> to have been completely missed by the High Court. It is well<br /> settled that  where on    the evidence  two possibilities     are<br /> available or open,<br /> 167<br /> one which  goes in  favour of  the prosecution and the other<br /> which  benefits     an  accused,  the  accused  is     undoubtedly<br /> entitled to  the benefit  of doubt.  In Kali Ram v. State of<br /> Himachal  Pradesh,(l)    this  Court   made   the   following<br /> observations:<br />       "Another golden  thread which runs through the web<br />      of the  administration of    justice in criminal cases is<br />      that if  two views are possible on the evidence adduced<br />      in the  case one  pointing to  the guilt of the accused<br />      and the  other to    his innocence,    the  view  which  is<br />      favourable     to  the  accused  should  be  adopted    This<br />      principle has a special relevance in cases where in the<br />      guilt of  the accused  is sought  to be  established by<br />      circumstantial evidence."<br />      We now come to the mode and manner of proof of cases of<br /> murder by  administration  of  poison.    In  Ramgopal's    case<br /> (supra) this Court held thus:<br />       "Three  questions  arise  in    such  cases,  namely<br />      (firstly), did  the  deceased  die     of  the  poison  in<br />      question ?     (secondly), had  the accused  the poison in<br />      his possession  ? and  (thirdly), had  the     accused  an<br />      opportunity to administer the poison in question to the<br />      deceased ?     It is    only when  the motive  is there     and<br />      these facts  are all  proved that the court may be able<br />      to draw the inference, that the poison was administered<br />      by the accused to the deceased resulting in his death."<br />      So far  as this  matter is concerned, in such cases the<br /> court must  carefully scan  the evidence  and determine     the<br /> four important    circumstances  which  alone  can  justify  a<br /> conviction:<br />      (1)  there     is   a     clear    motive    for  an     accused  to<br />       administer poison to the deceased,<br />      (2)  that the deceased died of poison said to have been<br />       administered,<br />      (3)  that the accused had the poison in his possession,<br />      (4)  that he  had    an  opportunity     to  administer     the<br />       poison to the deceased.<br /> 168<br />      In the  instant case,  while two  ingredients have been<br /> proved but two have not. In the first place, it has no doubt<br /> been  proved  that  Manju  died     of  potassium    cyanide     and<br /> secondly,  it  has  also  been    proved    that  there  was  an<br /> opportunity to    administer the    poison. It has, however, not<br /> been proved  by any  evidence that  the     appellant  had     the<br /> poison in  his possession.  On the  other hand, as indicated<br /> above, there  is clear    evidence  of  PW  2  that  potassium<br /> cyanide could  have been available to Manju from the plastic<br /> factory of her mother, but there is no evidence to show that<br /> the accused  could have     procured potassium cyanide from any<br /> available   source.   We   might   here      extract   a    most<br /> unintelligible and extra-ordinary finding of the High Court-<br />       "It is  true that  there is  no direct evidence on<br />      these two    points, because     the prosecution is not able<br />      to lead evidence that the accused had secured potassium<br />      cyanide poison  from  a  particular  source.  Similarly<br />      there is  no direct  evidence  to    prove  that  he     had<br />      administered  poison  to  Manju.  However,     it  is     not<br />      necessary to  prove each  and every  fact by  a  direct<br />      evidence. Circumstantial  evidence can  be a  basis for<br />      proving this fact."<br />                              (P.160)<br />      The comment by the High Court appears to be frightfully<br /> vague and  absolutely unintelligible.  While holding  in the<br /> clearest possible  terms that  there is     no evidence in this<br /> case to show that the appellant was in possession or poison,<br /> the High  Court observes that this fact may be proved either<br /> by direct  or indirect    (circumstantial)  evidence.  But  it<br /> fails to  indicate  the     nature     of  the  circumstantial  or<br /> indirect  evidence   to     show  that  the  appellant  was  in<br /> possession of  poison. If  the court  seems to    suggest that<br /> merely    because      the  appellant   had    the  opportunity  to<br /> administer poison  and the same was found in the body of the<br /> deceased, it  should be     presumed that    the appellant was in<br /> possession of  poison, than  it has  committed a serious and<br /> gross error of law and has blatantly violated the principles<br /> laid down by this Court. The High Court has not indicated as<br /> to what     was the  basis for  coming to    a finding  that     the<br /> accused could  have procured the cyanide. On the other hand,<br /> in view     of the     decision in Ramgopal's case (supra) failure<br /> to prove  possession of     the cyanide poison with the accused<br /> by itself  would result     in failure  of the  prosecution  to<br /> prove its  case. We are constrained to observe that the High<br /> Court has completely misread and misconstru-<br /> 169<br /> ed the decision in Ramgopal's case. Even prior to Ramgopol's<br /> case there  are two decisions of this Court which have taken<br /> the  same   view.  In    Chandrakant  Nyalchand    Seth's    case<br /> (Criminal Appeal  No. 120  of 1957  decided on 19.2.58) this<br /> Court observed thus:<br />       "Before a  person can     be convicted  of murder  by<br />      poisoning, it  is necessary  to prove that the death of<br />      the deceased  was caused  by poison, that the poison in<br />      question was  in possession  of the  accused  and    that<br />      poison was administered by the accused to the deceased.<br />      There is  no direct  evidence in  this  case  that     the<br />      accused was  in possession of Potassium Cyanide or that<br />      he administered the same to the deceased."<br />      The facts    of the    case  cited  above  were  very    much<br /> similar to  the present     appeal. Here  also, the Court found<br /> that circumstances afforded a greater motive to the deceased<br /> to commit  suicide than     for the  accused to  commit murder.<br /> This view was reiterated in Dharambir Singh's case (Criminal<br /> Appeal No.  98 of 1958 decided on 4.11.1958) where the court<br /> observed as follows:<br />       "Therefore, along with the motive, the prosecution<br />      has also  to establish  that the  deceased     died  of  a<br />      particular poison    said to have been administered, that<br />      the accused  was in  possession of that poison and that<br />      he had  the opportunity  to administer  the same to the<br />      deceased: (see  Mt. Gujrani  and another v. Emperor(').<br />      It is only when the motive is there and these facts are<br />      all proved     that the  court may  be able  to  draw     the<br />      inference, in  a case  of circumstantial evidence, that<br />      the poison     was administered  by  the  accused  to     the<br />      deceased resulting in his death.<br />       We feel  that it  was not right for the High Court<br />      to say, when this link in the chain had failed, that it<br />      could not    be very     difficult for    anybody     to  procure<br />      potassium cyanide and therefore the absence of proof of<br />      possession of  potassium cyanide  by  the    accused     was<br />      practically of  no effect. On the facts as found by the<br />      High Court it must be held that the second of the three<br />      facts which  have to  be proved,  in case    of poisoning<br />      based on  circumstantial evidence    has not been proved,<br />      namely that the accused was in possession of the poison<br />      that had been found in the body-Can it<br /> 170<br />      be said in these circumstances when the proof of a very<br />      vital fact     namely, that  the accused was in possession<br />      of potassium  cyanide, has     failed that  the  chain  of<br />      circumstantial evidence,  is so  far complete as not to<br />      leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent<br />      with the innocence of the accused and that the evidence<br />      which remains  after the rejection of this fact is such<br />      as to  show that  within all  human probability the act<br />      must have been done by the accused."<br />      We are,  therefore, clearly  of the  opinion  that     the<br /> facts of  the present appeal are covered by the ratio of the<br /> aforesaid decisions.  At any  rate, taking the worst view of<br /> the matter  on the  evidence in     this case two possibilities<br /> are clearly open-<br />      (1)  that it may be a case of suicide, or<br />      (2)  that it may be a case of murder<br /> and both  are equally  probable, hence    the prosecution case<br /> stands disproved.<br />      We now  proceed to     deal with  some of the judgments of<br /> this Court  on which  great reliance  has been placed by the<br /> High Court. In the first place, the High Court relied on the<br /> case of     Pershadi v.  State of    Uttar Pradesh(').  This case<br /> appears to  be clearly    distinguishable because     no point of<br /> law was     involved therein  and on  the facts  proved and the<br /> very extraordinary  conduct of    the accused,  the court held<br /> that the  circumstantial evidence  was consistent  only with<br /> the guilt  of the  accused and    inconsistent with  any other<br /> rational explanation.  Indeed, if  this would  have been our<br /> finding in  this particular case, there could be no question<br /> that the conviction of the accused would have been upheld.<br />      The next  on which the High Court placed great reliance<br /> is case     Lagu's case (supra). This case also does not appear<br /> to be  of any  assistance to  the prosecution.    In the first<br /> place, the  case was  decided on  the peculiar facts of that<br /> case. Secondly, even though the corpus deliciti was not held<br /> to be proved yet the medical evidence and the conduct of the<br /> accused unerringly  pointed to    the  inescapable  conclusion<br /> that  the   death  of  the  deceased  was  as  a  result  of<br /> administration of poison and that the accused was the person<br /> who admini-<br /> 171<br /> stered the same. This. however, is not the case here. On the<br /> other hand,  we have  held that the conduct of the appellant<br /> has not been proved to be inconsistent with his guilt and on<br /> this  ground   alone  the   present  case   can     be   easily<br /> distinguished. If  at all  it is  an authority    it is on the<br /> point that  this Court    is not    required to  enter  into  an<br /> elaborate examination  of the evidence unless there are very<br /> special circumstances  to justify the same. At this Court in<br /> that case  was clearly    of the    view that the High Court had<br /> fully considered  the facts and a multitude of circumstances<br /> against the accused remained unexplained, the presumption of<br /> innocence was  destroyed and  the High    Court was  therefore<br /> right in  affirming the     conviction. Of     course, Sarkar,  J.<br /> gave a    dissenting judgment. From a detailed scrutiny of the<br /> decision cited    above (Lagu's  Case) we     find that  there is<br /> nothing in  common between  the peculiar  facts of that case<br /> and the     present one.  Hence, this  authority is  also of no<br /> assistance to the prosecution.<br />      Reliance was  then placed    on the    case of     Ram Dass v.<br /> State of  Maharashtra(l) but  we are  unable to see how this<br /> decision helps the prosecution. The High Court relied on the<br /> fact that  as the accused had taken the deceased immediately<br /> to the    Civil Hospital    in order  to stop  the    poison    from<br /> spreading, this particular fact was eloquent enough to speak<br /> for the     innocence of the accused. A careful perusal of that<br /> decision shows    that this  Court did  not     accept     the<br /> prosecution case  despite circumstances     appearing  in    that<br /> case which  are almost similar to those found in the present<br /> one. Moreover,    here also  the accused    had immediately sent<br /> for their  family Doctor  after they had detected that Manju<br /> was dead.  The reason  for a little delay in lodging the FIR<br /> has already  been explained  by us  while dealing  with     the<br /> facts. In the decision cited above, it was clearly held that<br /> the case against the accused was not proved conclusively and<br /> unerringly and    that two reasonable views were possible, the<br /> relevant portion of which may be extracted thus:<br />       "On  a  consideration     of  the  evidence  and     the<br />      circumstances referred  to above, we are satisfied that<br />      this is a case in which the circumstantial evidence did<br />      not prove the case against the accused conclusively and<br />      unerringly, and  at any  rate two reasonable views were<br />      possible."<br /> 172<br />      We have  already found  in the instant case that taking<br /> the prosecution     at the     highest the utmost that can be said<br /> is that two views-one in favour of the accused and the other<br /> against him-were  possible. Ram     Dass's case  also therefore<br /> supports the appellant rather than the prosecution.<br />      The  last    case  relied  upon  by    the  High  Court  is<br /> Shankarlal's case  (supra) but we are unable to see how this<br /> case helps  the prosecution.  The observations    on which the<br /> High Court  has relied    upon appears  to have been torn from<br /> the context. On the other hand, this decision fully supports<br /> the case  of the  appellant that  falsity of  defence cannot<br /> take the  place of  proof of facts which the prosecution has<br /> to establish  in order to succeed. This decision has already<br /> been dealt  with by  us while  considering the merits of the<br /> present case and it is not necessary to repeat the same.<br />      These are    the only  important cases  of this  Court on<br /> which the  High Court  seeks to     rely and  which, on a close<br /> examination, do     not appear to be either relevant or helpful<br /> to the    prosecution case in any way. On the other hand, some<br /> of the    observations made in these cases support the accused<br /> rather than the prosecution.<br />      This now  brings us  to the  fag end  of our  judgment.<br /> After  a   detailed  discussion      of   the   evidence,     the<br /> circumstances  of   the     case    and  interpretation  of     the<br /> decisions of  this Court  the legal and factual position may<br /> be summarised thus:<br />      (1)  That the five golden principles enunciated by this<br />       Court in Hanumant's decision (supra) have not been<br />       satisfied  in     the  instant  case.  As  a  logical<br />       corollary, it     follows that it cannot be held that<br />       the act  of the accused cannot be explained on any<br />       other hypothesis except the guilt of the appellant<br />       nor can  it be said that in all human probability,<br />       the accused  had committed the murder of Manju. In<br />       other words, the prosecution has not fulfilled the<br />       essential requirements  of a    criminal case  which<br />       rests purely on circumstantial evidence.<br />      (2)  That, at any rate, the evidence clearly shows that<br />       two views  are possible-one  pointing to the guilt<br />       of the  accused  and    the  other  leading  to     his<br />       innocence. It<br /> 173<br />       may be  very likely  that the     appellant may    have<br />       administered the  poison  (potassium    cyanide)  to<br />       Manju but at the same time a fair possibility that<br />       she herself  committed suicide  cannot  be  safely<br />       excluded or  eliminated.  Hence,  on    this  ground<br />       alone the  appellant is entitled to the benefit of<br />       doubt resulting in his acquittal.<br />      (3)  The prosecution  has miserably failed to prove one<br />       of the  most essential  ingredients of  a case  of<br />       death caused    by administration  of poison,  i.e.,<br />       possession of     poison with  the accused (either by<br />       direct of  circumstantial evidence)  and  on    this<br />       ground alone the prosecution must fail.<br />      (4)  That in  appreciating the evidence, the High Court<br />       has clearly  misdirected itself on many points, as<br />       pointed out  by us, and has thus committed a gross<br />       error of law:<br />      (5)  That the  High Court    has relied upon decisions of<br />       this Court which are either inapplicable or which,<br />       on closer  examination, do not support the view of<br />       the High Court being clearly distinguishable.<br />      (6)  That the  High Court    has taken a completely wrong<br />       view of  law    in  holding  that  even     though     the<br />       prosecution may suffer from serious infirmities it<br />       could be  reinforced by  additional  link  in     the<br />       nature of  false defence  in order  to supply     the<br />       lacuna and  has thus committed a fundamental error<br />       of law.<br />      (7)  That the  High Court    has not     only misappreciated<br />       the evidence    but has     completely  overlooked     the<br />       well established  principles of law and in view of<br />       our finding  it is  absolutely clear that the High<br />       Court has  merely tried  to accept the prosecution<br />       case based  on tenterhooks  and slender  tits     and<br />       bits.<br />      (8)  We entirely  agree with  the High Court that it is<br />       wholly unsafe to rely on that part of the evidence<br />       of Dr.  Banerjee (PW    33) which  shows that poison<br />       was<br /> 174<br />       forcibly administered by the process of mechanical<br />       suffocation.<br />      (9)  We also agree with the High Court that there is no<br />       manifest defect  in the  investigation made by the<br />       police which    appears to  be honest and careful. A<br />       proof positive  of this  fact is  that even though<br />       Rameshwar Birdichand    and  other  members  of     his<br />       family who  had practically  no role    to play     had<br />       been    arrayed     as  accused  but  they     had  to  be<br />       acquitted by    the High  Court for  lack  of  legal<br />       evidence.<br />      (10) That in  view of  our finding     that two  views are<br />       clearly possible in the present case, the question<br />       of defence  being false  dose not  arise  and     the<br />       argument of  the High     Court that  the defence  is<br />       false does not survive.<br />      This was a fit case in which the High Court should have<br /> given at least the benefit of doubt to the appellant.<br />      Normally,    this  Court  does  not    interfere  with     the<br /> concurrent findings  of fact  of the  courts below,  in     the<br /> absence of very special circumstances or gross errors of law<br /> committed by  the High    Court.    But  where  the     High  Court<br /> ignores or  overlocks the  crying circumstances     and  proved<br /> facts,    violates   and    misapplies   the  well     established<br /> principles of  criminal jurisprudence  or decisions rendered<br /> by this Court on appreciation of circumstantial evidence and<br /> refuses to  give benefit  of doubt  to the  accused  despite<br /> facts apparent    on the    face of     the record  or on  its     own<br /> findings or  tries to  gloss over  them without     giving     any<br /> reasonable explanation    or commits errors of law apparent on<br /> the  face  of  the  record  which  results  in    serious     and<br /> substantial miscarriage of justice to the accused, it is the<br /> duty of     this Court  to step  in  and  correct    the  legally<br /> erroneous decision of the High Court.<br />      We     can   fully  understand   that     though      the    case<br /> superficially viewed bears an ugly look so as to prima facie<br /> shock the  conscience of  any Court  yet suspicion,  however<br /> great it  may be,  cannot take    the place  of legal proof. A<br /> moral conviction  however strong or genuine cannot amount to<br /> a legal conviction supportable in law.<br /> 175<br />      It must  be recalled  that the well established rule of<br /> criminal justice  is  that  'fouler  the  crime     higher     the<br /> proof'. In  the instant     case, the  life and  liberty  of  a<br /> subject was  at stake.    As the    accused was  given a capital<br /> sentence, a  very careful,  cautious and meticulous approach<br /> was necessary to be made.<br />      Manju (from  the evidence    on the record) appears to be<br /> not only a highly sensitive woman who expected whole-hearted<br /> love  and   affection  from  her  husband  but    having    been<br /> thoroughly disappointed     out of     sheer disgust,     frustration<br /> and depression    she may have chosen to end her life-at least<br /> this possibility  is clearly  gleaned from  her letters     and<br /> mental attitude.  She  may  have  been    fully  justified  in<br /> entertaining an     expectation that after marriage her husband<br /> would look  after her  with affection  and regard.  This  is<br /> clearly spelt  out in  the letters where she hinted that her<br /> husband a  was so busy that he found no time for her. A hard<br /> fact of life, which cannot be denied, is that some people in<br /> view of     their occupation  or profession  fined very  little<br /> time to     devote to  their family.  Speaking in a light vein,<br /> lawyers, professors,  Doctors and perhaps Judges fall within<br /> this category  and to  them Manju's  case should  be an eye-<br /> opener.<br />      For  the    reasons     given     above    we   hold  that     the<br /> prosecution has     failed to  prove its case against appellant<br /> beyond reasonable  doubt. We,  therefore, allow     the appeal,<br /> set aside  the judgments  of the courts below and acquit the<br /> appellant, Sharad  Bridichand Sarda,  of the  charges framed<br /> against him and direct him to be released and set at liberty<br /> forthwith.<br />      VARADARAJAN,  J.    This  appeal  by  special  leave  is<br /> directed against  the judgment    of a  Division Bench  of the<br /> Bombay High  Court in  Criminal Appeal    No. 265     of 1983 and<br /> Confirmation Case  No. 3  of 1983, dismissing the appeal and<br /> confirming the    sentence  of  death  awarded  to  the  first<br /> accused Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (hereinafter referred to as<br /> the 'appellant')  by the  Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in<br /> Sessions Case  No. 203    of 1982.  The  appellant,  Rameshwar<br /> Birdhichand Sarda  and Ramvilas     Rambagas Sarda were accused<br /> 1, 2 and 3 respectively in the Sessions Case.<br />      The appellant  and the  second accused  are the sons of<br /> one Birdhichand     of Pune  whose family has a cloth business.<br /> In addition<br /> 176<br /> the appellant  who is  said to    be a  graduate    in  Chemical<br /> Engineering had     started a  chemical factory  at Bhosari,  a<br /> suburb of  Pune. The third accused is uncle of the appellant<br /> and the     second accused.  The appellant     is the     husband  of<br /> Manjushree alias  Manju while  the  second  accused  is     the<br /> husband of  Anuradha (P.W.35).    Birdhichand's family has its<br /> residential house at Ravivar Peth in Pune and owns a flat in<br /> a building  known as Takshasheela Apartments in Mukund Nagar<br /> area of Pune.<br />      Manju, the     alleged victim in this case, was the eldest<br /> amongst the  five children  of Rameshwar (P.W 2) and Parwati<br /> (P.W.20). Anju    (P.W.6) is  the second daughter of P.W.2 who<br /> is a  Commercial Tax  and Income  Tax Consultant since 1960.<br /> P.W.2 is  living in  his own house situate in Subash Road in<br /> Beed city  since 1973,    prior to  which he  was living    in a<br /> rented house  in Karimpura  Peth in that city. Meena (P.W.5)<br /> is a  school and college mate and friend of Manju who passed<br /> the B.Sc.  examination in  Chemistry in     the First  Class in<br /> 1980  while   P.W.5  who   had    passed     the  10th  standard<br /> examination  together  with  Manju  was     still    studying  in<br /> college. Rekha    (P.W.3) whom Manju used to call as Vahini is<br /> another friend    of Manju. She is living with her husband Dr.<br /> Dilip Dalvi  in a  portion of  P.W.2's house in Subash Road,<br /> Pune as     his tenant.  P.W.20's elder  brother Dhanraj  Rathi<br /> (P.W.22) is a resident of Pune where he is doing business in<br /> the sale of plastic bags for the manufacture of which he has<br /> a plastic  factory called  Deepak Plastics  at Beed. It is a<br /> partnership concern  of P.W.20    and  some  others  including<br /> P.W.22's third    son Shrigopal. Deepak is one of the two sons<br /> of P.Ws. 2 and 20.<br />      After Manju passed her B.Sc. degree examination in 1980<br /> her marriage  with the    appellant was  settled by  a  formal<br /> betrothal ceremony  which  took     place    in  June  1981.     The<br /> marriage of  the appellant  and Manju  was performed  at the<br /> expense of  P.W.2 at  Beed on  11.2.1982. The  appellant and<br /> Manju  left  for  Pune    on  12.2.1982  after  the  marriage.<br /> Subsequently, P.W.2  sent his  elder son Deepak for fetching<br /> Manju  from   the  appellant's     house    at   Pune  and    they<br /> accordingly came  back to  Beed on  22.2.1982. The appellant<br /> went to     Beed four or five days later and took Manju back to<br /> Pune on the next day after pleading his inability to stay in<br /> P.W.2's house  for some     more days.  This was  Manju's first<br /> visit to  her parents'    house after  her marriage  with     the<br /> appellant. She    is said     to have been very happy during that<br /> visit. Thereafter Manju came to her parents' house alongwith<br /> her maternal uncle Dhanraj Rathi (P.W.22) on or about<br /> 177<br /> 2.4.1982. It is the case of the prosecution that during that<br /> visit Manju  was uneasy and had generally complained against<br /> the appellant  to P.Ws.3  and 6. P.W.2 planned to keep Manju<br /> in his    house for  about three    weeks on  that occasion. But<br /> news of     the death  of    the  appellant's  grand     father     was<br /> received in  P.W.2's house  in Beed  and, therefore, P.Ws. 2<br /> and 20    and Manju went to Pune for condolences on 11.4.1982.<br /> After meeting  the appellant's    father and  others at  Pune,<br /> P.Ws. 2     and 20     returned  to  Beed  leaving  Manju  in     the<br /> appellant's house  in Pune.  That was  the second  visit  of<br /> Manju  to   her     parents'  house  after     marriage  with     the<br /> appellant. P.Ws.2  and 20  came to  Pune again    on or  about<br /> 13.5.1982. After staying for some time as usual in the house<br /> of P.W.     22, P.Ws. 2 and 20 visited the house of Birdhichand<br /> on that     occasion. It  is the  case of    the prosecution that<br /> P.Ws. 2     and 20     found Manju  disturbed and  uneasy and that<br /> they, therefore,  took her  to the house of P.W. 22 with the<br /> permission of  Birdhichand. It    is  also  the  case  of     the<br /> prosecution  that   on    reaching   P.W.     22's    house  Manju<br /> completely broke  down and  started weeping  in the  arms of<br /> P.W.20. P.Ws.  2 and  20 returned to Beed from Pune and sent<br /> their second  son Pardeep  four or  five days later to fetch<br /> Manju, who  had, however, by then gone with the appellant to<br /> Tirupati  in   Andhra  Pradesh.      After     learning  that     the<br /> appellant and Manju had returned to Pune, P.W.2 sent his son<br /> Deepak to  fetch Manju    to Beed.  Accordingly Deepak brought<br /> Manju to  Beed accompanied  by the  third  accused  daughter<br /> Kavita on  25.5.1982. This  was Manju's third and last visit<br /> to her parents' house after her marriage with the appellant.<br /> It is  the case     of the     prosecution that  Manju was totally<br /> disturbed and  frightened during  that visit  and  that     she<br /> complained to  her mother  P.W.20 against  the appellant and<br /> she in    turn conveyed  to P.W.20  what she heard from Manju.<br /> Birdhichand went  to Beed  on  2.6.1982     without  any  prior<br /> intimation for    taking Manju  to Pune  on  the    ground    that<br /> Manju's presence  in his  family house at pune was necessary<br /> for the     betrothal ceremony of his daughter Shobha fixed for<br /> 13.6.1982 as  well as  for her marriage fixed for 30.6.1982.<br /> It is  the case     of the     prosecution that when Manju came to<br /> know that  her father in-law Birdhichand had come for taking<br /> her to    Pune she was wept and expressed her unwillingness to<br /> go  to     Pune  and   that,  however,  on  the  assurance  of<br /> Birdhichand that he would see to it that nothing happened to<br /> the life  of Manju,  P.W.2 permitted  Manju to    go  to    Pune<br /> alongwith Birdhichand  and she    accordingly went  to Pune on<br /> 3.6.1982 alongwith Kavita and Birdhichand.<br /> 178<br />      The family     of Birdhichand     and his  sons including the<br /> appellant is  joint.  As  stated  earlier  they     have  their<br /> family's residential house at Ravivar Peth, Pune besides the<br /> flat which they owned in the Takshasheela Apartments situate<br /> at some distance from their family house. Their flat has two<br /> bed-rooms besides  a hall  and other portions. Birdhichand's<br /> two married  sons, the appellant and the second accused used<br /> to go  to the  family's flat  in the Takshasheela Apartments<br /> for sleeping during the nights. The appellant and Manju used<br /> to sleep  in one  of the  two  bed-rooms  while     the  second<br /> accused and  his wife  Anuradha (P.W.35)  and their children<br /> used to sleep in the other bed-room.<br />      Manju had    written amongst others, three letters, Ex.33<br /> dated 25.4.1982     to her     friend vahini (P.W.3) and Ex. p. 30<br /> dated 8.2.1982    and p.    32 dated  8.6.1982  to    her  younger<br /> sister Anju  (P.W.6). In  Ex. 33 Manju has stated inter alia<br /> that she  was feeling lonely though all persons in pune were<br /> very good  and everybody  was loving  and that one reason is<br /> that there  are many  elderly  persons    in  the     house    and,<br /> therefore, she    does not  dare to  do any work independently<br /> and the     fear which  is in  her mind  every  time  leads  to<br /> confusion. She    has also  stated in  that letter  though all<br /> person in  Pune were  very good that she becomes angry if he<br /> (appellant) does not speak to her when she goes and talks to<br /> him even  ten times  and that  till now this man (appellant)<br /> had no    time to mind his wife. She has stated in that letter<br /> that she dare not ask him (appellant) whether his clothes be<br /> taken for  washing and    that at     present her  status is only<br /> that of     an unpaid  maid-servant. She  has finally stated in<br /> that letter  that on  the day  on which     self-pride  in     the<br /> appellant is  reduced no other person will be more fortunate<br /> than her  but it  is not  certain whether  she will be alive<br /> until that  date. In  Ex. 30  she has stated inter alia that<br /> she was     undergoing a  very difficult test and was unable to<br /> achieve her  object, that  it would be well and good only if<br /> she controls herself and that some other way will have to be<br /> evolved when'  that becomes  impossible. In  Ex. 32  she has<br /> stated that  though she     was happy at Pune she does not know<br /> why there  is such a dirty atmosphere in the house and it is<br /> felt every  moment that     something will happen. She has also<br /> stated in  that letter    that no work had been started in the<br /> house though Shobha's 'sari' function is fixed for 13.6.1982<br /> and, therefore, she is out of her mind.<br />      The case  of the  prosecution as  regards    the  alleged<br /> occurrence during  the night of 11/12.6.1982 is thus: on 11-<br /> 6-1982 at  about 10.30    p.m. Manju  accompanied by Anuradha,<br /> (P.W. 35) and<br /> 179<br /> three  children      of  the   latter  came  to  the  Taksheela<br /> Apartments by  an auto-rickshaw.  The night-watchman  of the<br /> Takshasheela Apartments,  kerba (P.W.  28) has deposed about<br /> this fact.  Syed Mohideen,  (P.W. 7) an auto-rickshaw driver<br /> residing in  the border     of Ganesh  Peth and Ravivar Peth in<br /> Pune claims  to have  taken two ladies, three children and a<br /> baby by     his auto-rickshaw  at about  11 p.m. on that day to<br /> Mukund Nagar. He has identified the photo of Manju published<br /> in a newspaper two or three days later as that of one of the<br /> two ladies  who travelled by his auto-rickshaw as aforesaid.<br /> The second  accused had     already gone  to the  flat  in     the<br /> Takshasheela Apartments.  The  appellant  reached  the    flat<br /> about 15 minutes later by a scooter, whom the night watchman<br /> (P.W. 28)  remarked that  he was  coming rather late he told<br /> P.W. 28     that it  was because  he had  a meeting.  After the<br /> appellant reached  the flat  he and  Manju retired  to their<br /> bed-room while    the second  accused and     P.W. 35  retired to<br /> their's. Thereafter  the appellant  came out of his bed-room<br /> at about  2 a.m. on 12.6.1982 and went to the second accused<br /> and both  of them  went out  of that  flat by  scooters soon<br /> afterwards. The     appellant proceeded  to  Ravivar  Peth     and<br /> called his  father while the second accused went to call Dr.<br /> Uttam chand  Lodha. (P.W. 24) who lives about one and a half<br /> kilo metres  away from    the Takshasheela  Apartments without<br /> seeking the  help of  Dr. Anjali  Kelkar,(P.W. 26)  and     her<br /> husband Dr.  Shrikant Kelkar (P.W. 27) who lived close by in<br /> the  same  Takshasheela     Apartments.  P.W.  24    reached     the<br /> appellant's flat  at about  2.30 a.m.  and found Manju dead,<br /> with rigor  motis having already set in and no external mark<br /> showing the  cause of death. He, however, opined that it may<br /> be a  case of  unnatural death and suggested that the police<br /> may be    informed. When    Birdhichand who     had arrived  at the<br /> flat by then advised that some other doctor may be called as<br /> he was    not satisfied  with the opinion of P.W- 24 suggested<br /> that Dr.  Anil Gandhi,    P.W 25    may be called if so desired.<br /> Thereafter, P.W.  24 and  the third  concerned who  had come<br /> with Birdhichand went to call P.W. 25 who lives about 7 kilo<br /> metres away  from the  Takshasheela Apartments. On their way<br /> they contacted    P.W. 25     over the  phone and took him to the<br /> appellant's flat where he examined Manju at about 4 a.m. and<br /> pronounced that     she was dead. He opined that she might have<br /> died three  or four  hours earlier and stated that there was<br /> no external  evidence showing  the cause  of death.  He     too<br /> suggested that    the police  should be  informed to avoid any<br /> trouble.<br /> 180<br />      The third    accused went  to Mohan    Asava, (P.W.  30) at<br /> about  4.30   a.m.  on    12.6.1982  and    called    him  to     the<br /> appellant's flat  after informing  him that  Manju was dead.<br /> P.W. 30,  who accompanied the third accused, saw the body of<br /> Manju in  the flat  and left the place after suggesting that<br /> the police  should be  informed. The third accused contacted<br /> P.W. 30     over the  phone at about 6.30 a.m. and asked him to<br /> go and    inform the  police that     Manju had died at 5.30 a.m.<br /> P.W. 30     accordingly went  to Maharishi Nagar Police Station<br /> at about  7 or    7.15 a.m.  and informed     the Head Constable,<br /> (P.W. 31) who thereupon made the entry Ex. 120 to the effect<br /> that Manju  was found to be dead when the appellant tried to<br /> wake her  a up    at 5.30 a.m- on 12.6.1982. P.W. 31 proceeded<br /> to the    appellant's flat at about 8 a.m. after informing the<br /> Inspector  of  Police,    P.W.  40  telephonically  about     the<br /> suspicious death of Manju.<br />      On receipt     of information     from P.W. 22 by a lightning<br /> telephone call    at about  6 a.m. on 12.6.1982 that Manju was<br /> extremely serious  P.W. 2  went from  Beed to Pune alongwith<br /> his wife P.W. 20 and his son Pradeep and Hiralal Sarda (P.W.<br /> 4) by  jeep at    about 1     P.m. on  12.6.1982. and learnt that<br /> Manju was  dead. Thereafter  P.W.2  went  alongwith  Hiralal<br /> Sarda to  the Sasson  Hospital where  Manju's body  had been<br /> sent by the police for autopsy.<br />      Dr. Kalikrishnan Banerji, P.W. 33 who conducted autopsy<br /> on the    body of     Manju did not find any external or internal<br /> injury. He  preserved the  viscera, small intestines etc. of<br /> Manju and reserved his opinion about the cause of her death.<br /> On receipt of the  Chemical Examiner's report Ex. 130 to the<br /> effect that  Manju's  viscera  contained  potassium  cyanide<br /> poison P.W.  33 finally     opined that  Manju had     died due to<br /> potassium  cyanide  poisoning  and  simultaneous  mechanical<br /> suffocation. After  completing    the  investigation  P.    W.40<br /> filed the  charge-sheet against     the appellant and the other<br /> two accused on 13.9.1982.<br />      The Additional Sessions Judge, Pune tried the appellant<br /> for offence  under Sec.     302  IPC  of  murder  of  Manju  by<br /> administering potassium cyanide poison or by suffocating her<br /> or by both, all the three accused for the offence under Sec.<br /> 120 B  IPC of  conspiring to  destroy the  evidence  of     the<br /> murder of Manju by giving a false report to the police about<br /> the time  of her death and the third accused for the offence<br /> under Sec.  109 read  with Sec. 201 IPC and Sec. 201 IPC for<br /> intsigating P.W.30  to give  false information to the police<br /> and giving false information to P.W. 22 regarding the murder<br /> of Manju.<br /> 181<br />      The appellant  and the  other two    accused     denied     the<br /> charges framed    against them.  The appellant  denied that he<br /> had anything  to do  with Ujvala  (P.W.     37)  with  whom  is<br /> alleged to  have been  in love    at  the     relevant  time.  He<br /> admitted that Manju and P.W. 35 accompanied by some children<br /> went to     their flat  in the Takshasheela Apartments at about<br /> 10.30 p.m.  on 11.6.1982  but denied  that they travelled by<br /> any auto-rickshaw  and stated  that they went there by their<br /> family's car driven by the second accused. He denied that he<br /> went to     the flat  about 15 minutes later and stated that he<br /> returned to  the fiat only at 1.30 or 1.45 a.m. on 12.6 1982<br /> after attending     a meeting  in the  Rajasthan Youth Club. He<br /> stated that  after changing  his clothes  he looked at Manju<br /> and found  something abnormal and became suspicious and then<br /> went to     the second  accused and that there after he went to<br /> call his  father and  uncle while the second accused went to<br /> call Dr. Lodha, P.W. 24.<br />      The Trial    Court found  all the three accused guilty as<br /> charged and  convicted them  accordingly and  sentenced     the<br /> appellant to death under s.302 IPC and all the three accused<br /> to rigorous  imprisonment for  two years  and a     fine of Rs.<br /> 2,000 each  under s.120 B IPC but did not award any sentence<br /> under s.201 read with s.120B<br />      The appellant  and the  other two accused filed appeals<br /> against their  conviction and the sentences awarded to them.<br /> The  State   filed  a    criminal  revision  application     for<br /> enhancement of    the sentence  awarded to  accused 2  and  3.<br /> These  appeals,     confirmation  case  and  criminal  revision<br /> application were heard together by the Division Bench of the<br /> Bombay High  Court, which  in a lengthy judgment. (195 pages<br /> of our    paper book)  allowed the  appellant's appeal in part<br /> regarding his  conviction and sentence under s.120 B IPC but<br /> confirmed his conviction and sentence of death awarded under<br /> s 302  IPC and allowed the appeal of accused 2 and 3 in full<br /> and acquitted  them  and  dismissed  the  criminal  revision<br /> application. Hence,  the appellant  alone has come up before<br /> this Court  on special    leave against his conviction and the<br /> sentence of death.<br />      I had the benefit of reading the judgment of my learned<br /> brother Fazal Ali, J. I agree with his final conclusion that<br /> the appeal  should succeed.  The learned  Judges of the High<br /> Court have  relied upon     17 circumstances for confirming the<br /> conviction and    sentence of  death awarded to the appellant.<br /> My learned  brother Fazal Ali, J. has rightly rejected every<br /> one of    those circumstances  as not conclusively pointing to<br /> the guilt of the appellant, including the<br /> 182<br /> circumstance that  the appellant  was last  seen with  Manju<br /> before her  death  on  the  ground  that  the  case  of     the<br /> prosecution based  on evidence of Dr. Banerji (P.W. 33) that<br /> there was  any mechanical  suffocation    of  Manju  has    been<br /> disbelieved by    the High  Court itself and that some entries<br /> in the    carbon copy  Ex. 134 of P.W. 33's report sent to the<br /> Chemical Examiner had been scored and interpolated after his<br /> report Ex.  132 to the Chemical Examiner had left his hands,<br /> that the  original entry  in the  postmortem certificate Ex.<br /> 134 contained  the words  'can be  a case of suicidal death'<br /> and, that the explanation of P.W.33. that he wrote the words<br /> 'time of  death' twice    and not     the words 'can be a case of<br /> suicidal death' and, therefore, he scored off one of them is<br /> not acceptable    at all.     Doctors P.W.24     and 25 did not find<br /> any external  injury on     the body of Manju which they saw at<br /> about 2.30  and 4.30 a.m. on 12.6.1982. Even P.W.33. did not<br /> find any  external or  internal injury on the body of Manju.<br /> In these  circumstances, unless the prosecution excludes the<br /> possibility of    Manju having  committed suicide by consuming<br /> potassium cyanide  poison, as  rightly    pointed     out  by  my<br /> learned brother     Fazal Ali,  J., (no  adverse  inference  of<br /> guilt can  be drawn against the appellant from the fact that<br /> he was    last seen with Manju, he being no other than her own<br /> husband who  is naturally  expected to    be with     her  during<br /> nights.) Some  of these     17  circumstances  cannot,  by     any<br /> stretch of imagination, be held to point to the quilt of the<br /> appellant.  Circumstance   No.    6   is    an  attempt  of     the<br /> appellant's father  Birdhichand to  get the  body  of  Manju<br /> cremated before     7 a.m.     On 12.6.1982  by expressing  such a<br /> desire to  P.W.30. Circumstance     No.9 is  arrangement of the<br /> dead body  of Manju  to make  it  appear  that    she  died  a<br /> peaceful and  natural death.  Circumstance No. 11 is absence<br /> of an  anklet of  Manju from her leg. Circumstance No. 12 is<br /> the conduct  of the  appellant in  allegedly concealing     the<br /> anklet in  the fold  of the  chaddar. Circumstance No. 15 is<br /> the fact  that according  to the  medical evidence Manju was<br /> pregnant by four to six weeks and it would normally dissuade<br /> her from  committing suicide.  With respect  to the  learned<br /> judges of  the High  Court, in    my view,  by no     stretch  of<br /> imagination, can any of these circumstances be considered to<br /> point to  nothing but  the guilt  of the appellant in a case<br /> resting purely on circumstantial evidence.<br />      However, since  I am unable to persuade myself to agree<br /> with my     learned brother  Fazal Ali, J. on four points, I am<br /> writing this  separate but  concurring judgment,  giving  my<br /> view on     those points, namely, (1) ill-treatment of Manju by<br /> the appellant, (2) intimacy of<br /> 183<br /> the appellant  with Ujvala  (P.W.37), (3)  admissibility  of<br /> Manju's letters     Exs. 30,32  and 33 and the oral evidence of<br /> P.Ws. 2,3,5,6  and 20  about the  alleged complaints made by<br /> Manju against  the appellant under s. 32 (1) of the Evidence<br /> Act  and  (4)  conduct    of  Dr.     Banerji  (P.W.33)  who     had<br /> conducted autopsy on the body of Manju.<br />      My learned     brother  Fazal     Ali,  J.  has    observed  as<br /> follows at pages 3 and 96 of his judgment:<br />       "On the  other hand  the plea     of the     defence was<br />      that while     there was  a strong  possibility  of  Manju<br />      having been  ill-treated and uncared for by her husband<br />      and  her    in-laws,  being      a  highly   sensitive     and<br />      impressionate woman, she committed suicide out of sheer<br />      depression and  frustration arising  from an  emotional<br />      upsurge." (P-3)<br />       "On the  other hand  this  circumstance  may    have<br />      prompted her to commit suicide, for if a child was born<br />      to her, in view of her ill-treatment by her husband and<br />      her in  laws the  child may not get proper upbringing".<br />      (P.96)<br />      I do not recollect any admission by Mr. Ram Jethmalani,<br /> learned counsel     for the  appellant in    the  course  of     his<br /> arguments about     any cruelty  or ill-treatment    to Manju the<br /> part of     the appellant or his parents. The evidence of P.W.3<br /> is that     during Manju's     second     visit    to  Beed  after     her<br /> marriage with  the appellant she found Manju not quite happy<br /> and very much afraid of the appellant. The evidence of P.W.5<br /> is  that   during  Manju's   second  visit  to    Beed,  Manju<br /> complained to her about the appellant returning home late in<br /> the night  and avoiding     to have  a talk  with her  and that<br /> Manju told  her that  she was  afraid of  the appellant     and<br /> apprehended danger  to her  life at  his hands.     The further<br /> evidence of the P.W.5 is that during her third visit to Beed<br /> she inferred from Manju's face a spell of fear. The evidence<br /> of P.W.6  is that during Manju's second visit to Beed, Manju<br /> told her that the appellant used to leave the house early in<br /> the morning  and return     late at  night under the pretext of<br /> work in     his factory  and that he was even reluctant to talk<br /> with her.  P.W.6 has  stated that during Manju's third visit<br /> to Beed     she was  extremely uneasy.  disturbed and  under  a<br /> spell of  fear, that  Manju told  her the  appellant did not<br /> relish even  her question  as to  why he was not prepared to<br /> have a simple talk with her, and that<br /> 184<br /> during    her   third  visit  to    Beed,  Manju  expressed     her<br /> unwillingness to go to Pune when Birdhichand went to Beed on<br /> 2.6.1982 for  taking her  to Pune. To the same effect is the<br /> evidence of  P.W   s. 2     and 20     about how  Manju looked  in<br /> spirit and  what she  stated during  her last two visits. My<br /> learned brother     Fazal Ali, J. has rightly rejected the oral<br /> evidence of  P.Ws. 2,  3, 5,  6 and 20. He has extracted the<br /> relevant portions  of the  letters Exs. 30, 32 and 33 in his<br /> judgment and  has observed  at page  23 that one thing which<br /> may be    conspicuously noticed  in Ex.  30 is  that Manju was<br /> prepared to  take all  the  blame  on  herself    rather    than<br /> incriminating her  husband or  his rents  at page 24 that it<br /> was conceded  by the  learned Additional  Solicitor  General<br /> that the relevant portion of Ex.32 does not refer to any ill<br /> treatment of  Manju by    the appellant or his parents; and at<br /> page 30     that it  can be  easily inferred  from Ex.  33 that<br /> Manju  did  not     have  any  serious  complaint    against     the<br /> appellant except  that she  was not getting proper attention<br /> which she  deserved from  him. These  three letters  do     not<br /> establish that Manju made any complaint of any ill-treatment<br /> by the    appellant or  his parents.  In my  view, these three<br /> letters and  the aforesaid  oral evidence  of P.Ws. 2, 3 5 6<br /> and 20    are inadmissible  in evidence  under s. 32(1) of the<br /> Evidence Act  for  reasons  to    be  given  elsewhere  in  my<br /> judgment. Thus    there is no acceptable evidence on record to<br /> show that  either the  appellant or  his  parents  ill-treat<br /> Manju. The  High Court    also has  not  found  any  such     ill<br /> treatment in  its judgment. On the other hand, what has been<br /> found by  the High Court in para 104 of its judgment is that<br /> the  appellant    treated     Manju    contemptuously.     Even  while<br /> setting out  the case  of the prosecution the High Court has<br /> stated in para 7 of its judgment that it is alleged that the<br /> appellant started giving contemptuous treatment to Manju and<br /> in para     20 that  the appellant     has denied in his statement<br /> recorded under    s.313 Cr.P.C.  that Manju  was being treated<br /> contemptuously. No question has been put to the appellant in<br /> the course  of his examination under s.313 Cr.P.C. about any<br /> ill treatment  of Manju     by the appellant or his parents. My<br /> learned brother     Fazal Ali,  J. has referred in pages 97 and<br /> 98 of  his judgment to this Court's decisions in Fateh Singh<br /> Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Shamu Babu Chaugale<br /> v. State  of Mahararstra and Harijan Megha Jesha v. State of<br /> Gujarat(3) and    has observed at page 98 of his judgment that<br /> circumstance not  put to  the appellant     in his     examination<br /> under s.  313 Cr.PC.  have to  be completely  excluded    from<br /> consideration in view of those decisions. Therefore, since<br /> 185<br /> no question  has been put to the appellant in this regard in<br /> the course  of his  examination under s 313 Cr.P.C.. even if<br /> there is  any evidence    about any  ill-treatment of Manju by<br /> the appellant  or  his    parents     it  has  to  be  completely<br /> excluded from consideration. I felt it necessary to say this<br /> in my  judgment since  I  think     that  in  fairness  to     the<br /> appellant it has to be done.<br />      My learned     brother Fazal    Ali, J. has set out the case<br /> of the prosecution in so far as it connects P,W. 37 with the<br /> appellant at page 3 of his judgment where he has stated that<br /> the positive  case of  the prosecution is that the appellant<br /> was not     at all interested in Manju and had illicit intimacy<br /> with P.W.37. On this point there is the evidence of P.Ws. 3,<br /> 5 and  6. The  evidence of  P.W.3 is  that during her second<br /> visit to  Beed, Manju  informed her that the appellant had a<br /> girl-friend by    name Ujwala  Kothari and  that he introduced<br /> her (Ujvala  Kothari) to  her and  told her  that she should<br /> learn from  Ujvala Kothari  about how she should behave with<br /> him. The  evidence of P.W.5. is that during her second visit<br /> to Beed,  Manju told  her that    the appellant  had an affair<br /> with a    girl by     name Ujvala  Kothari and  that she had seen<br /> Ujvala's latter addressed to the appellant and an incomplete<br /> letter of  the appellant  addressed to    that girl.  No    such<br /> letters have  been produced  in evidence.  The    evidence  of<br /> P.W.6 is  that during  her second  visit to Beed, Manju told<br /> her that  the appellant     had an     affair with  a girl by name<br /> Ujvala Kothari    and also  introduced that girl to her in the<br /> Pearl Hotel  saying that  she has  complete command over him<br /> and that  she (Manju)  should take  lessons from her (Ujvala<br /> Kothari) about    how she     should behave with him. There is no<br /> other  evidence     regarding  this  alleged  illicit  intimacy<br /> between the  appellant    and  P.W.37.  This  alleged  illicit<br /> intimacy is  totally denied  not only  by the  appellant but<br /> also by     P,W.37. The  alleged incident    in the    Pearl Hotel,<br /> according to  the case    of the    prosecution  took  place  on<br /> 17.3.1982. But    there is  no reference    whatever to any such<br /> incident in  any of  the subsequent  three letters of Manju,<br /> Exs. 30,  32 and  33, dated 25.4.1982, 8.5.1982 and 8.6.1982<br /> respectively. My  learned brother  Fazal Ali, J. has rightly<br /> rejected the  oral evidence not only of P.Ws. 3, 5 and 6 but<br /> also of     P.Ws.2 and  20 as  untrustworthy at  page 65 of his<br /> judgment. However, at page 68 he has stated that it has been<br /> proved to  some extent    that the  appellant had some sort of<br /> intimacy with  Ujvala Kothari  and  it    had  embittered     the<br /> relationship between the appellant and Manju. In my view, as<br /> already stated, the oral evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 20<br /> about what  Manju is  alleged to  have told them against the<br /> appellant and or his<br /> 186<br /> family, and  even  her    letters     Exs.  30,  32    and  33     are<br /> inadmissible in     evidence under s.32(1) of the Evidence Act.<br /> Thus, there is absolutely no reliable or admissible evidence<br /> on record  to show  that the appellant had any intimacy with<br /> Ujwala (P.W.37).  I am,     therefore, unable to share the view<br /> of my learned brother Fazal Ali, J. that the prosecution has<br /> proved to  some extent    that the  appellant had some sort of<br /> intimacy with  P.W.37 and it had embittered the relationship<br /> between the  appellant and Manju. I think that I am bound to<br /> say this  in fairness  to not  only the     appellant but    also<br /> P.W.37 who, on the date of her examination in the Court, was<br /> a 19  years old     student and has stated in her evidence that<br /> she had     known the  appellant only  as the  President of the<br /> Rajasthan Youth     Club in the year 1979 when she was a member<br /> of that Club for about 5 or 6 months in that year.<br />      My learned     brother Fazal    Ali, J.     has referred to the<br /> oral evidence  of P.Ws.2,  3, 5,  6  and  20  about  Manju's<br /> alleged complaint  against the    appellant and or his parents<br /> and also  to the  contents of Manju letters, Exs. 30, 32 and<br /> 33. I  have mentioned  above the  gist of that oral evidence<br /> and those  three letters.  My learned  brother has  held the<br /> said oral evidence and those three latters to be. admissible<br /> under s.32(1)  of the  Evidence Act while rejecting the oral<br /> evidence to  those five     witnesses as untrustworthy at pages<br /> 64 and    65 of  his judgment,  mainly on     the ground that the<br /> oral evidence  is quite     inconsistent with  the     spirit     and<br /> contents of  those letters.  He appears     of have relied upon<br /> those three  letters for two purposes, namely, rejecting the<br /> oral evidence  of those     five witnesses as untrustworthy and<br /> supporting the    defence version     that it  may be  a case  of<br /> suicidal death.     In my    opinion the  oral evidence  of those<br /> five witnesses about what Manju is alleged to have told them<br /> against the  appellant and  or his  parents  and  the  three<br /> letters, are  inadmissible under  s. 32(1)  of the  Evidence<br /> Act, which reads thus:<br />       "32. Statements,  written or    verbal, of  relevant<br />      facts made     by a  person who  is dead, or who cannot be<br />      found, or    who has become incapable of giving evidence,<br />      or whose  attendance  cannot  be  procured     without  an<br />      amount  of      delay     or   expense    which,     under     the<br />      circumstances  of     the  case,  appears  to  the  Court<br />      unreasonable, are    themselves  relevant  facts  in     the<br />      following cases:-<br />      (1)   When the  statement is made by a person as to the<br />       cause     of   his  death,   or    as  to    any  of     the<br />       circumstances<br /> 187<br />       of the transaction which resulted in his death, in<br />       cases in  which the  cause of     that person's death<br />       comes into question".<br />      The alleged  oral statements of Manju to P,Ws. 2, 3, 5,<br /> 6 and  20 are  said to    have been made during her second and<br /> third visits  to Beed in the end of February 1982 and end of<br /> May 1982  respectively before  her death during the night of<br /> 11/12.6.1982. She  had written    the letters, Exs. 33, 30 and<br /> 32 on  25.4.1982, 8.5.1982  and 8.6.1982  as stated earlier.<br /> The oral evidence of these witnesses and these three letters<br /> are not as to the cause of Manju's death or as to any of the<br /> circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death<br /> during that  night. The     position of  law  relating  to     the<br /> admissibility of evidence under s. 32(1) is well settled. It<br /> is, therefore,    not necessary  to refer     in  detail  to     the<br /> decisions of  this Court or of the Privy Council or our High<br /> Courts. It would suffice to extract what the learned authors<br /> Woodroffe and Amir Ali have stated in their Law of Evidence,<br /> fourteenth edition  and Ratanlal  and Dhirajlal in their Law<br /> of Evidence  (1982) reprint).  Those propositions  are based<br /> mostly on  decisions of     courts for which reference has been<br /> given at the end. They are these:<br />      Woodroffe &  Amir Ali's  Law  of  Evidence,  fourteenth<br /> edition. Page- 937<br />       'Hearsay is  excluded because it is considered not<br />      sufficiently trustworthy.    It is  rejected     because  it<br />      lacks the    sanction of  the test  applied to admissible<br />      evidence, namely,    the oath  and cross-examination. But<br />      where there  are special  circumstances  which  give  a<br />      guarantee of  trustworthiness to  the testimony,  it is<br />      admitted  even  though  it     comes    from  a     second-hand<br />      source".<br />                             Page-941<br />       "What is  relevant and admissible under clause (1)<br />      of this section (Section-32) is the statements actually<br />      made by the deceased as to the cause of his death or of<br />      the circumstances    of the transaction which resulted in<br />      his death".<br />                         Page-945-946<br />       "A statement    must be     as  to     the  cause  of     the<br />      declarant's death    or as to any of the circumstances of<br />      the transaction  which resulted  in his  death i.e. the<br />      cause and    circumstances of  the death and not previous<br />      or subsequent transaction,<br /> 188<br />      such independent  transactions being  excluded  as     not<br />      falling within the principle of necessary on which such<br />      evidence is  received. When  a person  is not proved to<br />      have died    as a  result of     injuries  received  in     the<br />      incident in  question, his     statement cannot be said to<br />      be a  statement as     to the     cause of his death or as to<br />      any of  the circumstances    which resulted in his death.<br />      (AIR 1964    SC 900). Where there is nothing to show that<br />      the  injury   to  which   a  statement   in  the  dying<br />      declaration  relates  was    the  cause  of    the  injured<br />      person's death or that the circumstances under which it<br />      was received  resulted in    his death,  the statement is<br />      not admissible under this clause". (AIR 25 Bombay 45).<br />                             Page-947<br />       "Circumstances of the transaction resulting in his<br />      death; This  clause refers     to two kinds of statements:<br />      (i) when  the statement  is made  by a person as to the<br />      cause of  his death  or (ii) when the statement is made<br />      by a  person as  to any  of the  circumstances  of     the<br />      transaction which    resulted in  his  death.  The  words<br />      'resulted in his death' do not mean 'caused his death'.<br />      The  expression   'any  of     the  circumstances  of     the<br />      transaction which    resulted in  his death'     is wider in<br />      scope than     the expression 'the cause of his death. The<br />      declarant need  not  actually  have  been    apprehending<br />      death." (AIR 1964 M.P. 30).<br />                             Page-947<br />       "The expression 'circumstances of the transaction'<br />      . occurring  in s.32,  clause (1)    has been a source of<br />      perplexity to Courts faced with the question as to what<br />      matters  are  admissible  within  the  meaning  of     the<br />      expression. The  decision of  their  Lordships  of     the<br />      Privy Council  in Pukala  Narayanaswanmi v. Emperor (LR<br />      66 IA  66) sets  the limits  of the  matters that could<br />      legitimately be  brought within  the  purview  of    that<br />      expression. Lord  Atkin, who  delivered the judgment of<br />      the Board, has, however, made it abundantly clear that,<br />      except in    special circumstances  no circumstance could<br />      be a  circumstance of  the transaction  if     it  is     not<br />      confined to  either the  time actually  occupied by the<br />      transaction resulting  in death  or the  sense in which<br />      the actual     transaction resulting    in death took place.<br />      The special  circumstance permitted  to transgress     the<br />      time factor  is,  for  example,  a     case  of  prolonged<br />      poisoning, while the special circumstance<br /> 189<br />      permitted to  transgress the  distance factor  is,     for<br />      example, a     case of decoying with intent to murder. But<br />      the  circumstances      must    be   circumstances  of     the<br />      transaction and  they must have some proximate relation<br />      to the actual occurrence."<br />                             Page-948<br />       "Circumstances of  the transaction' is a phrase no<br />      doubt that conveys some limitations. It is not as broad<br />      as the analogous use in 'circumstantial evidence' which<br />      includes the evidence of all relevant factors. It is on<br />      the   other    hand   narrower   than   'res   gestae'.<br />      Circumstances must     have some proximate relation to the<br />      actual occurrence, though, as for instance, in the case<br />      of prolonged  poisoning they may be related to dates at<br />      a considerable  distance from  the date of actual fatal<br />      dose".<br />                             Page-948<br />       "The Supreme    Court in  the case  of Shiv Kumar v.<br />      State of  U.P. (1966  Criminal Appeal  R. (SC) 281) has<br />      made similar  observations that  the circumstances must<br />      have some proximate, relation to the actual occurrence.<br />      and  that     general  expressions    indicating  fear  or<br />      suspicion,     whether   of  a  particular  individual  or<br />      otherwise and  not directly  to the  occasion of  death<br />      will not be admissible".<br />                            Page -949<br />       "The clause  does  not  permit  the  reception  in<br />      evidence of  all such statement of a dead person as may<br />      relate to    matters having a bearing howsoever remote on<br />      the cause    or the    circumstances of  his death.  It  is<br />      confined to  only such  statements as relate to matters<br />      so closely     connected with the events which resulted in<br />      his death    that may  be said to relate to circumstances<br />      of the  transaction which resulted in his death. (LR 66<br />      IA     66).    'Circumstances    of   the  transaction  which<br />      resulted in  his death' means only such facts or series<br />      or facts  which have  a direct  or organic     relation to<br />      death. Hence statement made by the deceased long before<br />      the incident  of murder  is not  admissible". (1974 CLJ<br />      (MP) 1200).<br />      Law of Evidence by Ratanlal & Dhirajlal (1982 Reprint)<br /> 190<br />                              Page 94<br />       "Circumstances   of    the   transaction;   General<br />      expressions indicating  fear or  suspicion whether of a<br />      particular individual  or otherwise  and  not  directly<br />      related  to   the    occasion   of  the   death  are     not<br />      admissible" (LR 66 IA 66)(18 Part 234).<br />                              Page 95<br />       "Circumstances must  have some  proximate relation<br />      to the actual occurrence and must be of the transaction<br />      which resulted  in the  death  of    the  declarant.     The<br />      condition of  the admissibility of the evidence is that<br />      the cause of the declarant's death comes into question.<br />      It is  not necessary that    statement must be made after<br />      the transaction  has taken     place or  that     the  person<br />      making it must be near death or that the 'circumstance'<br />      can only include the acts done when and where the death<br />      was caused.  -Dying declarations  are admissible  under<br />      this clause".<br />      The alleged  oral statements  of Manju and what she has<br /> stated in  her letters,     Exs 30,  32 and  33 may  relate  to<br /> matters perhaps having a very remote bearing on the cause or<br /> the circumstances  of her  death. Those circumstances do not<br /> have  any   proximate  relation     to  the  actual  occurrence<br /> resulting in  her death     due to     potassium  cyanide  poison,<br /> though, as  for instance  in the case of prolonged poisoning<br /> they may  relate to dates considerably distant from the date<br /> of the    actual fatal  dose. They  are general impressions of<br /> Manju indicating  fear or suspicion. whether of a particular<br /> individual or  otherwise and  not directly  related  to     the<br /> occasion of her death. It is not the case of the prosecution<br /> that the  present case    is one of prolonged poisoning. Since<br /> it is  stated by  the learned authors woodroffe and Amir Ali<br /> in their  tratise at  page 947    that the  decision of  their<br /> Lordships of  the Privy     Council in  Pakala Narayanaswami v.<br /> Emperor (1)  sets  the    limit  of  the    matters     that  could<br /> legitimately be brought within the purview of the expression<br /> 'circumstances of  the    transaction  and  that    decision  is<br /> referred to  in several     other decisions  of our  courts, it<br /> would be  necessary to    extract the relevant passage in this<br /> judgment. The learned Lords have observed at pages 75 and 76<br /> thus:<br />      "A variety     of questions  has been mooted in the Indian<br />      courts as    to the    effect of  this section. It has been<br />      suggested that  the statement  must be  made after     the<br />      transaction has<br /> 191<br />      taken place,  that the  person making it must be at any<br />      rate near    death, that  the  "circumstances"  can    only<br />      include the  acts done  when and  where the  death     was<br />      caused. Their Lordships are of opinion that the natural<br />      meaning of     the words used does not convey any of these<br />      limitations. The statement may be made before the cause<br />      of death  has arisen,  or before  the deceased  has any<br />      reason to    anticipate being  killed. The  circumstances<br />      must  be  circumstances  of  the  transaction:  general<br />      expression indicating  fear of  suspicion whether    of a<br />      particular individual  or otherwise  and  not  directly<br />      related to     the occasion  of  the    death  will  not  be<br />      admissible. But statements made by the deceased that he<br />      was proceeding to the spot where he was in fact killed,<br />      or as  to his reasons for so proceeding, or that he was<br />      going to  meet a particular person, or that he had been<br />      invited by     such person  to meet him would each of them<br />      be circumstances  of the  transaction, and     would be so<br />      whether the  person was  unknown, or was not the person<br />      accused. Such  a statement might indeed be exculapatory<br />      of     the   person    accused.   "Circumstances   of     the<br />      transaction" is  a phrase    no doubt  that conveys    some<br />      limitations. It is not as broad as the analogous use in<br />      "circumstantial evidence"    which includes    evidence  of<br />      all relevant  facts. It  is on  the other hand narrower<br />      than "re gestae" Circumstances most have some proximate<br />      relation to  the  actual  occurrence:  though,  as     for<br />      instance in  a case of prolonged poisoning, they may be<br />      related to     dates at  a considerable  distance from the<br />      date of the actual fatal dose."<br />      I am,  therefore of  the opinion that the oral evidence<br /> of these witnesses, P.Ws. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 20 about what Manju<br /> is alleged  to have  told them    against the appellant and or<br /> his parents  and what the has stated in her letters, Exs. 30<br /> 32 and 33, are inadmissible in evidence under s.32(1) of the<br /> Evidence Act  and cannot  be looked into for any purpose. At<br /> this stage.  it may  be     stated     that  Mr.  Ram     Jethmalani,<br /> learned counsel     for the  appellant submitted  that the said<br /> oral evidence  of those five witnesses is inadmissible under<br /> s. 32(1) though at first he sought to rely upon the letters,<br /> Exs 30,     32 and 33 which seem to lend support to the defence<br /> theory that  it may  be a  case of  suicide,  he  ultimately<br /> conceded that  what applies to the relative oral evidence of<br /> P.Ws. 2,  3, 5, 6 and 20 would equally apply to the letters,<br /> Exs. 30, 32 and 33 and that they too would be inadmissible<br /> 192<br /> in  evidence.  The  Additional    Solicitor  General  who     had<br /> strongly relied     upon the  said oral  evidence of these five<br /> witnesses and  the letters,  Exs. 30,  32 and  33  at  first<br /> proceeded in the end of his arguments on the basis that they<br /> are inadmissible  in evidence.    In these circumstances, I am<br /> firmly of  the opinion that the oral evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3,<br /> 5, 6  and 20  about what  Manju is alleged to have told them<br /> against the  appellant and  or his  parents as    well as     the<br /> letters, Exs.  32, 32  and 33  are inadmissible     in evidence<br /> under s. 32(1) of the Evidence Act.<br />      About Dr.    Banerji (P.W.  33) who    conducted autopsy on<br /> the body  of Manju what my learned brother Fazal Ali, J. has<br /> said in his judgment is this:<br />      "In column     5 of  postmortem  notes  Dr.  Banerjee     has<br />      clearly written 'can be a case of suicidal death' which<br />      indicates that  in the  absence of     the report  of     the<br />      Chemical Examiner    he was    of the opinion that it could<br />      have been a case of suicide. In his evidence P.W 33 has<br />      stated that  in Ex.  128 in  column No.  5 the contents<br />      scored out read 'time since the death' and since it was<br />      repeated in  the next  line he  scored out the words in<br />      the second     line. Despite    persistent cross-examination<br />      the Doctor     appears to  have stuck     to  his  stand.  It<br />      cannot, therefore,     be gainsaid that this matter was of<br />      vital importance  and expected  the High  Court to have<br />      given serious  attention to  this aspect  which goes in<br />      favour of the accused.... In the original while filling<br />      up the  said column  the Doctor  appears to have scored<br />      out something. The filled up entry appears thus:-'mouth<br />      is closed    with tip  (something scored out) seen caught<br />      between the teeth. But in the carbon copy of the report<br />      which was sent to the Chemical Examiner (Ex. 132 he has<br />      written 'caught  between the  teeth' in ink; but in the<br />      original there  is something else. This is fortified by<br />      the fact  that the     copy of the report actually sent to<br />      the   Chemical    Examiner      does     not   contain     any<br />      interpolation against the 'said column where the filled<br />      up entry  reads 'inside  mouth'..    These  circumstances<br />      show that Dr. Banerjee (P.W.33) tried to introduce some<br />      additional facts regarding the position of the tongue .<br />      . .  This, however,  throws a  cloud of  doubt  on     the<br />      correctness or  otherwise of the actual reports written<br />      by him  and the  one that    was  sent  to  the  Chemical<br />      Examiner. It  is obvious  that in the carbon copy which<br />      was retained by the Doctor<br /> 193<br />      the entries must have been made after the copy was sent<br />      to the Chemical Examiner".<br />      I entirely     agree with  these findings  of     my  learned<br /> brother Fazal Ali, J. But I am unable to share his view that<br /> these "circumstances are not of much consequence the opinion<br /> of the Doctor was that Manju died by forcible administration<br /> of  potassium  cyanide    or  by    the  process  of  mechanical<br /> suffocation and     that this  aspect need not detain the Court<br /> any further because the High Court has not accepted the case<br /> of mechanical  suffocation" and     that  though  a  number  of<br /> comments were  made on    behalf of  the appellant  about     Dr.<br /> Banerji's integrity  and incorrect  report he  does not find<br /> any substance  in those     contentions subject  to what he has<br /> stated about him.<br />      The fact  that the     High Court has rejected the case of<br /> the prosecution     based on  Dr. Banerji's report and evidence<br /> that it was also a case of mechanical suffocation is not one<br /> that could  be taken  into  consideration  as  a  mitigating<br /> circumstance in     judging the  conduct of  the Doctor who had<br /> conducted the  autopsy in  a case  of suspicious  death. The<br /> fact that  he had  reserved his     opinion about    the cause of<br /> death and  had then  noted in his report that the tongue was<br /> inside the  mouth but  has interpolated     the words 'mouth is<br /> closed with  tip (something  scored out) seen caught between<br /> the teeth' and 'caught between the teeth' only after receipt<br /> of the    Chemical Examiner's  report to support the view that<br /> it was    also a    case of     mechanial  suffocation,  is  not  a<br /> mitigating circumstance in favour of P: W. 33 The Doctor had<br /> scored out  the words  'can be a case of suicidal death' and<br /> has persisted  in his  reply that he had scored out only the<br /> words 'time since the death' which he claims to have written<br /> twice, which  explanation has  been rightly  rejected by  my<br /> learned brother     Fazal Ali.  J. The conduct of the Doctor in<br /> making these  later inter  polations and  alterations in the<br /> records     of  the  postmortem  examination  in  the  case  of<br /> suspicious death  in which  the appellant has been sentenced<br /> to  death   by    the   two  courts  below,  deserves  serious<br /> condemnation. The Doctor has tampered with material evidence<br /> in the    case of     alleged murder,  may be  at the instance of<br /> somebody else,    ignoring the  probable consequences  of     his<br /> act. In     these circumstances,  I am  of the opinion that Dr.<br /> Banerji (P.W.33)  is a    person who  should not    be entrusted<br /> with any  serious and  responsible work     such as  conducting<br /> autopsy in  the public    interest. In this case the appellant<br /> would have  gone to  gallows on the basis of the evidence of<br /> P.W.33 as he would have the<br /> 194<br /> court to  believe it,  and theo     ther evidence,     if they had<br /> been accepted,    but they  have been  rightly discarded by my<br /> learned brother     Fazal Ali,  J. as  unworthy  of  acceptance<br /> against the appellant.<br />      I agree  with my learned brother Fazal Ali, J. that the<br /> High Court  has clearly misdirected itself on many points in<br /> appreciating the  evidence and    has thus  committed a  gross<br /> error of law.<br />      I feel  that something has to be stated in the judgment<br /> in this case about the way the Investigating officer and the<br /> learned Additional  Sessions Judge,  Pune who  had tried the<br /> case had  gone about  a their  business.  Charge  No.  3  is<br /> against the  third accused for instigating Mohan Asava (P.W.<br /> 30) to    give false  information to  the police regarding the<br /> offence of  murder namely,  that the  appellant found  Manju<br /> dead when he tried to wake her up at 5.30 a.m. on 12.6.1982.<br /> It is  the  case  of  the  prosecution    itself    that  P.W.30<br /> informed the  police accordingly  at 7    or 7.15 a.m. on that<br /> day after  receipt of telephonic instructions from the third<br /> accused at  6.30 a.m.  though he  had himself  seen the dead<br /> body of     Manju earlier    in the appellant's flat where he was<br /> taken by the third accused who had gone to his flat at about<br /> 4 or  4.15 a.m. and informed him that Manju was dead, and he<br /> (P.W.30) left the appellant's flat a little later at about 5<br /> or 5.15     a. m. after telling Dr. Lodha (P.W. 34) that he was<br /> going to  report to  the police.  Thus, it would appear that<br /> the case  of the  prosecution itself  is that P.W. 30 is the<br /> principal offender  as regards    giving false  information to<br /> the police  about the  death of Manju. Yet the Investigating<br /> officer had  not filed    any charge-sheet against P.W. 30 but<br /> has conveniently  treated him  as a prosecution witness. The<br /> Additional Sessions Judge, Pune appears to have exercised no<br /> control over the evidence that was tendered in this case and<br /> to have     been oblivious     of the     scope of the examination of<br /> the accused under. s. 313 Cr. P.C. This is reflected by some<br /> of the    questions put  to the  appellant.  Question  No.  24<br /> relates to  P.W. 20  not maintaining good health and falling<br /> ill now and then. Question No. 25 relates to P.W. 22 being a<br /> patient of  high blood pressure and having suffered a stroke<br /> of paralysis  7 years  earlier. Question No. 30 relates to a<br /> reception held    at Pune     on 13.2.1982 in connection with the<br /> appellant's marriage  with Manju. Question No. 32 relates to<br /> P.W.  6      asking  the  appellant's  father  Birdhichand     for<br /> permission to  take Manju  to Beed  with her  when the party<br /> from P.W.2's  side started  from Pune for Beed on 14.2.1982.<br /> Question No.  115 relates  to P.W.30  indulging in  criminal<br /> acts of     rowdyism, tax    evasion etc,  and being     known as  a<br /> contact-man of the police. S. 313 Cr. P. C.<br /> 195<br /> lays down  that in every inquiry or trial for the purpose of<br /> enabling the  accused personally to explain any circumstance<br /> appearing in  the evidence  against him the Court may at any<br /> stage, without    previously warning  the     accused,  put    such<br /> questions to him as the court considers necessary and shall,<br /> after the  witnesses for  the prosecution have been examined<br /> and before  he is  called  for    his  defence,  question     him<br /> generally on  the case. It is clear that the evidence on the<br /> basis of  which the  above questions  have been     put to     the<br /> appellant is  wholly irrelevant     and that those questions do<br /> not relate  to any  circumstance appearing  in the  evidence<br /> against the appellant. The learned Additional Sessions Judge<br /> was bound  to  exercise     control  over    the  evidence  being<br /> tendered  in  his  court  and  to  know     the  scope  of     the<br /> examination of the accused under s. 313 Cr. P. C.<br />      In the  end, as I said earlier, I agree with my learned<br /> brother Fazal  Ali, J.    that the  appeal has  to be allowed.<br /> Accordingly I  allow the appeal and set aside the conviction<br /> and sentence  awarded to  the appellant and direct him to be<br /> set at liberty forthwith.<br />      SABYASACHI MUKHARJI,  J. I have the advantage of having<br /> read the  judgments prepared  by my  learned brothers  Fazal<br /> Ali, J.     and Varadarajan, J. I agree with the order proposed<br /> that the  appeal should     be allowed and the judgments of the<br /> courts below  should be     set aside  and the appellant Sharad<br /> Birdhichand Sarda be acquitted of the charges framed against<br /> him and     he should be released forth with. I do so with some<br /> hesitation and    good deal  of anxiety, because that would be<br /> interfering with the concurrent findings by two courts below<br /> on a pure appreciation of facts. The facts and circumstances<br /> have been  exhaustively and  very minutely  detailed in     the<br /> judgment of my learned Brother Fazal Ali, J. Those have also<br /> been set out to certain extent by my Brother Varadarajan, J.<br /> It will     therefore serve  no useful  purpose to repeat these<br /> here. It is necessary, however, for me to make the following<br /> observations.<br />      It is  a case  of circumstantial  evidence. It  is also<br /> undisputed that     the deceased  died of    potassium cyanide on<br /> the night  of 11th  and 12th  June. 13th  June was  the date<br /> fixed for  the betrothal of the sister of the accused. There<br /> is no  evidence that  the accused  was in any way hostile or<br /> inamicable towards  his sister.     The  deceased    had  a    very<br /> sensitive mind    and occasionally  had suffered    from  mental<br /> depression partly  due to  the fact  of adjusting  in a     new<br /> family and  partly due    to her    peculiar mental     make up but<br /> mainly perhaps    due to    the family  set up  of    the  accused<br /> husband. There is no direct<br /> 196<br /> evidence of  administering  poison.  There  is    no  evidence<br /> either way  that either     the deceased  or the accused had in<br /> her or    his  possession     any  potassium     cyanide.  In  these<br /> circumstances my  learned brothers,  in view  of the  entire<br /> evidence and  the letters and other circumstances, have come<br /> to the    conclusion that     the guilt  of the  accused has     not<br /> proved beyond all reasonable doubt.<br />      As I  have     mentioned  before,  I    have  read  the     two<br /> judgments by  my two  learned brothers    and on    some  points<br /> namely, four points mentioned in the judgment prepared by my<br /> Brother Varadarajan.  J., he  has expressed  views different<br /> from those expressed by Fazal Ali, J. and these are:-<br />      (1)  ill-treatment of Manju by the appellant;<br />      (2)  intimacy of the appellant with Ujwala (P.W.37);<br />      (3)  admissibility of  Manju's letters  Exs. 30, 32 and<br />       33 and  the oral  evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3, 5, 6 and<br />       20 about  the alleged     complaints  made  by  Manju<br />       against  the     appellant  under   s.32(1)  of     the<br />       Evidence Act; and<br />      (4)  conduct of  Dr. Banerji (P.W.33) who had conducted<br />       autopsy on the body of Manju.<br />      On the  three points,  namely ill-treatment of Manju by<br /> the  appellant,      intimacy  of    the  appellant    with  Ujwala<br /> (P.W.37) and  the conduct  of Dr.  Banerji (P.W.33)  who had<br /> conducted autopsy  on the  body of Manju, I would prefer the<br /> views expressed     by my    learned brother Fazal Ali, J. On the<br /> question of admissibility of Manju's letters Exs. 30, 32 and<br /> 33 and    the oral  evidence of  P.Ws. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 20 about<br /> the alleged  complaints made  by Manju    against the  accused<br /> under section  32(1) of the Evidence Act, my learned brother<br /> Fazal Ali, J. has observed about section 32(1) as follows:-<br />       "The test  of proximity  cannot be  too  literally<br />      construed and  practically reduced     to a  cut-end-dried<br />      formula of     universal application    so as to be confined<br />      in a  straitjacket. Distance  of time  would depend  or<br />      vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance,<br />      where death  is a    logical culmination  of a continuous<br />      drama long     in process  and is, as it were, a finale of<br />      the story,     the statement    regarding each step directly<br />      connected with the end of the drama<br /> 197<br />      would be  admissible because the entire statement would<br />      have to  be read  as an organic whole and not torn from<br />      the  context.   Sometimes    statements  relevant  to  or<br />      furnishing an  immediate motive  may also be admissible<br />      as being  a part  of the  transaction of  death. It  is<br />      manifest that  all these  statements come to light only<br />      after the    death of the deceased who speaks from death.<br />      For instance, where the death takes place within a very<br />      short time     of the     marriage or the distance of time is<br />      not spread     over more than 3-4 months the statement may<br />      be admissible under s.32." (Emphasis by me).<br />      I would, however, like to state here that this approach<br /> should be  taken with  great deal  of caution  and care     and<br /> though I respectfully agree with Fazal Ali, J. that the test<br /> of  proximity    cannot    and  should  not  be  too  literally<br /> construed and  be reduced  practically    to  a  cut-and-dried<br /> formula of  universal application  but it must be emphasised<br /> that whenever it is extended beyond the immediate, it should<br /> be the    exception and  must be    done with very great caution<br /> and care.  As a     general proposition, it cannot be laid down<br /> for all purposes that for instance where a death takes place<br /> within a  short time of marriage and the distance of time is<br /> not spread over three or four months, the statement would be<br /> admissible under  section 32  of the  Evidence Act.  This is<br /> always    not  so     and  cannot  be  so.  In  very     exceptional<br /> circumstances like  the circumstances  in the  present    case<br /> such statements     my be    admissible  and     that  too  not     for<br /> proving the positive fact but as an indication of a negative<br /> fact, namely  raising some  doubt about     the  guilt  of     the<br /> accused as in this case.<br />      For the purpose of expressing my respectful concurrence<br /> with the views of Justice Fazal Ali, it is not necessary for<br /> me to  agree and  I do    not do    so  with  all  the  detailed<br /> inferences that     my learned  brother has  chosen to  draw in<br /> respect of  the several     matters from  the exhibits  in this<br /> case. I     am also  with respect    not prepared to draw all the<br /> inferences that my learned brother has chosen to draw in the<br /> paragraph beginning with the expression "the careful perusal<br /> of this     letter revealed  the following     features". This  my<br /> learned brother     was  speaking    in  respect  of     Ex.  33.  I<br /> however, respectfully  agree with my learned brother when he<br /> says that  a close  analysis and  ading of the letter namely<br /> Ex. 33 clearly indicates:<br /> 198<br />      (a)  that the deceased was extremely depressed.<br />      (b)  that there was a clear tendency resulting from her<br />       psychotic  nature   to  end  her  life  or  commit<br />       suicide.<br />      Similarly I  have some  hesitation     about    the  English<br /> rendering of  Ex. 32  which is    letter dated  8th June, 1982<br /> which has  been set  out by my learned brother and which has<br /> been set  out in  his judgment which contains the expression<br /> "I do  not know     why there is such a dirty atmosphere in the<br /> house?" As  the original letter was read out in Court and we<br /> had the     advantage of  that, I    am inclined to take the view<br /> that the correct and the more expressive expression would be<br /> "I do  not know     why there  is such a foul atmosphere in the<br /> house?" Read  in that  light and  in the  context  of  other<br /> factors, this  letter causes  some anxiety.  It the deceased<br /> was sensing  foul atmosphere,  why was it? But this again is<br /> only a doubt. It does not prove the guilt of the accused.<br />      In     view    of  the      fact    that   this  is     a  case  of<br /> circumstantial evidence and further in view of the fact that<br /> two views  are possible     on  the  evidence  on    record,     one<br /> pointing to  the guilt    of the    accused and  the  other     his<br /> innocence, the    accused is  entitled to     have the benefit of<br /> one which is favourable to him. In that view of the matter I<br /> agree with my learned brothers that the guilt of the accused<br /> has not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt.<br />      In the  premises as  indicated before, I agree with the<br /> order propose</p> <p>Appeal allowed.<br />  </p>